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This thesis is concerned with the militarization of white South African society in the 
1960s. It argues that the military threat perceptions of the period were crucial in altering 
white views of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and reinforcing support for the 
National Party government. The military achieved enhanced public status within civil 
society as the state‟s supposed bulwark. A range of purported potential threats, both 
internal and external and regularly reported in the media, were investigated by the SADF 
in response to Afro-Asian bloc spokespersons calling for international military 
intervention against white South Africa to end apartheid. The government tried to 
persuade voters that such dangers were authentic, so justifying increased military 
expenditure and support. The SADF planned clandestine counter strategies, most 
particularly in the defence of Walvis Bay in Namibia, upgrading obsolete air and other 
defences and connecting threats to potential aggressors, including India because of events 
in Katanga in the former Belgian Congo and the idea of an “African Army”, implausibly 
advancing on South Africa.  The SADF widened conscription from a ballot system to all 
white male school leavers by 1968.  
 
World War Two issues influenced the attitudes of both the Afrikaans and English white 
communities to militarization in the 1960s. The SADF was important in bolstering white 
confidence and through deliberate public displays of military prowess, it helped to assert 
republican unity and “white nationalism” under Afrikaner leadership, though young 











professional grounds. The army also developed a reputation for ill-treating conscripts, 
something investigated in haste by the Minister of Defence concerned for the SADF‟s 
image amongst a community drawn increasingly more to materialism than patriotism. 
Paradoxically while the white public viewed “communism” or “communist-inspired” 
activities as its biggest “danger”, the SADF only partly organised its conventional 
warfare capacity, and such “threats” dissipated in favour of General Charles Fraser‟s 
theorising on revolutionary war, shifting SADF doctrine. Drawing on previously 
classified archival documentation, and numerous surviving Permanent Force officers 
from the era were interviewed, the thesis argues that the assumption of white South 
Africans in the 1960s that their survival required acquiescence to insipient militarization 
and government racial policy, with the alternative subjection to possible Congo-type 
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This doctoral dissertation considers selected issues concerning the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) and its connection to the white South African community between 1960 
and 1968. The Afrikaans and English-speaking components of the white population and 
the SADF are dealt with in separate chapters, principally because these language 
groupings can be generalised as having had at times different and often conflicting 
historical links with the military. From the 1960s the „white‟ political issues around the 
republic were significant to the military in several ways, particularly how the 
organisation came to represent Afrikaner nationalist assertiveness, but also of it 
supposedly projecting white unity. Also addressed are aspects of the militarization of 
white South African society and white community responses to this, including 
controversies relating to the army‟s ill-preparedness and its difficulties in managing 
increased trainee numbers from 1962. This issue is placed alongside SADF efforts to 
popularise itself amongst the white community as a highly visible national entity. An 
attempt is made to contextualize these issues against the official SADF intelligence 
appraisals of the time regarding the extent to which military thinking concurred with 
popular opinion concerning threat perceptions and the organisation‟s supposed 
importance.   
 
The central component of the thesis concerns the SADF‟s perceptions of potential 
military threats facing the country during our period, particularly regarding those of a 











white community regarding the National Party (NP) government working towards 
attempting to convince them of the „necessity‟ for supporting the SADF, both in terms of 
increased defence budgets and widened conscription of its young males. Also examined 
are the military‟s reactions to internal uprisings and guerrilla threats, perceived by the 
state as being manifest after the Rivonia trial revelations of Operation Mayibuye. There is 
little doubt that of all African decolonisation events, the crisis in the Congo from late 
1960, through to the later attempted succession by the Katanga province, had the most 
profound impact upon white South African society perceiving future threats towards their 
existence and starting to mobilize for militarization. While most of these supposed threats 
and certainly those of a conventional warfare nature were highly unlikely if not fanciful, 
the SADF‟s careful appraisal of them and reaction to them, are analysed in depth utilising 
previously classified documentation. This study indicates that they were taken seriously 
at the time. Some attempt is also made to gauge the effectiveness of the SADF and its 
responses to threats, in terms of how it portrayed itself publicly as capable of defending 
the country. This work closes with the period 1967-68, which represented the beginnings 
of an unconventional military threat to South West Africa (SWA). These two years 
witnessed something of a doctrinal change by the SADF to begin favouring preparation 
for counter-insurgency warfare over conventional warfare and the beginning of 
compulsory military conscription for all white males from their eighteenth year.  
 
SADF conscription and the organization‟s involvement with the SA Police from 1966 in 
guerrilla warfare, both inside SWA and some neighbouring states is therefore introduced, 











depth involving the Simon‟s Town Agreement and South Africa‟s defence relations with 
other states. Also integrated into this work are relevant details on militant dissident 
groupings such as Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), African Resistance Movement (ARM) 
and African National Congress (ANC)/South African Communist Party (SACP). All of 
these organisations were drawn into SADF military intelligence research on „threats‟ and 
are discussed where relevant to our understanding the South African military‟s role in the 
1960s. However, this work‟s principal concerns remain the SADF and its relationship 
with the white community. This population component was informed if not persuaded by 
government and military that real threats to it existed which needed to be resolutely 
guarded against. This thesis examines how the Defence Force received some popular 
white support in contrast to the near disdain or suspicion it was often viewed by some in 
this community during the 1950s. In short, this work studies why and how the SADF 
transformed into something of a bigger, probably more effective and certainly a visible 
instrument of the NP government during the 1960s. During this period, the Defence 
Force also attempted to foster an Afrikaner led white nationalism and republicanism.   
   
The first part of the thesis commences with a historical and sociological examination of 
the SADF leadership and defence issues during the 1960s. It also examines the changing 
status and image of the organisation regarding white South Africans from 1960 and the 
degree to which it became intrusive in civilian life through conscription. White South 
Africa faced growing international criticism by the beginning of the decade that increased 
in intensity after the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre. New defence minister, Jim 











whereby the SADF would endorse the coming republic. But Fouché also had to ensure 
tact regarding already troubled relations between members, besides their morale. His 
arrival in this portfolio is an obvious point of departure for this thesis. The military under 
Minister Frans Erasmus during the 1950s was conflict-ridden and this legacy was viewed 
by government as problematic for their campaign to attain majority white support for 
republic. The Afrikaner nationalist aspirations of achieving a republic, announced in 
March 1960 by Verwoerd as being decided by referendum, also meant significant 
defence uncertainties. Whereas during previous decades the South African military‟s role 
had been tied closely to British strategic assumptions, there had been a significant 
lessening of such during the 1950s. By 1960, outside of maritime obligations under the 
Simon‟s Town Agreement, the country‟s defence priorities were uncertain. The SADF 
was also unprepared in virtually every respect for the uncertainties of defence isolation 
and international hostility.     
 
The central component of the thesis relates to the SADF‟s threat perceptions and strategic 
responses are discussed regarding what were considered potentially hostile forces 
posturing or even considering military intervention in South West Africa (SWA) and the 
Republic. Where practical, this is related to some of the broader developments within the 
white community, its politics, perceptions and government policy. The government and 
SADF strategic planning for its expansion and deployment profoundly influenced the 
country‟s history; for it built the institutional base for later adventurous use of the 
military in pursuing goals of further securing control of Namibia and invasions of Angola 











commanders, white politicians and large components of white society, as fundamental to 
white South African survival against the context of international hostility. Threatening 
rhetoric at international forums like the United Nations (UN), Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), besides utterances by varied Afro-Asian spokespersons were recorded and 
discussed at length by SADF military intelligence being appraised as potential threats 
with military counter strategies drawn up in response. The SADF assessed a UN or 
„Afro-Asian‟ threat as plausible, particularly after UN military intervention in the Congo 
aimed at preventing the succession of Katanga, with Indian troops in the forefront of 
action that was also aimed at Belgian settlers.  
 
As the white population began to recover its confidence after being shocked by the 
international reaction immediately, post the Sharpeville shootings the SADF‟s public 
profile also grew, assisted by new arms acquisitions. This dissertation contends that just 
through noting defence expenditure the military lifted itself away from being the low 
priority civil service component of the 1950s. Between 1958/59 and 1966/67, the defence 
budget rose from R36 million to R210 million.
1
 What was also occurring but not fully 
comprehended by the public, nor unearthed by the few researchers on South African 
defence matters that have touched upon the 1960s (because of the previous unavailability 
of the relevant classified documentation), was that the SADF were also engaged with 
continual appraisals regarding potential military threats and these are discussed and 
analysed at length.   
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In the second part of the thesis, it is contended that during the first half of the 1960s, the 
SADF became increasingly “popularised” amongst the white community through 
government strategy, which capitalised upon media generated threat perceptions. Later 
under P.W. Botha‟s early  cabinet tenure in 1966-1968, the emphasis was also upon 
“socialising” conscripts into identifying the “enemy” as communist subversion in military 
and non-military forms. Much of our focus is with the former period of 1960-1966, where 
amidst the defence unknowns facing the country, the SADF in response increasingly 
raised its public profile. Militarization during our period was assisted by white fears 
being to an extent placated by claims of SADF military prowess. What also occurred was 
a merging of the military within Afrikaner society; For example through efforts by future 
Commandant General Hiemstra and his Afrikaanse Vereeniging Kultuur en Verdediging 
(AKVV),
2
 which tried to reinforce a “warrior” or “krygsman” component drawn from 
Afrikaner history, in contrast to British originated military culture that had dominated the 
South African military post-Union. Both the English and Afrikaans components of the 
white community had different if not often conflicting histories with the military. The 
legacy of World War Two influenced the attitudes of both groupings towards 
militarization and a detailed attempt is made at covering such.  
 
The mobilization of the white community into supporting the SADF was important to the 
NP government‟s attempts to draw overwhelming majority voter support for its political 
programs. The military had become seriously run-down during the 1950s in terms of its 
combat effectiveness and public image, which worried Verwoerd particularly as a jittery 
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white public needed reassurance from 1960. The defence budget substantially increased 
from the beginning of the decade, with the SADF between 1961 and 1964 particularly, 
receiving an urgent boost of both equipment and manpower. The period from 1960 to 
1968 constitutes that where the government made a concerted effort to draw whites and 
national defence closer against the backdrop of outside hostility to apartheid. 
 
The dissertation‟s chapter breakdown 
 
The first chapter explores some of the most important defence issues impacting upon 
South Africa by 1960. Those examined include the appointment of Fouché against the 
white public anxiety of the early period and his emphasis upon using the SADF to project 
white unity and confidence through the military. Fouché straddled between historic 
divides and suspicions within the white community, seeking to draw English and 
Afrikaans together in defence issues, while still ensuring and asserting Afrikaner 
nationalist political symbolism and leadership. Fouché‟s role was also to build bridges 
with the politically disempowered „English‟, while politically-motivated SADF 
commanders like Deputy Commandant General, later Commandant General Rudolph 
Hiemstra, encouraged Afrikaner nationalist fervour around defence. An insular outlook 
where “enemies” existed without and within was projected across to the rest of the white 
community through “military threat perceptions”. The split role of the Defence Force  
being perceived as either a supplementary police force or an entity concerned with 
external defence, was highlighted by the first press speculations of an “African threat” 
from decolonised states. The chapter examines Fouché and SADF commander‟s initial 











are introduced, including an examination of South Africa‟s defence arrangements with 
Britain and the development of local military intelligence which had to be virtually 
recreated after republic.   
 
Chapter two is specifically concerned with the leadership of the SADF during the 1960s 
with a particular emphasis upon that of Commandant General Rudolph Hiemstra whose 
appointment in the highest Defence Force position was clearly long intended given his 
Afrikaner nationalist political credentials and prior rapid promotion. Hiemstra‟s clashes 
with his seniors over national service during the early part of the decade are well 
documented from archival material. However, an attempt is also made to analyse other 
senior SADF commanders‟ roles in the decade, including Commandant General Piet 
Grobbelaar (1960-65); Admiral Hugo Biermann (SA Navy Chief/Maritime Forces Head 
(1955 – 1972 and Chief of the SADF from 1972-76) and Lieutenant General Charles 
Fraser (Chief of the Army from 1966 and Joint Combat Forces Chief from 1967). None 
of these and other senior officers roles are discussed in depth within any works 
encountered by this author. Therefore, their careers of those of other SANDF 
commanders, considered of value in enhancing our understanding of the chosen topic 
have also been researched where relevant within this thesis. 
 
Chapter three is a core component of this dissertation, namely the SADF‟s threat 
perceptions to both the republic and SWA. This chapter focuses partly on threats of a 
conventional warfare nature, these being more emphasised as existing by the government 











potentially having the most dire consequences for white rule in a comparatively short 
space of time. However, internal unrest and guerrilla threats are also analysed as part of 
the overall SADF strategic appraisals and threat perceptions. Unconventional warfare and 
its threat to white South Africa was a central feature of classified defence appraisals, 
although it was viewed as likely to build-up over a lengthy period and its foiling required 
specialised training and strategies. This chapter is constructed off the supposition, clearly 
indicated in the evidence utilised, that many white South Africans believed, even if just 
fleetingly in some cases, that the Cold War had created profound threats to the country. 
The Soviet Union was understood as an aggressive power, involved in the regular 
surveillance of the Republic. SADF documentation of the period makes it clear that its 
intelligence sources perceived that the Soviet Union was directly connected with African 
nationalist guerrilla organisations via contact along the coastline, facilitation of supplies 
and the deployment of personnel. With the USSR assumed to be inspiring revolution, 
some whites drew the conclusion that „communism‟ represented a greater threat to them 
than any black political aspirations. If they were not vigilant, the white community 
believed it risked facing dangers such as what ANC‟s armed wing Umkonto We Sizwe 
(MK) had planned or hypothesised; or at least as was understood through seized 
documentation presented by the state at the Rivonia Trial. The potential of a conventional 
warfare threat via African countries or the UNO, possibly in the form of an Afro-Asian 
invasion force, was a feature of newspaper articles during the early 1960s. Through an 
examination of formally classified SADF documentation, these varied threats are 












Chapter four discusses various SADF counter-responses in terms of air-defences and 
maritime strategies, particularly regarding the secretly envisaged urgency to ensure the 
defence of Walvis Bay in Namibia - referred to as South West Africa or SWA for most of 
this thesis to place the territory in its correct historical context. This chapter also presents 
a short over-view of shirting SADF doctrinal strategies from 1967-68 up to the changes 
in conscription policy and various counter-responses to threats not integrated within the 
previous chapter. It concludes that SADF expansions during the 1960s cannot be 
separated from the NP government‟s assumption that besides its role in national defence, 
the military could also serve as a political socialising agency for the white community. It 
was also during our period that the SADF would endorse amongst generations of young 
white conscripts, the government‟s ideology, policies, and most particularly its 
identification of the enemy with communist inspired goals. This chapter introduces Lt 
Gen Charles Fraser‟s counter-revolutionary theory, as he commended it to P.W. Botha 
and other SADF commanders. During 1967, the military also began to acquire experience 
in guerrilla warfare through clandestine involvement in other white ruled Southern 
African states. By 1968, the threat had shifted, according to the government, onto the 
terrain of „communist‟ propaganda and the SADF emphasised counter-insurgency 
strongly in training alongside its standard conventional war doctrine.  
 
Chapter five examines the relationship between the SADF and Afrikaans community. 
The shift in civil service political culture from 1948 towards a broad support of Afrikaner 
nationalist objectives included the SADF and the majority of its members were drawn 










or even popular entity. The government moved with caution to integrate the SADF more 
closely into the lives of Afrikaners, for reasons outlined by this chapter. We also explore 
something of how the SADF operated within the context of apartheid, during the 
Verwoerd years when the racial policy was at its most ideologically dogmatic.  
 
Chapter six discusses English-speaking South Africans and the SADF. It suggests the 
„English‟ as a grouping by 1960 had a more diverse, indeed, deeper historical connection 
with the formalised military, but being out of political power, carried general resentments 
towards National Party (NP) appropriation of defence. The chapter investigates how the 
„English‟ in a selective sense were reintegrated into the SADF at a numerically and 
culturally subordinate level. However, many still responded with enthusiasm. This is 
verified in different contexts, including our tracking the significant career progress made 
by some remaining English-speaking senior Permanent Force (PF) officers, to the 
bolstering of Citizen Force (CF) traditional regiments, besides support from defence press 
correspondents, newspapers, parliamentary opposition politicians and not least, ex-
servicemen in various ways. Also examined, within a military context, is how a barely 
discernable white „English‟ South African identity became more fluid during our period, 
dissolving within a kind of tentative “white nationalism,” which impacted upon the 
“English” generally favourable reaction to the government‟s call to arms. Also introduced 
is some detail are aspects of English-speaking war veterans during the 1960s, where it is 
contended their attitudes regarding national defence issues played various roles in 
facilitating government calls for support in promoting the SADF.                 











Chapters seven attempts an exploration of the extent to which the white community were 
mobilised behind the SADF through the organisation being “popularised” by defence 
authorities amongst the white communities. It also refers to the official perceptions 
within the SADF, by those tasked with assessing the force‟s credibility amongst white 
South Africans and the military‟s speculations upon the community‟s preparedness 
regarding perceived threats. The SADF was also concerned with what priority and 
credibility the white community accorded the military, as it attempted to amend its 
image. Fouché was anxious to gauge positive public feelings, considering the higher 
expectations of involvement anticipated by the SADF from both English and Afrikaans 
groupings. Because the white community were the predominant taxpayers, there was not 
least a political imperative to illustrate that raised defence spending was being 
appropriately utilised. This chapter highlights the very considerable white community 
interest in SADF public displays of various descriptions and occasions, which also served 
a purpose of making the Defence Force a more visible entity amongst the white 
community, during a period when they felt increasingly beleaguered. This in contrast to 
scores of complaints from those balloted for service, which resulted in urgent government 
investigations. One of this dissertation‟s contentions is that the white community felt 
considerable anxiety regarding long-term physical security, despite racial legislative 
protection and their fortuitously being able to enjoy the 1960s economic prosperity, from 
the lowest levels of the white working-class to the exceptionally wealthy. But 
nevertheless, even where life was prosperous and comfortable, constant reminders of the 
broader African political changes filled the media and the most politically disinterested 











manifestations dedicated to the overthrow of white rule throughout the continent. 
Similarly, the threat of “communism” and white perceptions of what this meant in terms 
of security, which was further fuelled by incessant government propaganda via the media. 
The militarization of white South Africa occurred between these “threat” factors and the 
SADF‟s sometimes clumsy efforts to ensure proper management of increased trainee 
numbers, alongside its simultaneous implementation of counter-strategies.        
 
Literary review of the period and notes regarding sources 
 
The SADF during the 1960s has received largely superficial attention from historians. 
While other researchers have covered the 1950s, no extensive archival study of the SADF 
and its relationship to the broader South African society had yet been undertaken 
concerning the 1960s, which has been one objective of this dissertation. The 
transformation of the UDF during the late 1940s and 50s is studied in some depth by 
Roger Boulter‟s 1997 doctoral dissertation: F.C. Erasmus and the Politics of SA Defence 
completed through Rhodes University and an MA completed by Louisa Jooste through 
UNISA in 1995. Boulter is principally concerned with the SADF from within, its 
leadership and effectiveness. This thesis to an extent is a continuation through to the end 
of the 1960s, but deals with several other themes, besides some of those within Boulter‟s 
work. An MA study on South African Air Force (SAAF) pilots departure from the Union 
Defence Force (UDF)/SADF from 1946-1971 was undertaken in 1978 through UNISA 
by Willem Van den Bos. Much of it is drawn from a statistical methodological research 
base and despite the title, provided limited insight concerning issues addressed in this 












There was one short overview written on 1960s South African defence issues contained 
within a chapter by James Barber‟s South African Foreign Policy 1945-73,
3
 updated 
briefly within a slightly later publication, South Africa‟s Foreign Policy - The Search for 
Status and Security, published in 1990. While Barber‟s writing summarises a small part 
of what is written in the chapter dealing with threat perceptions, besides providing some 
useful statistical data, he did not have access to archival material on perceived threat 
specifics and the SADF responses. Neither did Barber attempt an analysis of the SADF‟s 
effectiveness, nor was he concerned with any attempts at any sociological/historical study 
of the white community and its relationship to defence issues during the 1960s. This 
work‟s analysis of the relationship between the SADF and white community, besides the 
organisation‟s threat perceptions and responses is detailed and extracted from a wide 
range of sources, including archival documentation, interviews, official SADF 
publications, the press and popular magazines.  
 
Some other secondary sources consulted include: The Making of the Modern South 
African Military by Annette Seegers, (1996); Philip Frankel‟s Pretoria‟s Praetorians, 
(1984) and Kenneth Grundy‟s The Militarization of South African Politics, (1986). All 
three publications are the works of political scientists concerned with understanding civil-
military relations in South Africa during the twentieth century.  They were particularly 
interested in the degree to which the military began to influence and even usurp the 
political functions of constitutional government in South Africa, but with particular 
                                                 
3











emphasis upon the late 1970s and 80s. They made little or no use of primary sources 
from the military archives; it is highly unlikely such material would have been made 
available at their time of writing. Only to a very limited extent were these three works 
attempting to understand historically in detail, the changing nature of the SADF during 
the 1960s, by projecting the military‟s transformation against threat perceptions and 
white politics of the period. These writers were not interested in comprehending the 
military as an integral part of “white social history”, nor how the National Party strove to 
justify SADF expenditure and national service against a range of perceived threats. 
Seegers to an extent is an exception, for she discusses the Afrikanerisation of the military 
post-1948
4
 and aspects of the SADF during the 1960s through secondary sources, 
including comment upon its operational inadequacies after Sharpeville. She includes 
some historical overview of the SADF‟s adjustment in terms of the changing 
international and national circumstances, besides the rationale behind its arms 
acquisitions during the 1960s. However, she makes very limited comment on SADF 
conventional threat perceptions or the organisations reaction to these latter issues which 
comprise a core part of this dissertation. Neither was Seegers interested in how the 
English and Afrikaans communities perceived defence issues. Commandant Generals 
Hiemstra and Grobbelaar receive no comment in Seegers book, yet some reference to 
their and other officers involvement is fundamental to documenting a clear understanding 
of the SADF during the 1960s.     
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The only published autobiography by an SADF senior commander during the 1960s is 
Die Wilde Haf written by former Commandant General R. C. Hiemstra.
5
 His book 
provides some useful source material, particularly in his attempting to link Afrikaner 
nationalist politics and heritage with the SADF. This is an issue, which this dissertation 
attempts to bring to the forefront. P.W. Botha‟s 1997 biography, Stem uit die Wildernis 
by Daan Prinsloo,
6
 furnishes useful detail about Botha‟s early defence minister years. 
Unlike some of the above studies, this dissertation is primarily intended as an historical 
study and hopefully has benefited not only from greater access and utilisation of archival 
documentation, but also from new insights into the complexities of white political and 
social history, in particular The Afrikaners by Hermann Giliomee published in 2003. 
Also utilised are a range of articles and other recent works, such as those written by 
Generals Magnus Malan and Jannie Geldenhuys, which provide some personal 




Some articles have also made some short introductory comments regarding the 
relationship between the SADF and the white community during the 1960s. These have 
included McGill Alexander‟s: The Militarization of White South African Society, 1948-
1990 published in Scientia Militaria, Vol. 30 (2), 2000, besides Leopold Scholtz, Die 
ontwikkeling van die SA Leër in die Grensoorlog, 1966-1989 and Jacobs, C.J., The 
forward defence strategy of the SADF 1978-1989, both of which are published in 
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Grensoorlog Border War 1966-1989 A Special Edition of the Journal for Contemporary 
History, Vol. 31, No.3. December 2006. Alexander‟s article provides some limited 
coverage of the 1960s in four pages where he makes some relevant remarks, including 
correctly identifying the role of militant African nationalism as an important fear element 
within the white community and through which the government exploited 
English/Afrikaans „unity‟. 
8
 Alexander also identifies the 1960s period as being one that 
“created the required climate for the militarization of white society in South Africa”. 
However, there is little elaboration of these points and his article is drawn primarily from 
secondary sources.
9
 Leopold Scholtz makes several cursory comments about the SADF 
during the 1960s.
 10
 Scholtz also attempts in a few pages, to make some cursory 
evaluation of the SADF‟s efficiency during the early 1960s.
11
 In a separate article, 
Scholtz makes reference to SWA in terms of the beginnings of South West Africa 
People‟s Organisation (SWAPO) insurgency from 1966, including explanation of 
revolutionary warfare concepts as understood in the late 1960s by the SADF.
12
 A range 
of other articles published in various journals or unpublished, are referred to, as are a 
wide collection of secondary sources, which provided aspects of contextual background 
or information. Historian G.D. Scholtz‟s
13
 works ensured important contextual 
comprehension of Afrikaner nationalist political assumptions during the 1960s. 
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It is hoped that this dissertation‟s academic credibility and originality is further endorsed 
by a significant core of its content being drawn from recently declassified archival 
material, lodged at the Visagie Street, Pretoria, South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) Archives.  Although various themes concerning the SADF and the white 
community have been broached within a range of publications over the years, this 
dissertation was intended to be substantially different, in that it endeavoured to refer and 
contrast such sources with this archival documentation viewed for the first time regarding 
research. The SANDF archives contained a large range of different catalogues for the 
Minister of Defence and Commandant General groups, within which are listed numerous 
boxes of files. While for this topic many of these could be discarded, there still remained 
abundant material that immediately drew this author towards exploring the chosen 
dissertation topic issues, particularly the SADF perceived 1960s military threats to South 
Africa and SWA. Perhaps sixty to seventy percent of the documentation was written in 
Afrikaans and where necessary translated by this author, who was also responsible for all 
translations from utilised Afrikaans secondary source material. There were boxes also 
containing numerous amounts of correspondence dealing with complaints from trainees 
or their parents, often addressed through their constituency members of parliament or 
provincial legislature members. The same pattern was evident amongst the United Party 
(UP) archival material, which also contained many letters addressed to and by MPs 
expressing grievances regarding military trainees in terms of mostly alleged abuses, along 












The Fouché collection in the University of the Free State‟s Archive for Contemporary 
Affairs provided a useful collection of speeches by the former defence minister, often 
annotated by Fouché. The material obtained from the United Kingdom‟s National 
Archives in Kew, London was particularly informative regarding correspondence and 
British documentation alluding to Anglo-South African relations concerning arms 
negotiations and sales, besides British defence thinking over the Simon‟s Town 
Agreement. The National Archives in Pretoria produced little during this author‟s visit, 
except some cabinet notes of limited value. It appears that much of the ministerial 
documentation found its way back to the SANDF archives where at least some of it was 
viewed and utilized amongst the swaths of material available.    
 
An important source for this thesis came in the form of numerous interviews conducted 
with former middle-ranking or junior Permanent Force (PF) officers from the 1960s. 
Their evidence played a critical role in penetrating some of complexities about the SADF 
and the attitudes prevalent within the institution during a period increasingly now so 
distant. While it is self-evident that historical projects are mostly undertaken where 
significant participants have long passed on; it was useful to hear of details that could still 
be described by individuals who were „present‟. Therefore considering most of those 
interviewed are aged at best in their late sixties, this author worked carefully to ensure 
their opinions or recollections were heard, recorded and integrated where appropriate. As 
part of the gathering of sources, a press letter was published in several English and 











during the early 1960s to state their views on several questions. A significant response 
resulted; a few have been quoted from in this thesis.           
 
Graeme Callistair completed an MA in 2007 through Stellenbosch University, dealing 
with SADF conscription between 1952-1992, where he cited from this author‟s paper 
delivered at the 2005 SA Historical Society Conference: The South African Military 
Under Verwoerd: SADF Popularisation amongst the White Community, 1960-66, as well 
as a seminar given to the Stellenbosch University History Department in 2006 on “The 
SADF and White South Africa.” This thesis also refers here and there to some of his 
remarks on conscription. Another recent thesis which makes some reference to SA 
defence issues during the 1960s and provided most useful verification for one of this 
dissertation‟s contentions was P. Correia‟s “Political Relations between Portugal and 
South Africa from the end of the Second World War until 1974”. This was a D.Lit 
dissertation completed in 2007 through the University of Johannesburg. The contention 
referred to above was that India was perceived by the SADF as a military threat during 
the 1960s.   
  
There was also literature produced during the 1960s and 70s which dealt very generally 
with perceived military threats facing South Africa at the time in the form of “terrorism” 
on the “border”, or international communism and its military implications for South 
Africa. Some writers who published on these topics during the period were Al J. Venter, 
Michael Morris and Chris Vermaak. Activities by “communist inspired forces” on South 











some role in shaping popular white male culture.
14
 As a range of threats identified during 
the early 1960s by the SADF were disseminated through the media, any number of 
newspaper reports from both the English and Afrikaans press are utilised extensively 
throughout this dissertation. The Afrikaans popular magazine Huisgenoot provided 
insight into what its readership were interested in reading during the 1960s.  Huisgenoot 
served as a valuable source regarding how the SADF was presented to the Afrikaans 
community as “their own” and supposedly markedly important to their future security.     
  
This dissertation made extensive use and analysis of SADF publications: Most 
particularly Commando (later Paratus). Such also distinguishes this work from others on 
the SADF where no close examination has been attempted on these publications. 
Commando is a valuable source whose editors during the 1960s closely followed 
government policies regarding how these were promoted within the SADF. Commando 
also made considerable efforts to endorse both Afrikaans and English South African 
military history during the first half of the 1960s, with repetitive emphasis upon the two 
groups supposedly working together within the military for the good of the Republic. 
Afrikaner nationalist symbolism in the military was a marked feature of the publication 
alongside articles stressing “Afrikaans/English reconciliation”. The latter feature which 
was so obvious during the first decade of the 1960s became more muted by the 1970s. As 
the „English‟ identity of the pre-Republic period diminished and UP support shrank 
amongst conservative English white opinion, so it appears the government perceived that 
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it was no longer necessary to constantly publicise an inclusive approach regarding the 
military regarding the two white language groupings. Other “official” material utilised for 
this work, included parliamentary reports, various “inhouse” official booklets and films, 
amongst which was “Vesting van die Suide”/Bastion of the South, referring to the SADF 
and released by the Department of information around 1964.  
 
Notes on terminology 
 
For the sake of accurately reflecting the sources utilised within this dissertation, the 
abbreviation SWA (South West Africa) is repeatedly used for describing the 
contemporary Republic of Namibia; just as „Rhodesia‟ is utilized in referring to 
Zimbabwe and other pre-independence titles of various African counties. One of the 
changes brought in by the 1957 Defence Act, was that the term Union Defence Force 
(UDF) was replaced by South African Defence Force (SADF); part of Erasmus‟s drive to 
“republicanise” the South African military. From 1994, the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) is the correct description.  Both UDF and SADF are used in the 
pages that follow, depending upon the historical context at that point. Regarding „South 
Africa‟, sometimes that term is used, but also „Republic‟ or „RSA‟, depending upon what 
appeared appropriate to avoid continual repetition. Likewise other South African place 
names such as Pietersberg (today Polokwane) and the titles of the pre-1994 four 











PART ONE: THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND COUNTER STRATEGIES 
 




This chapter serves as an introduction regarding varied SADF strategic and other issues 
from 1960 to 1968, whereby the central components of white South African society‟s 
militarization and threat perceptions during this period can be understood. During the 
1950s, numerous SADF symbolic changes affirmed the NP‟s political goal of a republic, 
but defence remained a fairly low government priority. Frans Erasmus‟s portfolio was not 
a particularly prized cabinet position and defence issues were not central to the NP race-
based legislation passed in the 1950s. The SADF just obediently reflected where 
appropriate, the decisions made within other departments, whether these concerned 
apartheid legislation or foreign policy. The SADF was responsible for the protection of 
the white community as one national entity, regarding its privileges and security, and it 
therefore operated closely within government racial policy.  
 
By the end of 1959, many whites perceived the SADF as almost a sheltered employment 
institution, although there still remained within its ranks some highly competent 
professional officers, in whom resided significant war experience, despite those who had 
left during the Erasmus purges. Both the arrival of the Republic and emerging African 
nationalism placed a public spotlight on the Defence Force; not least because during 











alongside decolonisation. This chapter begins with a short over view of „white military 
heritage,‟ besides events concerning defence during the 1950s. It also deals with Anglo-
South African defence relations, which were a significant issue by 1960, particularly 
concerning the Simon‟s Town Agreement, besides arms purchases and intelligence 
sources. Thereafter, it introduces Jim Fouché‟s appointment as defence minister from the 
beginning of 1960; his policy emphasis upon „white nation-building‟ and the use of the 
SADF to encourage this. The National Party‟s (NP) attainment of the Republic fulfilled 
perhaps the most important Afrikaner nationalist historical aspiration, but the entire white 
community, which the government wanted to draw behind the SADF was sharply divided 
on the issue. This thesis attempts a clearer understanding of the white Afrikaans and 
English communities respective connections with the military and these are dealt with in 
chapters five and six. The new republican constitutional status and South Africa‟s 
termination of her Commonwealth membership a few months later had further 
implications for defence. So too, did the aftermath of divisive World War Two 
developments amongst the white community impact upon South African defence issues 
during the 1960s. These are addressed in detail particularly in chapters two, five and six. 
The early 1960s saw the SADF increasingly being viewed by Afrikaner leaders, 
alongside grand apartheid (the Verwoerdian homelands policy), as another prime 
guarantor of white security. Therefore, we also examine the relationship between the 











White South African “military heritage”  
 
“White South African military heritage,” although usually projected differently amongst 
the English and Afrikaans communities, consisted broadly of two origins. Firstly, a 
colonial military mentality lingered in components of the English speaking white 
community, largely because of their cumulative experience in response to historical racial 
conflict over land and resources. This mindset remained therefore an omnipresent feature 
with English-speaking white male culture. The military ethos amongst colonials had been 
further emphasised by their involvement in the South African War and during the 
following years, when additional volunteer regiments were raised intending to fill a 
perceived need for local defence. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
Citizen Force (CF) regiments catered for part-time soldiering within British South 
African society and maintained something of a military aspect within the collective 
psyche of this community. All male citizens were eligible for some military training in 
terms of the 1912 Defence Act. The professional and middle classes gained some social 
credibility by serving in an established CF regimental unit, which was an approved and 
often fashionable manifestation of patriotism and manhood during 1912-39. Cadets had 
been part of English South African boys schools since the late nineteenth century.   
 
The rural Afrikaner commando that was a unique South African military organisation 
since the seventeenth century and the foundation of Boer military activities against both 
British Imperialism and pre-industrial black communities were resurrected by the 1912 
Defence Act and operated as Rifle Associations. During the First World War, these 











Africa and were an important addition to the Permanent Force (PF) in crushing white 
worker unrest during 1922. Afrikaner historical associations with defending home, 
wagon-laager and their nineteenth century republics against British Imperialism, besides 
clashes with blacks over land resources, were deeply ingrained within Afrikaner 
collective cultural memory. As is described in chapter two and five, Afrikaners had in 
general an historical ambivalence towards uniformed standing armies. Remnants of this 
attitude even lingered into the early 1960s. But a significant proportion of the pre-World 
War Two UDF PF members were Afrikaners and the heritage of the Afrikaner 
commando had long been integrated into formal SADF structures.   
 
During the 1920s, the Pact Government and 1930s Depression years, with contemporary 
white political issues being such as coalition and fusion of parties, defence issues 
occupied a comparatively low priority. In 1939, the UDF was poorly prepared for war, 
while serious conflict occurred within the white community over South Africa‟s entry 
into hostilities, ensuring some polarisation amongst Defence Force members.
15
 Many 
publications detail and analyse how South African forces with thousands of volunteers, 
representing both white and black communities, drew significant praise for their war 
efforts, despite national political and economic difficulties. Three recent academic works 
analysing South African troops in World War Two as language or class groupings 
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include: John Lambert‟s paper on white English South Africans and the war, comprising 
a kind of social analysis of this community‟s military involvement. Albert Grundlingh 
has investigated the experiences of the Afrikaner soldier, while Neil Roos has written 
about South Africa volunteer servicemen and their experiences as soldiers, veterans and 
predominantly working-class men, in relation to their efforts to establish various 




Therefore, by 1945 although the country as a whole was exhausted by the recent war; 
experiences amongst returning volunteers and those of the PF UDF, had produced an 
arguably more united South African military heritage regarding the two white language 
groups. However, during the 1950s, the Defence Force underwent considerable internal 
turmoil and change. The challenge facing Fouché and the NP government during the 
early 1960s, was as part of a political project to re-invoke some of the South African 
military memories and culture and drawing the politically averse white communities 
behind both Republic and SADF. Such is one central concern of this dissertation.       
 
Defence had not constituted a priority NP issue post-1948 and very few government 
members had acquired any particular expertise or interest in the subject. The NP had 
simply preferred to use Erasmus‟s „Afrikanerisation‟ of the Defence Force as another 
manifestation of NP republic preparations. There was some rearming during the 1950s, in 
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liaison with Britain over plans for the Union to assist in Middle East defence and the 
obligations of the Simon‟s Town Agreement. With the republican constitutional goal in 
mind, Erasmus and his protégées such as future Commandant General R. C. Hiemstra had 
busied themselves with symbolic changes to titles, insignia and uniforms, besides 
advancing Afrikaner control and numerical preponderance within the UDF/SADF. 
 
South African military relations with Britain 
 
During the mid-1950s, the UDF/SADF purchased considerable conventional warfare 
equipment from Britain and Canada, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers and jet 
fighters (Vampires and Sabres - both aircraft types were obsolete by 1960). Most of this 
was intended to equip an armoured division and air component earmarked to assist 
Britain in defending the Middle East during global war, but after interminable bilateral 
discussions, neither South Africa nor Britain ratified this arrangement.
17
 By the end of the 
1950s, the SA military‟s role remained nebulous regarding its “traditional allies”. The 
British government who had been the Union‟s long-time defence partner, preferred to 
retain increasingly muted defence arrangements with South Africa. In a rapidly changing 
world of African decolonisation, the British response to Verwoerd‟s intensification of 
apartheid was to attempt a balance between continued Anglo-South African defence 
cooperation and with the reality of a growing Afro-Asian numerical dominance in 
international affairs.    
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The establishment in 1961 of the Republic accompanied increased political, diplomatic 
and trading isolation for South Africa, resulting in the SADF commanders and Fouché 
attempting a “dual process” in defence. Where possible, they tried to maintain traditional 
arrangements with Western powers, while often in public, NP politicians or senior figures 
in the military establishment would adopt the contradictory rhetoric of putting “South 
Africa First” in terms of defence priorities. The South Africans continually hammered on 
the country‟s supposed strategic importance and the dangers of communism for the 
continent; stressing that it was willing to play a significant role in “containing 
communism in the continent”. British documentation of the period shows that during the 
early 1960s, the United Kingdom government and military continued to value links with 
South Africa. The Simon‟s Town Agreement existing between South Africa and Britain 
in 1960, as set out in an Exchange of Letters of June 1955, contains the following 
illustrative statement from once classified British records: 
The (Simon's Town) Agreements are bilateral and are „to remain 
in force until such time as the two Governments decide otherwise 
by mutual agreement‟….The facilities we enjoy might, however, 
be endangered by a worsening of relations that might follow 
from a change of status in the Union….It does not necessarily 
follow that because she left the Commonwealth South Africa 
would also withdraw from naval defence planning with us, but if 





British concerns were listed as the potential loss of stores, radio communications, shore 
facilities, air reconnaissance provided by the SAAF and significant complications if the 
South Africans withdrew entirely from naval cooperation, although it was correctly 
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anticipated that this need not happen just because of the Republic.
19
 The Agreement 
resulted in the SA Navy undertaking a kind of “para-NATO role” in terms of its assisting 
in defending western interests in the South Atlantic.
20
 However, the Agreement terms, 
were particularly generous to British interests. For example, they allowed the Royal Navy 
(RN) Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic to have immediate access to the South 
African defence minister and in a war situation; the RN Commander would take 
operational command of all forces within his zone from a headquarters provided in the 
Cape outside of Simon‟s Town.  
 
However, the degree to which the Simon‟s Town Agreement slanted to the British 
government‟s advantage was never apparent in public discourse; being rather presented 
in public as a mutually beneficial arrangement between two anti-communist allies in 
protecting the Cape Sea Route. The British government also now had a stake in the 
efficiency of the SA Navy. By signing the Agreement, it also quietly ensured the South 
Africa fleet was protected from any overt NP political interference that could restrict its 
capacity to operate properly or impair its role in helping safeguard the Cape Sea Route 
alongside other Western navies.
21
 Also by consenting to assist with the expansion of the 
SA Navy, the British pushed the South African government to ensure their fleet‟s 
enlargement, besides the modernisation of naval facilities that could come under British 
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 Major General Dunbar Moodie, who worked at Pretoria 
Defence Headquarters during the early 1960s, remarked that Admiral Hugo Biermann, 
then SA Navy Chief of Staff, who was well respected within the RN, had a considerable 





From a British perspective, however, these links necessitated balancing against the 
diplomatic disadvantages of African-Asian anger at perceptions that Britain was 
condoning South Africa‟s racial policies. The British government also had to ensure 
strategic ties with potential Cold War allies in the emerging Third World. The SADF also 
had to manage in isolation, other perceived military threats, including defending SWA or 
the Republic against possible UN or Afro-Asian military intervention intended to force 
termination of South African control over SWA, or changing the Republic‟s racial 
policies. These latter themes are expanded upon considerably in chapters three and four. 
 
During 1963, the UN passed its mandatory embargo upon member states selling arms to 
South Africa. Besides the provisions of the Simon‟s Town Agreement whereby existing 
contracts would be honoured by the British government, the UK Defence Ministry 
continued to receive and consider South African arms requests. This was of course in 
terms of establishing whether British interests would not be compromised, if they 
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continued supplying the SADF with weapons. Approximately eighty percent of South 
African Army equipment in 1960 was British as also all of its naval materials and ships. 
While the South African Air Force‟s (SAAF) front line jet fighters from 1961 included 
French Mirage IIICs, a large number of other British aircraft types were in use and 
important South African orders were pending, including Canberra light bombers and 
Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft. The British government also anticipated some 





Increased South Africa defence isolation by 1960    
 
During the 1950s, the NP government failed to secure any military alliance with 
European countries regarding the Africa continent. As Barber explains, there was less 
conviction by western countries by 1960 that Soviet penetration was an issue in Africa. 
Unlike the South African government who remained convinced of the contrary,
25
 with 
Commando, the SADF‟s “in-house” magazine, widely available to both members and the 
public, increasingly publishing articles during the 1950s dealing with communism 
„spreading in Africa‟. Besides the Simon‟s Town Agreement, there continued other less 
high profile military contacts between South Africa, regarding Britain and the United 
States, such as officers attending various courses, but in the medium-term, defence 
isolation loomed for the SADF.   
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During 1960 and 1961 there were international crises with military dimensions within 
both Europe and Asia, most particularly in Berlin, besides the escalating nuclear arms 
race that significantly heightened Cold War tensions. Within this underlying global 
ideological conflict, the South African government and SADF chiefs cautiously 
concluded their defence would not be, indeed could not be abandoned by the West; even 
outside of existing Anglo-South African maritime arrangements. South Africa becoming 
a republic did not necessarily mean that the country would leave the Commonwealth, as 
predicted by opposition newspapers and critics. The Cape Argus, for example, cautioned 
in March 1960 that the financial cost of defence in isolation would be “colossal”. But 
(rather hopefully) it added that if South Africa remained part of the Commonwealth, her 
“fellow members… would come to her assistance…if there was a grave military threat”. 
The newspaper warned of further risks facing a country with extensive sea and land 
frontiers; material support loss; the risk of being isolated in terms of intelligence sharing, 
or where lost diplomatic support might possibly have assisted in negotiating with a 
potential belligerent. By early 1960, the dominant local media defence perception was of 
a growing danger emanating from Africa, from which white South Africans were:  
separated from the kindred nations of Europe, America and 
Australasia by wide oceans, and on her land frontier she is within 
easy reach of emergent African countries. Her relations with 
some of these are not, at present, reassuring.  
 
African nationalism and decolonisation contained a range of uncertainties for white South 
Africans. After British Prime Minister Macmillan‟s Wind of Change speech had made it 











and most certainly, when these were related to African hostility to apartheid, defence 
issues started moving foremost into the white political domain. If isolation was 
inevitable, a distinct possibility as the government had quietly conceded, then increased 
defence expenditure was necessary for modernising and strengthening air, land and sea 
defences from potential military aggressors. After the NP republican referendum success, 
the SADF General Staff began emphasising “national defence” as opposed to traditional 
international cooperation, as part of the government consolidating its constitutional 
“achievement.”  A more insular defence policy was developing, although the government 
remained concerned to retain traditional Western allies and continually stressed South 
Africa‟s supposed strategic importance. For a while, the public tone emanating from 
SADF commanders reflected the political message of white South Africa asserting 
sovereignty in defence. Die Burger, reporting upon the newly appointed Commandant 
General Piet Grobbelaar‟s address at the Military Academy‟s December 1960 passing-out 
parade, trumpeted the headline: “National Defence Now Comes First”. The Cape Times 
reported Grobbelaar stating: “South Africa, which was today part of a defence pattern 
involving other countries, was building up its forces for the time when it could stand 
alone to prevent any enemy from setting foot on its soil.”
26
 Grobbelaar was even more 
stridently republican, stating: “South Africa will no longer make a contribution to Allied 
war efforts”. Grobbelaar substantiated this argument by saying that equipment, planning 
and training, had to be regularly revised, because unlike in the past, where South Africa 
had the opportunity after the war declaration to prepare its defences, now the Defence 
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Force would need to ensure constant readiness.
27
 Despite the pro-republican bravado, 
South Africa in 1960 was a long way from arms self-sufficiency and the SADF was only 
just emerging from the demoralisation and conflicts of the Erasmus era.  
   
Ignoring the implications and realities regarding decolonisation for white rule in Africa, 
older mindsets persisted amongst some defence commentators, that colonial powers or 
white settler dominated African alliances would emerge. In 1962 the United Party (UP) 
official parliamentary opposition warned the government, “that at a most dangerous 
time,” the country was without any allies. While Fouché pointed to Britain and the 
Simon‟s Town Agreement, Senator Z. Berman (UP) challenged him as to what these 
meant, if Britain was not supporting the Republic over the UN hostility regarding SWA. 
Although the NP simply dismissed the UP of being destructive regarding defence 
issues,
28
 in reality the country was indeed being isolated, while the SADF were making 
new external military threat appraisals independent of traditional allies.  
 
South African Military Intelligence during the early 1960s 
 
This chapter also requires a brief reference to the intelligence structures existing within or 
available to the SADF during the early 1960s. While Erasmus had purged Smuts‟s highly 
pro-active UDF military intelligence that had spied upon pro-German NP members; 
during the 1950s, the SADF was still largely reliant upon Britain passing across whatever 
information her military intelligence authorities were willing to share. The new South 
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African republican status effectively closed much of the SADF‟s traditional information 
links, therefore required the local development of military intelligence skills. The history 
of South African military intelligence is difficult to accurately verify because of the 
current strict classification of archival documentation. Louisa Jooste of the SADF 
Military Archives has produced one account of the history of Post-1961 South African 
military intelligence, but this remains classified from most researchers. The only insight 
this author has into the publication is that revealed to him by Ian Van der Waag,
29
 who 
wrote the section dealing with the history of South African military intelligence pre-1961. 
His opinion was that the second half of the book was principally concerned with 
explaining the evolution of intelligence structures during this period, rather than being an 
explicit account of clandestine operations.
30
 It seems clear that SADF military 
intelligence structures in 1960 were also rather basic and required rebuilding after skilled 
staff also departed here after 1948.    
 
This author‟s examination of previously classified threat appraisal documentation, 
relating to SADF perceptions of the South African security situation during the early 
1960s, suggested little evidence of information obtained by channels other than local. 
Maj Gen Phil Pretorius who was sent on course to the USA during the early 1960s, 
returning to South Africa to lecture at the Army College on Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical warfare, was also involved in military intelligence during the early 1960s. 
Pretorius explained that after the Republic change, intelligence capacity had to be re-
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developed. There were a number of unknowns facing the future of local defence, 
including possibilities of internal and external threats, which the SADF appraised and 
tried to plan towards and re-equip in response.
31
 In short, SADF military intelligence 
capability was rudimentary in 1960, which obviously complicated Fouché‟s task and 
increased the possibility of inaccuracies within defence threat appraisals, besides the 
political responses and military counter-strategies.      
 
In his work Apartheid‟s Friends, James Sanders referred to the Potgieter Commission 
reporting that for several years after the Second World War, no military intelligence 
component existed within the South African military. Only from 1960, anticipating a 
break with the Commonwealth, did the SADF re-constitute a military intelligence section 
falling under Combat Gen Nic Bierman, then the deputy Inspector General. According to 
Sanders, from 1962 the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) became a sub-section 
of the Chief of Defence Staff‟s department.
32
 A central intelligence and security 
organisation “answerable directly to the Prime Minister,” was established in August 1962 
under Brig P. M. Retief and DMI documentation signed by him is used at length within 
this thesis. After Republic, the British Ambassador in South Africa quietly instructed its 
diplomats to make “discreet contacts” with black leaders in case of a change of 
government. 
33
 Less intelligence information was passed across from British sources to 
the South Africans after 1961 who were left to their own devices in conceiving the threat 
appraisal documents utilised within this dissertation.  
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Local intelligence agency rivalries 
 
Hilton Hamman in his book, Days of the Generals, gives some useful insight into the 
1960s and 1970s inter-service tensions over intelligence, as they later existed between the 
Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and its head Hendrik Van den Berg, the SAP security 
police branch, military intelligence and senior SADF commanders.
34
 Using interviews 
with several key surviving personnel as his source material, Hamman sketches a short 
account of personality clashes and conflicts of interest. His work came long after Kenneth 
Grundy‟s, who provides a short description of the creation of Republican Intelligence 
(RI) which preceded BOSS, in the wake of the sabotage committed by extra-
parliamentary African nationalist organisations in the early 1960s. RI was also under the 
leadership of Hendrik Van den Berg and worked initially as a secret structure alongside 
the security police, engaging itself in both external and internal activities on behalf of the 
government. It was effectively a competing structure to DMI, with rivalries and 
competition between military intelligence and BOSS are also described in Grundy‟s 
work.
35
 Five years after Grundy‟s writing, Annette Seegers published The Military in the 
Making of Modern South Africa, where she commented upon intelligence based upon 
parliamentary records and the abridged published version of the 1971 Report by the 
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Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to the Security of the State.
36
 Hamman‟s 
book, Days of the Generals has no references to either Grundy or Seegers‟s work.  
 
The appointment of Jim Fouché as Minister of Defence in January 1960: 
 
In January 1960, Jim Fouché replaced Erasmus as defence minister. Aware of the 
numerous controversies existing in the SADF, dating particularly from the internal 
conflict of the previous decade, Verwoerd had partly made the adjustment with an eye on 
attaining some English political support. But Verwoerd also held against Erasmus his 
lack of support during the 1958 NP premiership contest.
37
 After Sharpeville, the Langa 
march and other early 1960 manifestations of black resistance resulting in SADF call-up 
during the State of Emergency, Verwoerd and his cabinet urgently reconsidered the 
military‟s organisation. Particularly its capacity to assist the police in maintaining civil 
order with internal rebellion, now perceived as the immediate threat. Despite public 
assurances to the contrary, significant mobilisation and operational problems had 
occurred during the military‟s emergency activation.
38
  The SADF‟s priority within 
government would accentuate further during the decade.  
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While replacing Erasmus, Verwoerd still faced the dilemma that within senior Afrikaner 
nationalist political ranks, there was almost a complete dearth of military experience. 
Neither did anybody within the government possess any academic insight into military 
affairs.
39
 In 1964 amongst NP MPs, there was only one member who had undergone 
military training, G.H. Van Wyk who used details of his war service to bolster 
parliamentary arguments that the wartime UDF had been anti-Afrikaans.
40
 Fouché knew 
as little about his portfolio as Erasmus had, who had infuriated many senior officers by 
both his ignorance of military affairs and his ignoring of sound professional advice. 
Fouché was heavily dependent upon the SADF General Staff, but unlike Erasmus, the 
new minister was both a listener and a diplomat, using these skills in an attempt to repair 
some of the distrusts between the SADF and government, besides trying to smooth 
English/Afrikaans conflicts within the organisation that were attributed to Erasmus‟s 
legacy.   
 
Fouché‟s approach of facilitating a selective re-inclusion of the politically alienated white 
English-speaking community into the Defence Force was a consistent theme heard by this 
author, when interviewing English-speaking former PF members from the period, who 
recalled the “new attitude” during the minister‟s tenure. It seems clear that Fouché was 
following the instructions of Verwoerd in using his defence portfolio as one of the 
government‟s most important tools in building a „united white republic‟. This “public 
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relations drive” within the SADF by Fouché was spearheaded by the Defence Force 
magazine Commando, which paid special attention to reporting successful „cooperation‟ 
between the two language groups in the SADF, while also perfunctorily recorded 
statistics of English and Afrikaans recruits within articles on the new intakes. For 
example at the beginning of 1960, at the army, air force and navy gymnasiums, a break 
down of percentages were supplied according to the recruits language, education, 
province and religious denomination, the purpose being: “To illustrate how the 
gymnasium trainees are representative of the different white population and language 
groups.”
41
 Official SADF emphasis was now upon projecting a white nation commonly 
involved in defence, demonstrating how the SADF was utilised as an instrument for the 
indirect promotion of a common “white nationalism”.  
 
From 1960, the SADF was deployed periodically, ostensively for entertainment but 
clearly to also bolster white confidence. A significant example was a massive public 
display reported upon in Commando as: “The Defence Force sets the example”. After 
black unrest had swept the country a few months earlier, the SADF on 28 May 1960, as 
part of pre-Union Day festivities, demonstrated some of its weaponry for an enormous 
white crowd outside Bloemfontein. This military show comprised a spectacular display of 
firepower in front of 70 000 spectators, who had travelled to the site in 20 000 motor 
vehicles. The SADF utilised tanks, field artillery, jet fighters and Shackleton maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft, “attacking” targets in the veld, while an infantry battalion 
stormed a koppie occupied by “guerrillas”. Afterwards the huge crowd remained to light 
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braaivleis fires and watch a display of “searchlight aerobatics”.
42
 The gathering 
reinforced white national celebration and camaraderie with the SADF showing its 
supposed capacity to ensure white security.    
 
The importance attached by the government to this spectacle of military prowess was 
emphasised by the presence of Verwoerd, making his first public appearance after an 
assassination attempt, accompanied by Governor-General C.R. Swart and nearly the 
entire cabinet.
43
 Public military displays had been popular even before the UDF recruited 
via its „Steel Commando‟ and „Air Commando‟ shows during the Second World War,
44
 
but such SADF „entertainment‟ for the white community became even more prominent 
during the early 1960s. (See chapter seven) As this dissertation attempts to show, the 
SADF and white community were drawn closer by government design. This was also 
intended to nullify the degree of white public disdain had clearly existed towards the 
organisation. Commando within its March 1960 editorial quoted Fouché appealing within 
his first ministerial speech for the SADF not to be ridiculed. The inference was clear: For 
even within an official publication expected to ensure the military a confident monthly 
face, it was being tacitly acknowledged that the SADF had battled against a poor public 
image during the Erasmus years: 
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we can depend upon our armed forces. We need not to refer to 
them in a sneering manner…I regard it as my duty to build up the 
fighting strength of our armed forces
45
   
 
Besides the morale boosting value, there were other contexts behind the huge white 
public interest in SADF „shows‟; namely the uncertainties connected to the possible 
consequences of the coming republic and emerging independent „Black Africa‟. Amongst 
the Afrikaner community, republican fervour was strong, but white South Africans still 
felt insecurities in the wake of the Sharpeville shootings and related disturbances. With 
Verwoerd‟s white „nation-building‟ approach, the NP intended the SADF to symbolise 
part of the republican future, supporting the government‟s regular reinforcement of its 
appeal that English and Afrikaans communities should draw closer together. The NP also 
inferred that the potential future enemies were the continent‟s anti-colonial black 
majority. A few days before the Free State mass military display, the staunchly anti-
republican Natal Mercury quoted Fouché stating: “South Africa is no longer safely 
isolated” (the) “Defence Force  must be ready for any attack.” The newspaper went on to 
quote from the “Union Festival Brochure of the Defence Force”:  
At the time of Union, …the possibility of participation in a world 
conflict was merely an ideological issue….Today, however, 
Africa presents itself in a totally different form. The possibility 
must be borne in mind that a colossus of states could develop on 




Such reports a year prior to the Republic gives a clear indication of how the government, 
intended to use the SADF to politically bolster its position, by presenting perceptions of 
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military threats from African nationalism emanating out of newly independent states to 
the north. 
1960-61: The first “African invasion” political/press reports 
 
The image of a soaring common black nationalism emerging during African 
decolonisation, transforming itself into a conventional military force with the object of 
attacking the white republic and ending white rule, served as a useful, but powerful 
political gimmick to alarm a defiant and insecure white community becoming more 
conscious of international objections to NP apartheid policy. Amidst media reports of 
violence perpetrated against whites in other parts of Africa, uncertainty amongst white 
South Africans became even more pronounced. Settler communities in particularly 
Congo and Angola, had by mid-1961, suffered horrific violence through militant African 
nationalism. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly and vigorously prompted by politicians, 
the press and SADF figures alike, an unsubstantiated scenario of an “African invasion” 
started to become a feature of South African public debate. This also invoked discussion 
as to how the SADF was equipped for the new decade. The Cape Argus in March 1961 
called for the establishment of a “new modern army” “geared for the missile age – not an 
auxiliary police force that belongs to the ox-wagon days”. Under a sub-heading of “More 
potential enemies,” the writer demonstrated the hysteria of the time regarding supposed 
military dangers from the north.
47
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By this date, most African states closest to South Africa were still a year or two away 
from independence, let alone building up a substantial military capability. But numerous 
press and political speculation about the “Africa threat” reflects a paranoia and 
sensationalism, providing some insight to the extremity of white insecurities, that racial 
war from „black Africa‟ could somehow descend upon them. Already from MacMillan‟s 
February 1960 address to the South African Parliament and the violent events shortly 
afterwards in the Congo, the Verwoerd government were announcing their intention to 
construct the SADF as a counter-force against any military threat the decolonisation of 
Africa might precipitate towards the Republic, or any other aggressor challenging South 
African control over SWA.  However inaccurate and logistically impossible these 
scenarios were, an external “African invasion” constituted a central South African 
defence issue during the first half of the 1960s. This theme is discussed further within 
chapters three and four. 
 
Fouché: Attempts during 1960 to plot a new SA defence policy course 
 
„Showcasing‟ the SADF‟s fighting capacity also endorsed the military‟s identification 
with republican nationhood and it was assumed, helped to alleviate white anxieties about 
their security. From the beginning of Fouché‟s ministerial tenure, the SADF was “re-
introduced” to white South Africans as fully deserving their support. Commando 
correspondents had little comment to make on the political implications of the internal 
unrest, but much to report upon decolonisation, the Cold War and “communism” in 
Africa. The publication also reported with enthusiasm how “successfully” Defence Force 











and Afrikaans CF members. Fouché was the government‟s front man for this SADF inter-
white relations amelioration “project” and persistently reinforced the „common white 
cause‟. During the 1960 Union Festival Celebrations, while addressing the predominantly 
Afrikaans crowd in Bloemfontein, he commented in English upon the SADF‟s 
mobilisation after Sharpeville:  
During the period of emergency it was to me an extremely 
hopeful and gladdening sign to see how in all the Provinces the 
various English and Afrikaans medium Citizen Force units 
rallied to the cause of national security…show(ing) a 
praiseworthy spirit of unity for a common cause, namely that of 
self-preservation. I therefore believe that the armed services set a 
fine example for our population as a whole and it will be a good 
day for all of us if our entire nation could immolate (sic) 
(emulate?) the example set by the SA Defence Force  in working 




Commando reiterated the notion of the military „belonging‟ to both language groups; of it 
being an entity whereby national white unity could be publicly promoted and displayed 
amongst young white males. Addressing packed crowds at the conclusion of a national 
schools cadet competition, Fouché reflected symbolically upon examples of the 
respective white language groups‟ heritages regarding young white South African male 
historical heroes:   
Let the Dick Kings and Dirkie Uys‟s during this festival in 
Bloemfontein offer each other a brotherly hand on the road to a 
great future. When you return to your different schools 
remember that you coexisted here as future Afrikaans and 
English citizens of this country, played together and competed 
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Perhaps not without coincidence, Fouché chose an early Natal settler hero, for this 
province‟s white English-speaking community expressed the most cohesive virulent anti-
republican feelings (See chapter six). Earlier that year, Fouché had already made the first 
political moves to work towards a more conciliatory government stance regarding 
Afrikaans-English relations within the military. The Natal Mercury reported with 
satisfaction that Fouché had rescinded the proposed disbandment by his predecessor of 
traditional English CF regiments, the Imperial Light Horse and Umvoti Mounted Rifles. 
The editorial commented guardedly:  
Since the announcement of the republican referendum Natal 
might be excused for regarding any Nationalist manifestations of 
„sweet reasonableness‟ with suspicion, but for the present it 
would be both charitable and wise to take Mr Fouché‟s 




Fouché continued to shift the SADF away from other Erasmus changes that had caused 
anger and disdain amongst members, for example, “in the interests of administration and 
morale”
51
 the historic Boer inspired rank titles of Field-Cornet, Air-Cornet and Sea 
Cornet were abandoned. This amendment was even supported by the Inspector-General, 
Brig Hiemstra, a staunch Afrikaner nationalist who career is covered in chapter two.
52
 
The UP MP for Simon‟s Town, F.C. Gay, one of the parliamentary opposition‟s 
prominent defence spokespersons, stated with perhaps naive optimism:  
By making this decision on ranks and by retaining the … 
regiments that Mr Erasmus had decided must go, Mr Fouché has 
shown he is prepared to put defence matters on a national 
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basis…Having taken over defence he has dropped the party 




But Fouché was still a committed Afrikaner nationalist and a few weeks later, he rejected 
any SADF participation in the 60
th
 anniversary celebrations of the Ladysmith Relief 
during the South African War.
54
 Fouché compounded this by justifying his decision, in 
terms of having also disallowed official military involvement in a recent 60
th
 anniversary 
of the Battle of Paardeberg (which he described as a British defeat - it had been the 
opposite).
55
 Later he explained that he could not allow the SADF to participate at 
Ladysmith, as it commemorated a British victory and risked bedevilling attempts to work 
towards white reconciliation. Fouché asked in parliament whether it would be acceptable 
for Afrikaners to call upon the SADF to celebrate the Majuba or Magersfontein Boer 
victories.
56
 Fouché‟s attempts to be all things to all (white) men meant his politically 
manoeuvring between distrusts and resentments within both language communities. 
Addressing the conservative rural Afrikaans community of the Hennenman district of the 
northern Free State, Fouché emphasised both the theme of unity and necessity of 
conciliation with the South African English, besides assurances that existing defence 
alliances would not disappear. 
If South Africa became a republic, the defence agreement with 
Britain would still remain and the West would still cooperate 
with South Africa. Anyone who said that the British Government 
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had no faith in a National Party Government was not conversant 
with the true facts. South Africa was a vital link in the defence of 
the West… We must build a republic with the strongest possible 




It was significant that Fouché felt the need to state to a platteland
58
 Free State 
community, his confidence and support for the British government‟s defence outlook. He 
was responding to parliamentary criticism of the coming republic being likely to isolate 
South Africa in defence. However, within the context of conciliation with the local white 
English community, as is shown later, there were also Afrikaner detractors who rejected 
Fouché‟s efforts to be more inclusive. 
 
Fouché attempted to pacify the UP opposition who had furiously challenged Erasmus‟s 
changes and also despised Hiemstra; particularly as he was now the third highest ranking 
officer on the SADF General Staff and apparently moving rapidly towards the top. 
Fouché worked with diplomatic care and not always successfully to reinforce the 
perception that fair-mindedness regarding both language groups in the SADF was an 
important part of his approach towards setting defence policy. Although it was all part of 
government republican strategy to draw more English-speaking political support, it still 
created a quandary for the opposition UP, who during the months prior and post the 
republic referendum were anxious to retain their voting support. The UP demonstrated a 
particular interest in defence affairs and often endorsed NP decisions, although usually 
with criticism regarding details.  
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The other focus of Fouché‟s ministerial efforts concerned the securing of the state against 
perceived threats and trying to reinforce a new SADF vitality and purpose. Speaking in 
August 1960 to a Voortrekkerhoogte gathering of CF and Commando officers, Fouché 
reiterated that the army‟s current most important tasks were ensuring internal law and 
order and consolidating the country‟s external defence, in accordance with western 
perceptions of purported communist techniques: 
in a western-orientated country such as South Africa (internal 
security) is no less than securing against Communist infiltration 
and subversive actions that head towards revolution. Planning 
and training will keep pace with this thinking. Not excluded from 
training methods is conventional warfare, all service weaponry 




With the republican referendum held in October 1960, the newspapers continued 
reporting alarmist government announcements, which also fulfilled political purposes by 
the NP, trying to rally more pro-republican whites. At a meeting in Cornelia, Fouché 
equated such support as equivalent to ensuring white survival through military strength, 
embracing SADF strengthening as part of the republican rationale:   
three aspirations of the nation had to be considered when voting 
for or against a republic…Will we be able to maintain ourselves 
as Europeans? Will we be able to survive economically? And 
will our military defences be strong enough? The military forces 
of the country were strong and were still growing, he said. New 
regiments had been established and commandos were being 
strengthened. The country would now have to manufacture most 
of its own weapons, as the countries now supplying South Africa 
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Fouché had to deal with criticism suggesting the SADF, if increasingly orientated 
towards policing, would lose its external defence capacity. Concern was expressed 
whether dealing with unrest would become the SADF‟s primary function, with the 
force‟s training and equipment thus adjusted. The Cape Argus military correspondent 
attributed this to the government‟s confusion over the military‟s main function, allowing 
it to be: 
conver(ted) from a potential expeditionary force into an auxiliary 
police for keeping order…The past record of South African 
troops has been superb. Is this splendid tradition to collapse 
because timorous ideological politicians, none with practical 
knowledge of war, can see no further than their own internal 
fears?
61
   
 
This quotation is drawn from a lengthy newspaper analysis of the SADF at the end of 
1960 and reflects the World War Two outlook of UDF troops fighting abroad, while NP 
supporters of neutrality (or the Germans) had remained at home. Twenty years later, 
some former Smuts government supporters were critical of the NP government now using 
the SADF as police; ignoring the UDF‟s legacy of campaigning in other parts of the 
world during the World Wars. The military was a regular feature of discussion in the 
English-language newspapers of the 1960s, reflecting the strong interest that many 
English South Africans maintained regarding defence. Military matters constituted 
significantly newsworthy interest from many English press readers. This point 
underscores one of this dissertation‟s contentions: That many English South Africans, 
particularly the World War Two generation, were highly committed to both the military 
and defending the Republic. Despite the virtual complete exclusion of the English 
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community from political power since 1948 and notwithstanding Afrikaner nationalist 
assaults during the 1950s upon all forms of South Africa British symbolism, the military 
still interestingly evoked a strongly supportive „English‟ response. The Cape Argus 
reporter registered his dismay that South Africa might no longer be able to assist “in the 
event of an attack on her neighbours”. Such an operation required the right training and 
equipment. The reporter thought it relevant that the SADF had still not invested in 
helicopters to any meaningful extent, although in reality, the utilization of such aircraft in 
combat had still not been fully tested by 1960.   
The Minister of Defence and service chiefs…find that their time 
and energy, and their men, weapons and finances (are) diverted 
to matters which are the responsibility of the police and Minister 
of Justice.
62
   
        
As a consequence of the problems experienced during the emergency call-ups, besides 
responding to criticism from the parliamentary opposition that the SADF was being 
turned into a “home guard”, Fouché had announced in Parliament that the mobility of the 
Defence Force was to be improved and that they were being equipped with the “most 
modern weapons South Africa could afford”.
63
 Further criticism levelled against the 
government during this period was along familiar “language-group” conflict lines and 
accusations of incompetence. UP defence spokespersons like F.C. Gay and Brig H. F. 
Bronkhorst demonstrated white South African solidarity on defence. But this was of 
course, mixed with their political motives to expose the government in terms of previous 
neglect of the military. These and other UP members supposedly helpful overtures to 
                                                 
62
 Ibid.  
63











Fouché, offering their party‟s assistance and venturing that he had now the opportunity to 




Defence Budget considerations 
 
The early 1960s witnessed dramatic increases in defence spending. Whereas there had 
actually been a decline between 1955 and 1960, there were substantial increases 
thereafter to 1968, with defence receiving an annually increasing amount of total 
government expenditure. The rise in government spending on the armed forces during 
this period, was partly to cover large amounts of new conventional warfare equipment 
intended for strategic deterrence (as explained by the government) and also the 
facilitation of a remarkable expansion of the country‟s own weapons industry, with 
scores of licenses being obtained for the manufacture of a various arms. By 1965, Fouché 
announced the country was self-sufficient in small-arms ammunition. Other successes 
included within the aircraft industry, where a licence was obtained to manufacture Impala 
jet trainers, while French-designed armoured cars were also now locally manufactured 
(the French Panhard to be known in the SADF as the Eland
65
). However, other 
fundamental military hardware, including tanks, anti-aircraft and field artillery, missiles 
and most importantly, sophisticated military aircraft and naval vessels, besides scores of 
different types of munitions still had to be imported.
66
 It was against the impending UN 
arms embargo of 1963 that the government frantically rearmed the SAAF in particular, 
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considering that air superiority was long established as vital in ensuring success in any 
modern defensive war.   
 
The press followed the increases in military spending with avid interest. For example, by 
mid-1963, the Cape Argus under the headline “Defence Cost Soars,” noted that the 
defence budget of R157 million included an increase of R35 million, which exceeded the 
extra R6.5 million put aside for „Bantu Development. The newspaper reminded its 
readers that this was the “cornerstone of Government policy”. Finance minister Eben 
Donges explained that the increase constituted the “formidable price of protection against 
foreign aggression”. The actual budget details demonstrated where the increase applied 
regarding the actual material additions. A good proportion covered air defence (See 
chapter five); there was an eighty-fold rise in aircraft bombs and ammunition, suggesting 
the SADF was stocking up on munitions for its new Mirage fighters (delivered 1961) and 
Canberra light bombers (delivered 1962), besides the Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft 
(delivered 1965) already on order from the United Kingdom. Overall the budget‟s 
defence allocations had shifted from R40 million in 1959-60, to big jumps in 1961-62 
(R71.5 million), 1962/63 (R120 million) to 1963/64 (R157 million).
67
 Of the 1959-60 
defence expenditure, this was seven percent of the total government spending, rising to 
seventeen percent (R216.3 million) by 1966-67.
68
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The SADF and apartheid during the early 1960s:  National Party projections of how 
“race” connected to defence issues   
 
During the 1960s, the SADF operated within government racial policy and endorsed it 
where practical. Already from the middle of the 1950s, the future Commandant General 
Hiemstra was in the forefront of promoting government racial policy in various guises at 
public occasions and even more enthusiastically as the concept of grand apartheid 
generated excitement in NP ranks.
69
 In mid-1959, there had even been press speculation 
as to whether Hiemstra was not going to take over as Minister of Defence from the ill 
Erasmus.
70
  During the Day of the Covenant commemorations at Hoërskool Kensington 
(in Johannesburg) in December 1959, Hiemstra endorsed the concept of independent 
homelands.
71
 Fouché‟s first public address as defence minister (Vegkop on 16 December 
1959), included his remarking that “the person in South Africa who has not realised that 
further negotiations in the area of race relations in South Africa are necessary, has 




In the SADF by 1960, there were no „non-white‟ uniformed staff, but this was to 
change the following year, when Fouché announced the reactivation of the Cape 
Coloured Corps.
73
 The SA Navy started recruited coloured members for selected 
positions to alleviate its manpower problems and from 1963, the first navy recruitment 
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advertisements begin to appear in Commando offering various non-combatant roles. 
The re-establishment was announced of the Cape Corps (army) as a training unit, 
reversing the situation created by Erasmus, whereby no person other than a white was 
allowed to serve in military uniform. Commando provided editorial „approval‟ for the 
change in government policy, praising past coloured military contributions, although 
„cautioning‟ against the “Coloured man‟s” “partial(ity) to drink.”
74
 But despite such 
racial stereotyping, such tiny cracks in the breakdown of apartheid rigidity occurred, 
significantly, within the SADF, at an earlier date compared to other state departments. 
This is in itself a remarkable detail during this ideologically dogmatic Verwoerdian era. 
Coloured recruitment had occurred for almost the identical reasons for which the Smuts 
government had promoted it some twenty years earlier, namely the shortage of military 
personnel. Grobbelaar envisaged a tenth of the PF total personnel being ultimately 
coloured, serving in a supportive but not combatant role.
75
 By the 1960s, the need for 
additional military manpower was also connected to the SADF having to develop its 
capacity to respond towards perceived threats. Coloured navy and army components 
were included within the SADF‟s contribution to the Republic‟s 1966 fifth anniversary 
celebrations at Cape Town‟s Goodwood Showgrounds.
76
          
 
Rear Admiral H. Biermann, then Chief of Navy Staff, outlined navy personnel 
shortages in response to the Commandant General‟s instructions for reports regarding 
mobilisation plans. By a few months into 1963, Coloureds already in navy service were 
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occupying 163 PF posts, including 24 on the boom defence vessel, SAS Somerset 
(comprising most of the crew). Biermann outlined other positions that coloured sailors 
could fill: „writers‟ (effectively administrative clerks), store men, waiters and cooks. 
Although he did not envisage coloureds manning naval combat ships. Biermann 
anticipated white crew on other navy ships reacting unfavourably to living and working 
alongside coloured sailors: 
but it must be stated here that even the extended harnessing of 
the Cape Corps is not going to solve the navy‟s manpower 
problems, particularly, because of the circumstances of living 
together when at sea.
77
         
 
Rear Adm Chris Bennett believed that Biermann realised that it would have been 
impractical to provide separate work and facilities for coloured and white sailors 
aboard the navy‟s small ships,
78
 although later, the survey ship SAS Natal also 
included coloured crew. With considerable difficulty, the navy authorities ensured that 
there were separate facilities on the „Natal‟ in accordance with government racial 
policy. Its replacement, SAS Protea ordered from Yarrow shipyard in Scotland during 
the early 1960s, was deliberately designed so that white and coloured crew could sleep 
and mess separately. This would have been a decision endorsed by the Department of 
Defence with the knowledge and therefore approval of the minister and certainly 
known to the Navy Chief.
79
 Yet the earlier part of the decade, witnessed South African 
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military personnel attended various courses in the United Kingdom, where they met 
and established good personal relations with African and Asian counterparts. The 
“professional racial separation” which these SADF members returned to at home, 
resulted in them working between two entirely different worlds.
80
 Blacks were entirely 
absent from projected SADF uniformed roles except as potential adversaries. Fears of a 
threat from the decolonising north „Black Africa‟ became a rallying cry utilised by NP 
politicians even before republic. The Orange Free State Administrator J.W.J.C. Du 
Plessis, referred to such at a farewell parade for CF members at the Tempe military 
base in June 1960: 
The hostility of this solid black mass to the north of the Union 
and Federation has not been sought for, nor occasioned, and not 
deserved, taking into account the opportunities South Africa has 
created for her own Bantu.
81
   
 
Du Plessis made implicit reference here to the “opportunities” of grand apartheid. After 
MacMillan‟s visit to South Africa, Commando made a particular point of recording 
how Fouché had elaborated upon grand apartheid also containing a security dimension, 
whereby he argued that the futures of white and black were interlinked. Blacks were 
supposedly dependent upon white government efforts for their “advancement”. 
According to Fouché, South African blacks needed therefore to appreciate how whites 
also had to feel certain of their own security. Whites in return needed to prove their 
“bona fides” to the “black man”, namely that the white community desired “his 
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(blacks)” security and “full opportunities” too.
82
 As NP republican intentions also 
envisaged closer cooperation of the two white language groups, Fouché imagined a 
Defence Force that institutionally mirrored the government‟s plan to assimilate English 
and Afrikaans whites into one entity under Afrikaner leadership. Assumed by NP 
leadership was that most SADF members would also support the ideal of the larger 
political vision concerning the racial „self-determination‟ of black and white.  
 
As the SADF operated explicitly within separate development policy; when utilised as 
labourers, blacks received a kind of paternalistic acknowledgement regarding their 
culture, besides a distant concern for their welfare. For example, a white correspondent 
received a curt response on behalf of the Commandant General, when he complained 
that some black workers were given excessive privileges. The correspondent 
complained about the workers being flown home for leave from a site where an air base 
was being constructed. The SADF answer was that the work on the base was urgent; 
therefore, experienced SAAF labour was required and for humanitarian reasons, 
workers were given aircraft seats to Pretoria when these were available, for one long 
weekend a month at home.
83
 Nevertheless, strict apartheid racial separation remained 
explicit policy, even during operational conditions. During a 1963 SADF troop 
deployment exercise, intended to train for responding to any envisaged threat from 
across the Republic‟s border, the Commandant General‟s office were adamant that 
racial division would be implemented amongst captured (black) enemy troops.  
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The national policy of segregation of whites and non-whites is an 
accepted part of our planning and it is clear that separate 
facilities will have to be provided to handle, cage and provide 
medical attention for white and non-white prisoners of war.
84
 
   
Prominent visitors from other countries who gave any credence to government racial 
policies, received red-carpet treatment, particularly if they also concurred with NP 
political imperatives of “rapprochement”, in soothing previous World War Two white 
divisions and sensitivities. The government obviously hoped such visits would promote 
more international sympathy for white South Africans. A prominent „military example‟ 
was British war legend Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, who arrived in his private 
capacity during 1962, accompanied by Maj Gen Sir Francis de Guingand, his wartime 
Chief of Staff and now President of the South African Foundation.   
 
Montgomery was a most useful political ally, for he constituted such a significant figure 
to thousands of South African ex-servicemen. The high governmental level that received 
Montgomery, demonstrated how important the Afrikaner establishment viewed his visit, 
anticipating his supportive opinions on South African politics and defence concerns. 
Montgomery dined with Verwoerd and nine cabinet members at Groote Schuur besides 
being received enthusiastically by the Afrikaner academic and business establishments. 
Montgomery met with Professor H.B. Thom, the Principal of Stellenbosch University; 
leading Afrikaans businessman Anton Rupert and members of the Afrikaanse Sakekamer. 
He also visited schools and addressed war veterans. 
85
 Besides being feted with official 
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SADF receptions, Montgomery was flown by the government to the Transkei for a three 
day visit to this first Bantustan intended for independence and was quoted as supporting 
Verwoerd and white South African unity, concluding on his return to the UK, that 
“separate development” “was a plan worthy of the most sincere examination and study”:  
In South Africa there was „complete peace and quiet‟, very 
different from the rest of the continent, where we see chaos and 
unrest and nobody seems able to unscramble the racial omelette 
in a peaceful atmosphere.‟
86
    
 
By 1962, much of the parliamentary political debate centred directly upon Verwoerd‟s 
setting out a stark choice before the white electorate: Either apartheid or the UP policy of 
a “multi-racial state,” where franchised rights would be granted, whether on a federal 
basis, or according to a “civilisation test”. Either of which „UP criteria possibilities‟ the 
NP rejected, because such “would lead inevitably to Bantu domination because in the end 
numbers would count”.
87
 Within the same parliamentary debate, Verwoerd directly 
referred to the demands of the white Republic‟s opponents by outlining his views upon 
the motives for Third and communist world hostility to South Africa:  
 Afro-Asian nations and the communistic nations who had their 
own explicitly political reasons for trying to apply pressure…that 
political rights must be given to all. In the case of the 
Communistic Bloc this policy was being pressed for, to enable 




The identification of the “Afro-Asian states” and “communistic nations” as being those 
that threatened the white republic, was directly connected to their rejection of the South 
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African government‟s race policy. The NP dismissed UP and Progressive Party policies 
as naïve, while Verwoerd polarised political discussion around whites needing to either 
“segregate or die”. In Commando and official defence documentation, the SADF was 
projected as a supportive arm of government thinking. This linkage between South 
African defence issues and white survival received prominence in the press and popular 
Afrikaans publications. Clearly understood in the government and SADF position was 
that behind external perceived military threats, lay an undertone of black determination to 
“ethnically cleanse” Africa of whites. Therefore, grand apartheid was postulated as a 
legitimate security response for white South African survival.      
 
Portuguese colonial culture had not applied such rigid legal racial stratification and was 
viewed with concern by SADF strategists. Within an April 1963 appraisal of possible 
developments, impacting “upon the safety of the RSA”, military intelligence director, 
Brig P.M. Retief commented unfavourably upon the “official Portuguese policy” of 
“racial integration and economic development”. He emphasised that the Portuguese 
approach to race was:  
endeavouring to pacify and impress the UN and indigenous 
people and in view of the fact that the policy of race integration 
is in direct contrast to the RSA policy of separate development, 
the only common interest that the RSA has with the Portuguese 
Administration is that both countries want to remain in Africa 
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This document commented pessimistically: “neither of these (above) policy directions is 
acceptable for world opinion or the black leaders of Angola and Mozambique.”
90
 Such 
endorses our understanding that by the early 1960s, official SADF thinking had already 
dovetailed with broad NP racial policy, where the government outlook on decolonisation, 
was that it threateningly impacting upon the beleaguered white republic. There had long 
been South African government concerns about Portuguese military durability in Africa, 
dating back from the slow Portuguese army response to the 1961 Angolan insurrections.
91
 
Already by late 1962, there also existed doubts that Mozambique would remain under 
Portuguese control, with the Commandant General urging Fouché to ratify various SADF 
plans to improve defence on the eastern border.
92
           
 
The threat perceptions of the early 1960s invoked some popular responses envisaging 
the entire South African population repelling any invader. Amidst the speculation, 
Progressive Party MP Harry Lawrence, confirmed that Smuts had during World War 
Two considered arming blacks and coloureds if the Japanese had seized Madagascar.
93
 
UP parliamentarians also touted the image of a unified defence across colour lines, a 
view which usually distinguished them from typical NP public statements when 
defence and race were discussed. One NP retort to calls for the SADF to employ black 
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troops, was that British, French and Rhodesians recruiting “non-whites” (in their 
African colonial military forces) had not reduced the “anti-colonial” pressure on them 
by Africa nationalists.
94
 However, the picture of all races defending South Africa was 
not completely excluded from the Afrikaner popular vision. In 1964, Huisgenoot 
featured an article by the UP MP Piet Van der Byl, who revived war-time images of all 
racial groupings as part of the UDF facing a common enemy. When referring to the 
“possibility” of an “Afro-Asian military invasion, Van der Byl was quoted:
95
  
We shall be supported by hundreds of thousands of non-whites, 
particularly our coloured people, who despite their grievances 
have always proved they are great South African patriots. No Sir, 
the time for sitting silently while gall and venom is disgorged 




Significantly, Van der Byl‟s views were published in a mass-distributed Afrikaans 
publication that had also started running articles “rehabilitating” South African 
participation in World War Two.
97
 As representative of Afrikaner popular opinion, if not 
actually even playing no small role in creating such opinion, Huisgenoot was endorsing 
an alternative view to the Afrikaner nationalists of the 1940s, regarding those South 
Africans that had accepted the “Red Oath”, volunteering to fight anywhere in Africa and 
later Europe. The irony is striking, in that such was the stance of virtually all 1960s NP 
MPs, not forgetting that position also taken by the SADF‟s (1963) Deputy Commandant 
General Hiemstra and future Chief. Huisgenoot described how South Africa had 
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historically producing resourceful and brave soldiers who had demonstrated their mettle 
in battle twenty years before. From an NP government perspective, such “rehabilitation” 
of World War Two also assisted facilitation of the “white republican nationalism” 
promoted by the NP.  
 
SADF military intelligence (DMI) did not share Van der Byl‟s optimism of a loyal multi-
racial defence of South Africa. DMI studied the black opposition, which in terms of 
“armed struggle,” had after state counter-measures largely waned by the beginning of 
1963. But DMI still held that the “subversion” amongst blacks (by „revolutionary forces‟) 
remained and could not be underestimated; maintaining that it was intended to ultimately 
eliminate “key persons”‟, “communications” and “key positions,” besides being better 
organised and more prevalent than the possibilities of either further direct sabotage or 
terrorism. The most important subversive organisation was identified as the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC), besides external communist and Afro-Asian groups that 
purportedly synchronised their activities with internal anti-government organisations. The 
fear expressed by DMI was that both internal and external propaganda, intended to firm 
up subversive elements, was more successful than generally believed amongst whites. In 
contrast to the kind of views propagated by Van der Byl, DMI recommended that to 
restrict subversion, it needed to be understood that too much value was attached to a 
white South African belief, that the “larger portion of the Bantu were „loyally-inclined‟. 











could hurry the loyalist (black) element into the subversive kraal”.
98
  The implication was 
that military intelligence were engrossed within a racial defence paradigm, postulating 
that the “enemy within” constituted a demographically huge fifth column. As fears of 
external conventional threats receded by the mid-1960s, the military shifted doctrine and 
strategy towards counter-insurgency, whereby it was taught that successful combating of 
guerrilla forces, depended upon the state gaining support of the “hearts and minds” of the 
aggrieved population component on whose behalf the dissidents waged war. 
 
Commando magazine articles during 1962 and 1963 by segregationist theorist, Prof. 
H.J.J.M. Van der Merwe  
 
As the government explicitly believed white South African survival meant ensuring racial 
territorial segregation, the SADF did its best to propagate this to its members. Commando 
provided one important communication vehicle to SADF members for Verwoerdian 
rationales of African decolonisation and its potential impact upon the Republic‟s security. 
Between January 1962 and March 1963 Commando published regular extracts from 
Segregeer of Sterf (Segregate or Die) by Professor H.J.J.M Van der Merwe, Head of the 
Department of Afrikaans-Nederlands at the University of South Africa. The articles 
alluded to the negative implications of African decolonisation for white communities and 
administrations throughout Africa. Van der Merwe was introduced as a “convinced 
segregationist” who after “undertaking a lengthy journey through Africa, Israel and 
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Europe, gave particular attention to contacts between languages and races within the 
same national borders”.  
 
Reflecting upon South African white and black cultural diversities, Van der Merwe 
identified the former Belgian Congo as necessitating a particular examination, because 
there had been “identical circumstances of two disunited white groups (French and 
Flemish) existing amongst millions of blacks”. There is little surprise in his choice, 
considering the impact Congo post-independence events had in playing havoc upon white 
South Africa‟s sense of security. Simultaneously to this article, South African 
newspapers were filled with stories of atrocities perpetrated against white settlers in 
Katanga, both by UN troops (particularly Indian Army) and black Congolese. Refugees 
were reported arriving in Cape Town, desperately grateful for support from South 
African authorities.
99
 As a language expert and linguist, Van der Merwe maintained he 
was bound to also study people and their social/cultural milieu:  
social establishments cannot always be separated from the affairs 
of statecraft. It must be remembered that social groups usually 
use language as a binding factor. Unfortunately this 
exceptionally important ethnic-social-linguistic facet is not 
always viewed with its full implications for interpretations of 




Van der Merwe‟s articles contained the implications of Africa as a potential foe of white 
South Africa. His opening article stressed that at Pan-Africanist congresses since 1960, 
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there had been repeated calls for African states to organise a centralised military force.
101
 
His articles were published in Commando every two or three months during 1962-1963, 
keeping SADF readers abreast with African developments through his interpretations 
which endorsed racial segregation as the only logical route to white survival. Such 
writings appeared directly in an SADF official publication without any alternate views, 
even those of the conservative UP. In reality, however much it may have galled some 
English-speakers to openly concur with the nationalist viewpoint, very few during this 
period would have differed broadly from the kind of opinions Van der Merwe espoused.   
 
The SADF and grand apartheid  
 
From the defence ministerial position and a senior SADF capacity, Fouché and Hiemstra 
respectively, virtually worked in tandem regarding publicly expounding upon the NP‟s 
future political vision. UP criticism was that the NP‟s racial policy actually created 
defence weaknesses, for example, “handing over the Union‟s entire eastern coastline to 
Bantu states”.
102
 There were also occasional calls by individual NP politicians to utilise 
blacks in the military; for example, MP J.F. Schoonbee suggested that consideration be 
given to “Bantu” involvement in defence.
103
 But Fouché continually rebuffed this line by 
suggesting the SADF would also protect “the Black man who wished to live in peace in 
his own area,”
104
 besides that the „independent states‟ (Bantustans) would not necessarily 
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be hostile in the future to the Republic and their independence might even accentuate 




As was shown earlier, the SADF regularly exhibited its equipment for public interest 
through popular exhibitions, which included mock battles using live ammunition. These 
occasions also provided Hiemstra with the ideal opportunities for political speeches. A 
performance during the 1964 Republic Day celebrations in Mafeking, had the unusual 
dimension of also being witnessed by an audience of blacks almost equal to the white 
numbers. Commando reported figures of 3000 and 4000 respectively. As the guest 
speaker, Hiemstra performed the role of political soothsayer, explaining the SADF‟s 
purpose as inclusive defence for all: 
I am particularly pleased to see such a large number of the 
Tswana nation here. It is not often that they get the opportunity 
to see our Defence Force  in action – a Defence Force  that is 
built up from the money and contributions from all the people in 
our country, for the protection of all the people in our country, 
against the threats from certain outsiders that might attempt to 




Referring to the struggle to achieve a Republic and the technological progress thus far 
achieved in the country, Hiemstra gave an optimistic projection of the country‟s future, as 
it was intended to develop within the paradigm of separate development. 
The development of Bantu areas must of necessity raise 
contingent questions regarding ensuring power supplies, building 
materials, rail and road links, provision of water and many other 
needs. We shall aim at realising a higher and higher living 
standard for all our people. This means that not only the whites 
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but also the non-whites‟ productivity will have to increase to 
justify a higher gauging of wages.
107
    
 
It is difficult not to imagine that alongside this political rhetoric, such military displays 
were also intended to at least awe rural blacks with the state‟s military power, at best 
serving a barely disguised intimidating purpose of reinforcing racial social relations. 
After a display of air power during the opening of the new Pietersberg air force base in 
late 1964, the Commando correspondent let this ulterior motive slip through:  
There were many highlights. What was the climax? Some would 
have said the first public appearance of the Canberra bomber, 
and for others the formation flying of the Sabres, for young boys 
it was surely how the Mirage broke the sound barrier twice. For 
the Bantus, and there were thousands of them, it was the 
terrifying power of the air force.108    
 
The SADF also played its role in allowing government-recognised black leaders to 
honour its commanders. In a draft reply written in May 1964, by the Commandant 
General‟s office, in response to allegations made by the „UNO Committee of Experts 
on the RSA‟ it was proudly pointed out that:  
It is a fact that the Head of the SA Armed Forces was elected an 
honorary Chief of one of the Northern Bantu tribes as an 
indication of their respect for the SA Defence Force and the 
support they expect from it when required. This is a striking 
example of the mutual confidence prevailing between the White 
man and the Black man in South Africa.109 
 
After August 1966, SADF intelligence structures also postulated that grand apartheid 
could complicate the country‟s defence, as UP spokespersons had earlier suggested. 
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From a military-strategic viewpoint, homeland locations within the republic, SWA and 
British High Commission territories ideally needed integration into defence planning. 
The SADF were now viewing the Bantustans positioning as strategic problems from 
where potential guerrilla threats had closer proximity to both communication links, as 
well as their own possible „safe‟ bases in Swaziland, Bechuanaland, Basutoland or the 
wilderness of the Kruger Park. It was predicted that any development of an 
unconventional military threat on the country would not necessarily follow the same 
pattern as Angola or Mozambique. But DMI analysis concurred within apartheid 
assumption paradigms, believing the Republic‟s black population was “less vulnerable” 
to being politically influenced because the “traditional (South Africa) race policy” had 
been “accepted” by different race groups over centuries. There was a “much higher 
social and development standard (compared with other Southern African states) 
amongst all population groups in the RSA.” It was thought defence issues would be 
more easily managed by the fact that “different race-groups were located…with the 
intention of separate development”.  
 
However, it was also acknowledged that because of limited infrastructural development 
and the dependency upon “non-white labour,” the country was vulnerable to any 
interference with this labour or sabotage against key points, despite a relatively larger 
white population compared with its neighbours.
110
 Afrikaner nationalism during the 
1960s presented grand apartheid as a necessity for white South African survival, but the 
SADF, supposedly the final bulwark against threats, through DMI demonstrated some 
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ambivalence to the obvious flaws in apartheid compromising long-term military security. 
Compared to the 1950s, when defence had largely been towards the back of the queue 





NP ministers and SADF senior staff officers followed post-republic government public 
initiatives to promote a united white republic, where the Defence Force was projected as 
illustrative of such inclusiveness. New defence minister Fouché particularly emphasised 
Afrikaans and English cooperation on defence issues. After Sharpeville, the international 
condemnation of South African was severe, although objectively not necessarily 
militarily hostile, if just for the lack of Afro-Asian capacity to intervene in the Republic 
by force. Along with future potential internal unrest, post-republic defence uncertainties 
and looming international isolation, Fouché was appointed by Verwoerd to politically 
manage the reversal of inter-white antipathies within the SADF, a legacy from the 
previous Erasmus decade where Afrikanerisation had been the higher priority than 
operational effectiveness.  
 
The SADF‟s morale and fighting capacity required restoration and Fouché approached 
this task by demonstrating markedly better skills than his predecessor. It was during 
Fouché‟s ministerial tenure than the SADF was re-organised to face perceived potential 











retained its traditional maritime naval links with Britain, although these were shaped to 
the UK‟s advantage. However, intelligence structures utilised by the SADF had to largely 
be rebuilt from a previous heavy dependence upon Britain. As the South African 
government secured its republican constitutional status, so its isolation in defence became 
more apparent. The simultaneous implementation of Verwoerdian grand apartheid during 
the 1960s created its own defence complications, although the government, despite 
allowing very limited coloured recruitment, steadfastly stuck to its segregationist 
principles. Within both official and popular publications, a dual process occurred 
whereby World War Two was kind of “rehabilitated” for the promotion of white unity, 
while Afrikaner nationalist leadership and political policy were reinforced as applying to 











Chapter 2: Commandant General Rudolf Hiemstra and senior SADF leadership 
 
This chapter concerns Commandant General Rudolf C. Hiemstra‟s contributions and role 
in reshaping the SADF from 1960 to 1968, but also it attempts to describe aspects of 
other senior officers‟ involvement, along with selected short biographies. Hiemstra 
aspired to create a kind of volksweermag that was intended to enhance a common white 
South African identity, while remaining predominated by Afrikaner nationalist interests 
and under Afrikaner leadership. Ostensibly, it was meant for the SADF to serve as a 
unifying agent within a white society that still exhibited political, historical, cultural, 
educational and social divisions.  
 
Hiemstra‟s career deserves special attention, not least because it was fraught with 
political controversy, due to his regular imbuing of official duties with Afrikaner 
nationalist rhetoric, most particularly from around the mid-1950s, when he publicly 
started projecting a profile as a strongly politically orientated soldier.  In the 1950s and 
1960s, Hiemstra was an almost unique military civil servant at the disposal of the NP 
government. He had made the Defence Force his vocation before World War Two and 
during a career spanning over forty years, never wavered from espousing the most 
dogmatic Afrikaner nationalist vision. As a top SAAF pilot in the late 1930s, with 
considerable professional prospects, Hiemstra had suspended his career by declining on 
political grounds, to take the Africa Oath (or „Red Oath‟), whereby UDF members 
consented to war service in Africa. Hiemstra was following the NP position that South 
Africa should remain neutral in the war between Germany and Britain. In 1941, under 











from the military. After the NP election victory in 1948, Hiemstra regained his 
commission and bolstered with political patronage through new defence minister Frans 
Erasmus, renewed his career ambitions, accompanied with a triumphant zeal to 
„Afrikanerise‟ the UDF.
111
 Within little more than a decade, Hiemstra had risen to the 
highest ranks, serving as SADF Deputy Commandant General from December 1960 and 
thereafter as Commandant General: October 1965 to March 1972. Hiemstra was assured 
of a well-oiled career path as a pre-war serving officer of some ability and strong 
Afrikaner nationalist feelings. But it was only after the 1953 general election that he 
began to embark on making regular public political utterances; a practice in which 
Hiemstra indulged himself until his retirement in March 1972,
112
 without ever any open 
censure from the government.  
    
 
By 1960, with the possible exception of Erasmus, Hiemstra undoubtedly had contributed 
more than any other individual towards imbuing the SADF with Afrikaner cultural 
trappings. Hiemstra‟s meteoric promotion through the 1950s and appointment as Deputy 
Commandant General, illustrated the government‟s determination to advance him rapidly 
towards the country‟s top military position. Hiemstra‟s career history and political 
loyalties also ensured that he was a regularly and critically reported upon figure by the 
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English-language press and parliamentary Opposition UP, particularly during increased 
white public interest in defence issues in the early 1960s after the Sharpeville and Congo 
violence.  
 
Hiemstra spent a significant part of his middle career years ensuring the SADF a higher 
profile in the white and particularly Afrikaner community. Part of the underlying 
government rationale for making the Defence Force more “public” was to pave the way 
for broad white acquiescence regarding compulsory military training for all white male 
school-leavers. Hiemstra had long championed full conscription and its eventual 
realisation in 1968 was arguably his most important career achievement. During the first 
half of the 1960s, the shift towards a broadened balloted national service also constituted 
an important SADF response to its perceptions of military threats. Besides examining 
Hiemstra‟s career, this chapter focuses upon the roles, leadership styles and career 
circumstances of other senior SADF commanders during 1960 to 1968. Further detailed 
reference to SADF leadership is contained within chapter six on selected English-
speaking senior and middle-ranking officers. Other analyses on SADF leadership is made 
within particularly chapter four, concerning Lieutenant General C.A. Fraser‟s shifting of 











Hiemstra‟s background   
 
As one of just five SAAF regular officers who had declined on political grounds to 
volunteer for combat in 1939, Hiemstra was ostracised and according to his own account 
eventually arrested on vaguely construed charges of subversion and improper conduct. 
Under duress, he agreed to transfer to the Department of Transport.
113
 Almost directly 
after the 1948 elections, an embittered Hiemstra was appointed as Erasmus‟s adviser on 
conceptualising appointments and vetting promotions.
114
 This “second phase” of his 
military career had a dramatic beginning, through his contribution in facilitating 
Erasmus‟s firing of military intelligence chief, Lt Col C.B. Powell and the transfer of the 
Deputy Chief of General Staff, Maj Gen Evered Poole to a military attaché post in 
Germany. 
115
 This effectively ended the military career of this distinguished South 
African World War Two veteran; Poole who was expected to become the next Chief of 
General Staff, was the most senior English-speaking victim of Erasmus‟s 
Afrikanerisation campaign.  
 
In the early 1950s, Hiemstra spent several years working as a military attaché in Sweden 
during which he had the opportunity to observe continental European armed forces 
systems as potential alternatives to the South African British-inherited military culture. 
On returning home, he was appointed from May 1953 into the key position of Adjutant-
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General, responsible for the enforcement of Defence Force discipline and conformity to 
policy. The official UDF mouth-piece Commando, which had made its debut from 1949 
as one of Erasmus‟s many politically motivated creations, recorded Hiemstra‟s and other 
new appointments within an article entitled “Defence Personalities”. Commando‟s 
Afrikaans correspondents lauded the „republican-orientated‟ changes that swept through 
the post-1948 UDF. It was the first of numerous occasions over three decades where 
Hiemstra‟s activities were covered in obsequious detail by this publication. His 
photograph and short curriculum vitae was published together with those of Brig Piet H. 
Grobbelaar and Maj Gen H.B. Klopper, assigned to the positions of Chief of Army Staff 
and Inspector General respectively.
116
 These three important appointments followed 
within two months of the NP‟s 1953 general election victory and regarding Hiemstra and 
Grobbelaar ensured „safe‟ nationalists now being located in two of the most important 
UDF positions.  
 
Hiemstra made little effort to hide his obsession and loathing for “Saps” (UP supporters) 
within the UDF, ensuring that he was hugely unpopular with many war veterans, while 
some other Defence Force officers now projected themselves as NP supporters. Given his 
Adjutant General position, this antipathy amongst the UDF officer corps in no small way 
accelerated the serious conflict within the military during the early 1950s. Hiemstra was 
perceived by his detractors as Erasmus‟s lackey and it was the Adjutant General, now 
secure under Erasmus‟s patronage, that personally prepared the letters through which 
twelve “politically unreliable” officers were summarily discharged from service, during 
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the infamous “Midnight Ride” of 30 November 1953.
117
 This purge occurred in the wake 
of the general election where the NP had succeeded in increasing their parliamentary 
majority, despite a vigorous campaign by the UP and their determined Torch Commando 
allies. Now as most remaining „Sappe‟ Afrikaners deserted the UP, the NP leadership no 
longer perceived any future electoral threat from the parliamentary opposition, resulting 
in Erasmus becoming even more aggressive in his efforts to drive out remaining military 
personnel he believed were hostile to his policies, with Hiemstra dutifully performing the 
role of hit man. The UDF Afrikanerisation process could not obviously distinguish 
between war veterans and non-war veterans, but rather between those who openly 
supported the new government, or at least did not resist its decisions; and those whose 
dispositions, Hiemstra and others suspected suggested defiance towards Erasmus and the 
NP.  
 
Military transformation under Frans Erasmus from 1948 
 
While this chapter is not concerned with a detailed description of the changes under 
Erasmus, but for the purpose of further understanding SADF shifts during the early 
1960s, some reference to the previous decade is obligatory. Contrary to some popular 
perceptions, the public policy focus of the NP during the 1950s was not so much upon 
that of implementing apartheid, but rather consolidating Afrikaner unity, promoting 
Afrikaner nationalist cultural pride and awareness and most of all, protecting the largely 
                                                 
117
 Boulter,  F. C. Erasmus and the Politics of SA Defence, p.64. 
    Hiemstra, Die Wilde Haf, p.260. 
    Also, see Hartshorne, K., Avenge Tobruk, Purnell & Sons, Cape Town, 1960, pp 215-217, for one 











poor white Afrikaner community with state-sponsored employment and other securities.  
The NP elevated blue-collar and rural Afrikaner interests, as well as ensuring the 
prosperity of middle-class professional Afrikaners. This political alliance between the 
Afrikaner intelligentsia, middle class and the white workers was to be maintained.
118
 The 
military was a state institution that could be manipulated; and as the NP had always 
promised full employment for Afrikaners, there had to be a place in the SADF for both 
the blue-collar and the professional.  
 
Therefore, the culture of the Defence Force was reshaped to make it congenial for both 
the Afrikaner nationalist career officer and the man of more humble background who 
might work his entire service career in the quartermaster stores. Determined to implement 
his party‟s mandate, this was the kind of “transformation” that Erasmus set out to achieve 
in the UDF, introducing it to the public as reshaping the UDF into something more 
„national‟ and equitable regarding Afrikaner representation. Numerous changes at a 
symbolic level would complete the pattern of preparing the Defence Force as „republican‟ 
in appearance. Political intervention and favouritism by promoting available Afrikaner 
nationalists into important positions was intended to adjust UDF culture away from its 
British-roots to one more acceptable to Afrikaner nationalists.     
 
Outside of the small PF, the South African World War Two servicemen were all 
volunteers who had returned to civilian life after demobilisation. Although CF members 
were affected by Erasmus‟s policies, his decisions impacted more obviously upon the PF 
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personnel, particularly those with promotion aspirations but whose politics or home 
language rendered them out of favour. Defence spending was low during the 1950s and 
the military was allowed to rundown, most specifically in terms of its combat capacity.
119
 
“Transformation” within the UDF/SADF during the 1950s
120
 was not only a result of low 
budgets and political interference, as destructive and significant as these were. The 
institutional upheavals also resulted from inevitable changes occurring within a swelled 
wartime military organisation, whose over-riding purpose had been assisting the Allies 
towards victory. South Africa‟s diminished role in international defence obligations after 
1945 meant that the UDF had to shrink therefore some conflict for promotions was 
probably inevitable. While containing much valid research regarding the Erasmus 
changes, the dissertations written by Boulter and Jooste
121
 do not give adequate stress to 
the UDF/SADF grappling in the 1950s with multiple issues resulting from changing 
defence priorities during peace. Both rather fixate upon Erasmus, either vilifying him 
(Boulter) or defending him (Jooste).  
 
In mid-1948, Erasmus had established that less than half of UDF members were 
Afrikaans-speaking and that just twenty-one percent of the PF members between the 
ranks of captain and brigadier had Afrikaans surnames.
122
 It is not clear whether the 
former details also included the CF, where „English‟ regiments for historical reasons, 
were more numerous than their Afrikaans equivalents. „English‟ regiments often dated 
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their origins to the mid/late nineteenth century, during which colonials in Natal and the 
Cape, established volunteer regiments along British models. The Boer commando system 
had been essentially informal within both the Republics and colonies, although the Union 
government after 1912 had implemented structures to formalise them, but they had 
almost fallen away under Smuts‟s defence policies during World War Two.  
 
Afrikaner „transformation‟ of the UDF was Erasmus‟s chief concern and therefore with 
the exception of the navy, PF personnel during his ministerial tenure shifted to being 
predominantly Afrikaners, displaying themselves as either nationalist supporters or 
apolitical. Yet despite aggressive recruitment of Afrikaners during the 1950s, numerous 
war veterans from both language groups remained in the force. For those who fell foul of 
the new order, there were particularly within the army and air force, summary firings, 
sideways appointments and bizarre delays in promotion, instigated by Erasmus, his 
minions and sycophants against UDF members labelled as „anti-nationalist‟ or „too 
British‟ or too obviously „pro-Sappe‟. These unfortunates were often English-speaking, 
but also included many Afrikaners, who had challenged the new government‟s 
management of defence. Gen Jannie Geldenhuys was one of the new recruits during the 
early 1950s and the son of a PF war time UDF officer who had taken the “Red Oath”. 
Geldenhuys alludes in his autobiography to the intensity of political strife in the Defence 
Force during the 1950s, with its „English‟ verses Afrikaans character:  
Party Politics was on everyone‟s lips. The red-tab days were not 
quite forgotten….elections were held in 1953 and 1958. And at 
the (Military) College, reading the newspapers at breakfast was 











Sap; if you read the Transvaaler, you were a Nat- despite the fact 




However, the cost for the UDF/SADF was the loss of considerable professional expertise, 
although it still retained by the 1960s, significant numbers of war veterans. During the 
1950s, recognition of 1939-45 service was not entirely reduced simply to details within a 
PF member‟s SADF records. Through regular articles, Commando during this decade, 
acknowledged South Africa‟s World War Two contributions as well as veterans 
individual exploits.
124
  But war service had to still compete with Erasmus‟s strident 
transformation imperatives, euphemistically described as ensuring the UDF embraced a: 
“a decidedly South African character.”
125
 This policy led to a number of „political‟ 
appointments of officers who professionally kow-towed to government concerns. Partly 
to contrive a new culture, the UDF increasingly used Afrikaner historical symbolism and 
the importation of continental European military uniform styles. Commando published 
regular articles instructing „correct‟ Afrikaans military language usage, adding to efforts 
by Erasmus to elevate Afrikaans as a military language and Afrikaner nationalist culture 
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 By 1953, an English/Afrikaans dictionary on military 
terminology was available.   
 
Afrikaans-speaking career soldiers who had served the Smuts government during 1939-
45, in most cases fell in with the new political order with greater ease than their English-
speaking compatriots, not least because as one important professional emphasis was 
bilingualism, their promotion prospects were better advantaged.
127
 Afrikaner officers also 
more easily embraced the military‟s „national‟ cultural adaptation.
128
 According to Jooste, 
in 1948, despite a standardisation of Afrikaans military terminology, many PF officers 
were unable to communicate in Afrikaans. CF training was therefore largely conducted in 
English,
129
 a pattern that Erasmus was determined to change. When “Exercise Oranje,” 
the first large scale UDF field exercise since World War Two was held during May 1956 
at the Free State De Brug training ground, Commando triumphantly proclaimed: 
Exercise Oranje proved the practicability of bilingualism in the 
Union Defence Force . The troops taking part in the exercise 
consisted of both Afrikaans- and English-speaking units, with 





Erasmus specifically targeted the air force and army, in terms of discouraging English-
speaking officers through political ploys or lack of promotion, while the small English-
dominated navy received less intense attention.
131
 Those English-speaking officers 
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determined to pursue their careers, needed to be professionally respected by their 
Afrikaans peers, but they would also have rather avoided political discussion critical of 
the government. Some ingratiated themselves with influential individuals like Hiemstra, 
who was ruthlessly driving the political aspirations on behalf of Afrikaner nationalists 
within the Defence Force. According to Boulter, S.A. Melville, Commandant General 
from 1958 to 1960 apparently fell into this latter category, having immediately  
associated himself with Hiemstra after 1948, assisting him in identifying those officers 





The early 1950s witnessed Afrikaner political party support shifting almost in entirety 
towards the NP as part of the volksbeweeging
133
 described by Giliomee.
134
 Just as there 
was a marked swing of Afrikaner voters away from the UP, the same pattern would have 
been discernable amongst PF Afrikaner members, who would also have perceived the 
career advantages in shifting towards openly backing the NP. The war had presented 
them an opportunity for professional growth and unlike Hiemstra, most Afrikaner UDF 
members took advantage of this, even if they had not necessarily been Smuts supporters. 
During the 1950s, promotion could be markedly accentuated by demonstrating their 
consent with the government‟s vision of a UDF „national character‟ and thus some 
officers responded accordingly.     
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Hiemstra and Grobbelaar: Career rivalries and antipathies from the 1940s 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, public reminders of Hiemstra‟s lack of war service 
exacerbated old tensions between himself and Piet Grobbelaar, Commandant General 
from 1961 to 1965. Their mutual antipathy had a history of deep suspicions, jealousies 
and resentments. In the tiny PF of 1939, the two men were already well acquainted with 
one another. Hiemstra recalled that he had not expected Grobbelaar, then a captain in the 
Special Service Battalion, to sign the „Red Oath‟ (or „Africa Oath‟), initiated by the 
Smuts government for all PF members to either endorse or decline. Prompted by a small 
group of other objectors, Hiemstra had telephoned Grobbelaar to canvass his opinion and 
in a tense conversation, the latter confirmed that he had signed the oath as a professional 
soldier, because it provided him with a chance to fight. Hiemstra believed that charges 
later brought against him for “speaking with contempt regarding the Africa Oath,” were a 
consequence of Grobbelaar reporting their conversation. Hiemstra confirmed that in the 
decades long afterwards, the conversation‟s aftermath, which he believed was directly 




Dawid Grobbelaar maintained that his father always had nationalist leanings, but as a 
professional soldier was discrete in not projecting overt political opinions. While serving 
as a young PF member in the pre-war years, Pieter Grobbelaar had insisted in trying to 
emphasise Afrikaans military terminology and been drummed out the UDF by his 
immediate superior Evered Poole. During Oswald Pirow‟s tenure as defence minister in 
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the 1930s, Grobbelaar rejoined the military via a CF unit and with the politician‟s further 
support attained re-admission to the PF with a commission. By 1941, Grobbelaar was a 
lieutenant colonel and commanded 7 SA Reconnaissance Battalion during the desert 
campaign, 
136
 enhancing his reputation by being awarded the Distinguished Service Order 
for leading a daring armoured car raid against German and Italian troops
137
. Grobbelaar 
had a soldiering record against which Hiemstra had no comparison. Two decades later, 
Hiemstra displayed his bitter fury at the “English press” for referring to Grobbelaar‟s 
“gallant war record,” when the latter‟s service was recalled by the Sunday Times in April 
1962, on the occasion of Hiemstra being promoted to Lieutenant General, with 




According to Dawid Grobbelaar, his father during the war years was approached by the 
Ossewabrandwag (OB) leader Hans Van Rensberg, who advised Pieter Grobbelaar to 
remain in the Defence Force, because the “future Afrikaner-run state would require 
trained soldiers”. Dawid Grobbelaar‟s mother had apparently felt slighted by the 
predominantly English-speaking military community of Robert‟s Heights (later 
Voortrekkerhoogte) during the late 1930s and had quietly worked for the NP during the 
1948 election.
139
 Despite Piet Grobbelaar‟s impressive war record, he was under regular 
observation by UDF intelligence officers upon his return to South Africa from the north. 
Dawid Grobbelaar was adamant that regardless of his father‟s soldiering 
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accomplishments on behalf of the Union and British Commonwealth, he remained an 
Afrikaner nationalist patriot who chose to pursue his career as a professional.
140
 During 
the Second World War, the Smuts government instructed UDF Military Intelligence to 
spy upon Afrikaner nationalist political opponents. It is conceivable that because of his 
past record and alleged meetings with the OB, Grobbelaar was identified as potentially 
subversive and such would certainly have bolstered his career prospects after 1948. 
 
Grobbelaar had attempted to mend his relationship with Hiemstra and denied betraying 
him; but Hiemstra effectively rejected this overture. Hiemstra‟s autobiography clearly 
infers he was fully aware the changing political order had strengthened his own career 
prospects. A mutual antipathy followed both men to the highest SADF ranks during the 
early 1960s;
141
 Hiemstra‟s eldest son, Professor Louis Hiemstra of Free State University 
confirmed that his father and Grobbelaar did not have a happy professional relationship 
and had clashed over issues of seniority.
142
 Grobbelaar still worked hard at serving the 
post-1948 government and according to Boulter, projected himself immediately as an NP 
supporter, after having been known as a Smuts man.
143
 During the initial part of his post-
war career, Grobbelaar was involved in the Free State Command and circulated amongst 
the commando units performing inspections and appraisals. His son believed that during 
this period his father was noticed by well-connected NP members, who identified him as 
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a potential future senior military leader.
144
 By 1953, Grobbelaar was promoted to 
brigadier and appointed Land Forces Chief and with his extensive combat experience as 
an obvious recommendation, was appointed to the Commandant General position from 
December 1960.  
 
Hiemstra the “politician-general” during the 1950s.    
 
Hiemstra who held Afrikaner Broederbond membership,
145
 moved into military seniority 
from the early-1950s through his Adjutant General appointment.
146
 Hiemstra‟s first 
significant public political foray came at a Day of the Covenant gathering at Silverton, 
Pretoria during 1956, when invited to make a public address after an invitation was 
extended from the local Geloftefeeskomitee,
147
 who had gained access to him through the 
Broederbond. Hiemstra followed the „anti-communist‟ tempo so prominent amongst 
Afrikaner leadership at this point, comparing the “new barbarism” of communism with 
the Zulu attacks on the Voortrekkers in Natal in February 1838.
148
 From his senior SADF 
position, Hiemstra elaborated to assembled crowds of his own people, contemporary 
Afrikaner nationalist intellectual understandings of perceived threats.  
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Historian G.D.Scholtz whose influence upon SADF threat perceptions is referred to later, 
(see chapter 3, pp 163-170) had already by 1954 published, Het Die Afrikaanse Volk ‘n 
Toekoms, emphasising to Afrikaner leadership that they (Afrikaners) may have to fight 
Russian communism in order to preserve „Western civilisation‟ in Africa. Four years 
earlier, future SABC Chairman Piet Meyer had published a pamphlet detailing 
„communist activities in South Africa‟,
149
 while D.F. Malan had secretly confided to 
British intelligence representatives that he hated and feared communism.
150
  Hiemstra‟s 
speeches regularly referred to defining points in Afrikaner history, juxtaposing them 
alongside the contemporary political context, reminding Afrikaner audiences of their duty 
to remain true to their heritage of struggle, along with their destiny of being a politically 
united Christian nation in Africa.  
 
From August 1958, Hiemstra strengthened the direct involvement of Afrikaner political 
influence and ethos within the SADF by initiating the creation of a “cultural 
organisation,” the Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniging Volk en Verdediging (AKVV), accepting 
the position of its first Chairman.
151
 As the relationship of patronage between Hiemstra 
and Erasmus continued to thrive, this organisation became a vehicle through which 
Afrikaner nationalist commemorations were regularly endorsed with a military presence. 
Louisa Jooste‟s 1995 MA thesis on Erasmus provides an explanation of the AKVV, which 
might even have found approval with Afrikaner nationalists during the 1950s, but 
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perhaps this also demonstrated a lingering Afrikaner rationale regarding their insistence 
in re-stamping a new identity upon the UDF.  
The organisation‟s objectives were to promote Afrikaans as a 
military language, to enhance the Afrikaans military culture and 
to facilitate a healthy relationship between the Union Defence 
Force and the “volk”. By “volk” is specifically meant the 
Afrikaner volk. …During the following years the AKVV made an 
important contribution to establishing the Afrikaans language 
and culture within the UDF as well as creating attachment and 
respect for the Defence Force amongst Afrikaners.
152
     
 
Ian Van der Waag who categorizes Jooste as belonging to the genre of “Official 
Historian” remarks on her dissertation: “A recent biographical of Erasmus is a case in 
point (of „Official Historians‟) “being  mesmerized by the official memoranda…” with 
the writer going out of her way to „correct‟ and „improve‟ the image of the controversial 
defence minister.” 
153
 Such is relevant because we are concerned with the extent to which 
the SADF by 1960 had become entirely compliant to NP political designs, besides 
Hiemstra‟s contribution in facilitating this. The AKVV‟s activities displayed the extent to 
which Afrikaner nationalist cultural occasions received SADF support, compared to those 
whose purpose or orientation was interpreted as „English‟ or „Sappe‟. For example, 
Boulter refers to the Secretary of the (Louis) Botha Day Committee in 1959 being refused 
any SADF participation by Commandant General Melville, while during the same year, 
Hiemstra‟s AKVV received assistance in the form of bands and supporting personnel for a 
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concert concerning the Louis Trichardt Memorial Fund, Kruger Day ceremonies and the 




By the end of the 1950s, Hiemstra disengaged himself from Erasmus, who had long been 
the target of jokes and vitriol directed by English-language press defence commentators. 
Being the defence political boss, Erasmus had been the more obvious focus of hostility. 
However, Hiemstra had long fallen out with Erasmus over several issues of mutual 
contention. Within Jooste‟s dissertation introductory notes, she comments that her 
attempts to secure an interview with Hiemstra during the early 1990s failed. Jooste 
described the reason given by Hiemstra as being because “he had differed too much with 
Erasmus” (Hiemstra‟s own words).
155
 Jooste related her own understanding that 
Hiemstra, after effectively being Erasmus‟s prodigy, still retained grievances over the 
service conditions by which he had been reinstated.
156
 However, as was demonstrated 
earlier, Hiemstra also disliked the minister‟s intrusiveness in the Defence Force at an 
organizational level.  
 
UDF/SADF leadership during the 1950s  
 
C. L. De Wet Du Toit, the Commandant General from 1950 to 1956 (described 
incorrectly by Seegers as “not a volunteer in World War II”
157
) had been a brigade 
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commander in the western desert under Maj Gen Dan Pienaar
158
 although not without 
controversy.
159
 Maj Gen Dunbar Moodie, remarked that Du Toit “had made a spectacle 
of himself‟ shortly after the fall of Tobruk” and was in his (Moodie‟s) opinion one of 
Erasmus‟s worst appointments.
160
 After the 1948 election, Du Toit apparently had 
already made it clear to Erasmus that he supported the NP
161
 and was alleged to have 
particularly ingratiated himself with the minister.  Du Toit was appointed Chief of 
General Staff in 1950. This after a series of serious disagreements between Erasmus and 
his first Defence Force Chief, General Len Beyers (appointed from 1949), an NP 
supporting former UDF Adjutant General, whom the minister had brought out of 
retirement.
162
 Du Toit was identified by British military authorities as collaborating with 
Erasmus in denuding the SAAF of top English-speaking pilots and “good fighting 
Afrikaners as well”.
163
 Boulter also singled Du Toit out for apparently behaving with 
indiscretion and foolishness during official duty as UDF Chief, citing that during his 
tenure from 1950 to 1956, Du Toit allegedly indulged in discussions on current affairs 
with foreign military attaches, purportedly making outrageous and implausible comments 
that were reported back to various governments.
164
 A few years after his retirement, Du 
Toit was severely criticised in Parliament by Brigadier H. F. Bronkhorst of the UP, who 
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There is no evidence encountered by this author of widespread pre-1948 ill-feeling 
amongst Afrikaner career officers and non-commissioned officers, regarding either their 
English-speaking colleagues or the South African British-orientated military culture. 
Grundlingh has written about grievances amongst World War Two Afrikaner volunteers, 
as opposed to PF members.
166
 The weight of evidence suggests that Hiemstra and 
Erasmus‟s political interference instigated discontent and divisions in the military, mainly 
because political affiliation and opinion were perceived as explicit pre-requisites for 
career advancement. The consequence was political rifts within the UDF professional 
ranks around „transformation‟ on language and party political grounds. In a further 
reference in his autobiography to officers reading newspapers, Geldenhuys provides 
another brief insight into how irreconcilable these divisions were.  
During the stormy late 1940s and early 1950s, even the 
newspaper you read, as I experienced at the Military College, 
was a serious matter. It could be an indication of whether you 




Some officers politically hostile to Erasmus resigned, including a few who thereafter, 
entered politics as UP members, while others continued with their careers. Some officers 
openly supported the minister‟s intentions to bring Afrikaner personnel numbers, culture 
and language to predominate in the military, while others continued their duties with no 
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reference to politics. In the mid and late 1950s an officer suspected of discontent with the 
government and with Erasmus in particular, could be harassed to resign. But the men 
whom Erasmus had authorised to lead the UDF/SADF in the 1950s, were those for who 
the adjustment to the NP control was less difficult or not difficult at all and if they played 
their cards correctly, their career prospects were promising. Lt Gen Ian Gleeson who 
joined the UDF in 1953 and served as a young officer during part of the Erasmus period, 
believes that Erasmus‟s negative tenure was exacerbated by the fact that the first post-war 
Commandant Generals (Du Toit, Klopper and Melville)  
did not particularly impress or excel in the field of leadership 
qualities and therefore probably allowed Erasmus to fool around 
at levels that should have been out of bounds for political 
ministers.
168
   
 
Brig Gen McGill Alexander, whose army career began during the latter part of the 1960s, 
suggested that the mediocre line of 1950s SADF Chiefs, occupying the top position 
during a period of peace, preferred to complete their careers quietly before retiring on 
pension. This also ensured the minister was virtually unopposed when instigating changes 
that often lowered Defence Force morale.
169
 But there were prominent senior officers 
who derived career benefits from the Erasmus period, including some who held 
significant appointments during the 1960s and early 1970s. Some examples included 
Generals Grobbelaar, Du Toit and Sybrandt Engelbrecht in the army; S.A. Melville and 
Hiemstra in the air force; while navy Admirals Hugo H. Biermann and his brother S.C. 
Biermann were also recipients of Erasmus largesse. S.C. Biermann was an educationist 
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who post-1948 translated English naval terms and training manuals into Afrikaans and 
wrote regular articles for Commando advocating that the Afrikaner had an important role 
in the navy. S.C. Biermann also periodically endorsed a kind of Afrikaner „naval 
tradition‟ dating from Dutch mariners during the seventeenth century. According to Rear 
Adm Max Kramer, S.C. Biermann had served in World War Two as an able seaman, but 
advanced quickly through the ranks to Rear Admiral assisted, in Kramer‟s opinion, partly 




General H. B. Klopper who followed Du Toit as Commandant General (1957) for a short 
spell, saw significant active service during World War Two, including his being the 
Tobruk garrison commander that in June 1942 had surrendered the town and 25 000 
Commonwealth troops to the German Afrika Korps. (Although his decision was later 
supported and accepted by an official inquiry).
171
 In contrast to some other senior officers 
approved by Erasmus, Klopper had apparently remained friendly towards British defence 
interests.
172
 Melville (SADF Chief 1958-60) had a modest war record and allegedly was 
not highly regarded while serving as Commandant General.
173
 Grobbelaar who had been 
decorated in the war, proved himself a more respected Commandant General during his 
December 1960 to September 1965 tenure.  
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Adm Hugo Biermann who had served with distinction in the South African Naval Forces 
during 1939 to 1945 was one of only eight Afrikaans-speaking navy officers in 1948. He 
then experienced an astonishing promotion run through Erasmus.
174
 After being 
despatched to a course at the Royal Naval College and performing subsequent service as 
naval attaché in London,
175
 Biermann was appointed Chief of SA Navy Staff in 1952, 
with simultaneous promotion to Commodore from a Commander rank, without ever 
being a Captain. Rear Adm Kramer acknowledged that this appointment was initially a 
shock. More favoured candidates were officers like the SA Naval Forces incumbent 
Chief, Commodore H. E. Fougstedt, besides Captains Dryden-Drummond and Rice. 
Feeling marginalized, some English-speaking naval officers started to look for other 
careers, but Biermann encouraged many to stay, assuring them that their prospects would 
improve.
176
 Biermann‟s appointment also played some role in facilitating the growth of 
the navy through his good relations with both Erasmus and the Royal Navy. As 
mentioned earlier, Biermann had a considerable influence in pushing the minister towards 




Biermann was also politically a less overbearing officer compared to some other 
appointments of the 1950s. However, he was still a “political” appointee of a sort and 
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initially proved his worth to Erasmus in August 1953, when serving together with 
Melville on a court-martial committee constituted to hear a case containing strong 
political under-tones. The military court successfully prosecuted Col Jan Pretorius on 
apparently spurious grounds for theft, dismissing him from the service. Pretorius was 
known for his hostility to the NP while he had vehemently criticised Hiemstra‟s 
appointment to the position of Adjutant General. The court-martial occurred against a 
background of perceptions held amongst government opponents that it was explicitly 





Although respected by English-speaking officers for his diplomacy, fair managerial style, 
professionalism and inter-relationship skills, Biermann must have been conscious of his 
Afrikaans-background ensuring him a career advantage,
179
 although he certainly 
impressed all former officers interviewed as a highly competent naval commander. Over 
fifty years later Biermann felt that Erasmus “had done a lot of good for the navy” and he 
acknowledged that he got well with the minister.
180
 During the next two decades, 
Biermann was also highly regarded by the NP government; he became Chief of the 
SADF after Hiemstra‟s retirement in 1972 and worked closely with P.W. Botha.  
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UP criticisms in 1960 of SADF officer appointments  
 
Although Verwoerd had effectively dismissed Erasmus by the beginning of 1960 by 
shifting him to the Justice portfolio at the end of the previous year, the ex-defence 
minister‟s impact on the Defence Force continued to induce angry parliamentary 
exchanges. One of Erasmus‟s „victims‟, Brig H. H. Bronkhorst, in March 1960 lambasted 
the former minister, accusing him of “appointing unqualified generals”, “excluding 
English-speaking officers from promotion”, “falsifying examinations”, “refusing to allow 
wartime army and air force officers to go on special courses” and “appointing top ranking 
officers of low intelligence and little ability to do his political work for him in the 
Defence Force. Others …had reached senior rank through favour and not merit. Morale 
in the Defence Force had deteriorated and discipline had been destroyed mainly because 
of the open backdoor and undermining encouraged by Mr Erasmus.” Bronkhorst 
continued:  
Today (The General Staff who consisted of eight men many of 
whom)…were outspoken politicians – people who spoke politics 
on every possible occasion. A sad position of the Defence Force  
today was that there was not the necessary cooperation among 
the senior officers…(Erasmus) had opened the back door ….so 
that people could come through that door and carry tales. 
Through these tales those men had got to the top. Those who 
were accused were never promoted. The position now was that 
those men in the top ranks knew that they were not there on merit 
but through favours and they were now jealous of each other.  
 
Bronkhorst intimated how by this time, there had been a broad backlash against Erasmus 












The same gentlemen whom the former Minister helped in this 
way to get where they are today, are the people who have 
undermined the Minister in recent months and have made his 
position in the force impossible. That may be his due reward, but 
it is an unhealthy state of affairs.
181
  
   
Bronkhorst claimed there had always been more Afrikaans-speaking officers in the force, 
but that by 1960 there were only Afrikaans Generals and Brigadiers. 
There were English-speaking officers with the highest 
qualifications and excellent records who were today sitting in 
lower positions. There was also the case of an English-speaking 





Not all top-ranking Afrikaans SADF officers were necessarily ardent nationalists. 
However, many also clearly never felt any strongly principled objection against NP 
policies regarding curtailing links with Britain, nationalist non-participation in World 
War Two, marginalising of English-speakers in the civil service, or for that matter the 
government‟s racial policy. By late 1960, the PF was overwhelmingly Afrikaans, 
including virtually the entire General Staff, with the exception of Commandant General 
Melville. This was in contrast to 1948 when the entire General Staff was English-
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As the intensity of the NP‟s campaign to attract English-speaker‟s votes for the 1960 
republican referendum increased, the UP tried to trip up the government up by referring 
in parliament to alleged “anti-English” bias in the SADF over the previous twelve years. 
However, new perceived defence threat circumstances were to prompt changes in the 
SADF from 1960 - namely, events both in Africa and internally, regarding the rise of 
aggressive and potentially militant African nationalism. In response, the government 
focussed upon promoting a white republican ideal underpinned by a notion of bringing 
the two white language groups together in „one nation‟ under Afrikaner nationalist 
control. The SADF was intended as one standard-bearer of this political strategy, 
requiring in consequence, some changes in its leadership. Therefore, 1959 and 1960 
witnessed the exiting of Erasmus and Melville respectively and the appointments of 
Fouché and Grobbelaar. Such was the political legacy of the SADF bequeathed by Frans 
Erasmus during the 1950s that impacted upon the central ethos of the PF by the start of 
the 1960s, which Fouché had to tentatively remarket to a broader white community. A 
larger Afrikaner demographic and cultural identity for the SADF was achieved through 
Frans Erasmus‟s policies, while Hiemstra had played a central role as the minister‟s 
military political commissar. 
   
Church support for Hiemstra for the Commandant General position in 1960  
 
Hiemstra‟s rapid advancement continued; by June 1959, he had been promoted to the 
temporary rank of Major General and appointed to replace, until further notice, the then 
ill Grobbelaar, the incumbent Inspector General of the SADF. Hiemstra‟s new rank and 











newly created position of Deputy Commandant General,
184
 meaning that he and Hiemstra 
were effectively the second and third ranking SADF officers respectively under Melville. 
With his regular speeches and high political profile, Hiemstra had long made an impact 
upon broader Afrikaner nationalist civil society. In a letter addressed directly to 
Verwoerd, A. J. G. Oosthuizen, the Chairman of the General Commission of the 
Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk must have spoken for a larger groundswell of Afrikaners 
in early 1960 when he remarked: 
On behalf of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Church, I wish in all 
humility to bring an issue to your attention. We are aware this is 
a very delicate matter, where perhaps we as a church should not 
be involved. 
 
But, with an eye upon the critical times in which we live and in 
the face of us becoming a Republic, we cannot feel as ease unless 
the Commandant General of the Defence Force is a man that in 
so far as it concerns his national conviction, stands above any 
doubts. We understand that the current Commandant General is 
retiring in haste. Therefore, (we) are taking the liberty of 
bringing to your attention the name of General Hiemstra. He is 
somebody who has sacrificed much in terms of his nationalist 
principles. He is no opportunist nationalist, but one who 
remained a nationalist when it was dangerous to be one. There 
can be others of the same sort – we do not know. We have 
submitted his name because we know that he has proved his 
reliability. Our humble request is that our government will give 
specific attention regarding the appointment, to persons who like 
(Hiemstra) have demonstrated that they can be depended upon. 
May we also note that General Hiemstra belongs to the Dutch 
Reformed Church and not to the Reformed Church. Thus, we are 
not writing to you because of any Church considerations, but 
entirely with regards to our concern for the safety of our Nation 
(Volk) and Republic.
185
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The fact that Hiemstra received significant support from this particular Afrikaner church 
was indicative of some success in his attempts at making “volk” and military one in spirit. 
Oosthuizen‟s letter is clear evidence of the extent to which Hiemstra‟s politicking had 
entered the consciousness of the church, an important pillar of Afrikanerdom. It also 
illustrates this church denomination leadership‟s anxiety and stress upon perceiving the 
SADF‟s as having a critical role in securing the Republic. Oosthuizen‟s reference to 
“opportunist nationalists” is also a useful yardstick showing that Afrikaner nationalist 
leaders and civil society were not oblivious to those whom they perceived as politically 
expedient within their own ranks, including inside the SADF. Oosthuizen was also 
probably making a barely veiled negative comment about Grobbelaar, who was not yet at 
retirement age but in terms of seniority would have been Melville‟s obvious successor. 
Grobbelaar and other Afrikaner‟s acceptance of the „Red Oath‟ in 1940 could also well 
have been what Oosthuizen was implying by “opportunist nationalists”.   
 
Although Verwoerd did not respond personally to Oosthuizen, his private secretary 
assured him that the letter would be brought to the attention of Fouché and that “General 
Hiemstra and his deservedness are naturally well known.”
186
 By 1960, Hiemstra had 
achieved an image amongst Afrikaners of a military man and politician, who also made 
significant use of the Calvinistic concept of predestination to bolster his speeches. Being 
puritanical in outlook, Hiemstra seemed to intimate some kind of merger of Afrikaner 
nationalist history, Calvinist spirituality, national duty and national defence. An ideal 
substantiation and illustration can be observed through extracts of a public speech 
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Hiemstra delivered during the 1959 Day of the Covenant commemorations, held at the 
site of the South African War Nooitgedacht battle near Krugersdorp. The particular 
significance of this site was that according to Afrikaner nationalist historical belief, it was 
understood to be where Boer generals Beyers and De Le Rey, after beating back Imperial 
troops on 15 December 1900, had reconfirmed the Vow of Blood River in the presence of 
two thousand burgers and their families. Hiemstra utilised all the historical mythology 
and symbolism to state: 
I believe that the Day of the Covenant is the greatest single factor 
that can make us as a nation (volk) aware of our calling…How 
strongly will our (Christian) faith be confirmed if we do not 
reflect back on our own history? Even the bitter end of 1902 we 
can see today in another light. It is a consequence of regular 
reflection upon the path behind us that we come to the 
understanding, consciously or unconsciously, of our whole 
nation‟s existence thus far fulfilling its task…If we now want to 
determine a course forward, we must understand that we cannot 
detach ourselves from our past. This is our accumulated 
experience and the course along which a Higher Hand has led us. 
If we detach ourselves from this we would do likewise with the 
entire past three hundred years (rendering it) devoid of content 
and meaning.
187
     
 
Giliomee speaks about the Afrikaner ideological commitment to apartheid being a kind of 
“fusion between religion and nationalism.”
188
 What Hiemstra seemed to be attempting to 
achieve was an extension of this, in the form of a fusion between religion, nationalism 
and militarism. This is what he regularly disseminated through his speeches and official 
SADF publications during the 1960s. Hiemstra had the capacity to project the kind of 
theologically reasoned sense of mission, which endorsed Afrikaner nationalism during 
this decade. After the Cottesloe resolutions, Dutch Reformed Churchmen had been 
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cautioned via the Broederbond not to stray from the Afrikaners divine mission of 
survival; as a Bond member, Hiemstra‟s speeches placed him on the most favourable 
political ground.      
 
Hiemstra as a Republic campaigner   
 
With church and other Afrikaner civil society support behind him, Hiemstra embarked 
upon his own political campaign trail, whipping up support for Verwoerd‟s intention to 
ensure a republic. At the 1960 Union Day celebrations at Ladysmith, Hiemstra described 
the future drawing together of the two white communities within a republic;
189
 
Commando published his speech in entirety under a heading quoting directly from it: 
“Truth can be postponed never conquered”. Hiemstra chided English-speakers about their 
past „conduct‟ that he believed could have marred the possibility of their happy „union‟ 
with Afrikaners.  
the Afrikaans speaking partner was determined to develop and 
maintain their own personality, their own identity, and (only) 
after they had achieved this through establishing their own 
republics and their own gallery of great men and national heroes 
were they ready to enter into a Union with the English-language 
group. This fact can only be ignored at the price of great 
unhappiness. It might for instance have been kinder, and wiser to 
accept the Afrikaner‟s assertion of his language rights and his 
striving for a greater share in the nation‟s wealth as a perfectly 
natural and harmless assertion of his national identity, rather than 




As Chairman of the AKVV, Hiemstra moved around the country during the early 1960s, 
addressing civilian audiences and ensuring a military presence during occasions 
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commemorating various Afrikaner nationalist events. On Kruger Day in 1960 (10 
October) at Krokodildrif near Komatipoort, five days after the narrow white referendum 
poll in favour of a republic, Hiemstra presented a triumphant and lengthy history lesson 
on the Afrikaner struggle for self-determination. This was followed by an AKVV re-
enactment in period costume of the De Kuiper expedition of 1725, commemorating the 
first white exploration of the Lowveld. Thirty-one SADF volunteers and AKVV members 
dramatised part of the expedition, while Hiemstra presided over a ceremony renaming the 
drift De Kuiperdrif. Commando relayed Hiemstra‟s speech under bold-lettering in 
Afrikaans: “Delivered at the beginning of a new era in the history of South Africa, these 
thoughts by Combat-General Hiemstra deserve scrupulous study by Defence Force 
members”.
191
 Sweeping through three centuries of Afrikaner nationalist history, Hiemstra 
concluded with a direct reference to the NP‟s vision of all whites drawing behind the 
republican ideal, underpinned by the following „compromise‟:  
The Afrikaner has sacrificed his ideal of a homogenous 
„boerestaat‟ with a homogenous nation and one language while 
on the English-speaking side a large number have accepted the 
symbols of our nationhood…
192
   
     
However, the Afrikaner triumph of achieving the republic and its varied celebrations and 
accompanied speeches, while receiving the support of the SADF at a public level, gave 
no clue to the disputes within the organisation‟s General Staff. The Hiemstra/Grobbelaar 
feud, with its origins drawn from the historical context of intra-Afrikaner conflict over 
South Africa‟s entry into the war twenty years earlier, remained as the two men managed 
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the SADF, during its heightened role to protect the white republic during the first half of 
the 1960s.   
 
Hiemstra‟s clashes with Melville and Grobbelaar in 1960 over conscription.  
 
The following details of the Hiemstra/Melville/Grobbelaar differences over conscription, 
demonstrate the tensions amongst the SADF General Staff during 1960, as they urgently 
attempted to implement defence improvement strategies, faced as they were with 
renewed perceptions of increasing military threats against the country. As repeatedly 
stressed, these were partly a consequence of the markedly changing international, African 
and internal security situations, but the General Staff were also concerned with apparent 
white South African public apathy regarding defence issues.  
 
Early during June 1960, just several days after his Ladysmith republican address, 
Hiemstra by his own admission, had intended to test white public opinion as to the 
possible implementation of one year‟s continuous military national service for all white 
males in their eighteenth year. This would contrast with the then four months of balloted 
service spread over four years. Hiemstra mooted this proposal before a gathering of the 
Pretoria branch of the Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Bond, without seeking either the prior 
opinion or permission of Commandant General Melville, nor his deputy Grobbelaar. 
Hiemstra substantiated his opinions by explaining how during the March 1960 CF 
mobilisation after Sharpeville, men had been called up from important economic roles, 
including distantly placed farmers, contrasted with “young men walking around in our 











system as “expensive”, “useless”, incapable of “creating a proper, battle-ready Defence 
Force.” He concluded by explaining that because in any event, between R20 to R25 
million had to be found for defence, it would be foolish to cling to an obsolete system 
that used the available manpower uneconomically. As far as he was concerned, the ballot 
system failed to create a properly battle-ready Defence Force concerning its size, fighting 
capacity and “spiritual preparation”. That for approximately the same price, it would be 
possible to ensure a meaningful improvement in the SADF‟s fighting capacity, besides 
and significantly, Hiemstra believed it is his calling to explicitly link the SADF to 
Afrikaner nationalist history and heritage and emphasised that “the idea of national 
service was not strange to our military traditions of the past”.  
 
Although stressing that he had spoken in his personal capacity, Hiemstra was summoned 
by a furious Melville and Grobbelaar and threatened with court-martial. The very strong 
reaction of his superiors suggests that they were particularly angry at the perceived snub 
towards their seniority, but other documentation suggested they had noted with acute 
unease, Hiemstra‟s stepping into delicate political terrain. Hiemstra described the tense 
encounter below: 
With this speech I intended to test the general opinion. And it 
thus transpired both negative and positive. Within the Defence 
Force, as I expected, it caused an explosion at the highest level. 
General Melville, the Commandant General, called me to his 
office. His deputy, General Grobbelaar was also in the office. He 
was actually red in the face with anger. They were both incensed 
that I could have delivered such a speech without first obtaining 
their approval. Secondly they felt it (compulsory conscription for 
all white males) was a totally impossible scheme and completely 











his, he would not have hesitated to place me before a court-
martial.
193
     
 
But Hiemstra‟s speech had also successfully courted the press who recorded tentative 
approval for his plan from elements within both English and Afrikaans business.
194
 
Hiemstra endorsed his proposal by explaining that currently more than half of the 
Union‟s young white men received no military training and that if cost was a 
consideration, it was not necessary to call all men up in one year. However, if just ten 
thousand men were trained, within ten years the country would possess an army of 
approximately one hundred thousand.
195
 Die Burger pointed out that the recent 
mobilisation after the Sharpeville crisis had demonstrated the Defence Force authorities 
had much to learn. The inefficiencies of the SADF during the 1960 call-ups had not gone 
unnoticed, nor unchallenged by a leading NP supporting newspaper:  
it was possibly on the grounds of what transpired that General 
Hiemstra desires better training for a larger section of the youth. 
In any event South Africa will also in a military sense have to 
adjust to the wind of change in Africa.
196
   
 
Hiemstra received some unqualified support from the English press too, indicative of the 
impact on all whites of unsettling recent events both domestically and in Africa. The 
Natal Mercury reported: “In these turbulent times no one is going to question the wisdom 
of strengthening forces responsible for maintaining law and order should there be any 
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further disturbances in South Africa”.
197
 In his autobiography, Hiemstra quotes the 
Pretoria News as stating: 
When the Inspector-General of the nation‟s armed forces 
expresses the view that the existing system is inadequate for the 





The parliamentary opposition supporting newspapers also used Hiemstra‟s concerns over 
training and manpower to criticise the government over defence. However, Hiemstra‟s 
call to arms through the SADF ensuring better prepared and more soldiers, appeared in 
step with the growing concerns of many white South Africans during 1960. It is therefore 
curious to observe just how Hiemstra‟s strategically presented popular appeals succeeded 
in invoked such strong responses from his superiors.  
 
Neither Melville nor Grobbelaar could have harboured any illusions about Hiemstra‟s 
ambitions. In a letter addressed to Melville, with a copy despatched to Grobbelaar, 
Hiemstra expressed regret that his thoughts on a system of one year‟s national service had 
been rejected without any analysis of its plausibility. He reiterated that Melville was 
aware of Hiemstra mooting the idea of full white male conscription since his return from 
overseas in 1951 and objections to it had always revolved around two aspects: Firstly, the 
financial cost entailed and secondly, the required manpower to implement it. Hiemstra 
had remained adamant and re-emphasised a point that must have particularly antagonised 
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Melville and Grobbelaar. Namely that “the financial implications are not so frightening, 




Melville responded with a angry letter, copied to Fouché, which detailed some of the 
concerns Hiemstra had felt over a long period with the top management of the SADF. 
Hiemstra‟s criticism, which he set out so candidly, were according to Melville, no less 
than a condemnation of how South African defence had been reorganised for some years. 
Ironically, Hiemstra was endorsing much of what the NP‟s opponents had been saying 
throughout the 1950s, regarding the management of the SADF through Erasmus - the 
period during which Hiemstra had climbed the SADF corporate ladder, facilitated by his 
political connections. Melville stated that the memorandum that Hiemstra had used 
contained details from his Calvinistiese Bond address, which dated from 1955, but were 
subsequently amended in a form that the Commandant General had not seen before. It 
now included Hiemstra‟s opinion that within the SADF by 1960:  
there was a lack of authoritative policy, a lack of goal-directed 
planning and a lack of rationalisation, which in turn had 
contributed to hesitation, contradictions and postponements so 




Hiemstra had added provocatively: “The Commando organisation were currently not 
much more than subsidised shooting clubs – a subsidised sport.” Melville had furiously 
concluded that “these sorts of remarks were nothing more than blatant insults hurled at 
ministers, his own predecessors (Generals Du Toit and Klopper), and the entire General 
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Staff” (A concept Hiemstra ridiculed in his autobiography
201
 and subsequently changed 
during his own re-organisation of the SADF hierarchy after 1965.). 
 
Significantly, Hiemstra‟s letter was a barely disguised rejection of changes that Erasmus 
had instituted since 1948, one being the extra planning and finances spent on the 
Skietkommandos. Melville protested that the “Defence Force‟s conduct from the Korean 
War to the current unrest do not corroborate these wild allegations” and rejected 
Hiemstra‟s protests that his ideas had never been properly investigated. Melville 
explained that the Deputy Commandant General, Army Head of Staff, Quartermaster 
General and the Secretary for Defence all supported his views. His closing paragraph 
gives an indication of just how much dislike and antagonism existed between himself and 
Hiemstra, besides how far apart they were in thinking: 
The irregularity of this conduct by the third most senior officer of 
the Defence Force, the insulting insinuations against those who 
are responsible for legislation, defence policy and execution 
thereof is reprehensible to say the least. It has been with a great 
deal of restraint that I have still not reacted in a disciplinary 
manner, politely believing that the matter will now be 
dropped.
202
                             
 
However, Hiemstra chose not to drop the issue and after a weekend despatched yet 
another analysis to Melville arguing for one year compulsory service. Melville wrote 
another angry letter to Fouché, referring again to his having the full support of 
                                                 
201
 See Hiemstra, Die Wilde Haf, pp 277-278.   
202
 Letter dated 22 June 1960 from Melville to the Minister of Defence, KG Gp 5, Box 326, File No. 
KG/GPW/2/1/2, Verdigigingsprobleem en Oplossing: Waardeuring deur Veggenl. R. C. Hiemstra, 











Grobbelaar. Melville elaborated in detail upon why he rejected Hiemstra‟s plan, stating 
that further reorganisation at this stage would create chaos:  
not least because the CF and commandos were currently 
reorganising to comply with our revised security needs. Steps 
have already been put in place in order to upgrade to the best of 
our potential the mobility and fighting capacity of units. I would 
also like to reveal that as a consequence of the recent press 
reports resulting from General Hiemstra‟s speech, several senior 
officers of the above mentioned organisations have recently 
requested from me an assurance that the current reorganisation 
will be followed by a period of consolidation and stability so that 
they can take on the task with determination and complete it. 
Any sign of further insecurity will derail our plans.  In my 
opinion there is no justification in the current circumstances to 
meddle with approved plans, chiefly because it could lead to the 




Melville concluded by warning that considering the “destructive happenings” in Africa, 
the Defence Force needed to move forward, “determined and unrestricted” with the 
object of building up a healthy team spirit that would support to the country at a time of 
its need for protection. Melville requesting Fouché to make a decision on the matter of 
conscription; Hiemstra signed Melville‟s letter as viewed and it was marked as personally 
handed across to the minister on 17 August 1960.  
 
The correspondence suggests that Fouché did not fully concur with Melville and 
Grobbelaar‟s explanations, nor did the minister share the outraged emotions behind 
Melville‟s writings. Melville was due to be retired as Commandant General at the end of 
the year. He was an English-speaking SAAF officer married to the sister of former Prime 
Minister J.G. Strijdom and had been a careful supporter of Frans Erasmus‟s 
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Afrikanerisation policies during the 1950s. By the time the above correspondence was 
exchanged the decision on Melville‟s retirement was already made. His son Clifford 
Melville explained that his father‟s attitude has always been that he would “serve the 
government of the day,” 
204
 but by 1960, however well his career had thrived under 
Erasmus, Melville had neither the Afrikaner nationalist political credentials nor the 
military experience for the defence challenges facing white South Africa. More 
importantly, Melville had apparently misinformed Erasmus towards the end of his 
ministerial tenure over the combat-worthiness of the Defence Force and was later told 
bluntly by Fouché that blatant political favouritism in the appointment of officers was 
over.
205
 Ds. Oosthuizen‟s letter quoted earlier suggests that Melville was packed off into 
early retirement and Hiemstra quite conceivably did not feel intimidated by the 
Commandant General.  
 
Hiemstra‟s autobiography notes that Fouché‟s release of the details concerning 
Grobbelaar‟s appointment was “a very early announcement, probably to end the constant 
speculation and squabbling”.
206
 Although Hiemstra was severely reprimanded by his 
military superiors, Fouché did not give any supportive signals to Melville or Grobbelaar. 
Within his autobiography, Hiemstra triumphantly declared that once the row had 
subsided, the minister displayed no signs of being unsettled by it, nor did Fouché ever 
summon Hiemstra to explain himself.
207
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Grobbelaar and Hiemstra: Appointments in December 1960 as Commandant 
General and Deputy Commandant General.     
 
Hiemstra‟s influence within the SADF during the 1960s was in accordance with what the 
NP expected of such a senior civil servant in an important government department, hence 
Fouché‟s implicit support of Hiemstra in policy clashes with Melville and Grobbelaar 
over the issue of conscription. However, Hiemstra only ascended to the top SADF 
position from October 1965, serving as Grobbelaar‟s deputy for nearly five years. The 
SADF was understood to be the government‟s ultimate instrument ensuring both white 
survival and privilege against threats identified as emanating from communism and 
decolonised Africa. Afrikaner nationalist confidence in the force needed bolstering and it 
was in this role that Hiemstra was clearly a vital man for the NPs defence plans. The 
government anticipated that he would continue to influence SADF planning into the 
future and in time head the organisation. But Fouché was also aware of the white 
community divisions that were exacerbated during the 1950s around defence and was 
unwilling to risk worsening these, while the government were appealing for both 
language groups to jointly support the republic. Given that Hiemstra also received regular 
scathing criticism from the English-language press, besides leadership considerations for 
the time, requiring an experienced soldier for the top SADF job, besides Grobbelaar‟s 
seniority in age, Fouché supported the latter being appointed Commandant General.  
 
When Huisgenoot magazine in 1963 ran an extensive series of articles on the SADF, 
Grobbelaar received significant mention (Hiemstra none at all) and appeared in a colour 











“to the bone” and “held in the highest confidence by officers and men”.
208
 However, 
Grobbelaar as loyal as he was to the government never possessed Hiemstra‟s political 
connections. Grobbelaar was never invited to join the Broederbond, but he also never 
served under Hiemstra. His son remarked that his father‟s attitude was that “he had got to 
the top without such assistance” and suggested that much of the pushing from various 
individuals and institutions to promote Hiemstra as Commandant General in the wake of 
Melville‟s retirement was Broederbond-inspired. In one discussion with Hiemstra, when 
the latter explained that if Grobbelaar was appointed Commandant General, then he 
(Hiemstra) would serve under him, as he would expect Grobbelaar to serve under 
himself, if the roles were reversed. Grobbelaar had apparently replied that he would not 
be willing to serve under Hiemstra.
209
   
 
War experience would also have played the deciding role in Fouché‟s appointment of 
Grobbelaar over Hiemstra. According to Dawid Grobbelaar, his father had privately 
related how Verwoerd was markedly unsettled by events at Sharpeville, Langa and other 
manifestations of black internal rebellion and had therefore wanted assurances of 
appointing the „right‟ SADF commander.
210
 Fouché had found Melville unsatisfactory 
during the State of Emergency;
211
 he was in any event an air force officer with limited 
combat experience, while the most likely future threats to the Republic must be landward 
in the form of either or both, conventional and counter-insurgency, besides potential 
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internal rebellion. Grobbelaar also carried credibility amongst his peers. Lieutenant 
General Jack Dutton remarked about him: “Grobbelaar was an officer with an extensive 
World War Two record and was well known as such by many and duly respected”.
212
 
Therefore, acting upon Fouché‟s advice, Verwoerd appointed Grobbelaar in view of his 
wartime experience, despite Broederbond pressure favouring Hiemstra,
213
 but there was 
still a clear indication of Hiemstra‟s perceived value to the government and his assured 
position as the future SADF commander.   
 
Therefore, during the early 1960s, in the midst of white South African military fears and 
uncertainties there existed in the highest levels of the SADF deep inter-personnel 
antagonisms. The extent of this was of course unknown to the public and the 
parliamentary opposition who would have exploited it to the full. But however 
antagonistic Grobbelaar and Hiemstra felt towards one another, as nationalists they kept 
their disputes private, out of the hands of political opponents, which would have risked 
further uncertainties within the Afrikaans community. Although Ds. Oosthuizen‟s letter 
intimates that SADF internal wrangling in the General Staff level had not been kept 
entirely secret, suppressed internal political strife was also rife amongst NP politicians at 
this time, although equally masked from public view.
214
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The SADF General Staff and senior appointments during the 1960s 
 
The SADF senior staff by 1960 reflected a compromise amongst career soldiers with war 
experience who remained during the Erasmus 1950s era and others whose careers had 
prospered with “political” assistance. Some had acquiesced to the new political order and 
survived by a mixture of attention to professionalism merged with political expedience, 
while other individuals occupied directly politically favoured appointments, regardless of 
their suitability for the posts. Several of these senior officers were remarked upon, both 
positively and negatively by those individuals alive and interviewed for this thesis, who 
were also reasonably positioned professionally during the 1960s to venture judgements. 
Grobbelaar‟s appointment was welcomed by the UP‟s Brigadier Bronkhorst, who still 
reserved his venom for Hiemstra, long the Afrikaner nationalist military bogyman of the 
English-language press, UP politicians, many ex-servicemen and SADF members who 
had resigned during the 1950s. 
all knew (the Commandant General designate) was a good 
soldier and a man who would give his men a fair deal. But what 
would happen when his successor took over, no one knew. If the 
person at present designated to succeed him should be appointed, 
he believed the morale of the force would reach its lowest ebb.
215
   
    
From his appointment in December 1960, Grobbelaar tended to lead the defence 
initiatives announced by government. He was the driving force behind the significantly 
increased defence budgets of the early 1960s, which partly resulted from defence 
appraisals Grobbelaar commissioned, prompting the purchase of new conventional 
warfare weaponry. Hence, he effectively prompted these important decisions rather than 
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 Gen Magnus Malan recalled having a very high respect for Grobbelaar, whom 
he described as broadly aware of international trends and conscious of the growing 
hostility against the republic. Grobbelaar had often called for his subordinates to seek out 
relevant articles that he could peruse.
217
 With “military threats” rumoured, the SADF 
required more experienced soldiers in leadership and Grobbelaar made a number of 
personnel changes. He brought in CF members including several English-speakers and 
Afrikaners, whose careers Erasmus had apparently stalled during the 1950s. Although 
often Grobbelaar would have had to trade off using Afrikaner nationalists and 





During the 31 May 1961 Republic celebrations in Pretoria‟s Church Square, Huisgenoot 
published colour photographs of the military parade and saluting podium, where 
Verwoerd was flanked by his most senior SADF and SA Police officers.
219
 Amongst the 
SADF members standing directly behind Verwoerd were Grobbelaar and Hiemstra, 
besides Combat Gen Nic Bierman, the Chief of Army Staff, Combat Gen Sybrand 
Engelbrecht, Chief of Air Force Staff, Combat Gen Ben Viljoen and Chief of Naval Staff, 
Rear Adm Hugo Biermann. Nic Bierman was “recalled” after apparently being 
professionally relegated during the 1950s; having been a brigadier during the war but 
losing a rank after 1945, reverting to colonel. A 1937 rugby Springbok with extensive 
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World War Two experience as the 6
th
 SA Armoured Division‟s artillery commander in 
Italy,
220
 Bierman attended courses at the Imperial Defence College and served as a 
Military Attaché in London during the 1950s; but with his commendable war service and 
a British wife, Bierman was allegedly out of political favour during this period. Bierman 
was appointed Deputy Inspector-General from November 1959, before he was assigned 
to organise military intelligence and later take over command of the newly formed 
Directorate of Planning and Operations (DPO) during the early 1960s. This SADF 
component was tasked with identifying and appraising potential military threats and from 
31 December 1960 replaced the Inspector General position.
221
 Bierman‟s career had now 
re-advanced significantly; and in 1963, he was introduced within Huisgenoot as the head 
of the DPO, “one of the most important functions within the „Brain-centre‟ of the 
Defence Force in Pretoria”.
222
 However, he did not particularly impress Capt (later Gen) 
Magnus Malan, a future Defence Force Chief and Minister of Defence who also worked 
in the DPO at this early stage of his career and personally liked Bierman, but did not rate 
him particularly highly in his profession.
223
   
 
One of the last politically-motivated „Erasmus‟ appointments was that of Maj Gen 
Sybrand Engelbrecht as Chief of Army Staff from November 1959, when he was 
promoted from colonel to “temporary major-general” (missing brigadier). Engelbrecht‟s 
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appointment had even surprised Hiemstra, who described it as “shocking”,
224
 while Maj 
Gen Moodie related that Engelbrecht‟s appointment was bizarre, for Engelbrecht was 
apparently well known as “weak and incompetent”.
225
 Engelbrecht‟s war service received 
no notable reference in works consulted, although as a major, he had taken over 
command of engineering training at Potchefstroom during 1948 and had previously been 
Quartermaster of an Engineer Stores Base Depot.
226
 Jannie Geldenhuys recalled 
Engelbrecht as being primarily an academic and mathematician.
227
 Maj Gen Daan 
Hamman, Bierman‟s former DPO personal assistant, stated that Engelbrecht‟s 
appointment temporarily side-tracked Brig Piet Jacobs, a highly regarded soldier and war 
veteran, who later became Army Chief of Staff from 1963 to 1967, with Engelbrecht 




The SAAF Chief in the early 1960s was Combat (Maj) Gen Ben Viljoen, who had been 
the Senior administrative Officer for the SAAF in the Middle East during the war and 
continued to spent much of his post-war career in administration, rather than acquiring 
the technical benefits of flying as long as possible.
229
 Viljoen apparently had no 
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 but he had not served in Korea. Viljoen who was Air 
Force Chief of Staff from 1956 to April 1965, was followed by Lt Gen H.C. (Kalfie) 
Martin as SAAF Chief from 1965 to 1968. Martin was an experienced pilot and a highly 
regarded World War Two combat veteran. Amongst the serving top SAAF pilots in the 
1960s were the highly regarded Comdt Bob Rogers who led the delivery flight of 
Buccaneers from the UK to the republic during late 1964 and Maj Dennis Earp, who 
worked on the acquisition of the Canberra light bombers (delivered in 1962). Both 
became lieutenant generals and SAAF Chiefs during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Gen 
Magnus Malan, identified early as a highly promising soldier of sound Afrikaner 
nationalist pedigree as a captain assisted in the DPO. He was one of the officers who in 
1960, compiled the first local military appreciation. Thereafter, it was used by amongst 
others, Malan, Maj Gen Piet Jacobs and Brig Jan Burger
231
 to help ascertain future 
defence needs. 
232
 Five years later when Malan was heading SWA Command, he so 
impressed Hiemstra and P.W. Botha with his briefing on the security situation in SWA 
that they transferred him to what Hiemstra described as a “more difficult” command in 




Available evidence suggests that had the SADF been involved in a conventional war 
during this decade, Brigadier (later Maj Gen) Bill Barends stands out amongst senior 
officers as one who would have been the most promising of the potential combat 
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 Barends had been heavily involved with the 6th SA Armoured 
Division‟s fighting during the Italian campaign less than twenty years earlier
235
 and by 
the late 1960s, was second in command to Lt Gen C.A. (Pops) Fraser of the SADF‟s Joint 
Combat Forces (JCF) component. During the 1960s, the SADF was still dependent upon 
brigadiers and colonels with World War Two experience and a number of them, like 
Barends were English speaking and had been disadvantaged in terms of their professional 
prospects during the 1950s. Fraser who during the 1966-67 was Chief of the Army and as 
mentioned above was also Joint Combat Forces Chief was undoubtedly one of the most 
intelligent and effective SADF commanders;
236
 Fraser‟s career in further discussed within 
chapters four and six.    
 
One officer whose career catapulted during the 1960s was Lt Gen Willem P. Louw. Maj 
Gen Hamman described him as a “political plant”
237
 and Geldenhuys considered Louw 
very much a “Hiemstra man”.
238
 Louw was earmarked early, almost definitely by 
Hiemstra, as possessing the right attributes as both a soldier and nationalist. Louw 
enjoyed a meteoric career rise to Chief of the Army by 1968; indeed, notwithstanding his 
war service – he had been an infantry junior officer in Italy, he was invited to join the 
Broederbond in 1962.
239
 Louw was a tough physical soldier who established and 
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commanded the Parachute Battalion at a comparatively late age (early 40s). However, he 
appears to have been disliked by many of his subordinates for aggressive and 
confrontational management and was also not highly regarded for his capacity as a 
thinking soldier. Col Crook, a former CF artillery officer, described Louw‟s manner in 
the most unfavourable terms,
240
 while Gen Magnus Malan refers to him bluntly, when 
relating how Louw informed him of his (Malan‟s) transfer as Army Deputy Chief in 
1972.
241
  Lt Gen Ian Gleeson was candid in referring to Louw as: 
very abrupt and a person who would bully rather than discuss 
and debate. People were pretty fearful of him and got out of his 
way, rather than look for confrontation. On his visits to the unit 
in Walvis I do not remember gaining much in the form of 
inspiration or learning from him. I would rather have had more 
time with some of his other senior staff than him… I am not sure 
how he made such rapid progress. I remember him being the first 
OC of the paras. We were told that the Brits were impressed with 
their tough approach to their course and naturally Louw must 
have gained a good reputation as the first OC. 
242
   
 
Assessing the capability of the SADF General Staff of the early 1960s is partly 
speculative. Moodie was highly critical and thought with the exception of Adm 
Biermann, most of the senior commanders were rather mediocre. Moodie believed that in 
event of war, some General Staff members would have had to replace by highly regarded 
soldiers like Brig Bill Barends.
243
 General Malan was not sure how well a conventional 
threat would have been countered during the early 1960s. One of his concerns was that 
there was too little delegation of authority to middle-ranking officers from the highest 
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defence positions on the General Staff. As an example, Malan referred to an incident 
during 1963 when troops were being emplaned during an operation involving a civil 
disturbance in Damaraland. An army brigadier was actually checking each detail of 
equipment loaded into the aircraft. Malan considered this authoritarian „habit‟ in the long 
run was likely to have been too debilitating at operational level. For both big and small 
decisions would be decided at a level that during wartime, would exhaust commanders 




Hiemstra as a “politician general” during the early 1960s. 
 
Hiemstra‟s overt Afrikaner nationalist public and internal politicking within the SADF, 
presented a difficult challenge to Fouché. For example in August 1960, UP Senator R. 
Pilkington-Jordan, within private correspondence to Fouché, complained that Hiemstra 
was misusing his position for party political speeches. Fouché‟s carefully worded 
response was typical political double-talk, remarking that “speechmaking on matters of 
policy is the function of the responsible Minister and I have taken my stand on this”,
245
 
but also waved an olive branch, while encouraging Pilkington-Jordan to be more discreet 
with such matters by avoiding the formality of correspondence.  
My attitude has always been that I do not think it is correct to 
discuss such matters through the medium of writing. I am always 
ready to discuss matters of this nature with any responsible 
person and you are certainly one with whom I will be only too 
prepared to have a conversation- you know it.
246
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In mid-1962, Commando explained the AKVV‟s objectives as assisting Afrikaans-
speakers in the Defence Force to promote Afrikaans military terms and military culture, 
besides “strive towards a healthy relationship between the Defence Force and “volk” 
including “the building up of our own military tradition and good citizenship”. Despite 
Fouché‟s intentions of Afrikaans-English „military rapprochement,‟ Hiemstra tactlessly 
suggested that SADF English-speaking members should create their own such cultural 
organisation.
247
 His zeal for pushing Afrikaner nationalist symbolism within the SADF at 
every opportunity remained unabated, despite the official Verwoerdian line of „building a 
common white nation‟.  
 
Close reading of Hiemstra‟s autobiography reveals numerous references of hostility 
towards those English-speakers he had perceived as contemptuous of his decisions, with 
particular loathing reserved for those who had criticised his refusal to volunteer during 
the war. By the 1960s, Hiemstra had also demonstrated a capacity to stifle such feelings 
and besides the occasional lapse, he played the role of a loyal civil servant, embracing the 
expedient common white nationhood of the beleaguered Republic. When Verwoerd 
announced to Parliament in January 1960 that there would be a referendum amongst the 
white community to decide whether South Africa would become a republic, Hiemstra 
wrote that, “a senior English-speaking officer came into his office and began speaking 
about Dr Verwoerd‟s announcement.” This unknown officer made it clear to Hiemstra 
that if the Governor General was to be replaced by a State President, he would vote for a 
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 The full context of this discussion is impossible to resurrect, however, it 
does suggest that this English-speaking officer was fully conscious of the possible 
political implications of the republic regarding his own career, besides awareness of 
Hiemstra‟s own stance as an ardent republican, Verwoerd supporter and a politically 
influential SADF member.
249
 Hiemstra‟s diplomatic ability was confirmed by Lt Gen 
Jack Dutton, who wrote briefly on his own recollections of Hiemstra:  
He was an easy conversationalist with a pleasing manner and 
could adapt to any situation. When I was OC EP Command I 
even had him invited to open the Port Alfred Show!  He did a 





Maj Gen Phil Pretorius who in the 1960s was one of the SADF‟s top prospects in terms 
of intelligence work and the academic study of military affairs, also commented that he 
experienced Hiemstra as entirely approachable, helpful and diplomatic.
251
 But Hiemstra‟s 
strong emphasis upon promoting Afrikaner nationalist causes within the SADF of the 
1960s was not necessarily appreciated by all English-speaking officers, although they 
may have been cautious at the time about sharing such views. For example, Lt Gen Ian 
Gleeson remarked that Hiemstra‟s non-service during World War Two was a well-known 
detail amongst officers and did not promote respect.
252
 Maj Gen Moodie suggested that 
he experienced Hiemstra as increasingly more “political” over the years and not 
particularly impressive as a soldier. Moodie also related that Hiemstra had personally 
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disadvantaged him by revoking a decision made by Grobbelaar to despatch him (Moodie) 
as a military attaché to Australia, sending a friend (of Hiemstra‟s) instead.
253
 Most of the 
retired officers interviewed acknowledged that Hiemstra was perceived as having a 
political style with which he conducted his professional work.  
 
As shown earlier, shortly after Verwoerd shifted Erasmus to the justice portfolio in early 
1960, Hiemstra had severely criticized the former minister‟s management of the SADF at 
cabinet level. Hiemstra also amplified his strident calls for full white male conscription. 
Hiemstra clearly interpreted Fouché‟s appointment against the backdrop of the coming 
republic, as a moment to push for his own defence vision. As already demonstrated, 
Hiemstra‟s public utterances over conscription intensely angered both Commandant 
General Melville and his deputy Grobbelaar
254
, but also testified to Hiemstra‟s barely 
disguised contempt for some of the Erasmus‟s decisions. Hiemstra clearly felt confident 
that he had political backing at the highest level, more so than Erasmus, or the previous 
Commandant Generals, or even Grobbelaar, to whom he was responsible as his deputy.
255
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Hiemstra as Commandant General  
 
In anticipation of his being appointed Commandant General upon Grobbelaar‟s 
retirement, Hiemstra during 1964 embarked upon a tour of Europe, ostensibly in search 
of new ideas on defence. He was declined entry into the USA, but cordially received in 
the United Kingdom, Portugal and France. Hiemstra made a particular point of inquiring 
about air-defence systems during the British leg of his tour,
256
 this being at the time a 
specific SADF concern. In May 1965, Fouché announced Hiemstra‟s appointment as the 
new Commandant General to succeed Grobbelaar. The minister emphasised his view that 
Hiemstra was held in high regard by SADF officers of both language groups and despite 
his lack of a war record, possessed all the requirements for the post. Although the 
English-language press continued referring unfavourably Hiemstra‟s non-war service, 
257
 
Fouché deftly stepped around their outrage. Hiemstra came under predictable attack from 
the UP MPs Gay and Bronkhorst who called upon the government to reconsider the 
appointment, not least because it would cause friction amongst the senior officers. 
Hiemstra later swept this criticism aside by saying that Bronkhorst was still living in 
another era
258
 and in a sense, he was now correct. Although riled by UP MPs like 
Bronkhorst, Hiemstra believed that history and contemporary political issues were on the 
side of Afrikaner nationalists in drawing „English‟ support at the expense of the UP. 
Although many English South Africans still despised Hiemstra for his refusal to serve in 
the war, much had also changed by the mid-1960s in terms of the political context. The 
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white community and the white English component in particular were also enjoying 
prosperity. Amidst such new circumstances and imperatives, issues like Hiemstra‟s non-
participation, during a war twenty years earlier were fading in importance; not least 
because of growing political apathy markedly discernable within in the English 
community, itself partly a consequence of affluence. But there was also an omnipresent 
awareness amongst whites that new national defence issues now existed far removed 
from those 1939-1945. By the mid-1960s some English whites were even starting to vote 
NP, while the UP‟s support continued to decline, as many middle aged war veterans 
focussed upon work, families and the ex-servicemen‟s Memorable Organisation of Tin 
Hats (MOTHS). The latter organisation was not a front for the parliamentary opposition, 
nor did it display any strong party political component.
259
 Even in Natal, the war 
veterans‟ anti-republic marches of 1960 were never to be repeated again during the rest of 
the decade or thereafter in the same anti-nationalist form.   
 
Hiemstra‟s appointment and his publicly known perceptions on South Africa‟s 
“enemies”, accentuated the contemporary climate on communism being perceived as a 
particularly dangerous threat to the country. The Afrikaner-nationalist right had to an 
extent adjusted its focus from “external communist dangers” and its “traditional 
enemies”, namely British Imperialism or African nationalism, to the possibility of 
sedition and betrayal from within.
260
 Schalk Pienaar, the newly appointed editor of the 
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new Afrikaans Sunday newspaper Rapport, was one voice within the Afrikaner 
establishment who challenged the idea that military means would be adequate to deal 




Hiemstra was also now being invited to address predominantly white English-speaking 
audiences. Speaking at a huge air show in Durban during June 1965, he was not only 
accompanied by an impressive SAAF contingent that participated with its latest aircraft, 
but he also used the occasion to warn against communist subversion. He spoke about the 
SAAF being now modernised to hit back hard at any aggressor, considering the “open 
threats” made by communists.
262
 In his 1965 Commando Christmas message, Hiemstra 
referred to there being “destructive forces afoot, who would deprive us of the way of life 
we cherish so dearly for something of their choosing.”
263
 He was speaking within the 
context of ultra-conservative white political thinking, whereby although African militant 
nationalism within the republic‟s borders had been crushed, a belief persisted within the 
NP‟s right-wing that communist subversion remaining embedded within all extra-
parliamentary opposition to government policy. Such was the line of the verkramptes
264
 
within the NP, whom as Giliomee explains, were by the mid-1960s, starting to jostle with 
verligtes
265
 over the “soul of Afrikaner nationalism,” by “engaging in witch hunts against 
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everything that was not traditional”.
266
 Out of this tension within Afrikaner politics, 
accelerated an hysterical and uncritical over-reaction to a “communist threat” purportedly 
manifesting itself within and without, with the symptoms being discerned particularly 
strongly at SADF leadership level. Hiemstra‟s outlook was clearly in line with the 
verkramptes.         
 
Structural changes within the SADF command under Hiemstra  
 
Grobbelaar retired in September 1965 during the height of the Verwoerd years after 
having concentrated particularly upon the new conventional warfare armaments 
purchases. Grobbelaar and Fouché were congratulated by the UP defence spokesperson 
Gay for “repairi(ng) the damage done” (to the SADF) “or for everything they could 
do”….(and) were permitted to do”. Gay also called upon Grobbelaar‟s services to be 
retained rather than appoint Hiemstra as SADF Chief; supported by Bronkhorst, who 
maintained the same position as he had from the 1950s, suggesting that it was unfair for 
war veterans to serve under a man who chose not to fight.
267
 UP objections were of no 
consequence as Hiemstra assumed his new position on 1 October 1965. His political 
influence had also accentuated by this time; he is listed as being on the Broederbond 
Executive Council from 1964-65.
268
 Hiemstra emphasised that the time had arrived for 
SADF reorganisation, pointing that it had been five years, since the command and control 
structures had been shaken up and this now required review. He noted that there 
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remained deficiencies in the quantity and quality of SADF equipment, stressing his belief 
that the SADF needed to move towards full white male conscription and that increasing 
the SADF‟s manpower resources was the main task for the immediate future.
269
 Hiemstra 
was concerned in general about training standards that were already under investigation 
via the Groenewoud committee (see chapter seven, p. 415). But one of Hiemstra‟s most 




Despite the considerable threat appraisals completed between 1960 and 1965 and used as 
references in this dissertation, Hiemstra on assuming the top SADF job, effectively 
rebutted his predecessor‟s work immediately. Hiemstra refers in his autobiography to a 
statement he gave to a journalist from Die Transvaaler, almost the very day which he 
became Commandant General, wherein he intimated that little had been done to evaluate 
what threats existed and how the SADF needed to be restructured in order to deal with 
them.   
from (the SADF‟s) inception, (it) was never properly scrutinised 
to establish how large it should be or how it should be structured 
for its role. All changes which occurred in the past were 
haphazard attempts by those in command, often just to satisfy 
one or other personal whim. There was also no in depth study 
made of possible threats, on which to base our country‟s defence 
requirements…I believe that our chief task, from now on and as 
we advance, to ensure that the equipment made available to us, 
will be utilised to its maximum efficiency. I intend improving 
and changing the entire command and command structure, so 
that it can operate at any time both effectively and without 
(further) change. In my opinion the heads of Defence Force  
components must be capable of rendering command functions 
and not be simply staff officers, as has been the case. We have 
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also never possessed a properly coordinated staff group or 
general staff. What my predecessors referred to as a „General 
Staff‟ was not that. It was rather a sort of “senior command 
group”.
271
                    
 
Hiemstra maintained his projection of the Republic having to militarily be able to fend 
for itself. That historically the country during the last world war and in Korea had 
participated as part of Allied forces that had also provided logistic support and 
equipment, but never was it envisaged that South Africa may have to fight alone. 
However, “the rapid acquisition of independence by the African states and world reaction 
to a „minor‟ incident like Sharpeville changed this”.
272
 Hiemstra went on to speak about 
his belief in a national service system, whereby the SADF‟s manpower problems might 





Besides the oncoming national service the other most important changes which Hiemstra 
brought in were the creation of two separate commands, namely Joint Combat Forces 
(JCF) and Maritime Command under Maj Gen Nic Bierman and Vice Adm Hugo 
Biermann respectively. It was envisaged that these would be the command structures by 
which any land, air or sea threat could be countered, with these two commanders 
selecting what forces they required to meet any particular type of threat. These two 
commands along with the three services Chiefs and the Commandant General formed the 
now termed “Supreme Command” or “Opperbevel” of the SADF. With the Directorate 
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of Planning and Operations (DPO) being dissolved, which had effectively formed part of 
the second tier of command below the Commandant General, the short-lived Deputy 
Commandant General post was also scrapped.
274
 Former SAAF Chief Lt Gen Earp felt 
negatively regarding Hiemstra‟s changes, contending firstly Hiemstra was significantly 
disadvantaged by the fact that he had never been Chief of the Air Force and had not 
flown operationally after the early 1940s. Earp maintained that Hiemstra‟s philosophy of 
command and control contained fundamental errors. For example, if the SADF were to 
have taken some military action in SWA, a “force-multiplying” capacity was critical, 
where there would be an urgent need to move personnel. But professionally, according to 
Earp, it would have created problems where the SAAF Chief could not actually move his 
own men and equipment, effectively a “subversion of his power”. Army and air force 
Chiefs could not command their forces committed to action, for this was the sole 
responsibility of the JCF or Maritime Command Chiefs. Earp believed that Hiemstra‟s 
thinking was coloured by contemporary Canadian military philosophy that all soldiers are 
the same, fighting the same war – hence Hiemstra‟s early 1970s eccentric ideas on a 
common SADF uniform, where even the navy would be dressed in khaki.
275
   
 
Lt Gen Dutton also considered the concept unsatisfactory, citing the same reasons as Earp 
of it creating confusion of seniority and command prerogatives. The JCF Chief held the 
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equivalent rank level as the Army and Air Force Chiefs, setting up the potential for 
professional clashes and jealousies impeding operations, while the same possibilities 
existed with the Chief of Maritime Forces (Biermann) who was also Naval Chief of Staff, 
but held the same level rank (Vice Admiral) as the SAAF Chief (Lieutenant General).
276
 
Hiemstra‟s mid-1960s re-organisation of command and control received considerable 
criticism from former SADF members interviewed. 
 
Hiemstra and a “charge” of being “too political” (1966)     
 
Early in 1966, rumours had circulated that Hiemstra would be willing to instigate a coup, 
described, “at the snap of a finger” based upon a source (who according to Hiemstra) was 
“a certain highly placed person” that he declined to identify. Also alleged was that 
Hiemstra was a member of the Republikeinse Party, a tiny shadowy Afrikaner movement 
of the period that apparently aligned itself to the political right of Verwoerd.
277
 Both 
military intelligence and the Security Police Chief, Brigadier Hendrik Van den Berg 
investigated an English-speaking Dr Du Toit of Wakkerstroom who had apparently made 
the allegations. The records available indicate the results to be inconclusive and the 
rumours appeared to amount to little more than gossip.
278
 However, Hiemstra‟s apparent 
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secrecy over his source seemed to hamper the clandestine investigation by the police.
279
 
On concluding such, the police suggested a certain Mr Gillespie, as a consequence of a 
personal dispute with Dr Du Toit, had deliberately starting spreading damaging rumours 
to discredit his opponent. It endorsed a view held by some that Hiemstra‟s regularly 
voiced opinions upon Afrikaner political, cultural and national issues greyed over into his 
professional work. Indeed the question must have been asked in some circles as to 
whether the Hiemstra was harbouring political ambitions, although such was rejected by 




However, during his ascent to the top SADF position, Hiemstra‟s emphatic stated belief 
that the traditionally understood Afrikaner nationalist historical mission was a divine 
calling placed him in an entirely different category from other senior officers on the 
General Staff (later Supreme Command). Hiemstra‟s own admiration for Verwoerd is an 
obvious theme throughout his autobiography, referring for example, to the Prime 
Minister‟s rebuttal of MacMillan‟s Wind of Change speech as a „brilliant performance,
281
 
besides many other issues where he reflects upon national politics. Hiemstra‟s 
unquestioning support and faith in Verwoerd might have ensured him the future position 
of Defence Minister had the Prime Minister not been assassinated in 1966. 
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The abolition of the position of Defence Secretary 
 
Also in line with Hiemstra‟s determination to centralize control of the SADF to 
professional officers only, was his abolition of the position of Defence Secretary, the last 
incumbent being one Vladimir Steyn. According to Hiemstra, tensions had heightened 
when the Defence Secretary warned new Defence Minister P. W. Botha that military 
personnel were in general irresponsible regarding financial affairs.
282
 The Defence 
Secretary position, which had been part of the South African defence structure since 
Union, effectively meant that civilian civil servants had significant control in military 
business. This was a situation that Hiemstra had long been hostile towards and was 
supported by Fouché who two years earlier was quoted as stating that complaints 
concerning the Secretariat were a “delicate matter” and that he “became annoyed when 
the military side had to wait for approval by the administrative side”.
283
 The tensions 
were compounded during mid-1963, when a Secretariat official, John Deacon, was 
arrested together with several SADF officers in connection with bribery charges 
connected to the purchasing of military equipment.
284
 Die Burger and Die Transvaaler’s 
report of the officers all being Afrikaners,
285
 further angered Fouché as damaging to his 
attempts at revitalizing the SADF‟s public standing. Qualms were expressed via Die 
Burger who welcomed a judicial inquiry, fearing that gossip and rumours were politically 
damaging to the Defence Department and responsible minister.
286
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The resultant details of the trials regarding several Department of Defence officers were 
kept secret as was the Commission appointed to investigate.
287
 The situation embarrassed 
Fouché as there had also been implications of breaches in state security regarding weapon 
types under order. According to Seegers, secrecy within civilian involvement regarding 
defence spending in the 1960s eventually degenerated into corruption
288
 and such was 
already grasped by the UP defence spokespersons. They urged Fouché to move away 
from “unnecessary secrecy,” because defence was vulnerable to black-marketeering and 




Undoubtedly, for the Defence Secretariat, the alleged irregularities hardly promoted its 
value or supported sustaining the role it played in authorizing arms purchases. Hiemstra 
further claimed that as a consequence of the Secretariat‟s operation, the SADF had in the 
past been disadvantaged by the Civil Service Commission and Treasury. Hiemstra used 
the first opportunity of bringing the disputes to new defence minister P.W. Botha‟s 
attention, citing his complete disagreement with the SADF “two-headed structure” of the 
Commandant General and Secretary for Defence. Botha appointed a committee of senior 
civil servants to investigate and they recommended the Secretariat‟s disbandment.
290
 
Budgetary responsibility was transferred to a Comptroller of Finance Service who 
reported directly to the SADF Chief. This was part of a new series of Directorate-
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Generals, created according to Seegers, to ensure more specialization.
291
 With cabinet 
approval, Hiemstra was appointed Secretary for Defence from 17 October 1966 in 
addition to his Commandant General office. With Botha‟s assistance, Hiemstra was 
accentuating the prerogative of the SADF to operate more independently from any civil 
control, besides that of the defence minister.
292
 Maj Gen Phil Pretorius explained that the 
Defence Secretary had actually ranked above the Commandant General, and Hiemstra 
wanted a direct line to the minister, not be forced to work across a civilian.
293
 Pretorius‟s 
opinion was shared by Gen Magnus Malan, who pointed out that the Secretary for 
Defence effectively held the purse strings when it came to budgets and arms purchases. 
Malan believed that it was a humiliating situation for senior SADF officers to have to 
operate through a civilian civil servant.
294
 By 1968, Hiemstra was instrumental in finally 
achieving his long-held aim of full compulsory military national service for all white 




Erasmus and Hiemstra were jointly largely successful in repositioning the Defence Force 
to a significant extent within the Afrikaner nationalist domain by the time of Erasmus‟s 
departure at the end of 1959, this applying particularly regarding the army. With his 
unswerving commitment to Afrikaner nationalist principles, and notwithstanding his 
abilities as a manager and organiser, Hiemstra‟s most enduring legacy as a professional 
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soldier for nearly four decades was that of a political apparatchik serving the SADF on 
behalf of the NP. After a meteoric rise from 1948, he was appointed Deputy 
Commandant General by January 1961 and Commandant General by October 1965, 
without even having been Chief of the Air Force. Hiemstra had not flown operationally 
after 1941 neither had he held any large-scale command involving significant 
management of armed forces in a potential war situation. His career post-1948 was 
effectively in administration duties, which as shown in this chapter, he often discharged 
with a particular political agenda.    
 
As an often controversial figure during press discussions on South African defence issues 
during the 1960s, amongst the SADF‟s senior officers, Hiemstra was the most obviously 
committed Afrikaner nationalist and politically influential through his Broederbond 
membership. Hiemstra‟s career was decisive in politicising the SADF and promoting it as 
a cornerstone of defending apartheid and white South Africa. Yet he receives virtually no 
attention by Seegers, Frankel and other writers who have referred to the SADF during the 
1960s; a gap which this thesis attempts to correct. Throughout the early 1960s, Hiemstra 
endorsed his reputation as a military man prepared to court controversy with politically 
loaded speeches, including cavalier challenges to his seniors over conscription. 
Paradoxically, this was a markedly outspoken approach to follow, within a contemporary 
social culture of extreme conformity, for the assumptions of hierarchy were explicitly 
part of Afrikaner nationalist state structures. The interpretation proposed here of 
Hiemstra, based largely upon interviews, archival documentation and Hiemstra‟s 











history of Afrikaner “political martyrdom”. Hiemstra had no equal amongst other senior 
SADF officers during the period and this explicitly enhanced his influence with the 
Afrikaner nationalist establishment. 
      
Hiemstra‟s promotion of the AKVV was a vivid example of superimposing Afrikaner 
traditionalism onto SADF culture. This political role was also government sanctioned, 
initially through Erasmus and later more tacitly by Fouché, who trod warily, not to 
unduly further alienate other constituencies associated with the SADF. Particularly the 
white English members, many of whose larger community intensely disliked Hiemstra.  
However, Hiemstra enjoyed significant support in the Afrikaner section, a situation that 
no NP politician could ignore, especially during a period when Afrikaner nationalist 
hegemony and triumph were slowly waning with affluence and urbanisation. Therefore, 
government clamours about outside threats were also about retaining NP support besides 
shoring up Afrikaner and a broader white nationalism. These were strategies to which 
Hiemstra projected his political rhetoric to further draw white public consent and support 
for the SADF and military service.      
 
Fouché could also not risk further division and conflict amongst his officers by 
appointing Hiemstra over Grobbelaar in 1960. Neither could Fouché ignore an officer of 
Grobbelaar‟s experience regarding the potential military threats supposedly facing the 
country. Hiemstra had already disagreed in private with Grobbelaar over conscription and 
there had been significant acrimony over contestation for the top position. Yet despite 











one another:  The decorated army officer with World War Two experience, yet a loyal 
Afrikaner nationalist, alongside a kind of political commissar in military uniform. In 
leading a political party so markedly devoid of military experience, Verwoerd was 
extraordinarily lucky to have both Grobbelaar and Hiemstra, while Fouché‟s dependence 
upon the former was largely a consequence of the NP‟s dearth of defence expertise. After 
1965, Hiemstra worked closely with new defence minister P.W. Botha, who was younger 
and more assertive than his predecessor besides determined to learn quickly about his 
portfolio.  
  
The SADF General Staff of 1960-68 included a mixture of the experienced, the well 
respected and the very average. Anglicised Afrikaner and English-speaking senior/middle 
ranking officers, some with considerable World War Two experience were placed 
strategically into important leadership positions, as Fouché tried to restore efficiency and 
morale. Fouché had to play a delicate political game of balancing „merit‟ appointments 
with political demands. His legacy amongst surviving SADF members of the period 
interviewed is almost consistently that of the man who supposedly ended political 
favouritism in appointments. Although such appears to be only partially true, for Fouché 
operated as a  member of a cabinet determined to maintain Afrikaner control and unity 















This chapter concerns how the South African military during 1960-66 perceived military 
threats. African nationalist organisations are discussed so far as they are relevant to the 
military‟s own perceptions and operation. Previously classified SADF documentation is 
used to explain the Defence Force‟s appraisals of the security situation from 1960, 
particularly threats of a conventional warfare nature. The SADF informed itself of the 
supposed links between the South African dissidents training in Africa and elsewhere and 
of political changes resulting from decolonising and newly independent African 
countries, besides Cold War developments in the broader international scene. All these 
were also studied by the SADF as to how they might impact upon national security.   
 
At the beginning of the decade, Deputy Commandant General Hiemstra reflected that if 
global war broke out, it was possible that South Africa might face an “attack from 
Africa” (referring to bellicose utterances from African and Indian spokesmen).
295
 
“Invasion talk” and threats of “action” appeared regularly in the South African press 
during particularly 1961 to 1963 and after the Angolan uprisings by black nationalists 
during late 1961.
296
 Afrikaner nationalist historian, C. J. F. Muller described the period as 
follows:  
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A gulf separated the new Africa from the Republic…..and the 
prospect of bridging it seemed remote. South Africa‟s former 
careless isolation on the African continent threatened to become 
real isolation that was not without menace. South of the Zambezi 
„western civilization was on the defensive. The menace came not 
from the closing of comparatively insignificant markets or from 
the military strength of the black African states, but from forces 
in the world, at the UN and elsewhere, whose support the African 
states sought to obtain. The Republic responded to this 
widespread animosity by tightening the bonds amongst her 
White population, encouraging immigration from Europe and 
maintaining an armed vigilance. She was fortunate she was 
enjoying an economic boom.
297
      
 
Muller gave a predictable description of white South Africa facing and withstanding 
threats during the early 1960s, but this quote is devoid of the detail and ideological 
obsessions that dominated the government and SADF intelligence at the time, when 
confronted with such an unpredictable future. Muller refers readers to three of G.D. 
Scholtz‟s works. This nationalist historian and political analyst published prolifically and 
his work constituted one significant basis by which the SADF leaders attempted to 
comprehend global security trends potentially affecting the Republic in a 
military/strategic sense; such is outlined further at various points in this chapter. 
 
SADF perceptions of internal African nationalism as military threats  
 
Of the early 1960s conventional warfare threats, which the SADF appraised and armed 
against, official documentation testifies to considerable intelligence gathering detailing 
PAC and other South African dissident activities. Against this atmosphere of uncertainty, 
the government and SADF believed external international military intervention could 
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occur; either to support the revolutionaries; end apartheid to „preserve world peace‟ or 
wrest Republican control away from SWA. The PAC connection to a number of high 
profile national incidents during 1960 to 1962: Sharpeville; Pondoland unrest; the Poqo 
violence against white citizens; ensured this organisation received particular scrutiny.
298
 
The Pondoland disturbances of 1960 to 1961 were a kind of „peasant‟s revolt‟ against 
government attempts to force new settlement patterns and leaders upon communities. The 
uprising received a determined response by SADF contingents.
299
 But particularly after 
the Poqo Paarl and Bashee River murders of whites in late 1962 and early 1963, a range 
of horror press stories were constantly fed anew by government announcements, 
magnifying the impact upon the white community, already conscious of the ongoing 
racial violence in the Congo and attacks the previous year on Angolan settler 
communities. Such details postulated myriad dread possibilities of violent revolution in 
South Africa, supposedly sponsored by communist inspired intrigue. Newspapers 
continually published articles on incidents involving, according to the government, 




Important backdrops to SADF perceptions of threats and the white community‟s general 
concurrence thereof, included: Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) sabotage activities and later 
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that of the largely white African Resistance Movement (ARM); the Rivonia trial and 
revelations of Operation Mayibuye which particularly influenced SADF operations; 
besides the 1964 Johannesburg Station bomb and the arrest of Braam Fisher. From 1961 
and during the months following Rivonia in 1963 to 1964, white South Africans had felt 
beleaguered and shaken. International condemnations; actions by dissident movements; 
and the often violent manifestations of African nationalism were linked in popular 
perceptions to „communism,‟ which the SADF viewed during the 1960s as the most 
important threat, “motivated by Red China and the Soviet Union”. An SADF military 
intelligence (“DMI report listing potential threats facing the RSA in the period July 1965 
to June 1966”) phrased it simply: 
In spite of communism today being a world threat, it is a huge 
threat to the RSA because of the considerable advances it has 




Tanganyika/Tanzania was a particular SADF focus of concern regarding the military 
training of South African dissidents and even more significantly after the 
January/February 1964 Zanzibar Revolution. DMI viewed the Chinese influence as 
potentially more dangerous than the Soviets, understanding the peasant based revolution 
as more appropriate to a continent still many decades short of meaningful 
industrialisation. The Chinese presence in Dar-Es-Salam was a regular focus of DMI 
operatives and reports.
302
 At a popular level, Die Huisgenoot in 1964 reported on Chinese 
activities in Tanzania, noting “one huge advantage (over the Soviets): they are not 
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 thereby playing upon readers racial paranoia that in Africa, “non-whites” 
would find anti-white South African commonality even more effectively than white 
Russians. Vladimer Shubin, a previous Soviet historian who has written extensively and 
recently on the relations between the Soviet Union and ANC, insists that despite Soviet 
financial assistance from 1960 for the SACP and MK, the USSR did not initiate any 
military option against the white South African government. Shubin confirms that the 
Russians agreed to assist with arms and training, but pushed rather for the latter to be 
conducted within African countries.
304
 Nevertheless, some MK training occurred within 
the Soviet Union,
305
 further accentuating SADF perceptions of communism being the 
main motivator behind the ANC. 
 
The SADF had noted that from mid-1963, the Liberation Committee (LC) was 
established by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), intended to if necessary liberate 
South Africa by armed force.
306
 In a report from the Director of Military Intelligence 
ending 15 December 1964 concerning the “Unconventional Military Threat”, the view 
was that “subversive organisations” remained a concern, in the sense that they were 
“underground” while “planning and organising were being continued on an increasing 
scale outside the RSA.” The „LC‟ was reported to be investigating the defence plans of 
the governments in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, ascertaining the 
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strengths of the government security forces and that of black guerrilla movements for 
possible military support.
307
 The SADF were well informed on anti-South African 
guerrilla activities in Tanzania,
 308
although the military capacity of these opponents was 
puny and of little real threat. However, SADF commanders were concerned that in the 
long term guerrillas may succeed in creating conditions conducive to UN or Afro-Asian 
military invasion. The ANC and SACP also took seriously Afro-Asian rhetoric of 
militarily threatening the white south and Operation Mayibuye had assumed military 






It is not within the scope of this thesis to outline Mayibuye in detail: Suffice to say that it 
included the intended procurement of explosives to be used against a range of targets, 
while “internal guerrillas,” would be supported by 7000 externally trained fighters 
covertly landed by sea.
310
 Justice Minister Vorster believed in 1961 the country was 
facing a revolution, a situation, as Seegers acknowledges, not entirely imaginary.
311
 
Although SADF installations were the targets of some of these actions,
312
 besides the 
1960 troop call-ups and post-Sharpeville deployment, the military was not involved in 
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any high-profile action against African nationalist guerrillas. Unknown to the public, the 
SADF deployed according to perceptions of an “internal threat,” where such appeared to 
conform to “Mayibuye” patterns. By 1964, SADF military documentation reported in 
detail regarding dissidents from South African located in Tanganyika/Tanzania, with 





Although this dissertation is not specifically focussed upon the histories of resistance 
movements, nevertheless, it is worthwhile referring briefly to some details of Mayibuye 
that influenced the SADF‟s planning. Several white SACP members and MK military 
instructors also had some wartime military experience. Amongst others, Arthur Goldreich 
fought in Jewish military units in Palestine, while Jack Hodgson and Joe Slovo served in 
World War Two.
314
 They and a handful of like-minded veterans constituted a miniscule 
group who participated in attempted armed uprising against the South African 
government during the 1960s.
315
 One consequence of this was that the SADF and South 
African Police (SAP) particularly demonized and tailed white communists during the 
early 1960s. Hence, the intense government and media focus Fisher during 1964-65 upon 
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Braam, whose political and legal profile, with his historic Afrikaner family connections, 
ensured that he was perceived by the South African security establishment as the most 
significant SACP member.
316
   
 
In January 1963, Goldreich visited the Soviet Union for military assistance and discussed 
the Mayibuye plan with officialdom whom he met. According to Shubin the Soviet 
response was “cautious”; particularly as they were reluctant to transport arms by sea, 
discovery of which could compromise bilateral relations by exposing the clandestine 
operation.
317
 In April 1963, Oliver Tambo in discussions with Soviet officials emphasised 
that the South African government‟s dismissal of the MK sabotage campaign meant 
guerrilla war needed to commence, alongside politically isolating South Africa and 
disseminating anti-government propaganda amongst the black population. Strategy 
envisaged was based upon Chinese revolutionary warfare of peasant revolts surrounding 
cities, but such idealism was thwarted by “rigid security measures introduced by the 




ANC plans for MK required money, transportation, training and maintenance of the 
movement‟s members, with facilities and arms requested from “friendly countries, 
including the USSR”. Initially small arms and explosives were requested, but later there 
were expectations of “heavy machine-guns, anti-tank and recoilless guns, anti-aircraft 
guns, etc.”, together with “ambitious” transport plans involving “fishing boats and ships” 
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“bringing goods directly to South Africa or neighbouring states.”
319
 According to Shubin, 
Boris Ponomarev
320
 and other Soviet representatives had political considerations too, for 
example, how influential was the ANC and its armed struggle concept amongst the 
population and what was the attitude of the African states to the ANC, especially those 
geographically close to South Africa?     
 
Once the SAP seized the Mayibuye plans there was intense government focus on the 
apparent military objectives of MK.  Slovo claimed the plan was prepared by the High 
Command
321
 and discussed within both ANC and SACP, acknowledging in hindsight a 
“euphoric expectation” that African states would provide planes to transport MK 
members.
322
 It was further assumed that political isolation and hostility from African 
countries and the socialist world “may result in such massive assistance in various forms 
that the state structures will collapse far sooner than we can at the moment envisage.”
323
 
Significantly Mayibuye assumed not only “direct (foreign) military involvement in South 
West Africa” (SWA) and an “effective economic and military boycott”, but even the 
possibility of “armed international action at some more advanced stage of the struggle,” 
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As the Algerian revolution pattern was considered significant by Slovo, the ANC hoped 
to create a “political authority” in a friendly territory that would actually air-lift new 
guerrilla recruits regularly from South Africa and even ensure a “Provisional 
Revolutionary Government” (an idea borrowed from the Algerian experience).
325
 Shubin 
refers to the context against which Mayibuye was planned, including several African 
leaders at the OAU inaugural congress in May 1963 pledging “full support for our 
brother Africans”. For example, “Sekou Toure of Guinea…suggested fixing a date when 
any remaining white minority governments would have to face a joint African military 
force.
326
 After the revelation of Mayibuye details during the Rivonia trial, information 
dealing with the possibilities of MK/SACP guerrilla landings and military planning were 
distributed across to all South African security services, including the SADF, thereafter 
being integrated into the defence force‟s threat appraisals and operational responses.  
       
G. D. Scholtz – An Afrikaner nationalist intellectual underpinning for 1960s 
military threat appraisals.   
   
The scenario of an international military invasion deposing an autocratic white 
government in South Africa was not entirely new. Just before the NP‟s 1948 election 
victory, historian Arthur Keppel-Jones had penned such a possibility in a prophetic grim 
futuristic fiction of the country.
327
  As an Afrikaner nationalist intellectual, historian and 
journalist, Scholtz wrote prolifically during the 1950s and 1960s on communism, besides 
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hypotheses on factors potentially impacting upon the Afrikaner‟s future security and 
continued white South African political independence in Africa. His books included: Het 
die Afrikaner Volk ‘n Toekoms? (1954);
328
 Die Stryd om die Wêreld (1962); Die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika en die Wêreld (1964); „N Swart Suid-Afrika? (1964), and Die 
Bedreiging van die Liberalisme (1965). These publications were widely read amongst 
SADF senior officers, for not only were they directly marketed through Commando, but 
Scholtz was also a personal friend of Hiemstra. During the 1960s, the two men met and 
corresponded regularly and according to Leopold Scholtz (G.D. Scholtz‟s son), Hiemstra 
took Scholtz‟s views seriously. During the same period, Scholtz also held a very 
powerful Afrikaans media position as the editor of Die Transvaaler.
329
    
 
Die Republiek van Suid Afrika en die Wêreld integrated strategic assessments on where 
the Republic stood militarily in relation to emergent independent Africa and potential 
global scenarios. Scholtz intended Die Republiek to inform Afrikaners of global realities 
and the need to avoid isolation and possible punitive sanction. Die Bedreiging van die 
Liberalisme, published in 1965, presented the view, followed by SADF intelligence, that 
proponents of „liberalism‟ hoped to achieve “race equality” by ensuring that excessive 
pressure be placed on the Republic, which could bring direct UN intervention.
330
  In Die 
Stryd Om Die Wêreld Scholtz made an analogy of a “civilisation belt” amidst a larger 
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space occupied by “uncivilised” nations, which characterised the clash between the 
Western and Communist blocs by 1961. Scholtz superimposed this paradigm upon South 
Africa regarding „civilised‟ whites surrounded by blacks, with the fate of Afrikaners 
being directly tied to the broader clash between East and West.
331
 Die Stryd Om Die 
Wêreld and Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika were comprehensively reviewed within 
Commando‟s February and June 1963 editions. Verwoerd also took careful note of 
Scholtz‟s views, 
332
 being himself a director of the company that owned Die Transvaaler 
and other large-circulation Afrikaans newspapers. The other large circulation Afrikaans 
newspapers were owned by the Cape-based Nasionale Pers; including the influential Die 
Burger.
333
 A perusal of SADF documentation is strongly indicative of how Scholtz‟s 
thinking permeated through into official appraisals that conjectured on the Republic‟s 
preparedness, in terms of international hostility transforming into direct military threats.           
 
Scholtz‟s books were reference works during a time of vigorous Afrikaner nationalist 
hopes and beliefs concerning the implementation of grand apartheid, coinciding with 
emphatic rejection of this segregation vision in international forums such as the OAU and 
UN. Condemnations were sometimes accompanied by utterances of military intervention, 
expressed by individual representatives at the UN and more collectively in the OAU. 
Writers like Scholtz seized upon this aggressive posturing and amplified it. He was 
particularly engrossed with the Soviet Union and viewed its global ambitions in terms of 
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orthodox contemporary pro-Western Cold War interpretations. He assessed Russia as 
aggressively expansionistic on a global scale and emphasised that Africa was a 





Scholtz vilified the UN as a potent military threat to the Republic and that it had from 
1946 demonstrated growing hostility to the South African government. Scholtz quotes 
Jan Smuts responding to the initial UN criticism, directed mostly from the Indian 
government, delivered in the General Assembly against the UP government‟s racial 
policies shortly after World War Two. Smuts had launched a counter-attack on “equality” 
as advocated within post-war UN forums, where assertive Asian and African nationalists 
anticipated a weakening of European control of overseas colonies. Smuts was stung 
particularly by accusations that South Africa was fascist, discriminatory, and disdainful 
of “all the new slogans on which the new world was being built.”
335
 Smuts scathingly 
describing “UN equality” as leading to disastrous „integration consequences‟ during the 
second half of the 1940s, citing the pre-independence inter-cultural violence in Palestine 
and the Indian sub-continent occurring at the very time; reflecting areas that were 
historical ethnically/culturally divided.  
 
Smuts lamented that decisions were being made in the UN according to “equal votes” and 
a “new equality”, which he understood as marking the end of traditional assumptions 
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regarding global racial dominance by whites. Smuts was really reflecting upon the future 
of South African whites and how they might be affected by the still unknown 
consequences, resulting from post-World War Two indigenous resistance to European 
rule in Africa and Asia. Smuts grappled with this global shift that incorporated these new 
assertive nationalisms by explaining that:  
the majority of mankind are not Europeans. They are different 
people – black, yellow, coloured….A fundamental change has 
occurred. Those who through the ages have been the underdog in 
human history are now in a very different position. A situation 
has been created which needs very careful handling. That is the 




Smuts‟s bewilderment was used by Scholtz to bolster his own position that by the 1960s, 
the UN represented a profound threat to the white Republic. Explaining that the year 
1962 had witnessed the acceleration of the “process of equalisation”, now “infinitely 
stronger than in 1946”, with “the United Nations (becoming) browner and blacker”. 
Almost precisely the same thinking can be discerned regularly in SADF threat appraisal 
documentation. For example, a 1966 military intelligence assessment asserted: “There 
can be no doubt that the equalisation process, already given a strong impetus by the First 
World War, even more rapidly since the Second World War, is now manifesting upon 
terrain (in other parts of the world) (that was) previously untouched”.
337
 Scholtz quoted 
Foreign Minister Louw outlining to the South African parliament that by 1970, “Afro-
Asian” and “Communist” countries would overwhelmingly outnumber “White Western 
countries”. Louw had also stated in November 1960: “The Afro-Asian countries are now 
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in control of the United Nations. And they know it. That is abundantly clear from their 
attitude, not only in debates, but in the lobbies of the United Nations.”
338
 In November 
1960, Professor Nic Olivier, vice-chairman of Sabra and Professor of Bantu Studies and 
Administration at the University of Stellenbosch echoed the above views on „equality‟ at 
the UN:  
The atrocities carried out by Nazi Germany have instilled in the 
world an aversion of any type of discrimination, superiority or 
inferiority. The world has developed a completely over-rated 
romantic view of the black people. It has come to ignore 
differences between White and White or Black and Black, but 
will immediately sit up and take notice as soon as these are 
White against Black in any way. The same does not seem to be 
held for the case of Black against White, as in the Congo. The 
United Nations has become a dominant „force to be reckoned 
with‟ in the future of South Africa, because of the growing 




Such assessments of a hostile UN by the 1960s were transformed into official SADF 
appraisals postulating the international organisation becoming a potential military threat.  
Scholtz‟s perceptions of UN Afro-Asian preponderance and purported menace were then 
projected onto white South Africa‟s reality of being a demographic minority within their 
country. UN „equality‟ therefore foreboded loss of white political power to the black 
majority and unknown future consequences for the Afrikaners and other white South 
Africans. The anti-Portuguese settler uprisings in Angola in 1960-61 and the concurrent 
violence against Congo settlers, implied in the popular white South African view 
terrifying possibilities for them if they acceded to majority rule. Like other Afrikaner 
nationalist political theorists of the period, Scholtz perceived segregation as a survivalist 
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option. But he feared the UN because it epitomised an overwhelming global rejection of 
segregationist principles and therefore potentially threatened white South Africa,
340
 
because it also had access to a military interventionist capability, which had already been 
used against the Katanga secession.            
 
The Republic was treated as a pariah by most UN members because as Scholtz believed, 
it actively challenged this “equalization process.” He also asserted that international 
rejection at the General Assembly could transform into South Africa becoming a 
potential target of UN/ Afro-Asian military action. Scholtz referred to bellicose 
utterances from Third World representatives; militant rhetoric that was fairly common to 
the early 1960s and regularly quoted in South African government statements. For 
example, Scholtz cited the Ceylonese representative, one A.B. Perera speaking to the UN 
on 27 October 1961, who referred to South African racial policies being a menace to 
world peace and advocated the possibility of “such action by air, sea or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” - adding:  
This assembly is pledged to defend human rights and the dignity 
of men, and cannot ignore present events in South Africa. The 
cry of the non-white population – which is living in slavery what 
ever name you call it – demands concrete action. This virulent 




Scholtz identified SWA‟s strategic position as critical to South Africa, indeed equivalent 
to Canada‟s location regarding the United States; “a pistol that can be pressed against the 
Republic‟s heart”. A hostile power in possession of Walvis Bay could threaten South 
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African sea links. Enemy bombers, guided missiles and troop concentrations (according 
to Scholtz) could be located within the territory. Therefore “efforts by the UN (to 
challenge South African authority) must be rejected”, for “to place SWA under the 
authority of a capricious and hostile organisation” was “to play with the safety and 
freedom” (Of the Republic).
342
 We need to take a closer look at what the SADF 
comprehended as threatening to SWA. 
 
The UN and South West Africa: Early SADF concerns of internal insurrection and 
invasion  
   
Early 1960s press reports show that the spectre of a UN invasion of SWA or the Republic 
was a subject of newspaper speculation, while debate of such scenarios continued 
amongst military analysts till late in the decade.
343
 The UN was also viewed as a hostile 
entity, because it was popularly believed amongst some in South Africa to be advancing 
communism alongside militant African nationalism. Professor Olivier, (see above) spoke 
in 1960 of communist subversion and “agitators” provoking the “possibility of active 
intervention” by the UN, “start(ing)” in South West Africa.
344
 Press reports on the „UN 
invasion theme‟ increased in their intensity six months later; The Natal Mercury carried a 
dramatic headline: “Louw (The South African Foreign Minister) Asked: Do We Fight If 
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UN Troops Land?” State President Swart announced “that the Government would fight 
interference from outside… with all the means at its disposal,” The shifting of SADF 
units followed these statements, including air and sea components to maintain a watching 
brief on SWA.
345
 UP Senator Conradie asked if “trouble started in South Africa similar to 
that in the Congo, and the United Nations decided to send in armed forces”, (would) such 





As these supposed possibilities of external military threats became a heated press topic, 
conflict also ensued along language/political lines. When the Cape Town English-
language newspapers suggested government plans for increased military preparedness, 
amounted to arming the whites against the other four-fifths of the population,  Die Burger 
responded by referring to African decolonisation violence, citing potential linkage 
between anti-white bloodshed in Congo and Angola and that such could also envelope 
SWA. Die Burger acknowledged that South Africa without allies would struggle against 
a significant external military threat. Although convinced the West would not allow 
Soviet aggression, the newspaper warned that a “weaken(ing) of the internal race 
relations” might create a situation whereby the UN might militarily intervene in either 
SWA or South Africa. In which case the editorial concluded only a diplomatic averting of 
armed UN involvement was realistic.    
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This would be the ultimate military horror which could only be 
countered with political measures; and our foreign policy (and), 
as far as possible, our internal actions should have this in view.
347
    
  
But opposing a UN invasion was a possibility the government seriously considered. Such 
is confirmed by the build up by the SADF from mid-1961
348
 in response to threat 
appraisals, eliciting various counter-strategies and new equipment purchases discussed 
later in this and the following chapters. With the concurrent Angolan uprising against 
Portuguese settlers,
349
internal SWA insurrection possibilities also featured prominent in 
SADF thinking. Media perceptions already existed that the Angola situation was 
connected to anti-white incitement by shadowy communist provocateurs. The Cape 
Argus reported on “disturbances…in …Angola, where the ring-leaders are said to be 
foreigners armed with weapons of Czechoslovakian origin…Mr Khrushchev works on 
the principle: „Hit first, hit hard, hit anywhere.”
350
 The Natal Mercury supported Fouché 
moving the SADF into SWA, but urged him “in view of the strained relationships” 





                                                 
347
 Die Burger, Editorial, 28 April 1961.  
348
 See Barber, South African Foreign Policy 1945-1970, pp 190-191.   
349
 See Van der Waals, Portugal‟s War in Angola, 1961-1974, pp 55-89 for a reasonably comprehensive 
overview of the 1961 Angolan violence. 
350
 The Cape Argus, 9 March 1961,  p. 14.   
    On 6 January 1961 Chairman Khrushchev had announced in a widely reported speech that “victory for 
communism will come, not through nuclear or conventional war, but through wars of national liberation in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. This was interpreted by South African analysts as meaning direct Soviet 
intentions, to subvert and support African nationalist movements against western-orientated, white 
controlled African states. See Bell, P. M. H., The World Since 1945 An International History, Hodder 
Arnold, 2001, p.136, for one reference of the speech‟s international context.    
351











SWA came under particular SADF interest with the Angola uprisings directly 
determining the nature of intelligence information sought. A memorandum for 
Commandant General Grobbelaar from SAP Commissioner, H.J. Du Plooy dated 25 
March 1961, reported that “Bantus from Ovamboland had bought a large number of 
pangas in Angola”. Further information that “agitators from Ovamboland” had crossed 
into Angola, was passed by the South African Ambassador in Luanda to the Prime 
Minister‟s Office in Pretoria. The local (SWA) Bantu Commissioner was immediately 
instructed to work with the SAP‟s investigator, who reported that all (white) woman and 
children in the south of Angola had been moved to Luanda because of the alleged mass 
purchasing of pangas
352
 by members of `the Ukuanjama tribe in Ovamboland. Although 
it was added that it was not certain if there were subversive reasons for the purchases, or 
even that the people came from SWA, as the Ukuanjamas dwelt on either side of the 
border.  
 
This report demonstrates how the SADF was already being drawn into speculation of the 
consequences of militant African nationalism in SWA. The future South West Africa 
Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) leader Toivo Ya Toivo, described as a “well-known 
agitator,” was reported as collaborating with Angolan Ovambo dissident Tobiaas Zacheus 
in attempting to facilitate resistance in Angola. Toivo purportedly declared “the whole 
country (SWA) would rise up, the day individuals were charged with public violence 
resulting from their arrests in the Windhoek unrests of 10 December 1959”. Alleged 
Soviet subversion was also suspected: Grobbelaar was informed that photographs of 
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Russian sailors and woman were being circulated amongst SWAPO members in 
Ovamboland and its members spoke “openly of the Russians as their friends”. That in the 
past two months, non-Portuguese whites from Angola, speaking only broken English, had 
crossed over the border several times informing locals that they “must wait and be ready 
because one of these days they will be supplied with weapons”. The memorandum closed 
by stating that the Cape Town SAP Commissioner had instructed a senior security police 




Telegrams exchanged during 30 May and 2 June 1961 between the South African Consul 
in Luanda and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town, show further SADF 
concern over possible Soviet involvement in facilitating African nationalist insurrection, 
besides the Pretoria government‟s concerns that SWA territory might be drawn into 
Portuguese military operations. The Consul noted the Portuguese Angolan military 
commander had received information that Russian trawlers were caching arms on an 
island twelve miles up the Cunene River.  
It appears activities of trawlers have been watched by a British 
and a South African frigate and that observations have been 
made from the air. South West Police, however, have not been 
able to verify the presence of a cache of arms on island as it is 
very inaccessible from their side. It is not known whether arms 
are destined for operations north or south of the border. 
Portuguese Naval Commander proposes to send small party to 
raid the island…Frontier coincides with Cunene River…some 
doubt exists as to whether island is in Portuguese or South 
African territory or whether it can be reached without touching 
on frontier at various points in the stream. In circumstances and 
as possibility of resistance cannot be ruled out, (Portuguese) 
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Commander has asked me to obtain consent of Union authorities 
to proposed raids.
354
         
 
The Secretary for Foreign Affairs declined the Portuguese permission, preferring an 
SADF investigation. Due to SWA‟s disputed status military activity involving another 
country could have had international ramifications.
355
 It did not take long, for what were 
meant to be secret military matters, reaching the South African press and feeding back 
into white community anxieties, already heightened by the uncertainties of the new 
Republic being launched in an increasingly hostile global environment.
356
 Fouché 
announced that the government was duty bound “to protect SWA from external 
aggression”, that troops were being dispatched to Walvis Bay; the navy would patrol the 
coast and SAAF conduct flights on the coast and Angolan border, while investigations 
were also being undertaken regarding unrest issues across the SWA border. Fouché 
explained that the SADF would be based at Walvis Bay because mandate conditions 
forbade military bases in the territory.
357
 The town and a small surrounding enclave were 
historically South African territory inherited by the Union after its administration by the 
Cape Colony during the late nineteenth century. Although by the end of the year, much to 
the UN SWA Committee‟s chagrin, there was an SADF presence in Windhoek, which 
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Foreign Minister Louw loudly defended by referring to the June incidents of alleged arms 
infiltration.
358
    
 
In June 1961, Fouché announced that Portuguese and SADF chiefs had met in Cape 
Town and Luanda to discuss the Angolan uprisings.
359
 In fact, the South African Consul-
General in Luanda had already in secret correspondence, dated 5 April 1961, addressed to 
the Secretary for External Affairs in Pretoria, expressed doubt about the Portuguese 
military capacity to contain the rebellion. South African concerns over potential threats to 
both SWA and the RSA, were further exacerbated by Portugal‟s loss of Goa to Indian 
military action that December (see below), alongside fears expressed through the 
Republic‟s Consul in Lourenco Marques, that Portugal‟s grip on Mozambique was 
tenuous.
360
 A further report received by Grobbelaar detailed the need for the SADF‟s 
urgent involvement in SWA, premising that the recent violence in Angola could result a 
Portuguese collapse, placing the northern parts of SWA at risk to the same kind of 
uprisings. Without military control over SWA and assuming the “loss” of Bechuanaland 
as well, “a potential enemy would now be 200 miles from Pretoria to build up for an 
attack, instead of between 750 to 1000 miles”. Also of concern was that there were 
neither military outposts, nor any police in northern SWA, therefore no independent 
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information was easily obtainable about the movement of the Ovambos who lived on 




SADF commanders believed it was important to finalise plans to defend SWA, if the 
government decided this was necessary, but that a military reconnaissance of the territory 
was urgently required to assess required infrastructure, the building of strategic roads and 
airstrips and their defence, erection of buildings for supply dumps and the extension of 
civil communication. The Commandant General was urged to despatch a reconnaissance 
team under Combat Gen Nic Bierman to conduct an investigation by helicopter. A 
“strategic garrison” needed to be established at Walvis Bay to defend the harbour against 
potential hostile military landings and provide a physical location and closer availability 
of troops for the territory‟s defensive needs.
362
 Such details constitute clear indications 
that the SADF, as early as March 1961, were prepared to resist or at least hoped to deter 
an external military intervention. Grobbelaar forwarded the recommendations 
immediately to Fouché, if necessary for Verwoerd‟s approval,
363
 implying that the 
Angolan uprisings and mounting UN hostility had taken the SADF by surprise.  
 
Two months later, a council of officers appointed to construct an “evaluation in 
connection with the defence of the northern area of South West Africa”, concluded 
gloomily that the tribal system amongst the Ovambo on the northern border was 
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“anachronistic” and “unlikely to remain intact against the flood waves of Black 
Nationalism from the whole continent”. Subversion was identified as being directly 
connected with SWAPO activities; for example, through contact with “individual Bantus 
from SWA in New York” and the Anglican Church‟s schools which produced “educated 
Bantu”, more likely to be “agitators”; the number of radios in the territory, “enabling 
educated Bantu to keep abreast of world events and happenings at the UN”.
364
 The 
evaluation also reported upon the “grievances of the Bantu” and suggested that 
employees of the South West Africa Labour Association, who regulated the movement of 
Ovambo migrant workers, could possibly become the first white victims of terrorism.  
 
The SADF viewed SWA and Angolan unrest threatening white South African interests 
from a wider African decolonisation context. The SADF evaluation suggested that troops 
from the Congo‟s white-officered Force Publique had been directly involved in the 
Angolan violence.
365
 The 25 000 strong Force Publique had mutinied eleven months 
earlier against their conditions of service and the continued authority of white Belgian 
personnel in the newly independent country‟s armed forces. Such developments were to 
reinforce SADF beliefs of UN connivance with the anti-white violence that was occurring 
there. The following year, Afrikaner academic Prof. H.J.J.M. Van der Merwe also alleged 
in Commando, that Angolan rebels had obtained weapons through the Force Publique 
and Katanga-based UN troops.
366
 The Congo military mutiny resulted in extreme 
violence against white settlers in the country, further exacerbated with the declaration of 
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Katanga as an independent state and Soviet arms being lifted into Congo for Lumumba‟s 




These Congo events played a significant role in swinging white South Africans behind 
Verwoerd and grand apartheid, verified by a majority, albeit slender, voting support for 
the Republic during the October 1960 referendum. The SADF evaluation also made an 
interesting observation as to the origins and course of the Angolan violence, assuming 
white South African relations with blacks were better than those between the Portuguese 
and their indigenous communities. Thereby, it was assumed possibly forestalling events 
like those in Angola occurring in South Africa:  
The susceptibility of the indigenous people (of Angola) for 
subversive propaganda and the astonishing speed the movement 
(of violence) spread can be ascribed to the bad relations that exist 
between the indigenous people and the Portuguese. Over a period 
of years the Portuguese ruthlessly suppressed and exploited 
them. Owing to our better relations with the Bantu it is not 




South African press reports by the end of 1961 increasingly registered alarm over SWA 
and possible UN intervention. For example, a Cape Times headline read: “Warning of 
Racial War in S.W.A. – Situation going from Bad to Worse”. The article explained that 
South Africa had been denounced in a report issued by the United Nations Committee on 
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SWA, “written on the basis of complaints made in the territory, and called for an end to 
the enforcement of apartheid measures in SWA” …that only intervention by the UN 
„could prevent armed racial conflict‟”.
369
 The Natal Mercury reported under headlines, 
“Send in U.N. invasion now, African petitioner says,” which: 
should provide a military force, effectively equipped to land in 
South-West Africa, and able to withstand any armed opposition 
from South Africa, a petitioner who appeared before the 
Trusteeship Committee yesterday (Monday) said. …The 
petitioner was Mr Mburumba Karina, a former student in South-
West Africa and now a member of the Liberian permanent 
mission to the United Nations. 
370
  
      
 
SADF concerns of India leading “UN intervention” in SWA 
 
The invasion of Portuguese Goa in December 1961 by Indian military forces increased 
South African perceptions that the UN through Afro-Asian countries, were prepared to 
forcibly challenge remaining vestiges of colonialism such as SWA, particularly as no 
resolute UN reaction had occurred to the Indian Goa operation.
371
 While Verwoerd issued 
a statement strongly condemning “Indian aggression” in Goa,
372
 after they received 
Security Council clearance, a UN military force was dispatched to Congo including a 
significant Indian troop component. These had entered Katanga by November 1960 and 
under UN aegis, started terminating Katanga‟s succession. H.L.T Taswell, the South 
African diplomatic representative in the Rhodesian/Nyasaland Federation, had already 
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warned that Indian troops in Congo could be transferred across to SWA.
373
 Not only was 
India historically an arch-foe of white South African racial policies, it also possessed one 
of the largest militaries amongst Afro-Asian states and therefore began to feature in 
SADF appraisals concerning the possible defence of SWA.  
 
By April 1963, the Director of SADF military intelligence, Brig P.M. Retief outlined 
similar scenarios as Scholtz, when referring to “possible developments in Southern Africa 
which could impact upon the safety of the RSA during the coming twelve months”. 
Because non-military attempts by the UN had failed to shift the RSA from its racial 
policies or its position on the SWA mandate, concern was expressed that “under Afro-
Asian or Communist pressure, attempts could shift across to (UN) military action.”
374
 
SADF documentation reflected the government‟s firm belief that there was collusion 
between its foes. That MK sabotage and Poqo violence against white civilians, was 
planned and supported by the „Afro-Asians‟ and „Communists‟ bent upon creating 
internal chaos whereby:   
Repeats of bloody incidents such as Sharpeville, could contribute 
to allowing an attempt by the Afro-Asian bloc towards military 





Retief commented hopefully that the UN was in a difficult financial position because 
“various important members were currently refusing to contribute towards special 
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operations”. Retief surmised that, “unless they change their stance the UN will definitely 
not be in a state to undertake large-scale operations against South Africa or South West 
Africa. (unless the USA or Britain do it).” Written upon the actual document (possibly by 
the Adjutant General)
376
 next to this comment is - “What about Russia or India or 
Communist China?” This authentic addition of a contemporary reader‟s remarks is a 
useful indication of SADF thinking at that time. Not only is India mentioned as a 
potential “UN agent” but the hand-written insert demonstrates the author‟s lack of 
understanding, regarding the military capacity and objectives of the Soviet Union and 
China in 1963.
377
 He also misunderstood that in those Cold War years, there would have 
occurred certain Western veto of any such military intervention spearheaded by 
communist powers. Retief also suggested that the “race-composition” of any UN force 
attacking SWA would be significant, implying that white South Africans would oppose a 
„black-dominated‟ UN force far more effectively than a white one.
378
 A „UN invasion‟ by 
white soldiers might confuse any white South African sense of racial solidarity, besides 
possibly pitching the SADF up against what would be expected to be better trained and 
equipped forces.  
 
It is no co-incidence that SADF‟s secret plans for the defence of SWA in April 1963 were 
written contiguous to Indian troops being accused by the Rhodesian Federal government 
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of atrocities in Katanga against white and black civilians.
379
 Indian Air Force Canberra 
bombers had attacked Kolwezi in December 1961 and US Air Force troop transportation 
aircraft were at the UN force‟s disposal.
380
 Such tactical extensions were not unnoticed 
by the SADF, for Retief highlighted the UN‟s lengthening military capacity from Congo 
by emphasising that its forces were “now were in possession of excellent bases from 
where military operations could be launched against so-called colonial areas in Southern 
Africa.”
381
 Throughout 1960 to 1964, horrific reports from Congo and Katanga continued 
to be features in the South African press. A vivid example of Indian army attacks on 
white civilians was publicised in January 1963 within the mass-selling Huisgenoot. A 
series of photographs showing how a young Belgian man‟s wife and friend were shot 
dead by Indian troops for attempting to leave the Katanga town of Jadotstad by 
vehicle.
382
 Such events reinforced white South African perceptions of potential nightmare 
scenarios if they were to shift to a unitary democratic state; or of the possible 
consequences of an “Afro-African/UN invasion” of SWA.  
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There is no doubt that the Indian military capability played significantly upon those 
SADF minds responsible for its threat appraisals. The Goa invasion reinforced 
perceptions of India being a rising Third-World military power shifting from Gandhi 
passive resistance to armed action against a colonial power. China‟s brief territorial clash 
with India in 1962, demonstrated the latter‟s military limitations, but India remained a 
leader within the Afro-Asian political bloc and its UN representatives amongst the most 
vocal critics of white rule in South Africa. And its soldiers were perceived in the white 
south as serving in operations supporting militant African nationalism.  
 
The implications of the Goa invasion were not lost upon African nationalists. As the 
SWA mandate controversy dragged on, Goa was mentioned by Afro-Asian leaders in 
public statements, for example, in July 1963, the Cape Times headlined Tanganyikan 
leader Julius Nyerere, after talks with British Prime Minister, claiming: “We (Africans) 
will Fight S.A. „Like Goa‟”… if a peaceful solution is not found in South Africa”.
383
 The 
Goa invasion occurred at the same time as a UN Trusteeship Committee meeting was 
called, to discuss a South African proposal for a three man UN investigation group to be 
sent to SWA. This was in the face of a proposal by thirty-seven Afro-Asian countries to 
establish a committee intended to arrange the territory‟s prompt transition to 
independence. Afro-Asians were determined to bring the SWA matter to the attention of 
the Security Council, 
384
 a scenario which the South African government believed had the 
potential of developing into a Katanga-type UN intervention. The South African press 
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presented the potential „threat‟ to SWA as a military one and linked it to UN armed 
involvement in Congo. The Cape Times reported on local white defiance and their 
expectations of SADF assistance: “Whites in South Africa will Fight,” that “Most of the 
70 000 Whites in South West Africa are determined to remain in the disputed territory 
whatever the future holds and will fight if it comes to armed intervention from outside”: 
Mr Behrson, a prominent businessman…hoped the United 
Nations had realised through its Katanga operation the futility of 
starting hostilities in the name of peace…the Whites had no 
alternative but to fight it out. They had sunk everything into the 
country…In general the view is that United Nations discredited 
in Katanga (sic), will not resort to force in South West but if it 
did it would be defeated. The Whites look to South Africa to 
back them up…Mr S.J.J. Spies Mayor of Windhoek bluntly 
stated the tough attitude of Whites in the event of an outbreak of 
hostilities. „We will fight. No South-Wester will return to the 
Republic. This is our home.
385
      
 
SADF military preparations were also hurried along by the 1960 Liberian/Ethiopian 
charge pending with the International Court of Justice, that South Africa‟s administration 
of SWA had violated the League of Nations mandate. The prospect of South Africa 
losing in any decision made by the court, meant that the Security Council would be 
obligated to compel the Republic‟s compliance in relinquishing the mandate.
386
 This 
Pretoria envisaged could mean military intervention as a final resort, as such was 
sanctioned within the UN‟s Charter. Any such drastic action would have assumed the 
Western countries voting in favour and therefore contributing military forces. Although 
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this was an unlikely scenario, the SADF did not preclude the possibility of Afro-Asian 
states acting alone. SADF threat appraisals concurred that an aircraft carrier was a pre-
requisite for such military action,
387
 while staff tasked with preparing SWA‟s defence 
were specifically concerned about the Vikrant, the Indian Navy‟s sole aircraft carrier.
388
 
This vessel carried a squadron or more of British-built Seahawk strike jets, which in 
terms of performance, were on par with the Sabre,
389
 still the SAAF‟s frontline air 
defence fighter. 
390
    
 
Perceived military threats to the Republic via invasion by an “African Army”.  
 
As the SADF began rearming and reorganising during the early 1960s, its commanders 
were making contact with their counterparts in other white-ruled Southern African states 
with the intention to assist and learn where possible. In December 1963, the SADF 
allowed two SAAF Alouette helicopters to participate in a military tattoo held by the 
Portuguese armed forces in Lourenco Marques. The SAAF Chief of Staff, Combat Gen 
B.G. Viljoen remarked in a letter to Commandant General Grobbelaar, after consulting 
with the SA Vice-Consul, Mr J. Lamb, that the Portuguese authorities had considered the 
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SAAF helicopters participation as important because the Portuguese Air Force were to 
receive their own Alouettes the following year. They had used the display to enhance 
public confidence in their military forces and the future of Mozambique. Viljoen 
emphasised the strategic importance of Mozambique to the RSA.
391
 By this time, the 
SAAF were training Royal Rhodesian Air Force personnel within the Republic on the 
operation of the same helicopter type which the Rhodesian government had also 
acquired.
392
   
 
This apparently mundane correspondence underlined the fact that in terms of any “threat 
from the north”, the SADF‟s commanders looked with some sense of concern at the 
strategic importance of their “buffer” consisting of white ruled colonies north of the 
Republic, all of which by the early 1960s were facing African nationalist guerrillas trying 
to force black majority rule. The SADF believed that both Portuguese territories could be 
the targets of large-scale unrest and even “invasion” during 1963, particularly if assisted 
by other countries or advantageous “situations,” which undermined Portuguese colonial 
rule. If the Salazar regime fell and both colonies received their independence, there could 
be direct threats to both South Africa and SWA. Regarding Angola, “a subversive (base) 
and invasion (point) would be created on the northern border of South West Africa”, 
while the situation concerning Mozambique would be even more serious with the “RSA‟s 
right flank being left open”. “Sea and air landing facilities offered to an enemy invasion 
force” would be more favourably located, for a military force to advance towards the 
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economically and politically strategic Johannesburg/Pretoria complex.
393
 This appraisal 
was speculating upon an implausible military threat scenario, which the SADF had 
investigated, namely an “African army” marching upon white South Africa from the 
north, determined to terminate white rule. Although this was a virtual logistical and 
political impossibility during the 1960s, the scenario still regularly entered the pages of 
South African newspapers, political speeches and periodic announcements by senior 
SADF commanders, all of whom implicitly equated decolonisation and African 
independence as constituting a military threat to white-ruled South Africa.  
 
The scenario of a „united African Army‟ threatening South Africa had already begun to 
make the newspaper headlines from mid-1960 during Union Day celebrations, as a 
Republic was increasingly anticipated amongst NP supporters. In May 1960, the Natal 
Mercury had quoted from the Union Festival Brochure of the Defence Force, which 
mentioned a “colossus of (African) states” developing; that South Africa‟s “distant and 
safe isolation” was over. This marked, in the press anyway, the beginnings of an “African 
Army invasion” alarmism, clearly for the white public‟s pre-Republican referendum 
consumption.
394
 Thereafter, NP politicians followed the precedents set by the defence 
minister: In June 1960, the Administrator of the Orange Free State, J.W.J.C. Du Plessis, 
used the occasion of a farewell parade for CF members at Tempe military base to extend 
Fouché‟s „warning‟ to South Africa (and the West) facing threats from an Afro-Asian 
bloc: 
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The emerging black leaders are busy developing a black and 
Asian pressure group in the international arena that holds the 
seed of destruction not just for South Africa, but also for the 
West.
395
     
 
In 1961, Grobbelaar informed naval trainees that the “latest developments in Africa” 
meant the SADF needed to attain “a state of preparedness and efficiency that would 
discourage military aggression”.
396
 Both government and the official parliamentary 
opposition used the terms “African” and “African-Asian” “threats” interchangeably 
during numerous debates, which intensified press speculation of such intervention. 
During March 1962, Fouché informed Parliament that “military action was being openly 
advocated and secretly planned by some Afro-Asian states” and - “There existed in 
Africa and among other members of the Asian African group, the potential for 
establishing an “army of liberation”… each country could make a contribution which in 
its entirety could form a formidable army.”
397
 Fouché repeated his assertions on a range 
of occasions, for example, when addressing commando officers at the Witwatersrand 
Command in August 1962, he added that the state‟s policy was to continue the 
acquisition of modern conventional weapons and reorganise the SADF‟s field formations, 




Both the English and Afrikaans press reported upon this „African threat‟ in detail. The 
Cape Times had earlier commented that: “Although it is not easy to believe that there is 
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any imminent threat of armed invasion, it is an obvious commonplace that we live in a 
dangerous world and must have an efficient Defence Force.”
399
 Die Burger emphasised 
that a “New Phase in Defence” had arrived, but that “the revolution of independence in 
Black Africa and retreat of Western control from our continent” had shifted South 
Africa‟s “front-line” “south from Egypt to Rhodesia”.
400
 This referred the planned early 




The Cape Times interviewed former Commandant General H.B. Klopper who had retired 
in 1958. As a veteran of the North African campaign, Klopper would have retained some 
credibility amongst 1939-45 UDF veterans and some must have noted his response to the 
“invasion story” during an interview in March 1962, which echoed government views.  
South African defence planners can never exclude the possibility 
of invasion, while the prevailing volume of hostility and hatred is 
directed at the Republic by other African territories… „In 
defence the seemingly improbable is always the greatest danger. 
No matter how unlikely invasion may look at present, because of 
logistic difficulties, we must not relax.‟ Defence planners should 
not regard the Limpopo as the country‟s northern military 
frontier. An efficient early-warning intelligence service should 
be developed to ensure that any plot to invade South Africa could 
be detected and countered immediately.
402
          
 
Scholtz had also referred to the „African threat‟ scenario during 1962. He had extended it 
by commenting upon how the three British Southern African protectorates of Basutoland, 
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Swaziland and Bechuanaland constituted hindrances in South African defence planning. 
He quoted SADF Brigadier H.J. Zinn writing in 1954 about how:  
the three areas constituted “ separate and unknown factors in our 
internal defence plans”…(because of) “this control from a 
distance (by Britain)….South Africa is neither territorially, nor 
economically and certainly not militarily sound.
403
   
 
Scholtz stated that at some future point, “the biggest military threat for the Republic 
could possibly one day come from Africa” and (South Africa) would face the strategic 
dilemma of having no chance of control over the three British Protectorates.
404
 Scholtz 
appeared entirely blind to the logistical and military capability limitations of independent 
African states that made such a threat inconceivable. Just six years after the publishing of 
Die Republiek van Suid-Afrika en die Wêreld, Deon Fourie (1968) produced a 
comprehensive debunking of an African army scenario threatening the Republic.
405
 
However, political parties, press and popular publications dwelt upon the subject, 
ensuring that it remained part of white South African public discussion. Barber who did 
not consult Fourie‟s work, commented in 1973 that: “the picture of black armies 
marching on Pretoria was not inconceivable at the time. So much was changing in Africa 
that virtually anything seemed possible.”
406
 It is also possible that there was inadequate 
research by political parties to empirically examine the „Africa threat‟ assertions. UP 
defence spokesperson, J.R Bowring wrote to the party leadership in July 1964, 
encouraging study that would clarify South Africa‟s future relations with African states 
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and their military development; thereby perhaps also establishing whereby threatening 
utterances by African leaders might be transformed into action.
407
               
 
But not all politicians were anyway convinced by the „Africa threat‟. Progressive Party 
MPs saw it for what it was, in the sense of whites being scared into adopting a siege 
mentality against a hostile continent, further bolstering support for NP racial policy. 
Progressive Party leader Jan Steytler appealed to South Africans, that even if this 
„African invasion‟ threat was plausible and he believed not, it would constitute a “truly 
desperate” situation. Steytler‟s suggested that the government lessen outside hostility by 
ditching offensive internal measures towards segregation and rather build pragmatic 
bridges into Africa.
408
 Another Progressive member, John Cope, ridiculed Fouché‟s 
invasion statement as “operation white laager”:   
There is nothing subtle or obscure about the strategic objective of 
this propaganda move. Its aim is to consolidate the European 
electorate behind the Nationalist Party‟s philosophy of White 
baaskap. From a coldly military point of view the story of a 
pending attack is, of course, quite preposterous. But the story is 
not meant for military men. Such machinations by sinister 
elements are meant for an electorate that would seem to be in a 




However, although Cope identified what the NP government hoped to achieve politically, 
he was wrong in assuming the SADF had no interest in also evaluating the changing 
situation in the north. Brigadier Retief of military intelligence recorded confidentially in 
1963, that once Northern Rhodesia received independence, it would result in South 
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Africa having “hostile-inclined black states on the border of the Caprivi region.” He also 
remarked that there were “already indications that the RSA‟s “Bantus in this region were 
being aggressively spurred on by their Northern neighbours”.
410
 Military intelligence also 
anticipated Southern Rhodesia‟s future, that if it received independence under the current 
constitution, which limited the franchise to relatively few of its black citizens, there 
would be widespread unrest from “extremist black leaders”, resulting in intensified 
pressure upon the UN, by Asian-African and communists blocs to intervene militarily. 
The SADF speculated that Southern Rhodesia might unilaterally declare itself 
independent, if its government were pressured to accept a “one man, one vote” based 
constitution, viewing this as conceivably strengthening the RSA‟s position, with 




In mid-1963, the Liberation Committee in the OAU confirmed its intention to “liberate” 
South Africa by armed force if necessary.
412
 Even Progressive Party spokesmen could not 
ignore aggressive black African posturing, although their liberal philosophy incurred 
accusations of disloyalty from the government; representing as it did, the most 
progressive of white South African views (or at least where there was a parliamentary 
representative
413
). A member of the party‟s National Executive, Dr. P.V. Pistorius was 
quoted as stating: 
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The vast majority of non-whites would resent interference by 
foreign African dictators in South Africa‟s affairs, as much as the 
whites would…In the face of the challenge of Addis Ababa and 
of the United Nations, it was the duty of every South African to 
place the safety of the State above all other considerations…we 
must resist the attempts of African countries, many of which are 
governed by political thugs, to impose their will on South 
Africa.
414
          
 
Decolonisation and threats in international forums promoted uncertainty amongst the 
white community, therefore the SADF planners speculated accordingly in terms of how 
any military action against the Republic would manifest itself, besides how the situation 
had currently developed. Tanzania was viewed as transforming rapidly into: “An 
operational base for subversive and military operations against South Africa”, with: “All 
the most important communist powers being well-represented regarding diplomatic 
missions”. The three British Protectorates of Botswana, Swaziland and Basutoland were 
considered as presenting the “greatest subversive danger to the RSA,” on account of there 
being “very strong links with the militant Pan-Africanist Congress” amongst their pro-
independence political parties, although these states were “economically dependent upon 
the RSA and therefore extremely vulnerable”.
415
        
 
Clearly, it suited neither the military nor the government to spell out with absolute clarity 
that a conventional African military threat was unlikely, because it was one of several 
factors whereby support for the government and its military forces enlargement could be 
justified. In the racial stereo-typing typical of the period, exacerbated by African leaders 
irrational outbursts in the OAU and UN, white South Africans were easily led to 
                                                 
414
 Cape Times, 28 May 1963.  
415
 AG 4, Gp 4, File No. AG 672/2 Inligting, Memorandum Oor „n Inligting‟s Waardering Opgestel Deur 











uncritically perceive „Black Africa‟ as a threat. Against such a background of well-
publicised anti-white South Africa hostility emanating from African and Asian forums, 
the Verwoerd government increased defence spending and during 1962, extended the 
balloted military service call-up of white males from three to nine months.  
 
The official SADF line also linked the “Africa threat” to “international communist” 
intentions. In May 1963, Grobbelaar explained the SADF‟s role, in terms of allegations 
by the “UN‟s „Committee of Experts‟ on the RSA” that it could be used against the 
country‟s black population. Grobbelaar‟s response outlined that the possibility of mutual 
nuclear destruction by both Superpowers, meant that, “the methods of subversion from 
within, sabotage and guerrilla action” were becoming important tools of “exploitation by 
world communism”, because the dread possibility of nuclear war curbed conflict 
escalation possibilities. Armed forces world-wide, particularly since 1945, had been 
engaged in a range of operations against both communist-backed guerrillas and internal 
unrest. Grobbelaar substantiating this with examples from the Malayan, Algerian and 
Vietnamese experiences, besides troops being deployed internally earlier that year during 
violent racial civil clashes within the United States.  
 
Grobbelaar proposed the same case for the Republic, as existed in America and 
elsewhere, regarding the SADF being sharpened up in terms of preparedness. He rejected 
allegations that the South African military was being primed to participate in an internal 
“race war.” He made the predictable justifications that the SADF was there to protect the 











aggression and internal subversion “continually being made against us by militant 
external black leaders actively encouraged by the Communists”. Grobbelaar cited 
Kenyan Minister Oginga Odinga appealing in Peking “recently…for Red Chinese aid in a 
war against South Africa”.
416
           
 
Such was the official SADF line during the early 1960s. Except the broader reasons for 
the hostility to South African government policies are comprehended against the global 
post-war emphatic rejection of racially discriminatory legislation, besides the jostling for 
Cold War allies by East and West during the decolonisation process. Such had gained 
further momentum as newly independent African states emerged and the Civil Rights 
Struggle successes emerged within American society. These movements occurred to the 
extent that the South African white community effectively stood alone in any attempt to 
justify apartheid or any other legislated racial segregation. No amount of rationale by the 
Commandant General of the SADF would change general international perceptions about 
South African racial policies.    
 
Barber suggests that the government gained more confidence by June 1963, regarding the 
unlikelihood of conventional military threats. By early the following year, Fouché was 
dismissive of an “Africa invasion”.
417
 However, reports on African decolonisation in 
popular publications still reinforced white insecurities and provided opportunities to 
market the SADF for the white public‟s reassurance. A series of articles on the Defence 
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Force were published by Die Huisgenoot in October 1963, including a map of Africa map 
(see illustrations) depicting the continent coloured entirely black north of the Angolan, 
Mozambique and southern Rhodesian borders. The map‟s caption read as follows:  
This map partially displays the problem which South Africa must 
consider. Collectively 32 free African countries are planning 
aggression against South Africa. Before they can advance against 
our borders, the “speckled areas” (on the map – the white-ruled 
states) must first be „liberated‟. The text concentrated specifically 
on “African threats” referring “recently in Addis Ababa where 
Nassar, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Obutu…Kenyatta are conceiving 




Yet despite the media and politicians, DMI‟s detailed assessments of a potential 
conventional military threat from African countries indicated that such an African 
military capacity was indeed significantly lacking and that geographical-strategic-
logistical circumstances made such an „invasion‟ highly implausible. The SADF were 
also informed by an African Resistance Movement (ARM) member‟s speculation of how 
an invasion might ultimately be the only way in which African nationalists would 
actually succeed to “wresting political control from Afrikaners”. By October 1964, the 
SADF had obtained intelligence reports on remaining ARM members who had either 
escaped conviction or evaded arrest. Alexander Cox was one, and his personal views 
would have strengthened SADF perception that an African conventional military threat 
was unlikely in the near future, although perhaps not a long-term impossibility. Cox had 
explained himself in supposed confidence at Lusaka (But his views were documented and 
passed back to SADF intelligence and thereafter integrated into a report on “The 
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Unconventional Military Threat up to 15 December 1964”.)
419
 DMI had an open line to 
much of what was happening amongst South Africa dissidents. Cox‟s assessment noted 
that military invasion was “the only course which offers the opportunity of capturing 
South Africa as a unit,” idealistically suggesting such would be enhanced if: 
one country such as Zambia should call for volunteers to fight 
South Africa relying on the rivalries of Chinese and Russians and 
Americans to supply the troops, equipment and money to carry 
out such an operation. It is certainly an impossibility for Africa 




Cox had suggested that “invasion” would also do less damage to the country than other 
political solutions, such as equitable racial partition or extensive guerrilla warfare 
accompanied by economic sanctions. He envisaged any “underground 





By August 1966, SADF analysts maintained that: “It is clear from their militant attitude 
that the Afro-Asiatic countries‟ chief goal, namely the obliteration of white authority in 
the RSA, is to be achieved by force of arms”.
422
 But this report cautioned that although 
most African armies‟ leadership and fighting capabilities were still doubtful, they could 
still be a factor necessary to consider for the future. Besides Algeria, the United Arab 
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Republic, Ethiopia and Somalia, African air forces had neither offensive aircraft, nor 
properly trained pilots. There were no naval forces with an air-sea capacity, nor were 
there any African countries with significant logistical capacity. There had never been any 
known occasion of combined maritime exercises by African states and it was doubtful 
whether they could establish any significant maritime task force for long distance 
operations without outside assistance. The report further outlined its view that most 
African states were politically unstable and/or involved in “border activities,” where their 
available forces were already committed. An important factor to the disadvantage of 
Afro-Asian states, regarding any invasion they launched on the RSA, was their lack of 
being assured of air supremacy and their incapacity to establish strategic bases or assure 
the destruction of strategic targets. They would also not be in any position to secretly 




Yet despite what was clear to both the SADF‟s military intelligence and commanders, let 
alone any reasonably intelligent amateur analyst, namely that African states completely 
lacked the capacity to invade South Africa and terminate white government rule by 
military means, the idea still persisted within media, political and public discourse during 
the early 1960s, until thoroughly rebutted by Fourie‟s study.
424
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SADF perceptions of the significance of “Operation Mayibuye” during the early 
1960s  
 
Shubin comments that during the early 1960s, South African black militants drew 
inspiration from African countries where arms had been taken up against colonialists. 
The Algerian uprising was viewed by the SACP as a significant model. For by late 1961, 
French forces were battling to contain nationalists and the South African communists 
considered the SADF resources markedly inferior to those of France.
425
 So inspired, MK 
began their sabotage campaign on 16 December 1961, it being anticipated by Nelson 
Mandela and Joe Slovo, that full-scale guerrilla war would materialise if the government 
failed to heed demands for a negotiated political dispensation.
426
 In the wake of the 
state‟s defeat of MK‟s efforts, Operation Mayibuye was conceived by the ANC/SACP 
MK “High Command”
427
and as mentioned earlier, was also assumed to include military 
assistance and foreign intervention. When presented to Soviet officials, it received 
cautious support but nothing materially substantial.
428
 After the 1963 to 1964 Rivonia 
arrests and trial, the SADF took particular interest in the military aspects of the Mayibuye 
plans, details of which significantly impacted upon the Defence Force‟s threat appraisals 
and operational responses. Documentation confirming such is utilised within this 
dissertation and no other writings have been encountered by this author where such 
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archival evidence is analysed in terms of either the histories of the ANC or that of the 
SADF.  
  
Zanzibar revolution, January 1964: SADF assessments   
 
During the Zanzibar Revolution, black African nationalists displaced the historic Arab 
island rule. This event was carefully studied and reported upon within SADF appraisals, 
heightening the military‟s concern of external threats developing along the Mayibuye 
lines. Fouché announced in Parliament that “for the first time in our history the 
communists have a base in the Indian Ocean along the East Coast,” further describing 
this as “a dangerous breakthrough”.
429
 Occurring in the aftermath of the Rivonia trial and 
Mayibuye revelations, the Zanzibar developments accentuated speculation of new 
“communist bases” being established from where seaborne guerrilla landings might be 
launched upon the Republic. Such a line of thinking intensified when the South African 
press reported on American and British citizens observing “Cubans” collaborating with 
those over-throwing the island‟s Arab government.
430
  The SADF‟s intelligence 
appraisals also referred to the Zanzibar events occurring almost simultaneously to the 
January 1964 East African armed forces mutinies, which it was assumed occurred 
because of the continued presence in these forces of white officers.
431
 In correspondence 
four years later between author A.J. Venter and an unknown spokesman for the British 
Ministry of Defence, it was denied by the latter that there was any evidence of Chinese or 
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 But SADF assessments viewed the East African events as 
evidence of “increased grip of communism to the detriment of Western influence… the 
attempt (by communists to incite a similar revolution) on Mozambique can be planned 




A document dated 18 February 1964 referring to Zanzibar, was forwarded from the 
Acting Chief of Army Staff to the Commandant General.
434
 It contained an assessment 
describing the new regime as being at one with those African states hostile towards 
colonialism and “especially the White government and population of the RSA”. The 
revolution and mutinies were understood as Chinese “inspired”, because premier Chou 
En Lai had simultaneously been touring Africa. The mutinies in Kenya had occurred 
simultaneously with clashes along the Kenya-Somalia border, the Chinese having, it was 
alleged, “a strong influence in Somalia.” Besides local grievances and demands for 
Africanisation in the military, there were other potential explanations for the Tanzanian 
government courting Chinese assistance.
435
 Open Chinese military aggression towards 
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South Africa was discounted because of clashes with Western interests and Peking‟s lack 
of affordability/capacity for such an armed venture. It was suggested, however, that the 
Chinese could “exploit African nationalism” through assistance in arms and funds to the 





The SADF military intelligence also speculated on the possibility of Madagascar 
becoming the next target for a “communist” revolution: “A communist Madagascar with 
the RSA and Mozambique still under white control will compare with the present role of 
Cuba”, assuming obviously that Castro‟s regime was the main instigator of revolution in 
South and Central America. Military intelligence suggested that a “communist 
Madagascar” could perform the same role in Southern Africa. A parallel was drawn 
between the Arab/African conflict in Zanzibar and tensions between minorities regarding 
the black African majority within the Republic, most particularly in southern Natal.   
Leading Indians in Durban are convinced that the next target for 
a revolution, similar to the Zanzibar coup will be Malgassy” 
(Madagascar). The subversion which lead (sic) to the revolution 
in Zanzibar was that of clever exploitation of race differences… 
The incitement of the Black races against their former exploiters, 
the Asians. The same setting exists along the whole East coast, 
including the RSA and especially Natal. This type of propaganda 
and agitation is already visible in Natal; Indians are now currying 
(sic) the favour of the Bantu…. The cosmopolitan community of 
Durban lends itself to subversion. This is already being 
exploited. European, Indian and Bantu agitators are active….It is 
remarkable to note the many sabotage attempts in Natal 
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organised by Umkhonto We Sizwe. Goldreich the „master brain‟ 




Significantly, Arthur Goldreich a white SACP and MK operative besides a Mayibuye 
proponent
438
 was mentioned in this report. However alarmist their intelligence 
assessments were, the SADF were making links between Soviet-Sino attempts to draw 
newly independent countries into their sphere of influence alongside the activities of 
South African dissidents. The rest of the document continued to speculate as to the extent 
of Chinese assistance in training the Africa Liberation Army, defined as “composed of 
guerrilla-soldiers provided by various African states”.  
 
The report‟s recommendations were that South African political leaders “exploit the 
military situation on diplomatic level” by convincing their Western counterparts to 
reassess their cold-shouldering of the RSA in terms of defence agreements relating to 
Indian Ocean. That further SADF military co-operation was desirable with both the 
Southern Rhodesian and the Portuguese governments. It was recommended that the navy 
and aerial patrols focus on the east coast for intelligence gathering purposes,
439
 while 
local defence arrangements such as the commandos should be trained in intelligence 
gathering, particularly as it was believed that subversive activities could occur along the 
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coastline by contacts with “unauthorised ships”.
440
 The existence of South African 
dissident camps in Tanzania and the Zanzibar revolution, along with alleged communist 
involvement, prompted increased SADF concerns regarding assumed threat possibilities 
along the South African coast. 
 
Threat perceptions manifested by „enemy maritime activity‟ 
 
One of the more highly publicised „threat‟ phenomena during the 1960s was the 
widespread belief that hostile submarines were operating off the coast. Archival 
documentation includes numerous investigations of alleged sightings, while newspaper 
reports confirmed the public interest. These „sightings‟ and SADF responses became 
even more pronounced once the Rivonia trial‟s Operation Mayibuye evidence was 
available of purported plans to „land guerrilla forces by sea, for these details were now 
integrated into SADF operational planning. „Submarine sightings‟ and SADF search and 
responses dated from the 1950s, but intensified from 1960, with regular reports in 
newspapers during a period of growing white South African uncertainties.  
 
A typical example occurred in late October 1960 when a submarine was supposedly 
spotted at the entrance of False Bay.  The Cape Argus reported “a SAAF Shackleton … 
investigated….and found nothing,” commenting further that such reports averaged at 
least three a week received and investigated by the military over recent years. The 
newspaper‟s shipping correspondent compared the sightings as “false fire alarms…to the 
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 But this kind of sober rationale did not stem public „observations‟ of 
„submarines‟ receiving increased serious SADF consideration. The assumption was 
inevitably that Russian or other communist forces had the country under specific 
watch,
442
 but secret official documentation also speculated that the „submarines‟ might be 
part of a broader revolutionary plan.    
 
Brig Gen Theo De Munnik who flew maritime reconnaissance operations during the early 
1960s, confirmed that instructions were given to investigate official suspicions of Soviet 
attempts to spy or land saboteurs. The Pondoland coast came under particular attention in 
1960 to 1961, partly because of the discontent there regarding government-appointed 
tribal leaders, which some SADF planners believed was linked to communist instigations 
directed through clandestine contacts. De Munnik described the SADF imperatives on 
these missions: 
In the latter half of 1960, it was surmised that a threat of landing 
saboteurs, terrorists and arms along our coast was becoming a 
real cause for concern.  Shipping patrol flights were stepped up 
to keep track of what vessels and, more importantly, whose 
vessels were passing through our waters…Small fishing vessels 
close to the coast also came under the spotlight. .. Towards the 
end of 1960, the need for night time surveillance along the East 
Coast (Pondoland/Transkei) was considered necessary in order to 
detect or deter night landings from submarines, small fishing 
vessels or other ships of saboteurs, arms, etc. .. At the height of 
the calculated threat towards the end of 1960, these patrols were 
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carried out almost every night and a naval presence was also 




 De Munnik‟s recollections endorse how seriously the SADF from 1960 took the idea of 
these supposed threats. Opposition politicians exacerbated the hysteria by „exposing‟ 
their parliamentary rivals „failures‟ in foreign and domestic policy. One absurd example, 
was provided by MP Japie Basson in 1961, who referred to “beacons” which Russian 
ships were supposed to be planting in the sea off the SWA coast, purportedly capable of 
transmitting radio signals which would cause a rocket to change its course. He quoted 
Fouché claiming possession of documentary evidence that Russia planned an attack on 
South Africa, using certain African States as jumping-off points.
444
 The unknown 
Russian ships were photographed lurking off the SWA coast during the past six months. 
Basson lamented: “What hope have we in this dangerous world without allies? Nobody 
will help us if we get into trouble”. Describing the (NP) Government as the “grave-digger 
of the White man,” Basson concluded: “If the White man wanted to stay in control there 





Notwithstanding the sensationalist press value, the SADF never achieved any definite 
verification of a submarine sighting.
446
 The military also reacted with caution in terms of 
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challenging any such vessels. In February 1960, Air Chief of Staff, Combat Gen Ben 
Viljoen wrote to Commandant General Melville for policy clarification. Viljoen 
commented: 
As you are aware, there is reliable evidence that foreign 
submarines have been active in South African territorial waters 
over a long period. The nature of their activity is unknown, but it 
would seem obvious that if it were entirely innocent, the power 
concerned would adopt the normal diplomatic procedures before 
operating naval craft in our waters...The question arises, 
however, as to whether we would be justified in taking…drastic 
steps in the event of locating a submerged or „snorting‟ 
submarine in close proximity to our coast. I would suggest that if 
depth charges were dropped in the vicinity of such a submarine, 
a foreign power would be deterred from carrying out clandestine 
operations in our waters. Even though, however, depth charges 
were not aimed to hit the target directly, the possibility of 
destruction or serious damage to the submarine could not be 
discounted.
447
       
 
Melville‟s response was to write briefly upon the letter that there was to be “no offensive 
action” but only observation and reporting as in the past.
448
 Rear Adm Chris Bennett, 
who served in the navy‟s anti-submarine frigates during this period, believes that some 
sightings were definitely submarines, but not necessarily Russian, for it could not be 
guaranteed that Western countries would relay to the SA government, all details of their 
navies operations off the Republic‟s coast. Therefore, SADF use of anti-submarine 
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The SADF and white public assumption was always that the „submarines‟ were Russian. 
In a 1965 SADF assessment of the „sightings‟, it was explained that the only Afro-Asian 
navies operating submarines were Pakistan (one vessel) and Indonesia, neither of which, 
the SADF assumed were likely to risk them in such operation. Russia possessed a “large 
and active submarine fleet of all Communist countries” (sic) and had refuelling facilities 
in Dar Es Salaam and Zanzibar, while other Russian vessels, (possibly including from 
February 1965, a replenishing tanker) had long been present off the South African 
coast.
450
 The writer of this document, Maj Gen Nic Bierman discounted “Western powers 
and friendly nations” allowing their submarines to lurk clandestinely off the South 
African coast. The World War Two ethos of a war veteran like Bierman still assumed the 
mindset of South Africa being accepted as part of a western military fraternity.   
 
However, white public interest continued to be occasionally consumed with repeated 
reports of „Russians‟ spying off the coast, „landing supplies‟ or „agitators to instigate 
revolution or other menacing activities‟. Sensationalism and paranoia was inevitable, just 
as unlikely situations were also sometimes investigated; a notable example occurring in 
October 1964: Die Burger under the headline, “Velddrif threatened by the Russians,” 
published a lengthy article about a “highly suspicious object” discovered by Velddrif 
fishermen, amongst whom there was now “unease and wild rumours”. Claimed was that 
Russians were setting up underwater beacons for the control of guided projectiles – “as 
had already been discovered off the American coast”. The local fishing company 
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manager Mr P.J. Steyl reported that the object was located at the precise spot where the 
Russian ship Krasnodar had anchored regularly since December 1962.”
451
 A report on 
this mystery object found its way to Fouché, who gave instructions for an examination to 
be undertaken by the navy, while attempts were made to trace the origins of the press 
reports.
452
 SA Navy Chief Rear Adm Hugo Biermann was determined to ensure clarity on 
the matter, “in view of the wild rumours circulating amongst the fishermen.”
453
 Divers 
discovered nothing but rock formations, although by then the Foreign Affairs Department 
and even Verwoerd had taken an interest.
454
 The incident serves as a useful mirror of the 
rooigevaar
455
 mindsets amongst the white community; in this instance within a fishing 
community off coastal areas where Russians trawlers were regular visitors. In his book 
My Traitor‟s Heart, Riaan Malan spoke of visiting an uncle‟s West Coast farm during the 
early 1960s, where he sardonically recollects his relative‟s understanding‟s of the Red 
activity off the coast: 
At day‟s end, we drove over the sand dunes to watch the grey-
green Atlantic breakers rolling onto a lonely, windswept 
beach…Sometimes a defence-force Shackleton flew past at roof-
top height, patrolling against the Russians. (Uncle) Ben knew 
they were out there, lurking, because a Russian life-jacket had 
once washed ashore on the beach. The Russians were the enemy. 
That was already known.
456
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In early October 1962, a classified memorandum by Viljoen to the Commandant General 
reiterated earlier „submarine warnings‟. Conceivably, the tense international context at 
the time, concerning the plausibility of potential global war, underscored the earnestness 
behind this and other SADF correspondence. October 1962 was a period of significant 
Cold War tensions regarding issues around Berlin and particularly Cuba.  
It is suspected that unfriendly submarines are already active, 
along our coast, and that their aim is to land arms or subversive 
persons or both to foster internal disturbance. Such activity is 
likely to be intensified in time of internal or external trouble. The 
best counter to such a threat is frequent air patrols at irregular 
intervals by day and night and in all weather conditions. The 
most important stretches of coastline are those on the East Coast 




As mentioned above, Operation Mayibuye referred to plans of guerrillas landing on the 
coast and therefore the spectre of Soviet submarines off the Republic‟s coast received 
renewed attention after the Rivonia Trial. In June 1964 SAN Flag Officer, Rear Adm H. 
E. Fougstedt despatched orders to navy ship commanding officers, the SAAF maritime 
group and Walvis Bay Command that patrols would continue to:  
locate and identify unfriendly forces that may be engaged in 
clandestine operations against the RSA or SWA.”  Such was 
based upon: “Intelligence indicate(ing) the strong possibility of 
clandestine operations being carried out along the West coast of 
the RSA and SWA by submarines and surface craft…The 
nationality of these vessels cannot be specifically identified and 
may be various including South African; It is thought that the 
vessels are engaged in the landing of subversive agents, literature 
and arms, at remote places on the coast, and in gathering 
intelligence.
458
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The above happened just before Justice Minister Vorster had told parliament that the 
“Communist Party had given orders from outside the country that violence and sabotage 
should be limited pending the outcome of the (Rivonia) trial” and “he was ready for 
anything”.
459
 SADF military intelligence (DMI) reported in late December 1964 about 
ANC guerrillas being possibly landed the following year via Soviet submarine. Reports 
were despatched to the Commandant General, besides all SADF Chiefs of Staff and the 
SA Police, about anticipated guerrilla operations involving submarines. The details are 
revealing regarding the clear uncertainties amongst the SADF‟s command and 
intelligence.  
 
It was stated that the ANC had currently spread across Africa, five hundred trained 
fighters with Algerian and Cuban officers and several hundred other in training, with 
monthly replenishments of new recruits from South Africa. Some of these guerrillas were 
to be landed on the South African coast from a Soviet submarine early in 1965. The 
submarine would refuel and take on additional guerrillas at Zanzibar, which as 
demonstrated earlier, remained an area of high SADF concern. The Soviets had already 
completed a survey of the South African coast and identified the most likely landing 
areas, consisting of twenty-three points along the Transkei and Pondoland coasts. DMI 
strongly recommended that air and naval patrols were to be a priority for several months 
to come.
460
 The involvement of Russian submarines was also documented by DMI in a 
December 1964 appraisal, claiming detailed PAC plans existed to launch attacks upon the 
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Early the following year (5 January 1965), the SA Police National Commissioner gave 
urgent instructions regarding “Activities of Submarines: RSA Coastline” to the Regional 
Commissioners in all coastal sections from the Western Cape to Natal. The National 
Commissioner, R.J. Van den Bergh noted the same information described above 
regarding „ANC guerrillas‟. Police stationed near the coast, were instructed to be 
particularly alert and to make use of the loyal local (black) population for information. It 
was also emphasised that this information was under no circumstances to be relayed back 
to any member of the (white) public, because of the possibility that such would result in 
panic. Police Regional Commissioners were instructed to investigate possible landing 
sites, particularly in remote areas and to report anything irregular to the National 
Commissioner‟s Office or the nearest SADF unit, besides consult with the local security 




SADF Directorate of Planning and Operations (DPO) Head, Maj Gen Nic Bierman, 
within correspondence to the Commandant General in March 1965, even suggested that 
“a Communist Foreign power” might attempt to evacuate the SACP fugitive Braam 
Fischer by submarine. Bierman referred to the increased frequency of submarine 
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sightings since February and reiterated that intelligence reports indicated “a strong 
possibility of arms, equipment, and trained personnel being clandestinely landed…at 
points along the East Coast of the RSA.” The document speculated upon the advantage of 
a hostile power doing such an operation by submarine, “in aid of an uprising” “directly 
into the Bantu areas” off the Transkei coast to minimise detection by security forces.
463
 
Submarine sightings continued during 1965 with the SADF usually responding 
immediately. The Cape Times reported a determined search off Quoin Point west of Cape 
Agulhas that winter, where the SADF tried to elicit local assistance while attempting to 




The “Submarine sightings” – some closing remarks 
  
The SA Police and DMI completely misunderstood the extent of Soviet interest and most 
particularly any assistance rendered by them to the ANC.
465
 SADF documentation 
permits us to draw some important conclusions regarding the white security 
establishment‟s threat perceptions. Firstly, the „Russian submarine menace‟ was taken 
exceptionally seriously at the highest levels, because there persisted an extravagant 
SADF belief in ANC and SACP influence within the USSR. There were assumptions of 
ANC/PAC military capacities that were completely unrealistic; namely ANC/PAC or any 
other dissident armed wing‟s military capability to significantly confront the South 
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African state. The discovery of the Mayibuye plans had confirmed to the SADF that local 
African nationalist militant forces had contemplated such a challenge. Documentation 
also reveals the South African security establishment as jittery, markedly different from 
its confident public face. The Commissioner‟s comments about the vulnerability of the 
white population to panic, if informed of the prospect of an „ANC invasion of armed 
guerrillas‟, is indicative of the white public mood, which at the time was susceptible to 
stories of impending disaster through black revolution „linked to communism‟ or 
„Russia‟.   
 
In August 1964, Fouché had referred to the SADF commandos being critical for guarding 
key points and essential services, emphasising the earlier sabotage campaign as being 
viewed by the Defence Force just a “practice run”.
466
 The SADF worked within a 
community that although largely prosperous and privileged, often anticipated the worst in 
terms of „enemies‟ bent of their destruction and seizure of property. Like with the 
planning to defend SWA, (see following chapter) the security establishment were 
working secretly against perceived „threats,‟ on the understanding that any revelation of 
such could have political and economic consequences, particularly if there were serious 
white „panics,‟ as had occurred after Sharpeville. The „submarine sighting‟ phenomena of 
the 1960s were symptoms of a barely repressed white fear of enemies determined to 
invoke violent political change.  
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SADF fears at potential American intransigence 
 
One significant assessment drawn from this research has been establishing the suspicion 
and fear the SADF establishment sometimes held during the 1960s towards the USA. 
Verwoerd commented in parliament during February 1962 regarding local perceptions of 
America as a potential “threat”. Although he dismissed this as highly unlikely, as Barber 
notes, it was significant that such public speculation existed at all which Verwoerd had 
felt compelled to respond to.
467
 A 1963 intelligence appraisal briefly outlined the 
methods by which a UN attack on the RSA could take: Paratroopers along with air 
transported and naval components implementing attacks simultaneously against strategic 
points, both inland and along the coast. It was emphasised that given the UN‟s financial 
position, the assistance of a big power such as the USA was required and this was 
considered unlikely.
468
 There remained SADF speculation, still persisting in 1966, that 
under certain circumstances, the American government might assist in such an 
intervention. The possibility was considered of the Afro-Asians seeking USA assistance 
for a UN military force, operating under the auspices of the world body to ensure „global 
peace‟; such was clearly outlined in a SADF intelligence report: 
the African and Asiatic states are currently not capable of 
overthrowing white control in South Africa, and because the 
Communist bloc are restricted from directly intervening by the 
possibility that this would result in American military opposition, 
a tactic is being pursued to influence those states which could 
possibly ensure such a change, to act against the Republic. These 
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potential aggressors, whether at economic or military level are 
the big Western powers led by the United States of America.
469
   
 
Another report dated 22 August 1966, forming part of: “An Evaluation of the Military 
Threat against South Africa as at 13 September 1966,” gives a clear picture of the 
presumptions held by the SADF at this time regarding its foes:  
The enemy assault against the RSA forms part of the designed 
„liberation‟ of white South Africa through subversive elements, 
the Afro-Asian and communist countries, and certain liberal 
western organisations. Although the OAU endeavours to set out 
priorities in its „master plan‟, it has since the beginning of 
hostilities in Angola (1961) had to adjust its plan in order to 
adjust with changing circumstances.
470
  
        
The “enemy” was elaborated as being: “Afro-Asian countries with their slogan „Africa 
for the African‟”; “communist countries with their hankering for world-domination”; 
“Western countries with their anti-colonial policy followed by an enthusiastic taking up 
of the “equalising process” (gelykmakingsproses)”.
471
 Regarding the latter „process‟, it 
was understood that because since World War Two, (this “process”) had moved onto new 
terrain (Africa) and called for all discrimination on the grounds of colour being swept 
aside. Obviously, South Africa‟s policy of “separate development” was portrayed as a 
hindrance to the realisation of this. Therefore, “the actual objective of the enemy assault 
was the removal of whites from their position of political power and establishment of a 
multi-racial and ultimately a non-white regime in the RSA”. Nevertheless, it was felt that 
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in the event of a “possible third world war,” Western countries would have to come to 
terms with the Republic‟s “economic and military-strategic benefits”. The report 
commented that regardless of the recent decision by the World Court in favour of South 
Africa regarding SWA, UN military action could still occur to terminate the Republic‟s 





Although it was not anticipated that Western countries would support military action, 
there remained throughout this lengthy document a suspicion regarding America. 
Ironically, the mid-1960s was also a period during which the white South African 
community were becoming increasingly drawn for cultural imitations to American 
popular culture.
473
 Specific American interest regarding Southern Africa is confirmed by 
the US State Department having deployed a spy ship in Cape Town during the early part 
of the decade, which was to maintain a watching brief on the newly emerging nations of 
Africa besides the internal struggles within remaining colonies.”
474
 SADF documentation 
by 1966 laid an emphasis upon the USA as not necessarily „reliable‟. The SADF believed 
the American government would always explicitly cover its own interests first, even 
regarding the possibility of it supporting military action against South Africa:   
The USA might under changing circumstances be persuaded 
towards such a step (to supporting armed intervention in South 
African affairs). It is also expected that the USA in the Cold War 
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Although the American threat was a remote possibility, what seemed particularly to 
perturb SADF appraisers, was that the United States certainly possessed the capacity for 
military intervention in South Africa and was “the most easily persuadable to taking such 
a step”.
476
 (compared it was believed to other Western countries) The report reasoned as 
follows regarding potential scenarios that deserved consideration:  
If the war in Vietnam and police actions in other parts of the 
world, because of changing circumstances place a lighter demand 
upon the USA, while the pressure increases both within and 
outside that country to act against the RSA, there could still in 




DMI set out the possible threats to the Republic under three categories: “Unconventional 
forces comprising subversive groups; conventional forces comprised out of a country or a 
group of countries; and the UN”.
478
 Regarding the UN, it was assumed that any military 
action on its part would have to be backed by one of the “Great Powers”. Such 
intervention depended on economic and political factors that varied according to 
changing global circumstances. An analysis was set out upon each of the most important 
Western countries and the Soviet Union. The French were considered highly unlikely to 
participate in any armed action against South Africa; such an appraisal was based upon 
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the extent of their recent military collaboration with South Africa
479
 and their refusal to 
support several UN resolutions against the country. The British government intervening 
with armed force was also discounted, on the grounds their economy could not be risked 
regarding the “loss of South African gold”, investments, and “thriving trade”. The USA 
as the most powerful Western country was viewed in a less predictable light. It was 
assumed that because of the USA armed force‟s international commitments, including 
covering NATO, Vietnam, Cuba and standing in to replace Britain‟s withdrawal from the 
Middle East, it would not in addition be able to support “reckless actions demanded by 
the Afro-Asian countries in the UN”, nor would it consent to general economic sanctions. 
However, it was felt that the USA was vulnerable to criticism from Afro-Asian countries, 
regarding its actions in Vietnam and in consequence, might attempt to soothe this by 
supporting a full or partial oil boycott against South Africa.   
 
The DMI report however, emphasised it could not be discounted that the USA under 
changing circumstances might support military action again the Republic. The Soviet 
Union, it was thought unlikely to permit the inclusion of their military forces under any 
UN authority invading South Africa and their involvement would not be accepted by 
Western powers.
480
 Concerns were also expressed that the USA might by a stronger 
attitude and actions towards South Africa attempt to draw adverse attention away from its 
“negro problems” and Vietnam policy, through American endorsement of “liberalism” 
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and the “equalisation process.”
481
 Maj Gen Phil Pretorius, who served in intelligence 
during the early 1960s, recalled that amongst opinions expressed at the time was that an 
American aircraft carrier could be a significant part of such an international military 
threat to South Africa.
482
 In an analysis regarding US armed forces capacity in 1966, 
DMI established that at that stage, one US military division could be drawn for 
intervention, without calling upon reserves and if tensions in Europe and the Far East 




However, DMI reassured the SADF, that circumstances whereby Western powers might 
militarily intervene in South Africa by 1966 still seemed unlikely. However, it was 
recommended that it was imperative to establish what kind of issue the Republic‟s 
„enemies‟ might use to provoke the willingness of the USA to act militarily. Stressed was 
that the government needed to respond in some way to the possibility of military 
intervention, because there remained both internal and external pressure on the West to 
do so. Therefore, the recommendations were that a “strong and experienced Defence 
Force could reinforce the perception that overthrowing the RSA would require a full-
scale and expensive military campaign, while more subtle emphasise (needed to be 
placed) upon our value to the West in strategy and preparedness.” In his 1967 book, Total 
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Defence, Neil Orpen was still exploring the possibility of the USA backing a 




SADF threat perceptions: Closing comments 
 
By mid-1965, Fouché told parliament that in contrast to 1960, when training principally 
concerned internal security, this had long changed with perceptions of a possible external 
threat, hence the need to retain for periods significant numbers of conscripts under arms. 
Fouché also assured that improvements and additions had been made to the SADF, 
including transport and stockpiling of ammunition. He claiming the SADF had reached a 
stage were everything required for mobilization was now available.
485
 Addressing an 
official opening of an SADF new air defence system component on 15 November 1965, 
Fouché referred to the perceived threats:  
We are living in times of war and rumours of war…in times 
when threats are also being made against our fatherland. If these 
threats are to become a reality, nobody can predict. We are not a 
great power and have absolutely no ambitions but to be left in 
peace, thereby we can also guarantee peace.
486
   
 
Fouché continued playing the role of projecting for white South Africans, the necessity of 
ensuring a military deterrent. The government view, increasingly shared by this 
community, was that the country was innocent of wrong and its white inhabitants 
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misunderstood and maligned by the rest of the world. Therefore, military deterrent 
provision was appropriate and just. Fouché continued:  
(We wish)…to give our full attention to our…own unrestricted 
possibilities regarding ourselves, but also… to (assist) everybody 
in Africa that so desires. But it is just because we desire to be left 
in peace…we are also…militarily prepared….it would be the 
height of foolishness to …participate or precipitate a war in 
Africa, (which is) currently at its formative stage and 
experiencing an unsettled period. (Such) would be expensive for 
generations and could only entrain devastation. The Republic of 
South Africa has no such sinister….plans…such would be bring 
self-destruction or at best ensure an incalculable economic set-
back.
487
    
 
It is significant that Fouché referred to the question of war bringing an economic disaster 
for South Africa. For during these prosperous years, it would have made political sense to 
state clearly, that the government was not in any way pursuing a “military policy” 
threatening white community material comfort. Fouché‟s rhetoric obfuscated other issues 
that arguably threatened the economic stability of the country, such as increased political 
isolation and international hostility to apartheid.  
 
Although there was no evidence, nor purpose regarding any SADF “preparation” to 
“attack Africa”, the South African government remained concerned about aggressive 
Afro-Asian posturing at the UN, ultimately transforming into a military situation. In 
1965, speaking to trainees passing out from the Army Gymnasium at Voortrekkerhoogte, 
Fouché continued to warn of, “threats…made against the RSA, both from within and 
beyond our boundaries. These …cannot be disregarded and none of us may assume an 













attitude of indifference in matters concerning the defence and security of our country.”
488
 
Fouché was also of course, assisting in facilitating the process by which full white male 
conscription was soon to become a reality. By September 1966, DMI were more 
confident, predicting that the Republic‟s economic potential and “military-strategic” 
value would ensure Western powers limiting “communist influence on South Africa”, or 
precluding them from threatening South Africa‟s economic and strategic value. In a 
global conflict situation, Western powers would, according to the circumstances, be 
compelled to adjust their policies of distancing themselves from the Republic; a situation 
advantageous to the Republic provided the South African government was “still 
sustaining itself”.
489
      
 
Although DMI continued to stress that communist countries would not attempt unilateral 
military action because of likely Western rejection and the possibility of global war,
490
 
they remained concerned at the fluidity of the international situation. There were still 
various options open to the UN according to its Charter, which included displays of 
military force, naval and air blockades and ultimately direct military action. Concern was 
expressed that an economic blockade could lead to war through unforeseen incidents and 
the country would be dependent upon its limited “maritime (naval) capacity to offer 
resistance.” In anticipation of a physical blockade of South African harbours intended to 
prevent the importation of crude oil, the appraisal envisaged that a naval task force would 
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have to be stationed outside each of Cape Town and Durban. While if the blockade was 
intended to also cover refined petroleum products and other commodities, then Walvis 
Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London and Mossel Bay‟s usage would also be restricted.
491
 It 
was thought the operational area of UN ships would remain outside the offensive range of 
the SAN or the SAAF. However, revealing again SADF suspicion of United States 
intentions, it was also noted that: “Military personnel of the American Embassy in the 
RSA have recently become very active in trying to locate information regarding SAAF 




White community interest in the concept of a “blockade threat,” was demonstrated by Die 
Huisgenoot where a lengthy article was published scorning the likely effectiveness of 
sanctions; indicative of how topical the issue was considered by its readers. Certainly the 
magazine‟s owners (Afrikaans press group Nationalepers) assumed Huisgenoot’s 
audience would appreciate the publication‟s patriotic dismissal of boycott threats being 
the posturing by South Africa‟s „enemies‟. The article was written by H. de G. Laurie, a 
“well-known Afrikaans businessman,” who in explaining the different levels of sanctions, 
focussed particularly on the concept of a complete economic blockade. This meant 
sanctions in their “severest kind which coupled with military action, meant a 
blockade…to prevent any commerce (occurring) with the (relevant) country, or as he put 




                                                 
491
 HSI AMI, GP3, Box 430, Hoof van Verdegigingsstaf, Aanvulende Militêre Inligtingsrapport, 
Waardering van die Vyandelike Militêre Dreigment Teen die RSA soos op 13 September 1966, pp 6-8. 
492
 Ibid., p. 8. 
493











Laurie dismissed total sanctions as being impractical to implement, but acknowledged 
that a full blockade would be plausible, although it would need to be enforced by a strong 
naval presence. A blockade could present certain problems, for example, internal pressure 
to “give in” and the possibility of internal unrest being “difficult to control.” Laurie 
quoted the conventional white South African rebuttals of the time. That a blockade would 
ultimately be unsuccessful because of South Africa‟s “self-sufficiency” in food, the 
success of Sasol in converting oil from petrol, adequate coal-reserves for electricity and 
rail transport which remained the main internal form of goods conveyance. Laurie 
believed that the costs of maintaining a naval blockade presence would be huge, 
particularly if maintained over a lengthy period.
494
                
 
DMI held that any UN military intervention was unlikely and that if it happened, it would 
be a consequence of incidents occurring during enforcement of the blockade. However, 
such an attack would come from the air and sea, with its objective the destruction of the 
SADF and civilian authority. It was speculated that the success of such a UN military 
task force attack would also be dependent upon the “resoluteness, steadfastness and 
loyalty of whites to the government.” Of additional concern was the “attitude of the non-
whites towards the government” and “their capacity to successfully rise up and direct a 
struggle against state authority”. The degree to which the SADF was perceived as an 
effective military deterrent, would be a “very important factor (which could be) decisive 
if military intervention was ever considered against South Africa.”
495
 Finally it was held 
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that the UN would be cautious in terms of militarily acting against the country, because 





By the end of 1966, the SADF‟s fear of a conventional military attack had not completely 
waned, but it had considerably diminished since 1961 to 1963. The threat being 
envisaged more clearly by 1967 to 1968, namely “sporadic guerrilla war,” was assumed 
“at worst would accentuate in the near future.”
497
 It towards this kind of threat the SADF 
began to increasingly reshape its fighting philosophy and doctrines that had been more 
focussed towards the possibility of defending against a conventional warfare, or during 




It is a central contention of this dissertation that the SADF‟s role in collecting 
information on military threats during the 1960s and responding to them, has in this 
author‟s evaluation been neglected in previous writings and no comprehensive research 
during this period has been completed. While the white population within South Africa, 
after being shocked by the international reaction immediately post the Sharpeville 
shootings, by the mid-1960s began to recover its confidence as the economy started to 
boom,. But the SADF‟s public profile also began to rise, while government defence 
expenditure increased with new arms acquisitions and increases in balloted service.  
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Also occurring, unbeknown to the public were the extent of SADF perceptions of threats 
during the period. The military, as demonstrated in the next chapter, attempted to respond 
to these threats, often in haste with various counter-strategies. While politicians made the 
most of the unsubstantiated „African threat‟, the SADF still took seriously possible 
conventional threats, besides suspected guerrilla insurrection, as outlined through the 
evidence provided at the Rivonia trial on Operation Mayibuye. Hence, the close watch 
kept upon the coast and SADF responses to “submarine sightings”. A period of particular 
white anxieties stretched from Sharpeville, through the March 1961 Angolan uprisings 
and Republic declaration, until the mid-1960s. These violent events in the Portuguese 
colony further ensured SWA being an SADF priority, with concerns that the UN or 
“Afro-Asians” may try to wrest away South African control. Simultaneous events in 
Congo during 1960 to 1963, not only prompted further defensiveness by South African 
whites to rally behind government rationales of apartheid, but also induced the SADF to 
secretly conclude that UN action spearheaded by Indian forces could be imminent. This 
deduction was made partly because of the Indian armed forces leading role in forcibly 
stemming the Katanga succession.  
 
SADF suspicions of American intransigence were partly rooted in realisation that of all 
potential “invaders”, United States participation would be decisive. The SADF never 
completely ignored the possibility of such threats, while politicians, military men and 
others, made full use of such a scenario as a method of whipping white South Africans 











at least projected to be an effective military capability to serve as an effective deterrent to 
potential military threats. Against the background of comparative prosperity and privilege 
amongst white South Africans, there remained anxieties that ensured a steadily growing 
defence budget, a waning of white political opposition and a process which by 1968, 
legislated that all white male school-leavers would be doing compulsory military service. 
The white South African community had also been socialised during the first part of the 
1960s to give their consent for such a national service system. (See part two of this 















Already after the republic declaration, from June 1961 Fouché insisted in parliament that 
it had to be ensured that the SADF could defend the country against an external military 
threat,
498
 but where this threat would emanate from was vaguely postulated. This chapter 
introduces some important SADF responses to potential conventional military attack, 
thereafter explains the Defence Force‟s doctrinal shift by 1968 towards counter-
insurgency warfare; a change which occurred alongside the implementation of legislative 
changes compelling conscription for all white male school-leavers into a nine month 
stretch of military national service.    
 
Fouché, Verwoerd and Grobbelaar: Attempts to discern the role of the SADF (from 
1960) 
 
In the first months of his appointment, Fouché had reacted to defence needs as being 
primarily concerned with preventing a potential internal uprising by black South Africans 
while conventional warfare planning, was largely ignored. Half the Centurion tanks 
purchased during the 1950s (one hundred out of two hundred) were sold in September 
1960 to Switzerland, ensuring funds for other equipment (British documentation suggests 
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that most of these tanks were never even used by the SADF).
499
 Although Fouché made it 
clear at this early stage that it was intended, where possible, for South Africa to 
manufacture her own arms,
500
 as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, during 
1960 to 1966 it was increasingly more conventional threats that SADF equipment 
purchases and appraisals would be directed towards. Thereafter during 1967 to 1968, 
counter-insurgency warfare received closer attention. However, the earlier conventional 
warfare emphasis in our period is virtually undocumented by Seegers and other 
writers,
501
 although she does discern the apparent Defence Force confusion in initially 
trying to decide which arms and training required greater emphasis; whether orientated 




There were also occasions when Grobbelaar had to persuade Verwoerd not to interfere in 
defence matters. When called on one occasion to the Prime Minister‟s office over the 
Commandant General‟s reluctance to support the selling off of the army‟s remaining one 
hundred Centurion tanks, in a tense discussion, Grobbelaar told Verwoerd that he and not 
the SADF Chief would have to make it public that it was his (the Prime Minister‟s) 
decision to dispense with the vehicles.
503
 This confirmed that Grobbelaar was not 
prepared to take any risks regarding the possibility of a landward conventional threat 
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developing. As further shown below, defence planning in the early 1960s was intended to 
both ensure a dispersion of forces to cover potential internal uprisings or guerrilla 
activities and enable the placement of infrastructure to guard borders and SWA at Walvis 
Bay - regarding conventional warfare threats.   
  
Establishment of additional army and air force bases for internal and external 
defence 
  
One of the earliest SADF counter-responses during 1961 was to establish sixteen 
“Combat Groups,” each superimposed upon regional/territorial commands, splitting the 
country geographically up into a number of administrative military areas: For example, 
Northern Transvaal Command, Witwatersrand Command, Western Province 
Command… The first four Combat Groups were established from 1 January 1961 (11-14 
CGs), while 15 and 16 Combat Groups were set up from 1 April 1963.
504
 These Combat 
Groups were effectively “paper plans,” covering component parts of the Republic and 
SWA in the event of a conventional warfare attack,
505
 besides also facilitating the 
responses to unconventional warfare in their respective areas.
506
 The latter role was more 
in the public domain, while the government were far more secretive about counter 
strategies concerning conventional threats. At an administrative level, the Combat Groups 
comprised a commander, a general staff officer as second in command and an 
administrative/logistics officer. For example, 16 Combat Group in SWA was tasked with 
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the role of facing the possibility of an amphibious enemy landing at Swakopmund or 
Walvis Bay.
507
    
 
As mentioned, the first part of the decade was also interspersed with the SADF being 
alerted to possible internal insurrections.
508
 Considering white South African fears of 
such, the SADF also made provision to spread bases, equipment and men around to cover 
black population concentrations within both the republic and SWA. New bases were 
strategically placed where internal and external „threats‟ might manifest. From 
approximately 1962, the Combat Groups were supplemented by the creation of “Full 
Time Force Units,” which were strategically placed units made up of already trained 
balloted troops. These were located near the Bantustans and densely black populated 
areas across both the Republic and SWA, besides near border zones, including that of 
SWA. For example: 5 SAI Bn (Infantry Battalion) – Ladysmith; 6 SAI Bn - 
Grahamstown, 7 SAI Bn - Bourkes Luck (Eastern Transvaal) were all contiguous to one 
of Transkei, Ciskei, Kwazulu and Pedi areas. 2 SAI Bn with armour and artillery support 
was located at Walvis Bay, while 8 SAI Bn was based at Upington, along with an 
armoured car regiment and squadrons of the same were stationed at Zeerust and 
Jankempdorp, close to Tswana areas and national border.  
 
Training for infantry and armour was conducted respectively at 1SAI Bn and 1 Special 
Service Battalion in Bloemfontein, with artillery training at 4 Field Regiment in 
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Potchefstroom. Establishment of new SAAF bases followed same pattern: Rooikop at 
Walvis Bay, Pietersberg, Louis Trichardt, and Elliot 69, a sophisticated airfield intended 
to be right on the Transkei northern border. Hoedspruit was set up in the Lowveld so that 





In 1964, the government published the Odendaal report, which confirmed Verwoerd‟s 
cabinet was envisaging the imposition of grand apartheid style homeland planning upon 
SWA.
510
 From an SADF perspective, the report included an analysis of the territory‟s 
demography and other details pertinent to military strategic assessments. Each Combat 
Group was instructed to create a similar report relevant to their location. At the Army 
College during early 1964, a „paper exercise‟ was conducted for the benefit of unit 
commanders as to how the Combat Groups would function if called upon to repel a real 
threat.
511
 By 1 April 1965, a conventional warfare organisational shape was apparent 
within the SADF with the establishment of 7 SA Division, plus 17, 18 and 19 Brigades, 




Fouche had thundered out in early 1962 that “his holy duty (was) to ensure the security of 
South Africa against „the ruthless rapists of democracy…those countries which are the 
fools of Communism”. In the same article, the Cape Argus headlined: “Plan for 33 SA 
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Battalions in four years.”
513
 The press by early 1963 reported large increases in defence 
spending,
514
 the SADF already late the previous year, also made new defence appraisals. 
Grobbelaar presented Fouché with recommendations concerning infrastructural 
improvements on the east coast to bolster defence if the Portuguese lost control of 
Mozambique. This included declaring an exclusively white area, five miles wide, from St 
Lucia Bay to the Mozambique border, making it easier to detect landing by black 
guerrillas.
515





1963, Grobbelaar instructed the Chiefs of Staff to give detailed reports on preparations 
within each of their responsibility areas. If it became necessary to mobilise by the end of 
that year, the Commandant General wanted to specifically ensure that within the 
remaining time a minimum number of units could be activated. Grobbelaar confirmed 
that the preparations purpose was “to meet a possible threat from outside the borders of 
the Republic (that) was not defined and…could not be defined.”
516
 The SADF was 
attempting to confirm that it could respond effectively to any threat perceptions of the 
time, in a country where the white population was continually experiencing some degree 
of tension and uncertainty, both internally and regarding African decolonisation.  
 
These preparations existed alongside press and opposition parliamentary reports that the 
SADF was not actually in good shape. UP MP Bronkhorst alleged in mid-1964 that 
Defence Force arms and ammunition had been “lost” in the Western Transvaal, besides 
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cases of the same being “smuggled” across the Bechuanaland border. While Fouché 
boasted in parliament that the country‟s arms industry could cover all internal needs,
517
 
the parliamentary opposition pointed to Fouché‟s appointment of a Commission of 
Inquiry into aspects of the Defence Force. A report of the Select Committee on Public 
Accounts released information that “contained shocking disclosures of neglect and… 
emphasised the scarcity of manpower (in the SADF)”. There persisted an array of press 
criticism of the Defence Force; for example, the Commando system had long been 
attacked as lackadaisical, whereby members were allegedly able to attend parades as they 
chose, compared to ballotees who were compelled to be present for all relevant duties 
during their compulsory commitment periods of training. Fouché acknowledged that the 





There were also more serious concerns at the highest SADF command level, that vital 
sections of the organisation were not actually ready for war. As further outlined later in 
this chapter, the Mirage jet fighters were not yet fully functional with the radar networks. 
But there were issues of concern with other aircraft too; the proper operation of the new 
SAAF combat acquisitions between 1961 to 1965 of interceptors, light bombers and 
maritime strike aircraft were critical in giving the SADF its most important conventional 
warfare capacity. General Magnus Malan related that during 1965, shortly before 
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Grobbelaar retired, he accompanied the Commandant General on a tour of bases and 
units.  
He (Grobbelaar) wanted to make sure that units of the Defence 
Force to which sufficient time and funds had been allocated, 
were combat-ready. I had to accompany him during his personal 
tours of inspection to act as minuting secretary. This gave me a 
good grasp of the combat-readiness and morale of those units. 
Neither he nor I were impressed with the state of affairs, as many 
deficiencies were brought to light by the inspections.
519
   
 
Malan revealed that Grobbelaar had been anxious to ensure that the instructed upgrading 
of SADF capability and its re-armament been effectively carried out, for apparently, he 
was not convinced of his successor‟s (Hiemstra) capacity to ensure the correct standards 
of combat preparedness. This specific incident, from which the above quote was drawn, 
involved the SAAF‟s Buccaneer and Canberra squadrons, where (according to Malan) 
there were still deficiencies hindering their full operation.
520
 The SAAF 1960s expansion 
was a critical boosting of the SADF‟s conventional warfare combat capacity, but it does 
seem that appearances notwithstanding, there were other barely concealed operational 
problems during the early 1960s. In addition, there were also concerns about the navy‟s 
complete ability to train and operate (see below). By 1966 the SAAF were operating 28 
Sabres jet fighters (with 10-15 in reserve); 20-25 Mirage IIIC and IIIEs, a squadron of 
Canberra light bombers, a squadron of Buccaneers maritime strike aircraft, 8 Shackleton 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 40 helicopters, a range of about thirty or forty transport 
aircraft and very large numbers of Harvard training aircraft (around 250). SAAF 
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personnel were about 3000. The SA Navy with about 2500 personnel operated 2 
destroyers and 6 frigates, 12 minesweepers, a survey ship and several smaller vessels 
(although not all at the same time – at least half the vessels were “mothballed” in reserve 
at any one time). The SA Army had around 71 200 personnel, including 51 500 
commando members. It had about 100 Centurion tanks and other armoured vehicles, 
although these figures for 1966 were not available.
521
 As reiterated above, the biggest 
shifts had come in the SAAF‟s growth and to a lesser extent the number of men available 
for call-up.     
 
However, the reality of SADF preparedness during the early 1960s was that although 
reorganisation took place and much new equipment was hastily purchased; in some 
important respects, the organisation struggled to bring itself up to a standard required to 
resolutely face the conventional warfare threats envisaged. As we note in the second part 
of this dissertation, the balloted conscript system and the treatment of trainees also 
received significant criticism across a cross-section of the white population. However, 
SWA was one specific zone regarding defence, where actual SADF threat perceptions, 
resulted in more than just “paper plans” like the Combat Groups.  
 
SADF counter-strategies for the defence of SWA 
 
The SADF countered UN hostility over SWA with secret plans that mixed paranoia and 
military logic. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the SADF appraisal writers also 
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closely mirrored the theorising of nationalist intellectuals like Scholtz, who took seriously 
the bellicose anti-white South African utterances of Afro-Asian politicians.
522
 Hiemstra 
believed that the UN would eventually lose credibility if it did not succeed in enforcing 
its decisions on SWA. And such could ultimately be in the form of military force. 
Furthermore, Hiemstra held that if internal revolution occurred within South Africa, there 
was an even greater chance of the international body attempting an invasion.
523
 SADF 
planners concluded that the possibility did exist of an attack on SWA by the UN or Afro-
Asian states. Both strategically and logistically, the most obvious point of penetration 
from the sea was at Walvis Bay, being the only deep-water harbour along the SWA coast. 





The establishment of the Walvis Bay military base made provision for it to contain 
components including infantry, armour and artillery, besides a base from where SAAF air 
support would be closely available. Grobbelaar visited the new establishment in February 
1962 and ordered that two six inch coastal defence batteries also be installed, to be 
known as “Namib battery,” with guns dating from World War Two that had been stored 
at Windhoek,
525
 that such obsolete weaponry might at least assist in serving as a visible 
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deterrent for any potential aggressor.
526
 Invasion threats were also taken seriously enough 
by Grobbelaar for him to issue orders for the secret surveying by navy divers of the 
coastline between Cape Cross and Sandwich Harbour, in order to locate the most obvious 
landing grounds. The report noted numerous potential sites for a successful amphibious 
operation
527





An operation plan termed Impala was produced in February 1962 under Director of 
Planning and Operations (DPO) Chief, Combat Gen Nic Bierman, for the defence of the 
South African territory in the Walvis Bay-Rooikop enclave against any coastal invasion 
force that might be landed along that coast.
529
 The assumed enemy was an “international 
force”, probably, but not necessarily, legitimised by the UN. Within the planning 
scenario, the enemy was described as forces drawn from hostile Afro-Asian nations 
attempting an invasion of SWA, who possibly would also have the support of “certain 
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 From June 1962, an exercise was planned for that August, where during 
nine days the army practiced conventional war tactics in the desert with air and naval 
support.
531
  A later report noted that by early 1963 it was also expected that if Afro-Asian 




Although SADF officers were broadly made aware of government concerns regarding 
SWA,
533
 very few were privy to the Walvis Bay defence details, revealed within 
previously classified early 1960s documentation utilized here. For example, in August 
1962, Fouché while addressing Commando officers of Witwatersrand Command, referred 
to the “increasing threats” against the Republic. He referred to the “Councils of the 
World” arguing that force be used to end the South African mandate over SWA. But such 
information was readily available anyway in the press. However, Lt Gen Dutton who was 
involved in the planning acknowledged that at the time, the actual SADF planning to 
defend Walvis Bay and SWA was exceptionally sensitive and confidential.
534
 
Confidentiality was vital from both a military and political viewpoint, the latter obviously 
because of the alarm it would have raised amongst white South Africans. A full-scale 
military defence of SWA from an invading force could have resulted in potential defeat 
and/or very high casualties among the defenders, who would have been white members 
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of the SADF and mostly balloted trainees. The SADF continued to evaluate and update 
their appraisals throughout the first half of the 1960s, conducting training around Walvis 
Bay, without ever publicly stating its actual purpose. Detailed plans were set out for the 
Staff Chiefs of the three SADF services; it was anticipated that any invaders would have 
to follow the same steps, which UDF troops had in 1915, namely capture Swakopmund 
and Walvis Bay, secure harbour facilities (and airfields) and thereafter advance rapidly 
inland to occupy Windhoek. It was expected that an amphibious operation might be 
bolstered by air-transported troops operating from a neighbouring state. It was in this role 
that the SADF surmised Indian intervention might occur from Congo. The SADF 
planners assumed that Portuguese control of their Southern African territories was not 
guaranteed nor that former British colonies in the region would assist any SWA defence 
plan.   
 
The SADF anticipated the sea attack would coordinate with troops airlifted to occupy 
Windhoek and other SWA territory of tactical importance. The amphibious invasion 
force would be at least of brigade strength, but expanded, if required, to division strength 
and supported by at least one aircraft carrier, as the operation would be impractical 
without air cover. Hence, the SADF concern about the Indian navy aircraft carrier 
Vikrant (see previous chapter) The SADF worked on the basis that the invasion would 
occur according to an operational pattern, whereby enemy aircraft would attack airfields 
and shore gun batteries, inhibiting the movement of the Walvis Bay garrison. There could 
be decoy landings to mislead and split the SADF defenders, while one or two invading 











bombardment. The beachhead would be extended - the objective being the seizure of 
Walvis Bay, bringing the harbour facilities into operation for the benefit of the invaders. 
The rest of the invading force would then begin an advance in the direction of 
Windhoek.
535
 The plan as envisaged above, followed typical Western military doctrine of 
a World War Two-type operation.   
 
SADF plans to repel the “invaders” 
 
The documents outlining the SADF strategy to “defeat” the “invaders” are marked “top 
secret” and filed under the name “Operation Olympus”, the Defence Force‟s overall plan 
to defend SWA. The Navy Chief of Staff received instructions to ensure a hydrographical 
investigation to establish likely landing areas between Cape Cross and Sandwich Bay. 
The Army Chief of Staff‟s orders were to halt and destroy any invasion immediately, by 
which 2 SA Infantry Battalion were to trap the enemy on their beachhead, or if this failed, 
to withdraw back into prepared positions to defend the Republican territory around 
Walvis Bay. Harassing operations would be conducted against enemy troops attempting 
to march on Windhoek, besides destroying invaders‟ communication lines to their 
beachhead. Reconnaissance of all roads leading east from possible landing grounds was 
required, with the intention to deny an enemy their usage, with such scouting done in 
secrecy regarding the public.  
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The SADF operational plan indicated that its forces available immediately for repelling 
any amphibious force, consisted of a motorised infantry battalion and the local 
commando; supported by a squadron each of Centurion tanks and armoured cars; one 
battery each of medium artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, besides various forms of 
logistical support. The intended air support was a fighter squadron, a flight of maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft and a flight of helicopters.
536
 Additional air force preparations 
included ensuring the Rooikop airfield could receive SA Airways aircraft with troop 
reinforcements; the stockpiling of aircraft fuel tanks; building protective walls at the base 
against air attacks and the ensuring of enough aircraft weaponry ammunition for three 
sorties per day over seven days. Shackleton maritime reconnaissance aircraft were to be 
moved to Rooikop, while preparations were made for Sabre jet fighters also to be 
stationed there.
537
 An additional air base was later planned inland at Karibib to ensure 
that the Sabres could be available from this point in the event of an UN attack.
538
 While 
the Air Force Chief of Staff was instructed to continue discussions with the airlines 
regarding the acquisition of aircraft for troop transportation, his navy counterpart was 
ordered to ensure arrangements were made for the switching off, if necessary, of 
                                                 
536
 AG GP 4, Box 3, Military Operations, Operation Olympus, File AG/585/3/5, Operasie Plan Impala, 
Letter from KG dated 30 April 1963, Aanhangsel A, AG‟s copy,  Department of Defence Documentation 
Centre, Pretoria. 
537
 KG, GP 5, KG/GPW/1/5/9, Box 324, Operation Olympus, Aanhangsel A by KG/GPW/1/5/9, 
Department of Defence Documentation Centre, Pretoria.  
538
 Interview with Gen M. Malan (Officer Commanding SWA Command in 1966), 7 August 2007. He 











navigational lights and aids along the SWA coast.
539
 The operational plan closed with the 
following stress upon the secrecy of any arrangements.  
All of the above courses of action must occur under the strictest 
secrecy. Any reconnaissance, planning, discussion or actions that 
are considered necessary, must be restricted to the minimum 
number of people, and conducted in complete secrecy.
540
        
 
By early 1965, a navy committee received the task of devising a “common organisation, 
doctrine and procedure for conducting naval gunfire support operations directed against 
land targets and controlled by ground or air observation.” The rationale behind this 
instruction was explained: “The SA Army may be called upon to carry out land 
operations against enemy rebel, insurgent and/or invasionary forces in the coastal area of 




Verwoerd demonstrated something of the contemporary government fears by his 
response to some public correspondence.  Verwoerd had no experience in the military, let 
alone in issues concerning possible guerrilla infiltration or military invasion of the 
Republic. In 1963, he took serious note of an implausible suggestion by a German-
speaking South West African, P.G. Berens of Swakopmund, that the French Foreign 
Legion be invited to assist with any internal uprising, thereby preventing the cost and 
work loss of local men being called up for such service. Behrens referred Verwoerd to a 
press cutting from the Windhoek Zeitung newspaper, speculating upon infiltrators from 
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Angola coming to cause armed uprisings in South Africa. Verwoerd‟s response to Fouché 
was to ask him to refer Berens‟s letter to Justice Minister Vorster, and that: “We must be 




Operation Olympus planning continued in June 1965, with a detailed analysis of 
perceived “Bantu uprising” in the north spreading south to white areas, linked to the 
possibility of it even heightening the supposed external military threat by a UN or Afro-
Asians force. An amphibious attack scenario on SWA was once again mooted, although 
an overland assault from the north was dismissed as unlikely. There was an additional 
concern that such an uprising might occur simultaneously with unrest within the 
Republic, which would impact upon possible SADF troop numbers available for 
commitment to SWA. This detailed documentation confirms that the SADF persisted 
with plans to defend the territory to the mid-1960s.
543
 It was believed that UN 




The Air Defence of the RSA: 1960s Threat perceptions and responses.  
 
Considering the critical decisiveness of air power in warfare, it is important that some 
detailed assessment is attempted in this work regarding SADF perceptions of air defence 
issues and counter strategies applied. Historically the closest South Africa came to an air 
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threat occurred in World War Two when Japanese naval air units probed the Union‟s east 
coastline during mid-1942. The UDF in Durban had struggled to organise adequate air 
defences at short notice against potentially serious threats to the harbour and shipping. 
The Japanese conquests of European Asian colonies prompted the UDF to seize 
Madagascar and Col S.A. Melville, later SADF Commandant General from 1958 to 1960, 
was given charge of the SAAF component of this operation. The Japanese threat receded 
from July 1942, but the UDF remained on Madagascar.
545
 A similar pattern of viewing 
Madagascar as the key to protecting the South African east coast would re-emerge in 
SADF assessments of potential threats during the early 1960s.   
 
South Africa‟s air defence during the early 1960s. 
 
The SADF needed to ensure the protection of the Republic‟s Witwatersrand and Pretoria 
industrial heartland. It acquired from 1961 and in haste, Mirage IIIC interceptors, linked 
to a sophisticated radar network, but it was several years before the entire air defence 
outlay was fully operational.
546
 Grobbelaar reported to Fouché in June 1962 about 
continuing air defence deficiencies. Earlier that year, Fouché had spoken in Parliament 
about South Africa being threatened by Afro-Asian countries, noting that some had 
“received long-range bombers”.
547
 The only African country that actually had any was 
Egypt and these only from 1963; but obviously part of the Arab‟s states arming against 
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Israel. Despite the unlikelihood of these aircraft being employed against South Africa, 
besides the government‟s politicking by emphasising threats, local air defences were 
indeed inadequate. By mid-1962, its reactive capacity comprised the semi-operational 
squadron of Mirages, about three squadrons of obsolete Sabres and the army‟s World 
War Two vintage anti-aircraft artillery. New modern light anti-aircraft guns were on 
order, but this delivery would only be completed by the end of 1964 and in any event, 
would be effective at best against low-flying aircraft.
548
 Grobbelaar acknowledged that 
modernising air defences was expensive and difficult to maintain; but following 
contemporary UK patterns, it would mean the SADF investigating surface to air missiles 
(SAMs). A British study team was despatched to work with the SAAF in establishing 




The purchase of the Mirage IIIs and initial operating difficulties 
 
As stressed, the enlargement of the SAAF‟s combat capacity during the 1960s was the 
most important SADF response in upgrading its conventional warfare capacity. A 
significant air force expansion occurred involving 26 different aircraft types and 
continued through into the mid-1970s.
550
 The first Mirage order went off urgently in 1961 
with the aircraft arriving shortly afterwards, indicative of SADF anxieties that year 
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regarding threats. However, operating Mirage interceptors required expensive 
infrastructure. Former SAAF fighter-pilot, Col Johan Radloff and former SAAF Chief, Lt 
Gen Dennis Earp, explained that an essential part of the whole Mirage project was its 
radar back-up, without which intruding aircraft could not be intercepted. The Mirage 
acquisition was intended as a response to high-flying bombers and the aircraft were fitted 
with an additional rocket motor to boost them up beyond 50 000 feet. The Devon radar 
station was built as integral to an air defence system for detecting intrusion and guiding 
interception. Unlike the Sabres that were comparatively antiquated in operation, Mirage 
ground radar would get aircraft into position for pilots to make the final attack.  
 
The air defence modernisation process radar component was called Operation “Nassau,” 
and implemented from 1962, with surveys conducted for locating the right spots to place 
radar stations. Mariepskop, Ellisras, and Mafeking across the Transvaal Highveld were 
chosen, with Devon (in the middle of Highveld) producing the combined radar picture. 
The radar network was assembled in stages and the entire infrastructure only finally fully 
completed by 1971. The first phase was operational from 1964 and in keeping with Cold 
War worst-case scenarios the Devon complex was built to withstand a nuclear attack.
551
 
Both Earp and Radloff confirmed that the Mirages were not fully operational until the 
late 1960s. The radar equipment came from the British Marconi company, which evaded 
the arms embargo through the legal interpretation of the equipment‟s role as “civilian” or 
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 The publicity of the radar installation and Mirage acquisition was 
presented as evidence that the country air defences were operational, but the white South 
African public, bedazzled by the new Mirages at air shows, did not comprehend that the 
old Sabres continued to be the SAAF frontline interceptor until the radar network was 
completely operational.
553
 In parliament, UP MP Bronkhorst revealed, “the absence of 
radar stations on the ground” and “trained technicians,” alleging that the Mirages were 
therefore “useless”.
554
 When the new radar system first phase was officially opened in 
November 1964, Fouché explained it was part of a deterrent against military aggression 
by any “irresponsible power”, but in reality this was more of a political public relations 
show, than how well the system might actually have functioned then.  
Responding to the specific brief by the SADF regarding perceived air threats, a report 
compiled by three Royal Air Force officers was completed in May 1963,
555
 with the 
threats they envisaged, fitting SADF appraisals that had already outlined concerns  
regarding potential UN/Afro-Asian military intervention:  
(Air threats) on the Transvaal complex by up to twenty bomber 
aircraft…using conventional weapons…with the possibility of 
nuclear weapons later. Attack against the Durban harbour zone 
and the Cape Town/Simonstown complex by up to 20 carrier-
borne aircraft…Attack against any other point on the South 
African coast with forces as for Durban.
556
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SADF commanders believed an “air threat” could be also used as a means of forcing 
internal political change. Although it was acknowledged that no African state, besides 
Egypt, could threaten South Africa from the air, documentation pointed to SADF 
concerns persisting with an “African threat”. This was “based” upon the existence of 
airfields in independent states by 1963 and “hostile intent on the part of the great majority 
of the Afro-Asian and communist nations”.
557
 Indian Air Force operations in Katanga 
with Canberra bombers using 1000lb bombs during late 1961, had demonstrated UN 
readiness to use air power for intervention operations.
558
 SADF concerns also were that 
air personnel and equipment might be assembled within a shorter time than the SADF 
could purchase and implement adequate defences. As the USSR had phased the IL-28 
„Badger‟ and other 1950s bombers out of its armoury, the SADF feared these might be 
passed onto Afro-Asian countries and “volunteers” found to crew them, while aircraft in 
the Indonesian, Indian and Egyptian military service “could be rapidly re-deployed in 
Central Africa.” It was surmised that conventional weapons would initially be employed, 
but that nuclear weapons, if obtained, could also become a factor in a prolonged conflict. 
Strategic targets within the Transvaal industrial complex would be the most obvious. In 
terms of “logistical problems under African conditions,” about twenty aircraft at most, 
operating at a very high altitude, would comprise the attacking bomber force‟s 
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 Such were the official SADF confidential threat perceptions of possible air 
attack in 1963.    
 
Earp and Radloff both confirmed that the envisaged threat was indeed Russian-built 
bombers coming in high (70 000 feet) and fast (Mach Two – twice the speed of sound) 
and that until the Mirage and radar systems were fully functional, the SAAF did not have 
the means to intercept these.
560
 Although SADF air threat perceptions appear highly 
unlikely, if not paranoid, they were reacting to external unknowns, increasing 
international hostility to the South African government and the UN‟s Katanga 
intervention. These factors heightened SADF urgency in responding to what they 
assumed as plausible threats. Documentation utilised is indicative of how isolated and 
threatened the SADF perceived the country to be; the „air threat‟ was understood as real, 
because of intense Afro-Asian hostility to South Africa‟s racial policies. The RAF team 
also recommended the establishment of an air defence operations centre which would 
have immediate access to higher authority, because of the possible political implications 
of emergency decisions.    
 
Air threats to the South African ports and coastline 
 
It was acknowledged within SADF threat appraisals that the “postulation of a potential 
threat from the sea” was unlikely, given African countries incapacity for any significant 
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naval operations. However, references were still made to this being “not beyond the 
bounds of possibility from certain Asian and Communist countries” and that a lack of air 
defences on the coastline: 
may provide the incentive for certain groups to indulge in such 
an adventure. The probability of diplomatic and military 
blackmail, including the use of token or „prestige‟ hit-and-run 
attacks on strategic coastal targets cannot be discounted. While 
the military importance of such raids may be small the political 
effect could be serious.
561
               
 
The report outlined concerns for the defences of the Durban and Cape Town, assuming 
deployment of an attacking aircraft carrier with at least twenty aircraft to establish air 
superiority over a landing area for troops.
562
 If the Mirages were also to cover the ports, 
the acquisition of a second squadron was recommended, because the Witwatersrand was 
assumed to constitute the most important area requiring defence by both aircraft and 
SAMS. It was accepted that Durban, Cape Town and Simon‟s Town also justified 
permanent SAM deployment reinforced by Transvaal based jets. Anti-aircraft artillery 
would also be utilised for the ports defences, although the guns effectiveness was 




                                                 
561
 KG, Gp5, Box 336, KG/GPW/2/3/3, Air Defence, Assessment of Potential Air Threat to South African 
Ports and Transvaal Industrial, Administrative and Military Complex, p. 3, Department of Defence 
Documentation Centre, Pretoria. 
562
 KG, Gp5, Box 336, KG/GPW/2/3/3, Air Defence, Assessment of Potential Air Threat to South African 
Ports and Transvaal Industrial, Admnistrative and Military Complex, pp 3-5, Department of Defence 
Documentation Centre, Pretoria. 
563
 KG, Gp5, Box 336, KG/GPW/2/3/3, Air Defence, Report on the Air Defence of the Republic of South 
Africa: 1963 – 1968 by Air Commodore E.J. Morris (Leader) 3
rd
 to 14 May 1963, p.1, Department of 











By April 1963, the British Military Attaché, Air Commodore F.J. Rump was keeping the 
British Embassy, British Chief of Defence Staff and the Ministry of Defence informed as 
to likely future SADF requirements regarding British arms. The British Labour Party‟s 
parliamentary opposition leader Harold Wilson had questioned continued British arms 
sales to South Africa. After the Labour Party‟s election victory in 1964, the new British 
government, only with the greatest reluctance allowed the final delivery of already 
purchased Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft to the SAAF. After Rump‟s discussions 
with Grobbelaar and “various members of the SA Defence Department”, ground to air 
guided missile systems (of the British Bloodhound or Thunderbird type) were anticipated 





The initial SADF response accepted the RAF recommendations. The Witwatersrand 
complex required, besides the protection of the Mirage squadron, a SAM system of sixty-
four missiles with guiding radar. Durban and Cape Town necessitated the same with 
thirty-three missiles each and an additional Mirage squadron Because of the excessive 
costs of the missiles, which were also quickly rendered obsolete by rapidly changing 
technology, it seemed logical that steps were needed whereby South Africa developed 
self-sufficiency in its own SAM development.
565
 Nevertheless, the government ordered 
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the Bloodhound system, while beginning its own missile program in 1964,
566
 only to 
predictably have its British order refused in January 1965 as the arms embargo and 
isolation tightened.
567
 In December 1965, the outgoing Defence Minister Fouché fumed 
during a speech to the Heidelberg Rapportryers: 
South Africa could not continue to make itself a war target if the 
West was not prepared to supply ground to air missiles to defend 




To some extent, this was all just purely political posturing, for local missile research in 
collaboration with the French was progressing towards the development of the local 
Cactus SAM system unveiled six years later. The SADF had part eluded the UN arms 
embargo, although it was recognised by SAAF experts that the older Bloodhound was 
technically better,
569
 demonstrating that the 1960s arms sanctions was not simply 
“inconvenient,” as Barber suggests,
570
 for the SADF did not always attain its first arms 
preference. In the same breath, despite occasional anti-western rhetoric by South African 
government politicians and threats of the Republic “going it alone”, there was no 
question that the NP wanted to break defence links with traditional allies and suffer total 
isolation in military affairs.      
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Another significant response to any potential air threat from the north at the end of 1964 
was the opening of a new SAAF base in Pietersberg, intended as a location where fighter 
interceptors would be located. Couched typically within the “white unity-speak” of the 
time, State President Swart explained the base‟s purpose: 
Pietersberg has acquired an enhanced status today through it 
becoming here in the north a very strategic bastion (vesting), 
ensuring greater strike power in the event of an attack on our 
Republic. We are a strong country and a bilingual country; I can 
state this morning: Do not panic!
571
  (Moenie panic nie!) (sic)  
  
The new base inauguration was also significant in that for the first time, some of the 
SADF‟s newly acquired weaponry was displayed alongside older equipment. New 
armaments now included British built Canberra light bombers; Mirages; Sabre jets; 
paratroopers dropping from American built C130 „Hercules‟ transport aircraft (the 
SAAF‟s latest in air lift capacity); besides demonstrations of artillery and air-
transportation of light armour, including the newly acquired French Panhard armoured 
cars.
572
 According to a DMI report from August 1965, air-defence concerns remained 
part of SADF threat perceptions. It was reiterated that since 1960 as a consequence of 
political developments in Africa, potential enemy airfields had moved closer to the 
RSA‟s borders. Modern transport planes had also been supplied to some African states, 
including Nigeria and Tanzania. DMI surmised that although there was no immediate 
danger, potential enemy capability still meant consideration was needed, that (African) 
air forces could be shifted into northern airfields and present a threat. The article referred 
to the recent acquisition of Mirage jets as deterrents and made recommendations 
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regarding further strengthening air defences, including looking at the financial 




By 1965, the UN “Unit on Apartheid” for the UN‟s Department of Political and Security 
Council Affairs, detailed in a report the strengths and expenditures of the SA military. It 
noted that early warning detection radar supplied by the British Marconi company had 
been erected in the Transvaal. Also recorded (incorrectly) was that by 1966, a large 
SAAF base was opened at Pietersburg with a squadron of Sabre jets and three new radar 
units.
574
 (indicated above the base was already operational by late 1964.
575
) Significantly, 
this UN report mentioned the establishment of a SAAF base at Mpacha in the eastern 
Caprivi Strip of Namibia, described by President Kaunda as a „threat‟.
576
 The “Unit on 
Apartheid” had been established by the Secretariat of the UN to assist the General 
Assembly resolution 2144 A (XXI) of 26 October 1966, which intended to ensure 
“maximum publicity” of apartheid via “special studies on the policy”.
577
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The SA Navy‟s envisaged role in global war: National defence versus international 
commitments    
 
Post-Republic SADF threat perceptions and responses were also reconsidered in terms of 
the Simon‟s Town Agreement, with its emphasis upon the SA Navy cooperating with the 
West. Fouché reiterated at the end of 1962 that the navy would work with the SAAF in 
combating any submarine threat off the coast, besides repelling any amphibious invasion 
force.
578
 By March 1963, the navy‟s commanders were attempting to find a balance 
between attending to both national defence needs and commitments to allies during a 
global war. The assumption was „enemy‟ action would be “based upon the African 
Continent” and “Madagascar.” But particularly feared scenarios were the possibility of a 
South African harbour falling into enemy hands and/or losing their control of RSA 
territorial waters, which would require “offensive mining”. In terms of planning between 
the British and South Africans, NATO merchant ships were to be diverted to „safe areas‟ 
after any nuclear exchange in the Northern Hemisphere;  South Africa was one such 
designated „safe area.‟ It was anticipated was that as many as a thousand commercial 
vessels could congregate around the ports. The SADF expected that a conventional 
submarine threat could also develop, meaning the emergency anchorages would require 
protection from this. No plan existed, according to the SA Navy, on the part of Britain or 
other NATO countries to assist in mining or other protection of open merchant shipping 
anchorages, outside of those in the anticipated European war theatre.
579
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In terms of the Simon‟s Town Agreement, the SADF in 1963 was still an integral part of 
Allied defence planning to ensure Western shipping security off the Republic‟s coast. 
The protection of Table Bay would require over six thousand mines and it would take 
thirty days to lay them using one large ship, for the Republic‟s ports during war could not 
be devoid of such elementary defences. The document utilized here, for example, cited 
the appalling consequences if a loaded tanker in the middle of Table Bay was attacked 
and exploded. The recommendation was that the navy acquired as soon as possible a 
specialised mining vessel, that mines were to be stockpiled and a specialised navy mining 
and mine-countermeasures school be established.
580
    
 
British documentation confirms that war plans existed which the SA Navy had prepared 
in conjunction with the Royal Navy (RN), referring to co-ordinated control of shipping 
during war, “in an area which includes the South African Strategic Zone”. Since World 
War Two, the SA Navy remained integrated into British global strategy as “custodians of 
the Cape Sea Route”. The South African fleet, “in accordance with British strategy…was 
an anti-submarine and convoy force that operated ships designed for the imperial role of 
Britain, rather than for the maritime requirements of a small developing country”.
581
 As 
part of the “world-wide dispersal plan,” specifically intended for RN use, were 2000 tons 
of armament stores and equipment for merchant ships located at the SADF Ganspan 
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magazine and 500 tons at Simon‟s Town. The Shell depot in Cape Town had large stocks 
of fuel oil for the RN, while naval radio stations in the Cape Peninsula and the Cape east 





SADF documentation further expands upon the naval scenarios anticipated for the 
Republic during a global war. When Grobbelaar instructed SADF General Staff in 1963 
to prepare mobilisation plans, Rear Adm H. Biermann drew his report within the context 
long collaborated upon with the British. These envisaged virtually all the SA Navy‟s 
ships being seaworthy and battle-ready within ten weeks. 
583
 In reality, however, such 
rapid naval mobilisation would have been unlikely, unless a deteriorating international 
situation had already long prompted prior action.
584
 The navy‟s biggest problem was an 
acute shortage of manpower. Biermann felt it necessary to raise this detail in the report, 
because it was understood that world conflict would provide little chance for the orderly 
calling-up and training of reserves. Because of merchant ships off the sub-continent 
during war racing for South African ports, “the navy‟s most important contribution in 
(the) first stage of a nuclear war would be…protection (and)…fleet control over these 
ships.” 
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Biermann referred to other SA Navy roles being the “detection and destruction of enemy 
warships; the interception of enemy commercial vessels”; “strong control enforced upon 
all (commercial) ships to prevent sneak attacks, mutinies and unauthorised landing and 
movements.” He reiterated that navy personnel deficiencies were “dangerous” in terms of 
envisaged requirements
585
 and insisted this would necessitate the vigorous recruitment of 
women.”
586
 Biermann also emphasised to Grobbelaar that national defence be considered 
as equally important to any assistance rendered to South Africa‟s allies and that these two 
components would have to be balanced during a war situation where the Suez Canal 
would be potentially closed. During a global conflict, the SA Navy would have 
responsibility for the routing (including convoys) and protection of all shipping in the 
South Africa maritime area. Defensive minefields would also therefore be needed at 
Durban and minesweepers deployed there too.
587
   
 
Biermann‟s navy mobilisation scenarios are also indicative of the SADF‟s global 
strategic uncertainties in the Cold War era and evidence that the Defence Force was still 
strongly drawn and orientated towards working within western defence planning. Yet as 
has been shown, the navy and rest of the SADF also completed entirely separate 
preparation for their solo defence of SWA and Republic against possible international 
threats. Therefore SADF planning bizarrely straddled two entirely separate possibilities 
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of being both part of western defence in global war and as an isolated pariah, defending 
the Republic or SWA against possible international intervention.  
 
However the reality of how prepared the navy was during the early 1960s, suggested that 
some of their planning occurred within limitations already existing through political 
isolation. There was already the issue of the SAN‟s personnel shortages, but there were 
also intimations that the navy might not be able to perform its war role properly. After 
Capex exercises during mid- 1964, UP MP Bronkhorst alleged that navy ships would be 
incapable of defending themselves from air attacks; that there were inadequate trained 
personnel to handle its sophisticated equipment; not enough ammunition for the exercises 
and too few training programs. Bronkhorst‟s colleague, MP Vause Raw inquired how 
many of the men instructed in Britain to use the “electronics on South Africa‟s new ships 
were still in the navy?”
588
 While naval ammunition continued to be supplied from Britain 
after the 1963 arms embargo, the SADF was forced to stockpile in anticipation of this 
source being closed. Shortages verified by British documentation confirm that sales of 
larger calibre shells to the SA Navy were terminated from July 1965,
589
 but the UK 
embargo was also extended to lighter gun types as well as anti-submarine mortar 
projectiles for the new frigates.
590
 By December 1966, ammunition deficiencies were 
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even more critical, with navy gun-crew training not being adequately completed.
591
 
Official reports on the quality of training and objectives achieved during the “Capex 64” 
exercises were less condemnatory than suggested above; but SA Navy/RN links were 
clearly loosening
592
 and disgruntled SADF members were making private report-backs to 
the parliamentary opposition. Fouché referred in parliament to Biermann‟s plans 
regarding replenishment of personnel shortages during war, but Bronkhorst had sensed 
significant government uncertainties regarding defence, remarking that the country‟s war 
capacity was not as demonstrably strong as the NP liked to project. Bronkhorst accused 
Fouché of being reluctant to involve the parliamentary opposition appropriately in 
defence matters, by refusing to establish a “special Parliamentary Select Committee on 
defence matters,” meaning, as he put it, “South Africa could ….face an emergency as 
unprepared as she had been at the start of World War II”.
593
         
 
While the navy struggled with its manpower problems
594
 there remained a determination 
by the SADF to ensure the maximum peacetime fleet capacity,
595
 despite the financial 
cost, arms boycotts and increased international isolation. By September 1964, there were 
as many as five frigates and destroyers jointly operational, the most in the SA Navy‟s 
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history, reflective of the uncertainties facing the Verwoerd government and possible 
demands on its armed forces.
596
 But the SADF were looking with concern at their ability 
to ensure the kind of reconnaissance and maritime combat capability that future 
circumstances might dictate. In a document entitled supplementation to the Navy Chief of 
Staff‟s Memorandum 1, read at a General Staff meeting on 15/16 January 1964, the 
complexities of the Navy‟s maritime air support needs, revealed something of senior 
military officers thinking regarding possible threats.
597
 It was acknowledged that the navy 
stood at a crossroads between its responsibilities regarding the defence of the Republic 
and its wider obligations in terms of the Simon‟s Town Agreement, concerning the 
protection of the sea-route around Southern Africa. The navy‟s operational capacity 
largely comprised it being equipped for counteracting enemy submarines and mines. The 
concern was that in the event of a global nuclear war, even if the RSA was not a 
combatant, there was the expected armada of commercial ships entering South African 
waters. Since the 1961 Republic declaration and South Africa‟s departure from the 
Commonwealth, the SADF General Staff were now considering other military threats 
besides contradictions with existing defence arrangements. The document under 
reference suggested that the defence of the sea routes during a global war did not warrant 
a higher priority than national defence, which more narrowly encompassed the protection 
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Nevertheless, despite some navy officers calling for South African maritime interests 
first, the navy continued exercising alongside the RN throughout the 1960s and into the 
early 1970s. The government were determined to maintain its one international defence 
alliance and therefore accepted an enlarged role in sea defence, hoping the formal 
revision of the Simon‟s Town Agreement by 1967, would also mean the British at least 
re-supplying naval equipment. British documentation shows that the SADF approached 
the UK Ministry of Defence with negotiations regarding the replacement of their five 
World War Two vintage frigates and destroyers, besides their two fleet minesweepers. 
The possibility of a South African subsidiary of Yarrow ship-builders was mooted to 
build vessels locally. Negotiations also began for the supplying of the SAAF with twenty 
maritime patrol aircraft, besides sixteen anti-submarine helicopters, ship-launched guided 
missiles and tank spares. This document confirmed that the United States government 




But the British government balanced the political disadvantages of selling the South 
Africans any military equipment against the likely diplomatic clashes with African states. 
In the British government‟s opinion, their relations with the Commonwealth and other 
Third World states outweighed any strategic considerations of further assisting the 
SADF. Such was the British decision, despite bluster in February 1968 by defence 
                                                 
599
 UK National Archives, DEFE 24/256, letter dated 15 February 1967, from O.J. Porter of Ministry of 











minister P.W. Botha, that in time of war, the South African government would only make 




Maritime air strike capability 
 
Further ensuring deterrence against any conventional military attack on the republic from 
the UN or any other power, regarding South Africa‟s race policies or its control of SWA, 
the SADF tried to prepare itself in accordance with its own threat appraisals that 
postulated an amphibious task force assault. Referring to the necessity of maritime air 
defence requirements for supporting the navy regarding national defence, the 
recommendation from the Navy Chief of Staff‟s Memorandum at a General Staff meeting 
on 15/16 January 1964, listed the following conditions envisaged as necessary for a large-
scale amphibious landing by Afro-Asian forces. Assuming that such an attack had to have 
the occupation of a harbour as a critical objective, it would also require adequate air 
support. An aircraft carrier was therefore essential and Durban was considered the most 
likely target. Another worst-case scenario was the possibility of Mozambique falling into 
„enemy hands‟ with Lourenco Marques only three hundred miles from Durban, 
601
 while 
attacks might also be directed at the destruction of naval bases at Simon‟s Town or 
Durban. Such an “invasion” would require a brigade strength landing force, transported 
by a task force of some twenty seven to thirty seven ships, including an aircraft carrier, a 
cruiser, six to eight frigates and destroyers, two to three submarines, escorting troop 
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transport ships and provisioning tankers. It was reasoned that the assembly of such a 
force was within the capability of Afro-Asian countries,
602
 but could not happen secretly 





The documentation utilized stressed that the SA Navy did not possess the capacity to 
intercept such a force, but would be entirely dependent upon maritime air support. 
Working on a warning period of three days, with the enemy progressing at a rate of 
fifteen knots a day, the task force would need to be brought to battle within a line a 
thousand sea miles from the coast.
604
 A memorandum dated 17 April 1964 and signed by 
Col. J.G. Willers, General Staff Officer (Air), was forwarded onto Grobbelaar 
concerning: “A maritime air support policy for the SAAF and SAN”, in response to the 
document referred to above. The assessment on successfully responding to the task force 
scenario was accepted as: 
Maritime strike aircraft are required to bring the enemy to battle 
whilst at sea in order to defeat the invasion before landing in 
order to retain the initiative.
605
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Maj Gen Phil Pretorius reiterated that the possibilities of a Soviet threat were also 
discussed amongst the SADF defence community and that “paper exercises” were 
arranged around this perception. It was also considered feasible that Africa could be some 
kind of “stand-off” point for a landward invasion. Therefore the Soviet “Order of Battle”; 
namely, how their military were organized when on the offensive was studied by SADF 
military intelligence. Pretorius explained in detail that SADF planning he was involved in 
during the early 1960s had also taken into account the scenario of a task force attacking 
the country. If it had involved an aircraft carrier, it would have to be neutralized through 
weaponry that could punch well above its weight.
606
 There is little doubt that the decision 
to purchase of submarines (1963) and the Buccaneer strike aircraft (arriving in late 1965) 
was partly motivated by the SADF wanting to ensure it possessed a deterrent to any 
amphibious assault upon SWA or the Republic.   
 
In assessing how seriously the government responded to these perceived threats, by mid-
1964, the expensive contract signed with the British government for the supply of thirty-
two Buccaneer jets was itself under threat. The Buccaneer was the best low level 
maritime strike aircraft available at the time to western countries and their allies. Its 
remarkable capacity for shipping strikes was well known and the Royal Fleet Air Arm 
had already worked on scenarios of attacking the Soviet-built Indonesian Navy 
cruisers.
607
 In May 1963, Fouché referred to the purchase of Buccaneers as an additional 
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means of repelling any ship attempting to land troops on the South African coastline.
608
 
The British Labour Party government elected in mid-November 1964 determined to 
enforce all aspects of the UN arms embargo. After tense discussions with the Verwoerd 
government over the already existing Buccaneer contract and delivery,
609
 the first (and 
only) fifteen aircraft, finally arrived in Pretoria under World War Two veteran Comdt 
Bob Rogers,
610
 while the additional sixteen aircraft delivery was cancelled by the UK 
government in their stricter compliance with the UN‟s decision.   
 
Research has suggested that the SAAF Buccaneers were also purchased because of their 
versatility to operate equally against land and sea targets.
611
 Rear Adm Chris Bennett 
thought that the Buccaneers order might have been planned as early as the late 1950s due 
to pressure by the British government on the SADF to include some kind of affordable 
maritime surface strike capability.
612
 Former Buccaneer pilot Brig Gen Theo de Munnik 
considered the fact that the squadron was based at Waterkloof, Pretoria, a “mid-way point 
between coast and northern borders,” might be viewed as an indication that the aircraft 
were intended to serve both land and sea strike roles.
613
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The decision to purchase submarines for the SA Navy 
 
A significant maritime weapon acquisition where its conventional warfare intention was 
indisputable for both deterrence and aggressive actions was the SA Navy acquiring a 
submarine capability. According to Wessels, South African cabinet approval for a 
submarine purchase was granted in 1964, after Biermann and Grobbelaar motivated for 
the vessels as a fundamental part of the navy‟s operational needs. Wessels deduces that 
the decision to purchase the submarines was based upon them constituting a strategic 
deterrent at a time of growing political isolation for the Republic. 
614
 British 
documentation demonstrates clearly that the SADF were contemplating a submarine 
purchase as early as April 1963 for acquisition from UK sources.
615
 The SA Navy 
reasons for acquiring submarines would therefore be directly connected to SADF threat 
perceptions of the period, concerning possible task force attacks, although no specific 
document was obtained detailing any appraisal calling for a submarine fleet to be added 
to the navy. However, there appears little doubt that the decision to acquire submarines 
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Less than twenty years before the 1960s, German submarines had created havoc amongst 
Allied shipping off the Cape and Natal coasts, reinforcing within both public mindsets 
and SADF thinking, as to how strategic and vulnerable the Cape Sea Route appeared. The 
SA Navy‟s submarine purchase can also be explained as a further extension of the navy‟s 
fleet expansion under the Simon‟s Town Agreement. Fouché had formally announced the 
submarine acquisition plans in May 1965 without giving further details.
617
 Cabinet 
minutes dated 26 February 1964, included notes detailing that the government had 
already decided to sound out the US military over their willingness to sell the RSA three 
submarines.
618
 Submarines provided a very powerful striking capacity in relation to their 
size and cost. Within the context of the Cold War, they were a very significant weapon 
indispensable to any balanced naval fleet arsenal. Their presence also ensured that the 
requisite nation could, if deemed necessary, use their submarines to impose their will in 
defence issues on own terms, by possession of a powerful deterrent against large ship 
borne forces. 
619
    
 
Comdr (later Rear Adm) Martin Kramer was the senior officer in the submarine project 
of the 1960s. He recalled that a US diplomat or envoy once remarked aside to him once, 
that the SA Navy's submarine capacity had prevented immediate American consideration 
of extreme action by the USA against the Republic, regarding international community 
pressure of apartheid being considered a „threat to world peace‟. Kramer felt it was not 
entirely clear whether the submarine acquisition was intended as a potential deterrent 
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against a possible amphibious invasion force (he mentioned India in this regard), or 
whether the submarines constituted part of a „balanced fleet,‟ which the SA Navy had 
lacked in the 1950s and 60s. Before Republic, the assumption was that the RN would 
perform any role required by submarines and the possibility that naval links with the 
British would diminish, might remove any ready „friendly‟ submarine capability.
620
      
 
However, it is clear that more urgent threat deterrent concerns were in the minds of 
Biermann and Grobbelaar when they persuaded Fouché to confirm the submarine 
purchases. However unlikely they may have been in reality, threats of an UN/Afro-Asian 
amphibious force to SWA or the Republic, required a deterrent that the SA Navy could 
not provide with its lightly armed surface ships. SADF investigations of British 
submarine designs were confounded by the 1963 UN Mandatory Arms Embargo and the 
Labour Party‟s election victory; the SA Navy representatives therefore decided upon the 
French „Daphne‟ class submarines recently brought into service with the French Navy. 
These vessels were well-developed for locating and destroying surface vessels, but also 
were adapted for reconnaissance, information gathering, mine-laying and clandestine 
landing of special forces;
621
 it was in the latter role that the submarines would be used 
increasingly from 1972.
622
 Agreement reached during April and June 1967, between the 
South African government and the French Dubigeon-Normandie shipyard at Nantes, 
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which ensured the construction of three submarines ordered.
623
 In a South Africa where 
„militarization‟ amongst the white community had shifted considerably since the early 
1960s, the submarine announcement received significant publicity.        
 
Unconventional warfare threats to SWA and RSA by 1966-68: Counter-strategies 
implemented  
 
 By 1966, reports of potential South West Africa People‟s Organisation (SWAPO) 
insurgency was viewed by the SADF as forerunners of guerrilla activity and likely to lead 
towards an unconventional warfare penetration of SWA, along the similar lines as 
occurring in the sub-continent‟s other white ruled states. Army Chief Maj Gen C. A. 
Fraser identified Col Magnus Malan as the candidate best suited for the important 
appointment of SWA Command head and requested Commandant General Hiemstra to 
release Malan from his work as Commandant General Secretary. Malan was undoubtedly 
being groomed towards moving up the SADF senior ranks, for from 1967, he was invited 
to join the Broederbond.
624
 Malan occupied the SWA post during 1966 to 1968; he 
explained that because the Defence Force had long anticipated revolutionary guerrilla 
activities by SWAPO, there was time to prepare a response. Courses on revolutionary 
warfare, as expounded by Mao Zedong were taught at SWA Command, while counter-
insurgency warfare was also stressed in local training. Malan considered his years of 
command in SWA particularly significant in the training of counter-insurgency 
techniques to officers residing in the territory. This resulted, according to Malan, by the 
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end of this command period there being more anti-guerrilla expertise within SWA 




By September 1966, unconventional warfare via infiltration by SWAPO, PAC or ANC 
guerrillas was perceived as the most „likely threat‟, but this kind of “revolutionary 
warfare,” where insurgents attempted to ignite a “people‟s war” amongst the population 
had completely failed by that time. State security clampdowns; white South African 
refusal to hand over political power; the lack of politicisation amongst the black 
population; but perhaps most important of all, the Republic‟s “buffer zone” of white 
controlled states, rendered effective infiltration virtually impossible.
626
 Contemporary 
intelligence reports affirmed the latter whereby „enemy bases‟ could not be established in 
neighbouring territories. It was considered unclear what the reaction of the “indigenous 
population” would be in the event of “large-scale terrorism”, but without any bases, 
guerrilla attacks were severely hindered.
627
 Military intelligence speculated that some 
geographical factors possibly favoured insurgents (the proximity of homelands and 
neighbouring states) while others might advantage state security forces (larger white 
population and terrain not entirely suitable for guerrilla warfare). The report utilised here 
referred to the need for a full interdepartmental appreciation of the internal situation 
                                                 
625
 Malan, M., My Life with the South African Defence Force , pp 46-49.    
626
 As briefly summarized by Jacobs, C.J. (Dr), The Forward Defence Strategy of the South African 
Defence Force, a paper distributed at the 5
th
 War and Society in Africa Conference, “The Second World 
War, Armed Forces and Southern Africa from 1939 to the Present, SA Military Academy, Saldanha, 12-15 
September 2006, pp 1-2. (Published in Border War 1966-1989 A Special Edition of the Journal for 
Contemporary History, Vol. 31, No.3. December 2006). 
627
  HSI AMI, GP3, Box 430, Hoof van Verdegigingsstaf, Aanvulende Militêre Inligtingsrapport, 











where all the country‟s vulnerabilities could be identified.
628
  Overall, the security 
situation concerning potential guerrilla intrusions registered little alarm, with short 
reference to “limited infiltration of trained terrorists and saboteurs from Zambia through 
to Caprivi/Bechuanaland,” besides, “recently a well-armed group infiltrated through 
South-Angola to SWA”.
629
 The latter referred to a SWAPO base established 
clandestinely at Ongulumbashi in Ovamboland that the SA Police, with covert SADF 
support, had attacked and destroyed it on 28 August 1966
630
 and already during that year, 
the SADF had moved into the Caprivi Strip conducting exercises.
631
 Part of the military 
strategy was to close down the Kazangula Zambezi River crossing to guerrillas; this 





The appointment of P.W. Botha as Minister of Defence 
 
Magnus Malan suggested that Verwoerd had appointed Botha to the defence portfolio 
from May 1966, possibly because of the latter‟s proven organization skills. Although no 
documentary evidence was found as to exactly why Fouché was moved to another 
cabinet position, it was probably a variety of reasons. Hiemstra remarked that Fouché‟s 
shifting across to the agricultural portfolio better suited his “nature and knowledge” and 
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“his advanced years were a disadvantage”.
633
 The intimations are there existed both 
political and portfolio demand considerations that were beyond Fouché, in addition, 
because defence needs were constantly changing, significant SADF re-organisation was 
envisaged. Malan thought that Botha‟s appointment might have also been Verwoerd‟s 
strategy to bolster his Cape NP support.  Malan recalled that Botha had on his accession 
to the defence portfolio, remarked to him that Vorster as Justice Minister was very 
concerned about defence issues.
634
 Botha who before Defence had occupied the Coloured 
Affairs portfolio was a politician on the rise. After first arriving in Parliament in 1948, he 
had been elected unopposed in the George constituency during the March 1966 elections. 
Verwoerd‟s first choice had been the veteran politician Ben Schoeman, who declined and 
suggested Botha as a better alternative. A few days after the election, Verwoerd pressed 
the position on Botha, who according to his biographer accepted it with some reluctance, 




General Fraser‟s concept of “Revolutionary War” 
 
 From the mid-1960s, there was increased interest within the SADF regarding counter-
insurgency operations and concepts of revolutionary warfare. As early as March 1965, 
Grobbelaar requested that a set of textbooks, forwarded to him personally by the 
Portuguese military Chief of Staff, be translated into Afrikaans as a matter of priority. 
Grobbelaar was assured by the Portuguese Military Attaché, Lt Col Gravito that the 
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material (entitled “O Exercito na Guerra Subversiva”) was based on Portuguese African 
military experience.
636
 Counter-insurgency and combating guerrilla warfare had been 
integral to SADF training for some years. However, it was Lt Gen C.A. (Pops) Fraser, the 
Commander of Joint Combat Forces (JCF) from 1967, who promoted an influential study 
of guerrilla warfare entitled: Lessons learnt from Past Revolutionary Wars, later revised 
as Revolutionary Warfare: Basic Principle‟s of Counter Insurgency.
637
 Fraser was 
concerned as to how the subject pertained to South African defence in terms of threat 
appraisals.  
 
This change in doctrinal approach slowly phased out some of the confusion that had 
arisen amongst SADF commanders during the 1960s, over differences in opinion whether 
they were preparing specifically for conventional war or for combating guerrillas.
638
 As 
late as 1966, the overall combat doctrine taught in the South African Army‟s staff college 
was still British in origin.
639
 Fraser was instrumental in beginning a process, whereby the 
SADF started developing its own doctrines for South African circumstances. Although 
military exercises encompassed both “types” of warfare, based principally upon French 
and British experiences, Fraser gave a more detailed strategic outline, concerning what he 
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believed were the effective means in dealing with insurgency. Fraser‟s work was 
translated into Portuguese, being confidentially passed across for their use; his 
acknowledgments at the publication‟s start noting the translator wanted to keep his name 
anonymous.
640
       
 
Before Fraser‟s involvement directed Botha towards contemporary military studies, the 
prolific publishing military historian, Neil Orpen
641
 had already published a number of 
articles concerning contemporary South African defence issues in both Commando and 
the press. Botha‟s biography mentions Orpen‟s book, Total Defence being referred to the 
minister, where Orpen explained that South Africans were overestimating their 
conventional military strength and any invading force with “great power backing” would 
have vast air power and numerical superiority over the SADF. Orpen therefore postulated 
the idea of a “Nation-in-Arms” and “Total Defence” in which the Boer Commando 
tradition would be extended into organized and specially trained commando units, 
conducting irregular warfare in support of the SADF‟s conventional units.
642
   
 
However, it was Fraser‟s work that made the bigger impact on Botha. By 1968, Fraser 
had successfully started to disseminate his writings on revolutionary warfare and counter-
insurgency within the SADF. Already in December 1967, Fraser had broadcast two talks 
on Springbok radio on the topic and transcripts of these were published a few months 
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 Fraser had spent time in France as a military attaché, where he 
studied French strategist André Beaufre‟s concepts that conflated the interests of state 
and nation, implying that combating an internal enemy required full mobilisation of all 
the state‟s governmental resources. Fraser organised lectures on Strategic Studies at the 
SADF Staff College in 1968, the first time such had ever occurred; introducing officers 
including then Brig Magnus Malan to Beaufrian thinking. He was assisted in these talks 
by Deon Fourie, who in his book dealing with African states military capabilities, also 
drew attention to Beaufre‟s 1965 writings, Introduction to Strategy.
644
 Fraser‟s work was 
studied by P.W. Botha and senior SADF officers and his theories would significantly 
influence the Defence Force thinking. Young PF officers like McGill Alexander received 
copies of his book for study
645
 and ambitious members like Malan embraced Fraser‟s 
concepts with enthusiasm. At a time when the most senior SADF commanders were still 
wedded to military doctrines based on World War Two experience and lessons, Fraser 
influenced the beginnings of a markedly different approach. Fraser demonstrated an 
intellectual approach to military affairs that at the time was rare amongst senior SADF 
officers and was decorated in 1969 for his contribution to defence.
646
 (See illustrations) 
Seegers outlines the aspects of Beaufrian thinking that interested Fraser, but is less 
concerned with the contributions of different SADF personnel, or the extent to which  
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Fraser changed the SADF commanders‟ mindset away from World War Two orientated 
doctrine. 
 
1967: The SADF begins to attain clandestine battle experience  
 
From 1967, the SADF had secretly taking steps to ensure that select groups of troops 
were being battle-hardened in other southern African conflicts. According to Peter Stiff, 
the Army Chief, Lt Gen Willem Louw, despite Hiemstra‟s disinterest in the creation of 
special forces, permitted Jan Breytenbach taking twelve 1 Parachute Battalion members 
to attend a Rhodesian Special Air Services course. Already the South African Police 
(SAP) was operating in Rhodesia, after the first ANC MK detachments had accompanied 
ZAPU guerrillas in August 1967 across the Zambezi. The ANC guerrillas had intended to 
infiltrate through Botswana and move towards the Transvaal. This South African 
assistance was accepted by the Rhodesian government for potential political advantages, 
but reluctantly so by their security force chiefs, 
647
 with the SAP units sometimes being 
derided by their allies for inexperience.
648
 The SAP used SA Army paratroopers for 
„shadowing‟ their patrols, with these SADF members accompanying to add military 
expertise. This arrangement, however, only occurred with the first contingent of police 
due to professional tensions between police and army. SADF paratroopers also shadowed 
the police in the Caprivi Strip during the same year and were occasionally seconded to 
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Portuguese units and Rhodesian SAS during the mid to late 1960s.
649
 SAP involvement in 
military counter-insurgency operations in both SWA and Rhodesia was partly a 
consequence of security police chief Hendrik Van den Bergh‟s long-standing friendship 
and influence with Prime Minister Vorster. Other assistance to Rhodesian security forces 
included the use of SAAF helicopters, along with the pilots and ground crew.
650
 Other 
SADF entities were involved too in Rhodesia at this early stage: correspondent Willem 
van der Berg, who was a conscript from 1967 and served in the Signal Corps as a junior 
officer found himself with the SADF in Rhodesia during this period, in support of other 




During 1968, Lt Gen Dennis Earp, later the SAAF Chief, as a was major appointed to the 
air force component at Rundu, working with Fraser on the air side of operations. Earp 
was interested in Fraser‟s philosophy of counter-insurgency/revolutionary warfare which 
he viewed as an entirely different approach from the Portuguese, who used conventional 
warfare-type logic in their campaigns against guerrillas. Earp commented that the 
Portuguese officers were often of high quality, but conscripts had long tours of duty and 
were not trained to operate in small groups, unlike the South African and Rhodesian 
forces. Therefore, the Portuguese sometimes avoided large areas, with their 1960s anti-
guerrilla strategy being based upon the principle that if „adequate‟ military forces were 
committed, then such would ensure success. Fraser was committed to his ideas of 
counter-insurgency, but Earp believed that in terms of spreading Fraser‟s Beaufrian 
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approaches to countering revolutionary warfare, it was difficult at the time to coordinate 
military activities with other government departments.   
 
From 1968, the SAAF were directly involved in also assisting the Portuguese in Angola 
through helicopter support, this being entirely clandestine regarding the South African 
public. During October that year, Earp witnessed indiscriminate Portuguese attacks on 
local population groupings viewed as having harboured guerrillas, which he objected to 
and succeeded in getting his views heard by higher authority. Such Portuguese “tactics” 
were entirely opposite to the “win the peoples‟ hearts and minds” strategies of 
successfully countering revolutionary warfare. Earp believed that Fraser‟s ideas were not 
always appreciated, but he agreed that Fraser had considerable influence upon P.W. 
Botha and others in government. Fraser‟s counter revolutionary strategy was to become 




Conscription by the end of 1967     
 
The first intake of white trainees under the new conscription came in during 1968; an 
important counter strategy in itself was this boosting of SADF manpower. Criticism of 
the previous ballot system was outlined in Commando earlier that year, along the lines 
that Hiemstra had attacked it eight years earlier. The tone of conservatism as espoused by 
the SADF is vividly evident in this Commando report on a Transvaal Scottish parade of 
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members that would have been part of the final balloted draft at the end of 1967. 
Accompanied by senior PF members Maj Gen Van der Riet and Brig P. L. De Lange, 
Hiemstra presented new colours to the regiment.  
it was satisfying to see how keenly their traditions are being 
preserved by the young men who are on parade. Beyond all 
doubt these constitute a fine body of men and, as a Citizen Force 
unit, the battalion must rank among the best. The public enjoy 
military parades and should be given more tattoos, trooping 
colours, beating retreats and demonstrations of their efficiency 
and skill. Not only would they stimulate national pride but they 
would also counter the despondency that has grown over the 
beatniks, hippies and other human oddities that prowl our city 
streets and haunt coffee bars.
653
       
 
It is no coincidence that the tone of this Commando article represented such a marked 
disdain regarding manifestations of western youth cultures, which were now also evident 
amongst some young white English South Africans. 1968 was globally a tumultuous year 
of often violent student protests, while the SADF were being projected by Commando as 
providing an alternative socialising experience, namely that of national service, which 
asserted a white South Africa military traditionalism. This could be ensured just as 
efficiently within the milieu of a traditional „English‟ regiment like the Transvaal 
Scottish, as within the Afrikaner dominated army, which now managed the majority of 
the increased trainee numbers. Establishing the state‟s role in drawing all components of 
society into the defence of the nation was part of the kind of counter-insurgency 
theorising, which Fraser‟s writings had stressed. This pattern would greatly accentuate in 
the future with P.W. Botha and Gen Magnus Malan‟s concepts of „Total Strategy‟.            
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The SADF retained a perspective of its possible role in a global war, based largely upon 
naval defence according to pre-arranged planning with the British government. By the 
mid-1960s, the expanded SA Navy were suffering deficiencies in both men and 
equipment, but it did not find the British government forthcoming in any reneging upon 
their decision to support the 1963 UN mandatory arms embargo. Despite protestations by 
the South African government and their threats to abandon the Simon‟s Town 
Agreement, this never occurred during the 1960s. The final parting of the ways between 
Royal and South African navies lingered until 1975, as international isolation tightened 
further on the Republic. Despite significant operational delays, new air defences were 
implemented by the SADF as an important counter-strategy, while the Defence Force 
also during the first half of the decade, made some hurried plans, along with military 
exercises, to defend SWA from an amphibious assault on Walvis Bay. 
 
While the SAAF invested in maritime strike aircraft, the SA Navy significantly increased 
its maritime deterrent capability through its submarine acquisition, constituting its only 
plausible response to any determined invasion plan, in the unlikely occasion of such ever 
being attempted  by the UN and/or the Afro-Asian bloc. By 1968, in terms of military 
counter strategies, the SADF as an entity was working entirely as part of the 
government‟s determination to maintain the white rule fortress in South Africa against 
external enemies. By 1968, more markedly than earlier perceived conventional warfare 
threats, were the SADF‟s expectations of being called to embark upon a counter-











already shown determination to attempt this course; although their ill-fated forays to filter 
guerrillas through Rhodesia in 1967 were far from constituting any serious threat to the 
Republic. The SADF anticipated further SWAPO incursions into the north of SWA after 
the organisations military defeat in 1966. It was also expected by SADF military 
intelligence that there would be renewed attempts by MK to try and penetrate the 
Republic with armed guerrillas.   
 
While responsibility for combating these first armed contacts between the South African 
state and its own black dissidents had fallen on the SAP, the SADF was also 
clandestinely involved with Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. Lt Gen Fraser‟s 
influence on the SADF to train and operate more towards counter-insurgency as a 
specific doctrine, had also ensured a significant mind-set shift both at political level, 
through Defence Minister Botha and within the Defence Force‟s Supreme Command. In 
terms of counter strategies, the SADF had from 1960, moved away from being something 
of an “internal police force” to an organisation urgently rebuilding its conventional 
warfare capability and designing responses to perceived external threats. When it became 
clearer that no such conventional threat was imminent from international or regional 
political blocs, the SADF combined this preparation with an enlarged stress upon 
counter-insurgency. It was here that Fraser played a decisive role. The assumed “buffer 
states” of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories were being drawn deeper into internal 
conflict with their own black nationalists, while white South Africa and the SADF by 
1968, with some misplaced confidence, faced the inevitable continuation of the 











South African state. The final and important SADF counter strategy, attempting to draw 
the white community closer towards accepting the Defence Force as inevitable and 
essential for their safety, was the instituting of national military service for all white male 













PART TWO: THE MILITARIZATION OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA 
 




This chapter introduces the Afrikaans community‟s change in perceptions of the SADF 
by the 1960s, compared to those of 1948 and during World War Two. It also discusses 
the infusion of Afrikaner nationalist politics, viewpoints and culture into the Defence 
Force, particularly during the 1950s, through Hiemstra and the Afrikaanse 
Kultuurvereniging Volk en Verdediging
654
 (AKVV). Hiemstra‟s view that compulsory 
white male military service was necessary took time to disseminate and even receive full 
consent from across all levels of Afrikaner society. With their historical antipathies 
towards the military lingering even in the early 1960s, some Afrikaners still needed 
reassuring that the Defence Force was now „their own‟.  
 
Although there was virtually full conformity to military service, the growing Afrikaner 
middle-class also applied in large numbers for exemptions on study and professional 
grounds. This trend manifested itself as growing 1960s affluence promoted more 
attractive career and professional routes for young men of ambition and any enforced 
time spent in the Defence Force could be viewed as a hindrance. Historically Afrikaners 
had an unsettled relationship with the military, most specifically during the 1960s, those 
in middle-age or older who experienced the intra-Afrikaner disputes during World War 
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Two. But that legacy slowly faded during the 1960s where political divisions within this 
community became less relevant regarding their collective attitude to the SADF. An 
attempt is made to analyse this changing relationship between Afrikaners and the 
military, with particular emphasis upon the decades just before and following the NP‟s 
attainment of the republic.      
 
Afrikaner UDF volunteers during World War Two 
 
Grundlingh has shown how Afrikaners who served in the UDF during the Second World 
War had markedly mixed motives for doing so, ranging from economic need to their 
identification with the Smuts government‟s white reconciliation policies.
655
 It is 
conventionally accepted that the NP‟s 1948 election victory was partly a consequence of 
disgruntled ex-soldiers of overwhelmingly Afrikaans background expressing their 
discontent at the UP government‟s tardiness over demobilisation, rationing, shortages and 
other issues that raised grievances amongst UDF volunteers directly after the war. 
Government failure to speedily facilitate the troops prompt return from the Helwan transit 
camp in Egypt led to soldier riots there in August 1945 and the UDF‟s attempts to 
suppress damaging press coverage for the UP government. It has been argued this 
resulted in many ex-servicemen being influenced to either abstain from voting in 1948 or 
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At a broader social historical level, Afrikaner urban working-class members who voted 
NP during 1948 were expressing their disillusion regarding perceptions of their poor 
employment prospects considering the rising black population on the Witwatersrand. 
This was a recurring theme of earlier twentieth century South African industrial history; 
the white worker fear that blacks were being legitimised by the state in competing for 
„white jobs‟ at lower pay. This was one core dynamic of white political party issues 
during the 1920s and 1930s, alongside other issues concerning English/Afrikaner feuds 
over national symbolism, the British constitutional connection and the two white 
community‟s „language rights‟, all of which became points of contestation within the 
SADF during the 1950s. The „soldier‟s vote‟ factor was but one of a number of long-
standing political grievances amongst the insecure white and predominantly Afrikaner 
white working-class. P.G. du Plessis‟s 1971 play “Siener in die Suburbs” captures a 
perhaps literary essence of poor white Afrikaners still struggling with post-war poverty. 
A sub-plot involves an absent father from a dysfunctional family who was reported 
missing „somewhere in the North” in 1945. This ensures his wife a war pension, which is 
squabbled over amongst the extended family and others.
657
 Du Plessis could well have 
chosen this setting for his fictitious tragedy as representative of a number of poor post-
war Afrikaans families.     
 
Neil Roos contends that between 50 to 70 percent of UDF white volunteers at the end of 
1941 were Afrikaners and that a good proportion of these were poor, unskilled and from a 
rural background. But he does not necessarily provide conclusive evidence that the 
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majority of the Afrikaner soldiers were “working-class”.
658
 Roos bases his figures partly 
upon E.G. Malherbe‟s (the wartime Director of Intelligence) estimates as outlined in the 
Official Yearbook of 1946. Roos‟s „percentages‟ which already have a significant range 
from 50-70 percent have limited methodological certainty, as they were extracted without 
any official statistics.
659
 In the spirit of English-Afrikaner unity such differences of 
recruitment regarding home-language were not researched by the UP government.
660
 
Roos‟s contention of overwhelming Afrikaner numerical dominance can possibly be 
challenged by the fact that a large proportion of the UDF units sent north were traditional 
„English‟ regiments, drawn from English-speaking urban areas. His methodology of 
utilising interviews with forty-two individuals, mostly elderly mostly English-speaking 
World War Two veterans, is not without value, but it could not allow him to accurately 
postulate language breakdown percentages. Of course, competing figures of Afrikaner 
versus „English‟ South Africans serving are further complicated by the large numbers of 
white „English‟ who had already volunteered for service in British forces.
661
  
 Lambert concurs with Roos that a larger proportion of the UDF volunteers during the 
North African campaign were Afrikaners
662
 with many captured at Tobruk while others 
were permanently demobilised before the Italian campaign. After 1945, this grouping 
formed part of the insecure urban white working-class proletariat. During the initial 
stages of the war, volunteering occurred in both white language groups to secure 
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 Lambert concludes that although many middle-class English believed 
that serving South African soldiers would one day help to consolidate a united post-war 
country,
664
 “neither the government” nor ex-servicemen‟s organisations “were prepared 
to accommodate the more radical social demands of the Springbok Legion.” But the 
consequences of government failures in managing demobilisation to the satisfaction of 
the UDF volunteers, meant as Roos puts it: “many returned soldiers believed that the UP 
and English South Africa generally were insensitive to their needs,”
665
 a perception that 
contributed to the UP being voted out.”
666
   
 
But we have no way of accurately quantifying how many Afrikaner ex-servicemen voted 
nationalist in 1948, nor the assumed increases in their support for the NP during the 1953 
and 1958 general elections. Neither can we determine the extent to which these veterans 
contributed to the „yes‟ and „no‟ totals of the 1960 republican referendum. It clear that the 
majority of Afrikaner war veterans after 1945, never collectively honoured their war 
service in predominantly Afrikaner forums, along the same lines as, for example, the 
English dominated Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTHS).
667
 Neither did Afrikaner 
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veterans as an „ethnic grouping,‟ commemorate either war service or their fallen 
comrades within a range of other ex-servicemen associations. Certainly some Afrikaner 
veterans joined the MOTHS, Sappers Association or Gunner‟s Association – to name just 
three South African veterans „collectives‟; but these remained either English-dominated 
or at best, reflective of Smuts‟s „South Africanism.‟ As Afrikaners swung en mass to 
support the NP, so some veterans would have shifted their politics and civic association 
memberships accordingly.  
 
One of the comparatively few post-war reflections (encountered by this author) written 
by an Afrikaans-speaking veteran on the eve of the 1960s, appears within Commando‟s 
June 1959 edition. Capt P.A. Van Zyl, who served as a non commissioned officer within 
the Special Service Battalion during the Italian campaign, presented a different 
perspective of the Afrikaans veteran, claiming that the Afrikaans language and culture 
were sidelined within the UDF by the practicalities and stress of war. In contrast to 
English-speaking comrades whose war-reflections often included the theme of 
camaraderie transcending fear, Van Zyl in contrast described disillusionment and cultural 
alienation. He suggested that the war had a damaging effect on the collective psyche of 
those Afrikaners who participated, because they were not only traumatised them from a 
combat perspective, but also culturally marginalised and virtually rejected their own 
identity. 
668
 Of course, Van Zyl‟s article also needs to be seen within the political context 
                                                                                                                                                 
the small MOTH club in this town being largely utilised by the small English-speaking community. His 
father had voted UP but had spoken comparatively little of the war, although this was probably motivated, 
my former neighbour explained, by trauma from combat rather than the fear of being „ostracised‟ by the 
Afrikaner nationalist political attitudes of the time.    
668











of the SADF in 1959 and the Erasmus/Hiemstra SADF “Afrikanerisation” endeavours. 
He wrote enthusiastically over the „progress‟ made by Afrikaans as a military language 
since the war and expressed obsequious approval at the infusion of Afrikaner culture into 
the SADF by Hiemstra‟s AKVV. While Van Zyl was clearly striving to be seen as 
professionally embracing the Erasmus‟s policies, he was also attempting to transcend the 
political sensitivities between being a committed Afrikaner nationalist in 1960 and a 
volunteer during the war. Van Zyl‟s article suggests he welcomed 1950s NP 
transformation within the SADF, besides describing his war service markedly differently 
compared to other veterans, who might have still felt a frustrated sentiment for the „South 
Africanism‟ purportedly engendered by their UDF war experiences.  
 
The Afrikaner community and their World War Two veterans 
 
Therefore, despite the thousands of Afrikaner ex-servicemen these veterans received very 
little in terms of honour and remembrances from within their own communities. Such 
was in stark contrast to the English South African community, within their schools 
particularly, where the former pupils amongst the Second World War fallen were 
prominently commemorated within buildings, structure and inscribed plaques.
669
 
Virtually nothing of a similar feature exists at Afrikaans schools existent during 1939 to 
1945. Within the PF army and air force personnel, where Afrikaners started to 
predominate from the mid-1950s, the staffing at senior and middle ranking levels 
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included many World War Two veterans;
670
 but unlike those within the English-speaking 
community, their Afrikaans counterparts were ignored within Afrikaner nationalist 
controlled institutions. Precisely the same pattern was evident at Afrikaans universities, 
where there is little evidence of any monuments or commemorative structures compared 
to what exists at the „traditional‟ English language universities.  
 
Such is the legacy of the two white South African language groupings participation in the 
global conflict of 1939 to 1945; where for some, the war represented honourable 
participation for a struggle against totalitarianism, besides the sacrifices of volunteers that 
engendered these veterans with honour and respect. For others the war connected to 
highly emotional political accusations of lending support to a perceived former oppressor, 
besides that of the UP government, allegedly ignoring the will of an Afrikaner majority 
who supported NP calls for South African neutrality. Dwelling upon war service could 
cause a muted embarrassment in Afrikaner circles and a potential source of division 
amongst Afrikaner political efforts to unify the volk under NP political programs.  
 
As a consequence, both the war and the Afrikaans veterans‟ experiences were, as far as 
Afrikaner nationalist politicians and historians were concerned, considered at best simply 
forgotten. Afrikaner nationalists and their historians assumed that the motives and 
political attitudes of Afrikaner World War Two veterans equated those of the English 
South African troops.
671
 Therefore, these veterans were ignored within the triumphal 
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accounts of 1948 and the creation of the republic
672
. Such Afrikaner nationalist historical 
accounts of the volk’s triumph became the basis of the historical mythology taught 
throughout educational institutions and cultural societies and this formed part of the 
socialisation and mass mobilisation of Afrikaners behind the NP. It might also form part 
of the explanation why Afrikaner senior officers, like De Wet Du Toit, Grobbelaar and 
Biermann, to varying degrees ingratiated themselves with Erasmus during the 1950s, not 
only to further their professional ambitions, but also to „prove‟ that despite their war 
loyalties to Smuts they were still Afrikaner patriots (like Hiemstra).
673
 Col Jan 
Breytenbach recalled Afrikaner recruits during the early 1950s viewing war veterans with 
contempt
674
 and of course the majority of both prominent and ordinary SADF PF 
members in the early 1960s, were Afrikaners and/or war veterans of whom many were 
now in senior ranks and accepted in terms of their political credentials.
675
 The latter also 
occurred because of Fouché‟s determination to pursue “white unity”.  
 
Inevitably, World War Two Afrikaner veterans‟ sons who joined the SADF also went 
through the process of being socialised in culturally closed Afrikaner institutions where 
there was no positive endorsement of war service. Maj Gen Chris Thirion, who served in 
the Defence Force from 1962 to 1992, described a personal history that may well mirror 
how other Afrikaner veterans‟ families reacted to war service. Thirion described his 
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father as follows: “for some or other reason, the things that I remember about him was 
that he was a very staunch United Party supporter…when Smuts called people to go to 
war he went.
676
 In 1962, Thirion joined the Parachute Battalion and had already at 
Stellenbosch University during 1958 to 1961, shifted his political support from the UP to 
the NP. 
During my university days I became sort of Nationalist 
orientated and I voted for the Nats, whereas…in the beginning I 
voted for the United Party. And then I made that switch, and I 
started to become, not a party member, but I voted for the 
Nationalists, so to speak. And in that process of having gone to 
university, becoming a Nat and then joining the military, my 
father‟s perception and reaction to that was that I‟ve joined the 
army of the Nats
677
       
 
Most family units would have conformed to the new political realities. The post-1948 
dispensation included securing through patronage and favouritism, a privileged place for 
Afrikaner nationalists within what became for them, a culturally congenial and supportive 
civil service. However, the NP still had to ensure the political ground was prepared 
amongst its supporters for the implementation of compulsory military service. Hiemstra‟s 
controversial call during 1960 for the government to replace the ballot system, with nine 
months to a year‟s continuous national service was politically premature.
678
 For some 
amongst the Afrikaans community, there still lingered resentments regarding formal 
military service and alleged UP pressure during the 1940s for Afrikaners to volunteer.
679
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Clearly speaking on behalf of such hesitancy within components of the community, the 
NP Cape mouthpiece, Die Burger approached Hiemstra‟s suggestion with caution:  
For a non-militaristic nation such as South Africans, General R. 
C. Hiemstra‟s thoughts regarding instituting a year‟s national 
service can sound disagreeable. In the light of what we have been 
doing thus far (in terms of existing military service arrangement) 
it is indeed a drastic proposal. If something of this sort is decided 
upon, it will need to be quietly instituted to avoid unease.
680
     
 
Changing perceptions amongst Afrikaners regarding the SADF in the early 1960s 
 
From even before the 1940s, NP historical antipathy towards the military dated from their 
hostility to the UDF in 1914 and the decision by the Union government to invade German 
South West Africa. Afrikaner nationalist negativity for the UDF was exacerbated by the 
defeat of the white (Afrikaner) proletariat during the Rand Revolt, culminating in the 
Smuts government‟s decision to enter the war in 1939, followed by physical attacks upon 
UDF members and sabotage of state infrastructure by the Ossewabrandwag 
Stormjaers.
681
 Hiemstra alluded to such remaining Afrikaner feelings in the terms below, 
describing how the ballot system first introduced from 1953, had also been intended to 
transform the CF away from it being „English‟ by implementing the lottery system and 
creating “single-language” regiments.  
For myself a Defence Force must be a personification of a 
nation‟s (volk) highest ideals and spiritual values. In the past, as 
well as the last war, the Afrikaner group kept to one side 
regarding the country‟s Defence Force, because it was so 
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strongly British-orientated. The creation of single-medium 
regiments now made it possible for both language groups to 
preserve that which was meaningful to them without giving 
offence to one another.
682
  
   
One could argue that Hiemstra was misrepresenting Afrikaner war veterans, stressing his 
own experiences while assisting in creating myths about non-Afrikaner war participation, 
almost reducing these veterans to invisibility, including scores of serving Afrikaner 
members of the SADF. During the 1950s, the part-time force component of 
“skietkommandos” had received generous funding and publicity, an example of state-
sponsored assistance to Afrikaner cultural promotion in the SADF, also supposedly 
intended to bolster the part-time forces. Such were manifestations by the government‟s 
drive for Afrikaner unity during a period marked by a confident surge within Afrikaner 
nationalism. Thousands of Afrikaners who had not volunteered for war service now 
discovered their own “culturally congenial” type of military camaraderie within these 
rural “skietkommando” contexts, or even SADF careers for others who later joined the 
PF. During the 1950s and 60s, Commando devoted numerous pages for articles and 
reports concerning the regularly held commando “bivouacs”, shooting  competitions and 
general “skietkommando” news.     
 
As SADF commanders by the second half of the 1950s contemplated potential threats 
emanating from African decolonisation and Cold War tensions, some Afrikaner 
nationalist military men and intellectuals had already started reshaping historical 
interpretations, projecting Afrikaners as possessing an explicitly military heritage 
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component. Through the creation of the AKVV in August 1958 Hiemstra had further 
bolstered Afrikaner nationalist dominance within the SADF, with the explicit aim of 
raising the Afrikaner‟s historical  and cultural profile. This was to assist, in nullifying 
lingering antipathy amongst some Afrikaners for the military, by rationalising how such 
distrust grew during the Afrikaner‟s historical experiences of soldiers and formal armies. 
At the AKVV‟s first united congress in May 1959, Hiemstra stated: 
I wish to leave the political factors aside and would just like to 
illustrate that for Afrikaners, the concepts citizen and 
soldier/warrior (krygsman) became synonymous with one 
another, and words like soldier, sailor and militarist took up 
uncomfortable connotations. The proud figure of the citizen-
soldier (burgerkrygsman) could simply not be associated with 
the soldier in uniform who had alienated Afrikaners. This feeling 
remains strong even today amongst our people…It is the task of 
the current generation of Afrikaner militarists who involve 
themselves in the study and practice of modern military science 
to continue the search of how current military requirements can 
be reconciled with a defence system that matches the Afrikaner‟s 
national character and the notion of the (Boer) citizen-soldier, 
formed during the course of the (past) 250 years. Only then will 
volk and defence be one again amongst us…There are deep 





Hiemstra‟s views underscored the Afrikaner nationalist priority of volk unity, which was 
a critical feature of NP strategy post-1948, with no space permitted for any other 
Afrikaner political participation than via the NP‟s agenda. Neither did Hiemstra appear to 
place much emphasis upon standard democratic government/civil authority over state 
departments, including that within the military. His calls for a synthesis of the Afrikaner 
citizenship with a partly contrived modern military culture and obligations had almost 
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fascist undertones. As white South Africa moved towards republic, English-speakers and 
Afrikaner non-nationalists, along with their own cultural mores and viewpoints were 
marginal in Hiemstra‟s vision. His view was that the SADF‟s transformation was to 
continue, to ensure that: “those things that still remind the Afrikaner of his deepest 
humiliations must go…our military leaders themselves will need to adjust to the 
requirements set for them by Afrikanerdom”.
684
 Hiemstra believed the country‟s white 
citizens would “need a more sympathetic conception of the particular conditions and 
demands of the military life, particularly where our problems are exacerbated by the fact 
that we are not a homogeneous nation”.
685
 Conceivably, Hiemstra was referring to 
English-speakers, also needing to both accept and be part of the future Afrikaner 
controlled republic and its defence. He was also, or so it appears, calling upon those 
Afrikaners who still harboured historical antipathies towards the Defence Force to 
dispense with such. Hiemstra‟s speech demonstrates his role as “NP politician-soldier” 
attempting to remould South African military culture to resembling an Afrikaner 
nationalist shape, although this was an ideological zeal which Fouché needed to both 
utilise and play down during the 1960s, to also maintain the NP‟s stress upon “white 
nation-building.”   
 
Afrikaans historian G.D. Scholtz‟s (His 1950s and 60s works were introduced in chapter 
three) encouraged Afrikaners to seek deeper insight into their position regarding 
communism, Africa, potential military threats and strategic issues. Some of his books 
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were marketed through Commando like, Het die Afrikaner Volk ‘n Toekoms (1954) 
which was introduced as (understanding) “the emergence of the struggle for the world in 
our mother language, Afrikaans”.
686
 Scholtz also referred to the lingering antipathy 
amongst some Afrikaners towards the military, as a kind of remnant of their collective 
negative historical experiences. Scholtz argued that this had alienated many Afrikaners 
from the UDF during the post-Union years and this feeling had lingered amongst some 
until even after the establishment of the Republic. As Scholtz put it within Die Republiek 
Van Suid Afrika en die Wêreld (1962):  
the (negative) relationship that a considerable section of the 
Afrikaans-speakers have maintained towards the Defence 
Force…is not belied when the range of historical reasons are 
viewed, (causing) many Afrikaners to stand apart regarding the 
Defence Force …between the South African Defence Force  and 
the majority of Afrikaners…intimate bonds did not 
exist…Comdt J.J. Theron declared on an occasion: „The 
Afrikaner always had an aversion for the military 
uniform…because for him it was the symbol of oppression, 
because it reminded him of hardships in the past and the feelings 
of injustice had always remained with him.‟”
687
       
 
Scholtz acknowledged that some Afrikaner “aversion” towards the SADF remained and 
this dissertation argues that it is one key to comprehending why the government and 
SADF were so cautious regarding extending the ballotted military call-up at the 
beginning of the 1960s. Although during the 1950s, thousands of Afrikaners involved 
themselves in „skietkommandos‟ or the newly formed Afrikaans CF units, it would be 
safe to assume most did so as a community common experience, rather than out of 
Afrikaner society collectively consenting in any profoundly intrusive formal 
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militarization. The skietkommando popularity amongst Afrikaners during the 1950s and 
1960s was also not any kind of „nostalgia seeking‟ from war veterans, for World War 
Two South African military heritage was not included at all in the activities. On the 
contrary, it was explicitly an Afrikaner male community experience, although some 
training occurred under the direction of war veteran PF members. The Afrikaans press 
expressed caution on the issue of extended conscription, but as the early 1960s events 
drew Afrikaners towards accepting SADF perceptions of external threats, Hiemstra 
persisted with using his position to subtly prepare the way via his public political rhetoric 
for white male military national service.    
 
The Afrikaans press were also starting to urge their readers to accept new national 
defence needs and be part of them. By early 1962, the government had postulated that 
military preparation was then a corner stone of its responsibility, whereby its supporters 
could judge the NP. Die Burger’s 28 February editorial headlined: “The Pressure from 
the North”, stressing that certain inevitabilities existed. That there was nothing the 
government could do about the “southward advance” of decolonisation, but it undeniably 
“affected South Africa‟s vital economic, political and military interests. The editorial 
appealed that the white community needed to accept that defence planning meant 
increased public spending and participation. It concluded pessimistically that “barring 
happy miracles, we have little time to put our political, economic and military houses in 











having “shrunk to our immediate neighbours…..those who believe that we are in all 




Giliomee explains that after republic in 1961, Afrikaans newspapers became less 
penetrating in their questioning of the government, while some leaders of “nationalist 
cultural organisations” were more strident in their calling for Afrikaner exclusivity and 
stressing ideological rigidity. The Cold War context increasingly manifested itself 
amongst the extreme right-wing of Afrikanerdom, through vivid warnings of communist 
threats, becoming more apparent as links were forged with like-minded individuals, both 
local and foreign. Ferociously supportive voices came from amongst others, the NG 
Kerk‟s official journal Kerkbode edited by Andries Treurnicht, the South African 
Observer and cabinet minister Albert Hertzog.
689
 An analysis of Hiemstra‟s speeches, 
particularly at AKVV events, suggests that his mindset lay squarely within this kind of 
rigid ultra-right thinking. He scorned predictions by the UP and others that leaving the 
Commonwealth would lead to the country‟s economic collapse.
690
 As discussed earlier, 
Hiemstra was a popular guest at important Afrikaner gatherings, including that of the 
ASB (Afrikaanse Studentebond) dinners at Pretoria University in August and September 
1962,
691
 indicative of the students perceiving his opinions as bolstering their own. The 
ASB embraced an extremist and defensive emphasis upon “Afrikaner survival”, 
encouraging discussion about threats from “liberalism, Communism, jingoism and 
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Roman Catholicism” with students strongly cautioned to resist undermining influences to 
Christian-National principles.
692
 When invited to the university on Republic Day in 1964, 
Hiemstra also spoke of the need to build prosperity amidst a world of revolution and 
dramatic change, but that the concurrent demands for development would be very 




As shown in chapter two, Hiemstra used his public speaking opportunities to implore 
white audiences to see grand apartheid as part of their defence. This in the sense that 
separate black states in his opinion would economically uplift black South Africans 
within their „homelands‟, thereby reducing the internal threat of rebellion and external 
hostility. Such was the message of his Day of the Covenant address delivered at Delmas 
in December 1963,
694
 while during Kruger Day (10 October) in 1964, he repeated the 
common white South African belief at the time, that the country‟s mineral wealth could 
ensure it developing into one of the world‟s most significant industrial lands.
695
 Hiemstra 
also laid emphasis by reflecting upon changes within the life-style of the 1960s white 
community, showing marked differences with many of his own generation‟s more 
Spartan formative years. During a speech given to young graduating officers at the 
Saldanha Military Academy in December 1962, he reminded them, many of whom were 
now products of newly urbanised and increasingly prosperous white South Africa, that 
they were to respect and seek advice from older officers and non-commissioned officers 
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who had been less privileged.
696
 Addressing the Rapportryers at Volksrust in October 
1962, Hiemstra invoked his theme of promoting national military service for all white 





When addressing largely Afrikaans audiences, Hiemstra often shifted to historical 
overviews aimed at NP politicking and Afrikaner cultural issues, as he continued his 
efforts to inculcate within this community a nostalgic image of their ancestors as 
„soldiers‟. Propagation of this „Afrikaner military heritage‟ was treated with some 
urgency by Hiemstra, as the 1960s volk was „city-socialised‟; more individualistic and 
competitive, besides less politicised, while extreme past nationalistic fervour was slowly 
dimming. Hiemstra reminded his audiences how the Afrikaner‟s forefathers had 
„willingly served‟ to ensure the current generation their existence. He referred to the first 
Free Burgers declaring themselves‟ ready to defend house and home and not leaving this 
duty to others. Hiemstra propagated a concept of the “Afrikaner warrior” developing by 
the end of the nineteenth century into the most outstanding citizen-soldier of his time.
698
 
But images of Afrikaners as historically „citizen-soldiers‟, while perhaps being accepted 
to an extent within Afrikaner school and university history classes, were not necessarily 
formalised and integrated amongst the priorities of growing numbers of Afrikaner 
suburban families, who were enjoying the economic boom and the pleasures of 
consumerism.  
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By December 1963, with a range of perceived internal and external military threats facing 
the country, the government‟s policy stress for voters continued to be upon white unity. 
The SADF was now supposed to reflect white-nation building and at a passing out parade 
held at the Military Academy, Professor Thom, Rector of Stellenbosch University, 
directly addressed issues concerning recognition and promotion of an Afrikaans military 
culture alongside that manifested by South African whites of British descent:
699
  
We see in our land two language groups alongside one another, 
each with a military past and energetic military tradition. The 
combined potential of these two groupings military capacity 
must be without doubt impressive.
700
   
 
Under the title: “A New Image of Our Defence Forces”, Thom followed the 
contemporary NP political line of endorsing a supposedly successful „union‟ of the two 
language groups, being the core of this “New Image” after more than half a century of 
differences that „hindered‟ this process. 
after lengthy and cautious negotiations, the Union of South 
Africa came into existence, and it appeared as far as the military 
was concerned, English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers would 
move closer to one another and build up one solidly united South 
Africa Defence Force. But once again unfortunate circumstances 
intervened ensuring that this healed closure never happened. Two 
World Wars occurred where there were serious differences of 
opinion between English-speakers and a large proportion of 
Afrikaners. In spite of the fact that Afrikaners accepted the 
reality of history, and they accepted that South Africa 
participated (in this war). But (this) did not ensure that English-
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speakers and Afrikaans-speakers moved closer to one another in 
the military terrain …there were Afrikaners that felt in their 
hearts the country‟s Defence Force  (manifested itself) as 
something (belonging to) the English-speakers, and that 
Afrikaners could not with pride also claim it for themselves as 
their own.
701
       
 
Like Hiemstra, Thom ignored the large number of Afrikaners who actually had 
volunteered for war service, some of whom remained in significant numbers within the 
ranks of the SADF‟s personnel. Thom glossed over the most controversial issues from the 
prior twenty years, including the violent opposition to war participation by some 
Afrikaners, the most extreme being effectively pro-Nazi. But it was also the reality of 
impending isolation, including the recently ratified mandatory United Nations arms 
embargo, that from the government‟s perspective, motivated „official‟ need to endorse a 
perspective of the two white language groups „fortuitously finding one another‟ in 
defence issues. Referring again to this “New Image” of the Defence Force, Thom 
remarked: 
With significant gratitude we have taken note that this (old) 
image of our Defence Force has rapidly changed in recent times. 
Afrikaners have begun to take a far more active share in the 
business of our Defence Force. Afrikaners also now accept the 
Defence Force  as their property and pride; ….and together found 
and appreciated one another…in cordial cooperation and healthy 
mutual respect. Our Defence Force and its new image, has 
become a powerful factor in the merger of the strengths of 
English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers. For the first time in 
our history we see now the possibility that, if our country is 
forced to defend itself against an aggressor, that aggressor will 
have to reckon with the full, combined potential of both the 
English-speaker and Afrikaans-speaker‟s military traditions…it 
is reassuring to know that should our Defence Force need to act, 
it will not be just the members of one language group…this 
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(new) image is not only reassuring, it is also truly inspiring for 
the future.
702
      
 
 The reality was that the Afrikanerisation of the SADF under Erasmus and “New Image” 
under Fouché had shifted the military away from the English-orientated “South 
Africanism” of the United Party era of some years previously. This in the sense of 
supposedly sincere equal collaboration with the two language groups eventually assumed 
to assimilate. The Republican Afrikaner nationalist inspired building of a „white nation‟ 
manifested as a kind of Hertzogite „two-stream policy‟, with explicit Afrikaner 
nationalist leadership and possibly eventual assimilation of the English within Afrikaner 
culture. When NP politicians or senior civil servants like Hiemstra addressed audiences 
including both language groups, the reality of Afrikaner leadership was played down and 
the „white nationhood‟ aspect strongly endorsed. When Hiemstra addressed Afrikaner 
audiences related to the AKVV‟s activities or events significant to Afrikaner history, he 
often did so, seemingly quite contrary to the supposed „white nation-building‟ ideal of 
the early 1960s.  
 
Afrikaans Churches endorse the political call of the imminent threat to the volk’s 
survival   
 
A key factor in garnering Afrikaner enthusiasm for the SADF was the increased role of 
Afrikaans churches in supporting compulsory military service. Church leaders as 
custodians of perhaps most influential of Afrikaner organisations, expressed fears for the 
future survival of an Afrikaner republic within a rapidly changing and hostile Africa. 
                                                 
702











Their influence played a vital role in impressing upon the Afrikaans community, the 
supposed importance of the SADF for volk survival, just as commando service had been 
viewed during previous centuries. This approach was largely absent amongst church 
denominations where the white English-speaking community worshipped: Anglican, 
Catholic, Methodist, etc. In these churches, increasing scripturally reinforced criticism 
was voiced regarding government racial policies, but all leading Christian denominations 
still maintained active chaplaincies within the SADF during the 1960s.  
 
The official Afrikaans church endorsements of the military repelling dangers to the 
republic were also fundamental to acceptance of progressive SADF intrusion into 
community and private lives. As verified earlier, during 1960 the Hervormde Kerk 
(Reformed Church) leaders had even corresponded with Verwoerd to influence his 
appointing Hiemstra to the Commandant General position.
703
 The same fears for 
Afrikaner survival were displayed by the larger and more influential Dutch Reformed 
Church (DRC). During the Cottesloe conference of December 1960 organised by the 
World Council of Churches, senior DRC and Hervormde ministers together with 
theological professors tried to formulate a stance regarding the implications of NP 
homeland policy. DRC delegations accepted resolutions resoundingly challenging the 
grand apartheid cornerstone of government racial policy. But pressure from both 
Verwoerd and the Broederbond ensured that by October 1961, the Synods of the 
Transvaal and Cape DRC had emphatically rejected the Cottesloe resolutions. This 
repudiation outlined by both Church and Broederbond contained a vital central message, 
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namely that South Africa and Afrikaners in particular were under attack from outside 
forces. A Broederbond circular defined this “national struggle for survival” as a “cause” 
which required “an unconditional commitment”, and “our God-given national calling”. 
As Giliomee describes it: “Church, NP and government” (and the latter would have 
included all its civil service entities such as the SADF) were being expected to “stand as 
one in combating the challenge from without”. With very few exceptions, Afrikaner 
congregations accepted this rationale.
704
 The “national struggle for survival,” meant 
defence of a white nation was underpinned by church leadership alongside Afrikaner 
intellectuals and this ensured that SADF elements would also be influenced to view 
defence as part of this supposedly divine mission of white survival. 
 
Synthesis of Afrikaner society and the SADF during the 1960s   
 
Within the Afrikaans community there were mixed responses to Hiemstra‟s efforts in 
promoting Afrikaner culture and history within the SADF and Fouché‟s efforts and to 
build “white nationhood” within the same. Amongst some Afrikaans members of the CF 
and “Skietkommandos,” there was recognition that support for Hiemstra could be 
advantageous channel for individuals to further both their own ambitions and advantage 
their CF units, by prominently coupling both to support for the Afrikaner nationalist 
cause within a military context.  
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The Pretoria University military unit provides one interesting case study where 
Hiemstra‟s direct patronage was solicited by its commander. Pretoria University during 
the early 1960s contained amongst the most conformist Afrikaner education institutional 
culture subservient to the political order. For example, within the university‟s history 
department, only a narrow volksgeskeidenis
705
 was taught in South African history 
classes. The department was headed by the ultra-conservative A.N. Peltzer, whom 
historian F.A. Mouton has described as playing “a crucial role in undermining the 
collective ability of Afrikaners to think for themselves…(his) contribution (was to 
promote) the stifling spirit of conformity which characterised Afrikanerdom (during his 
tenure as Professor of History during 1947 to 1970).”
706
 It was Pretoria University 
students, dressed in university jackets and ties that were amongst those who physically 
attacked the civil rights protesters who regularly demonstrated during the early 1960s on 
the Johannesburg City Hall steps.
707
 As already shown, significantly it was Hiemstra, as 
the leading Afrikaner nationalist military figure, who was invited to a university campus 
to address students overwhelmingly nationalist with many inclined towards the right-
wing extremes of party thinking.     
 
However, even at Pretoria University, despite the ASB‟s invitations to Hiemstra, political 
support for the NP was not necessarily translating into a mass enthusiasm amongst 
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Afrikaans youth for the military. Upon his Commandant General appointment in October 
1965, Hiemstra received a letter of congratulations from the Regiment Pretoria 
University‟s Commanding Officer, Comdt J. A Vorster, who emphasised how from its 
inception in 1949, the regiment had endeavoured to preserve Afrikaans traditions in the 
army against initial “arduous struggle” against the “overwhelming English-speaking” PF 
artillery personnel. A core part of Forester‟s communication concerned the perennial 
historical white language group conflict in the military. Vorster referred to the courses 
and training camps during earlier years as being places were Afrikaners were initially 
discriminated against, but that subsequently the unit: “had built a tradition and esprit de 
corps which Afrikaners could be proud of.” After references to the „white nation-
building‟ theme, Vorster revealed that out of a university of ten thousand students and 
eight hundred lecturers, the unit had the support of just three hundred and fifteen 
members, of whom by 1964, only about thirty percent were actually lecturers, students, 
or even past students. Vorster‟s main concern was that: “the purely university character 
of the unit had already disappeared because of involuntary incorporations” of its 
personnel by the Army Headquarters. Vorster concluded obsequiously:  
For seventeen years this regiment has looked forward to the day 
when the SA Defence Force would be led by a full-blooded 
South African son. Now this ideal has been accomplished. A 
regiment that has stood firmly by these ideals and convinced of 
its right of existence in the Defence Force, through its 
achievements, loyalty and particular character, now requires 
security regarding its future.
708
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Two issues can be deduced from Vorster‟s correspondence. Firstly, it demonstrates that 
in 1965 there was no overwhelming interest by students in the Pretoria University 
military unit. As discussed later, there was also limited interest by young educated 
Afrikaners for an SADF career, as it provided scant motivation to shift away from other 
potential plans to secure high paying occupations. Secondly, there existed within the 
Defence Force Afrikaners of strong political orientation, who viewed Hiemstra‟s 
ascendancy to Commandant General as an opportunity where their own positions and 
interests might be secured, demonstrating that despite “white nation-building”, political 
favours were certainly still anticipated by some.   
 
Early in 1962, twenty-five English language commando units were established, because 
as Fouché explained, urbanisation from country to town had created the need.
709
 Whether 
this shift had specifically occurred in recent years amongst the white English community 
is debatable, however, the concept of both communities being included in the commando 
structure, fitted the NP idea of drawing the English community closer to the Afrikaner 
nationalist mindset of defence; in this case within the heritage of Afrikaner military 
symbolism. In May 1965, the Ventersdorp Commando‟s Commanding Officer, Comdt 
Frans Cronje enlisted his own MP, one J.C. Greyling to intercede over a change 
introduced to the „skietkommandos‟ beret badge. The single word “Kommando” had been 
replaced by the word “Unitas”, angering Cronje and apparently others who resented this 
supposed diffusion of commando identity, they assumed to incorporate in the „English‟. 
Cronje‟s complaint provides an interesting insight into how a conservative Afrikaner in 
                                                 
709











the military during 1962 could refer to his English fellow citizens doing the same part-
time military activity. According to Cronje, the reason why defence authorities had 
changed the badge was to ensure: 
we (Afrikaners) do not offend our dear (liewe) English friends. 
Commandos remind them of the English war, and how the Boer 




Cronje insisted that at a Commandos commanding officers‟ 1964 conference, that the 
attending officers “had in unison supported that representations be made to restore the 
honour of the term “Commandos” with the current badge being retained with the name 
„Kommando‟ inscribed underneath.” Cronje pointedly reminded his MP that he (Cronje) 
was the grandson of a Boer War general and then slated English speakers for their 
reluctance in accepting symbolic changes accommodating the country‟s new republican 
constitutional status.  
what can our own South African troops flaunt? Only with the 
Commandos; all the other wars were not for South Africa but for 
King and Country. We have to deliver up our own traditions and 
then the English-speakers are allowed to boast about the VCs 
(Victoria Crosses) they won by shooting Boers…The Imperial 
Light Horse Regiment received four VCs during the English war 
in the siege of Ladysmith. Their badge consists out of crossed 
flags of which one is a Union Jack. I recall the huge battle to get 
them to change their name to the Light Horse Regiment, but 
what about their badge?... We Afrikaners have to throw away all 
our traditions to win the goodwill of the English-speakers. Where 
is our national pride?
711
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Cronje concluded by explaining that conventional Defence Force channels of 
communication had brought no resolution to his complaint and that somewhere within the 
SADF, there was “violent opposition that was putting this „thing‟ aside”.
712
 Greyling‟s 
representations elicited an official SADF response that it was not cost-effective to have a 
bilingual Commando/Kommando badge, hence the „bilingual motto‟ addition of “Unitas”. 
The response also alluded to negative white community perceptions of the 
“skietkommando” system, which Fouché, acting upon Hiemstra‟s advice, was 
endeavouring to improve, based upon their perception that the “skietkommando” term had 
been stigmatised amongst many in the white community and the insignia change 
constituted one way of correcting this.  
 
The SADF‟s explanations on behalf of the Commandant General dismissed Cronje‟s 
claims of a general resentment for the new badge and claimed the opposite was true.
713
 A 
year earlier, Cronje had written a letter in English to Commando on the same topic, 
lecturing an English-speaking correspondent to accept “there is only one European nation 
in this country no matter how many language groups we are all South Africans (sic).”
714
 
The above correspondence places another perspective upon how the NP‟s program of 
white unity within the SADF was viewed askance by some Afrikaners. Not all old “anti-
English” antipathies by the 1960s had been smoothed by NP calls for greater white unity. 
It seems reasonable to postulate that some Afrikaners in the SADF tried to persist with a 
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continuation of Erasmus‟s policies of political favouritism, but found this less favourably 
received by Fouché, who made it clear that English-Afrikaans cooperation in the SADF 
was part of his policy emphasis.
715
 If the „English‟ were perceived by some Afrikaners as 
being appeased by government, then others also still bristled with the issues dating six 
decades back and earlier. One zealous attempt to suggest that the British Crown engraved 
into the gun barrels of SAN warships should be ground-off invoked a warning by 
Commandant General Grobbelaar that nobody could grind on the gun steel for the 
obvious reason that such could weaken the equipment.
716
 Occasionally provocative 
sectionalism slipped into official publication: An anonymous letter in Commando from 
the wife of an Afrikaner SADF member suggested that it would be preferable if two 
separate Defence Force wives organisations existed for English and Afrikaans members, 
with a possible future single organisation uniting both under the embracement of 
Afrikaner culture. This received a sharply critical response from another correspondent 
two months later; the writer identifying herself as English-speaking by birth, Afrikaner 




Amongst some Afrikaners in the SADF during the 1960s, the strongest felt of these old 
grudges were expressed in private or hidden. Fouché also had to compromise for while he 
had made it clear at the beginning of his appointment to former Commandant General S. 
A. Melville that political favouritism in appointments was past,
718
 the minister also had to 
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play quid pro quo by continuing with some political appointments to counter-balance 
those made on merit.
719
 Some of the extreme political posturing in the SADF had 
diminished by the end of the decade. By 1968, Commando was providing less space to 
AKVV activities, which clearly began to lose impetus after Hiemstra‟s resignation from 
the organisation‟s chairmanship. In his autobiography, Hiemstra described the AKVV‟s 
demise as one of his regrets,
720
 but his promotion of Afrikaner nationalism within the 
military remained unrelenting during the decade. Concurrently, other components of the 
SADF worked to conform to some extent with republican ideal of promoting a common 
„white nationhood.‟ Therefore, ultra-nationalistic appeals for the exclusive promotion of 
Afrikaner nationalist symbolism within the SADF were officially toned down or rejected 
and inevitably, this tension regarding “white cooperation” also existed within the NP, for 
insulting white English-speaking South Africans constituted one of the given reasons for 
Prime Minister Vorster‟s expulsion of Albert Hertzog from the NP in 1969.
721
       
 
Afrikaners within the SA Navy: Attempts in the early 1960s to „balance‟ the 
language groups.  
 
As a consequence of earlier historical circumstances the navy retained a high proportion 
of English members and this continued, despite political interference regarding uniforms 
and traditions. The navy also never underwent any radical cultural shift; partly because 
the NP were anxious to maintain membership of the only official international defence 
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arrangement which South Africa was part of. The 1957 Simon‟s Town Agreement‟s 
conditions included the South African government purchasing additional ships and 
ensuring the development of various maritime activities. These involved technical skills 
and capabilities that meant specialised careers were available with a greater range of 
options than most conventional army positions. These possibilities remained attractive to 
some English and Afrikaans-speaking school-leavers who viewed the navy as potentially 
an interesting and varied career. Because of a strong adherence to professionalism and the 
navy‟s more diverse representation of the two white language groups, it was the least 
“nationalistic” of the three service arms and the most “English”, despite attempts during 
the 1950s and 60s to alter this. In an article on the navy‟s recruitment of trainees during 
mid-1961, Biermann explained that his command was collaborative of NP military social 
engineering:    
It is perhaps to be completely expected that the majority of South 
Africans who involved themselves in the early days with our sea 
traditions, came out of the English-speaking section of our 
population. Since 1946 there is a growing awareness amongst the 
Afrikaans-speaking youth of the importance of the navy. We in 
the South African Navy are proud that our portion of the Defence 
Force is a true reflection of our land‟s population groupings. 
About sixty percent of the personnel are Afrikaans-speaking and 
forty percent English-speaking. The teamwork amongst us is 
outstanding because the expression “Brotherhood of the Sea” is 




As would be anticipated from any policy drive instructing personnel being appointed into 
an organisation because of a perceived political need to ensure some kind of „ethnic 
balance‟, some individuals were inevitably found unsuitable. Rear Adm Chris Bennett 
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who attested in the navy during the mid-1950s, related that a number of young Afrikaners 
were deliberately recruited to „de-anglicise‟ the navy. Rear Adm Max Kramer recalled a 
discussion with Hiemstra in the 1960s over the Commandant General‟s aggressive efforts 
to ensure a white demographic „representivity‟ in the navy, Hiemstra insisted on working 
towards a goal of sixty percent Afrikaans and forty percent English, which we can only 
assume had not quite been achieved by Biermann‟s efforts described above. When 
Kramer explained the navy had traditionally always been very „English‟, this invoked a 
retort from Hiemstra that such was all the more reason to change it.
723
 But 
Afrikanerisation had mixed success with an organisation where its roots were deep 
regarding the RN, its parent navy. Roland Suhr who served in the navy gymnasium from 
January 1967, remarked that the all-pervasive influence of the RN was a feature of the 
SA Navy and its PF members:  
It seems that many of the customs and traditions of the Royal 
Navy…were instilled in us. It was also noticeable that many of 
the non-commissioned officers, such as our instructors, had in 
fact attended courses at various Royal Navy institutions…and 
were inordinately proud of having done so. It was quite 
interesting to see Afrikaans-speaking NCOs going off duty 
dressed in tweed jackets and carrying Royal Navy duffel bags 
looking, I should imagine, very much like their counterparts in 
the United Kingdom… (the breakdown of trainees home 
languages at the gym) was approximately 50% English and 50% 
Afrikaans. Nevertheless, although there was some Afrikaans 
spoken on the parade ground, the language of instruction was 
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 By the 1970s, even some junior officers of Afrikaans background were voicing their 
discontent at the limitations of colleagues from their own language group, who they 
claimed lacked adequate ability although were senior in rank.
725
 These included 
individuals who would have been jostling for promotion during the Fouché years of the 
1960s. But „white unity‟ in the SADF was not however evident in the decisions regarding 
the naming of new SA Navy warships. While the NP spent the decade after 1948 
consolidating their electoral victory, Erasmus endorsed a naval expansion program where 
Afrikaner historical figures and symbolism would be reflected in ships names.
726
 Three 
frigates delivered from UK shipyards in the early 1960s all received the names of 
nineteenth century Boer Republic presidents, specifically Presidents‟ Pretorius, Steyn and 
Kruger. The decision by the cabinet to name the frigates had been made during the late 
1950s, with strict instructions that the first one launched be named after republican icon 
Paul Kruger.
727
 The frigates were delivered between 1962 and 1964 accompanied by 
significant media attention.
728
 The trend of Afrikaner historical names for ships continued 
when the navy‟s three submarines were ordered from France in 1967, with all were 
named after Afrikaner nationalist historical heroines, specifically Maria Van Riebeeck 
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and Johanna Van der Merwe, while the third, Emily Hobhouse was an Englishwoman 
who occupied a highly honoured place in Afrikaner historiography. 
 
Afrikaner reactions during the early 1960s to compulsory military service  
 
Although young Afrikaner males were entering an establishment that by the 1960s was 
generally more culturally familiar compared to English-speaking conscripts, there 
remained some disenchantment with compulsory balloted military service, extended and 
lengthened in 1962, thereafter by 1968, becoming compulsory for all white males at age 
eighteen. Objections to being „called up‟ were not strictly „political,‟ but usually based 
upon concerns related to tertiary study and professional ambitions. There were also more 
serious comments, elaborated upon further in chapter seven of poor treatment and 
training by PF instructors, resulting in some Afrikaner young men expressing their 
contempt for the SADF.  
 
There were numerous attempts by those balloted, assisted by their parents, to obtain 
exemption from military training because of post-school study plans. The SADF 
responded to such requests with lecturing letters explaining the impracticality of making 
exceptions; how critical the country‟s defence was and that the military were dealing with 
scores of such applications. Also at the basis of such appeals was that urbanised 
Afrikaners were enjoying the 1960s economic upswing and resultant prosperity. Besides 













 some prosperous Afrikaner citizens viewing their own 
personal interests as superseding state obligations, particularly those as demanding as 
military national service. There was no widespread public objection, let alone any actual 
opposition, for the social conformity norms amongst the entire white population was far 
too powerful. In any event, Afrikaners and whites in general during this period to a 
greater or lesser extent accepted the NP‟s rationale of bolstering the country‟s security. 
However, there were definite signs that the nationalist excitement of achieving the 
republic was waning; a point not lost on Hiemstra in terms of the implications for the 
SADF and conscription.     
 
Hiemstra had noted the subtle changes within the Afrikaans community and used them to 
drive his calls for broadened military service. He referred to current young men no longer 
being “children of the veld” with little practice or experience in “skietkuns” (musketry). 
However, they were also not “children of the street”, by which Hiemstra concluded they 
would also require training in the art of urban-warfare.
730
 He was effectively saying that 
the new urbanised Afrikaners were somewhere between country and town and that for the 
purposes of training them as soldiers, they required particular attention, for they fitted 
neither the stereo-type of the nineteenth century rural Boer citizen-soldier, nor the street-
wise mindset of the urban proletariat struggling to survive in city ghettos.  
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With ample job prospects either in the state sector or amongst the opportunities created 
by the professional and business prosperity of the burgeoning Afrikaner middle-class, in 
Hiemstra‟s view young men would develop in ways unlikely to fit his „warrior‟ profile, 
unless compelled into military training. In addition, potential military service problems 
were likely to increase amidst heightened professional ambitions and increased numbers 
of Afrikaner males applying for university Admission. Such explanations illustrate how 
during a period when the NP was concerned at ensuring volkseenheid
731
 a component of 
the Afrikaner community were beginning to waver regarding SADF demands. Hiemstra 
and those who agreed with him hoped compulsory service for all white males at eighteen 
rather than the much criticised ballot system might head off more numerous objections; 
for the ballot was applied at random, resulting in many citizens completely exempt from 
service, while others could be significantly inconvenienced. This was a marked 
difference regarding earlier Afrikaner antipathies to the military, based upon historical 
issues of the UDF being too „English‟. The effects of prosperity upon the Afrikaners 
attitudes to compulsory military was not something that Hiemstra‟s generation 
anticipated, but it was to become a regular theme within his public addresses through the 




Within the Defence Archives are lodged numerous trainee exemption applications for 
study, employment, or other grounds related to applicants being concerned at their 
professional disadvantage resulting from military training. One case study serves as a 
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useful example, illustrating the type of resentments experienced by some middle-class 
Afrikaners (and the white community in general) towards compulsory military service. J. 
F. Du Plessis‟s mother made several attempts during 1963 to intercede for her son being 
balloted for military service. „J.F.‟ was an academic achiever and his mother the wife of 
an SADF major. She enlisted her local Member of the Provincial Council (MPC) to make 
representations to the Exemption Board. After her request was denied, she felt so strongly 
that she attempted to communicate directly with Verwoerd; an extract from her letter to 
the Prime Minister reading as follows :  
We have applied for exemption (for our son J.F. Du Plessis) for 
the reason that the child desires to study further in science…is 
one scientist not worth more than one trained soldier? It is 
commonplace to hear about the shortage of scientists; presented 
here is somebody who wants to attain proficiency as a chemical 
engineer and is rejected by authority…I also have proof that boys 
are obtaining exemption if studying teaching. Is this more 
important than studying science? …Just like any other parent, I 
have my son‟s interests at heart and it hurts me to think that he 
must slacken off for a year and what guarantee does a person 
have that he will thereafter still diligently continue with his 
studies? … I would greatly appreciate it if you can enlighten me 





She added angrily that “notwithstanding our representations, we received a „rolled off‟ 
answer that (exemption) could not be permitted.” 
734
 Her accusations regarding the 
SADF‟s lack of sensitivity and discernment concerning military service exemptions 
prompted her letter being forwarded from Verwoerd‟s office to the highest defence 
authorities. Mrs Du Plessis received a lengthy reply from Verwoerd‟s private secretary, 
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pleading the Prime Minister being involved in a program “over lading with state business 
and international problems” and explaining that policy did not allow ministers dabbling 
in each others portfolios. The complaint was referred to Fouché, although the response 
came via Defence Secretary Badenhorst, who in a detailed and personalised answer, 
provides some insight into the SADF military ballotees exemption possibilities during the 
1960s. Du Plessis was informed that the Exemption Board was:  
having to consider weekly thousands of applications and that she 
could be assured that her son‟s situation was not an isolated one; 
that scores of citizens have found themselves in the same 
circumstances. The Exemption Board felt that making an 
exception of your son will create a dangerous precedent clashing 
with its policy that students were balloted for compulsory 
military training before beginning university training (sic).
735
  
      
The rest of Badenhorst‟s letter consists of a patronising lecture on patriotism, appealing 
for Mrs Du Plessis to consider country before family, with the underlying rationale that 
volk, property, past struggles and nation stood to be lost, indeed even expropriated by 
some enemy. It was an appeal couched in language intended to ring a chord with 
Afrikaner nationalists. English-speaking and Jewish parents from the identical vantage 
point, might not necessarily been able to identify with all of what Badenhorst wrote to Du 
Plessis:    
What would all the splendid endeavours possessions and 
endeavours of the South African nation mean if the fatherland 
were not protected? What would all the praiseworthy 
achievements of its scientists mean if their work‟s fruit does not 
remain their own property? Consequently there can be no doubt 
that the defence of the Republic of South Africa must enjoy the 
highest priority. There are many parents who feel about their 
sons just as you feel about your own son, and where should the 













line be drawn? Would it not be an injustice to remove from a 
young man the privilege of giving up one year for ensuring the 
continuance of his nation and country?
736
  
      
Mrs Du Plessis was reminded that an attempt to attain military exemption, even through 
the intervention of the Defence Minister or any “respected person,” was futile unless the 
application was supported by appropriate facts. In short, she was left with no doubt that 
the SADF alone made the decisions regarding ballotees‟ exemptions and that traditional 
civil representation by parliamentary representatives was futile. Badenhorst reported to 
Commandant General Grobbelaar that there had been during the beginning of 1963, 
lobbying through the press for university students to be relieved of their military call-ups 
or have them deferred. No mention was made in this documentation of the strong 
resentments against the ballot system that compelled service from some with legitimate 
study reasons for exemption; this while others with no such ambitions were by random 
chance entirely freed of all military obligations. Badenhorst made reference to how the 
Rector of Pretoria University Professor Rautenbach, during 1963 had apparently 
expressed serious misgivings about military training occurring between school and 
university. The sensitivities of the ballot system as a political issue are clearly illustrated 
by the fact that once Fouché had immediately challenged Rautenbach on his assertion, the 
university administrator quickly backtracked and claimed that the original newspaper 
report had misquoted him. To ensure there was no room for misunderstanding, 
Rautenbach later despatched a telegram to Fouché, stating: “Already three hundred 
ballotees from last year have been registered (at the university); above what was 
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 It would be difficult to conceive of the Rector of such an 
important Afrikaner institution, working within the culturally sealed, ultra-conformist 
Afrikaner establishment of the 1960s, doing much else than agree with a NP cabinet 
minister. However, non-political dissension with military service amongst some of the 
white Afrikaner middle class and other socio-economic groups during the early 1960s 
was a reality Fouché and his officials had to come to terms with.  
 
Besides ambitious young urban Afrikaners whose parents attempted intervention on their 
behalf, the farmer could also be disadvantaged by military service; a useful example 
featuring an Afrikaner from a rural background, demonstrates how family loyalties 
created objections to compulsory military training. After beginning his military service 
on 4 April 1963, M.J. de Kock defied his unit‟s (5 SA Infantry Battalion at Ladysmith) 
commander by deserting six months later. De Kock explained that his action had been 
necessary in order to assist his ill father on their Northern Free State farm during the 
planting and ploughing season and before his desertion, De Kock was denied leave by 
both his unit and regional commanders. The matter was considered important enough, for 
the Adjutant General to keep the Commandant General informed, emphasising that the 
father‟s condition of health was being investigated together with any other mitigating 
circumstances. De Kock was not placed in detention barracks, but continued with normal 
training after three weeks absence without leave.
 738
 The official documentation utilised 
here suggests a sensitivity and fairness towards De Kock‟s case, also indicating caution 
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regarding the traditional Afrikaner farming constituency, where military service could 
conflict with their agricultural priorities.   
 
As shown at several earlier points, the SADF also attempted to endorse components of 
Afrikaner traditionalism, like displaying respect and awareness of the cultural place 
regarding the „boer‟ within the volk or Afrikaner nationalist historical symbolism. A 
Department of Information film on the SADF, released in 1964, had numerous scenes 
specifically intended as such. These included a farmer on a tractor staring upwards in 
appreciation at SAAF Sabre jets flying low overhead and closing scenes of a soldier 
standing on guard at the Voortrekker Monument, filmed against the backdrop of the 
setting sun.
739
 Significant SADF involvement occurred at Afrikaner commemorative 
ceremonies, such as the annual Day of the Covenant Commemoration of the Battle of 
Blood River. In December 1965 where the SADF provided troops for the event, 
Commando remarked upon the soldiers being moved from their Ladysmith base to the 
actual battle site: 
5 SA Infantry Battalion transported the guard of honour easily 
within fast-moving troop carriers…to the historic terrain. This 
modern unit possesses the same inspiration…as the 
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wenkommando of Pretorius, which shall echo if the call ever 
comes again.
740
      
 
The Afrikaner middle-class emerged agreeable, but not always overwhelmingly 
enthusiastic about military duty, while in contrast, approximately around 1964 there 
appeared simultaneously ultra-hawkish elements of „anti-communism‟ within the 
Afrikaner right, including from within the SADF‟s AKVV. At the beginning of his 
Defence Minster tenure, Fouché had made it clear that NP‟s defence policies were 
entirely in line with the kind of sentiments espoused by Scholtz: That the „threat‟ of 
communism was an external and internal danger. In the November 1960 edition of 
Commando, Fouché was quoted in the editorial from a speech that he had delivered a 
month earlier at Lichtenberg:  
It will now be up to us to prove that our fight against Communist 
infiltration in Southern Africa is a basic part of our whole set-up. 
We must prove to the Western World that the Republic of South 
Africa, in its strategic position, is developing into a Western 




Hiemstra‟s AKVV seemed to view itself as being in the vanguard of a McCarthy-like 
search for „internal enemies‟, supposedly complementing Fouché‟s „identification‟ of the 
broader trend regarding the global dangers of „communism‟. By mid-1965, the AKVV had 
made some telling references as to how threatened this ultra right-wing part of 
Afrikanerdom assumed itself to be, despite the crushing of most internal political extra-
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parliamentary resistance. In a virtually hysterical address that year to the Afrikaanse Taal 
en Kulture Vereeniging (ATKV), an older and larger, but civilian-based fellow Afrikaner 
cultural organisation, the AKVV paranoia was almost manic in its perceptions of 
“enemies” within and without.   
The struggle around us is fierce. Attack after attack is being 
launched upon … our free and lovely land. There are those who 
seek our demise with violence and economic pressure. In the 
chambers of the world, they scream for our blood. Regarding 
them, we do not hesitate to state: We stand strong and 
immovable. There is even a more subtle attack against us. There 
are those, even within Afrikaner ranks, who want to break down 
our volk on the cultural front and deliver us to those who seek 
our demise. In our literature, in our churches, and at every 
cultural level they fleetingly raise their heads. They gnaw at our 
soul, because a volk’s soul is its CULTURE! A VOLK’S 
CULTURE is its POWER! Its POWER and CULTURE are born 
out of its love for those things that are its own – Its GOD, its 
LAND, its LANGUAGE, its TRADITIONS, and its MORAL 
VALUES. The Afrikaner culture was always a ray of light for 
the advancement of the South African nation. The Afrikaner 
culture was always the salvation of the white national element in 
South Africa…Guard and keep what has already been built, but 
without pause and with great power and careful consideration, let 
more be built upon Afrikaner culture.
742
 (Capitalised words as in 
original)         
 
This quote is worth repeating at length for it demonstrates the AKVV was lying well to the 
right of verligte/verkrampte
743
 struggles within the NP, a trend that manifested itself more 
particularly after 1966; also bearing in mind that the AKVV remained a significant 
political entity within the SADF during the first half of the 1960s.  
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Verwoerd‟s assassination and SADF honours for the Ossewabrandwag  
 
Verwoerd‟s assassination in September 1966 occurred in a national security context that 
had to some extent stabilised after the battery of security legislation was enacted under 
the direction of the Justice Minister John Vorster, soon to become the new Prime 
Minister. Commando covered Verwoerd‟s death with undisguised Admiration for him, 
referring to the slain Premier being always remembered as the “Father of the Republic” 
and headlining the photos of the funeral procession: Dr H.F. Verwoerd – A Giant 
Amongst our Heroes is Laid to Rest.” Commando subscribers were encouraged to 
purchase copies, available in both English and Afrikaans of an illustrated study of 
Verwoerd‟s life: “A Pictorial Biography - Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd  1901-1966 
published by Voortrekkerpers”. The marketing of this work continued within all the 
further Commando editions of that year. The SADF contributed significantly to the State 
Funeral pageantry, including Harvard aircraft over flying Pretoria‟s Church Square in the 
shape of the letters „HV‟.
744
 Amidst the shock of the assassination, some friction between 
the language groups flared briefly at the Langebaan Air Base and made the press. A 
young English-speaking SAAF officer named Lamb, in the company of other officers, 
allegedly expressed his satisfaction at Verwoerd‟s assassination;
745
 charges laid against 
Lamb were later quashed and he went on to experience a successful career in the SAAF.  
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Amongst Afrikaner politicians, controversial issues of the 1940s still re-emerged, where 
the SADF were drawn in as representative of the state. During 1967, defence authorities 
assisted in the acknowledgement of issues connected to extreme past white (and 
Afrikaner) divisions, when in October 1966, Hans Van Rensberg the former 
Ossewabrandwag (OB) Commandant General was buried. Flags in Pretoria were flown at 
half-mast and a military guard of honour was provided with SADF officers acted as pall 
bearers, while both Vorster and his Security Police chief, Gen Hendrik Van den Berg 







Afrikaner nationalists that felt alienated by the British-orientated military culture in the 
UDF of 1914-18 and 1939-45, with their hostility to South African participation, shared 
with the „English‟ aspects of viewing the Cold War as having similar dynamics to World 
War Two; namely the West opposing a totalitarian expansionist power. Achieving 
republican status affected the Afrikaner outlook in defence matters, with increased 
concerns related to the perceived need for the protection of whites against “communism” 
or African nationalism. The SADF were an integral part of ensuring this, therefore it 
came to occupy a higher profile within the Afrikaans community.  
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Afrikaners war veterans of 1939-45 adjusted into their post-war roles within the 
UDF/SADF, despite the lack of recognition from within their own community. The 
writings of Afrikaner intellectuals like Scholtz, demonstrated a still lingering historical 
antipathy amongst some towards the military. While Hiemstra played a significant role 
during the 1960s, often through the AKVV, in influencing SADF military culture, the 
Defence Force and military training also did not necessarily find universal acceptance 
amongst the Afrikaans community in the 1960s. It was clear that despite volkseenheid 
and external military threat perceptions, significant numbers of Afrikaners also 
considered SADF obligations a burden. Du Plessis and De Kock‟s cases are two 
examples out of scores, demonstrating that the Afrikaans white community did not as one 
sheep-like entity, immediately and enthusiastically embrace extended military service 
during the early 1960s. There was no militaristic, national demonstration when Hiemstra 
in 1960 lobbied in public for compulsory service regarding all white males, or when the 
balloting was extended during 1962 in terms of increased numbers of youths being called 
up, while their duration of service was extended. There was a steady number of ballotees 
from Afrikaans backgrounds requesting exemption for a variety of reasons, mostly 
connected to work and study issues. The government was cautious not to rush into 
compulsory conscription, conscious that the balloting system was already received a 
lukewarm response. This was partly because its random operation was perceived as 
unfair; but the government and SADF were faced with some challenges in creating a 
white society more accepting of the military and compulsory training for citizens; 
although most Afrikaners during the 1960s generally acquiesced to the Defence Force‟s 











the military with the political zeal, displayed at its extreme end by organisations like the 
AKVV and there remained those who assumed Erasmus‟s political favouritism would 
continue.    
 
This chapter contends that the NP, Fouché and the SADF employed political caution by 
allowed the extended ballot of 1962 to „adjust‟ Afrikaners and the rest of the white 
community into „consenting‟ to a full conscription by 1968 of all white males at eighteen 
years of age. However, as SADF military strategy was changing during 1967-68 towards 
the doctrine of counter-insurgency, a more penetrating political response was required by 
the state to ensure some sustained subtle militarization of white society and such was 
more easily disseminated amongst the Afrikaans community, within institutions that 















One of the most important conclusions derived from recent research was that white 
English South Africans (sometimes referred to below simply as the „English‟) played a 
larger role in the SADF during the 1960s than might have been implied by Boulter, 
although this author does not entirely disagree with Boulter concluding:  
Erasmus had created such a legacy of disillusionment that 
English-speakers generally from that era (1950s) onwards 
viewed the defence force as yet another sphere of state activity in 




As noted throughout this thesis thus far, during this decade something of a loose 
compromise within historically divided white South Africa occurred, which represented 
an almost tentative and defensive „common‟ white nationalism. This trend was more 
discernable within the strongly conformist defence structures when compared to other 
public or civic social components. The 1950s conflict in the SADF had left a legacy 
whereby a perception persisted amongst many English-speakers, particularly those of the 
World War Two generation, that within the Defence Force they were still unwelcome or 
viewed as „unpatriotic‟. This outlook adjusted to some extent during the 1960s, although 
it did not completely disappear, notwithstanding English South Africa largely accepting 
and some even supporting military service.  
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This dissertation suggests that in fact, English-speaking PF senior officers played a 
prominent part in the SADF during 1960 to 1968 out of proportion of their numbers, even 
within the Afrikaner-dominated army. Furthermore, compulsory military training re-
invigorated „traditional‟ CF regiments through the manpower additions it provided and 
this helped to ensure further „English participation‟ in the Defence Force. During 1960 to 
1968, English South Africans were nevertheless a minority within the SADF, whether as 
PF or CF members, ballotees or part of Commando units; but overall they were not „rare‟ 
within the PF, despite the Erasmus period producing a significant number of resignations. 
Research has intimated that during the 1960s there remained reasonable numbers of 
SADF „English‟ members still pursuing careers, including particularly war veterans and 
to a lesser extent some post-war recruits. It was from amongst this „English‟ and 
„anglicised Afrikaners‟ war veteran „grouping‟, often disadvantaged during the 1950s, 
that individuals were shifted during the 1960s into important positions within the SADF 
command structures.       
 
White English South African “identity” during the 1960s 
 
The severance of the British connection performed symbolically by both the republic and 
Macmillan‟s Wind of Change speech, helped dissolve any remaining possibility of a 
popular “English South African” sense of identity developing comparable to that of their 
historical kin in Australia or New Zealand. Constant nationalist sniping at all that was 
British had also facilitated English South Africans slowly relinquishing their British past 
as a defining component of identity. In early 1962, a member of the English South Africa 











publicly at the nationalists, referring specifically to the press speculation of foreign 
military intervention in ending apartheid. This was one of the reasons for the 
government‟s deliberate pulling together of English and Afrikaans: 
Nationalists,…had attempted to draw English-speaking South 
Africans into their laager by controlling education and 
information sources. They did so because of foreign and internal 
policies which might ultimately lead to a foreign attack and 
internal strife.
748
   
 
Neil Garson intimated that by the latter date, English-speaking South Africans, quietly 
but pervasively, were being persuaded that for the achievement of white unity they must 
sacrifice some distinctive cultural attributes. Amongst these was a tradition of dissent and 
a capacity for self-criticism.
749
 The amorphous, uncertain South African „English‟ 
identity dissolved further and strong differing with government became even less 
apparent within some „English‟ institutions and private entities, as the political isolation 
of the 1960s set in alongside the crushing of internal black political resistance. This 
occurred particularly in establishments like schools, private clubs/sports establishments 
and business; less so at universities and churches. While English-language newspapers 
criticised government racial policy, they also gave considerable favourable commentary 
to SADF and general defence issues. But the republic also experienced remarkable 
economic growth, where „English‟ business thrived as English South African identity lost 
its tentative cohesion, even in Natal, where during the strident Afrikaner nationalist 
assaults in the 1950s on British South African symbolism and traditions, the „English‟ 
had discovered some solidarity in defiance.  
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The African Resistance Movement (ARM) as a 1960s “English South African 
dissent grouping”   
 
The most extreme version of the „dissent tradition‟ mentioned above by Garson was 
manifested by the largely white English-speaking ARM‟s sabotage attempts in response 
to the government and its racial policies. This ultimately futile attempt at confronting the 
state was launched almost exclusively by young English South African whites, several of 
whom were originally members of the Liberal Party. But white reaction to ARM activity 
demonstrated that such activities would never draw the white English community‟s 
support. As with their response to white war veterans who participated in the ANC MK 
sabotage campaign, English South Africans recoiled with horror, if not embarrassment 
from any suggestion of an „English‟ „counter-militancy‟ to the Afrikaner government. 
Even after the state had effectively destroyed the organisation, the SADF through 
military intelligence reports allocated significant attention to former ARM members. 
Military documentation from early 1965 reported closely upon the movements of former 
ARM members and quoted from their writings, which described the English/Afrikaans 





                                                 
750
 Document dated 17 November 1964 headed “Zambia Political Intelligence African Resistance 
Movement, Guerilla Oorlogvoering, Director of Military Intelligence, Supplementary Military Intelligence 
Report, RSA – The Unconventional Military Threat, Period Ending 15 December 64, KG GP 5 BOX 472, 











Liberals such as Randolph Vigne who participated in the creation of the National 
Liberation Committee (NLC), which later became the ARM, believed the white English 
community had undergone some kind of “moral collapse” during the early 1960s. The 
ARM members who were products of English South Africa, had their militancy 
vehemently rejected by other English South Africans, who had already to an extent 
viewed the Liberal Party as  an “embarrassment or a source of shame”.
751
 Alan Paton had 
caustically referred to English South Africans as “half-willing, half-wry prisoners, moved 
by self-interest and the desire for security rather than by that quaint relic known as British 
fair play”.
752
 ARM member Alexander Cox who had not been convicted along with other 
members, suggested that by making the white English and Jewish communities future 




No Afrikaner Government in South Africa can ever concede 
common roll rights to Africans. Whereas the English-speaking 
element in South Africa, if suffering enough, could be made to 
accept this, the Afrikaner electorate is, if anything, more right-
wing than its Government. It is fully prepared to suffer to 
maintain control because of their history
754
….The Afrikaners are 
only in position to use the economic wealth of South Africa 
because they tax the initiative, wealth and skills of the non-
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Afrikaner population. This group must be weakened by attraction 
elsewhere and direct attack…
755
   
 
However, Paton and Vigne were not really accurate in their allegations of the English 
community being simply craven or motivated by self-interest, for there was also 
determined „English‟ participation (and acceptance) in the SADF during the 1960s. The 
ARM‟s tactics and politics were rejected by the white English community as at best naïve 
and unrealistic. While the „English‟ were powerless in the face of Afrikaner nationalist 
authoritarianism, there was not much disagreement with Afrikaners on security issues. In 
fact, most of the English community probably needed little persuasion that measures 
contrary to the Rule of Law were justified to crush sabotage and African nationalist 
resistance.
756
 The ARM had very few white followers and consisted mostly of university 
students and young intellectuals, whose marginalisation by the English community also 
highlighted the gap in political outlook that had opened between „English‟ intelligentsia, 
particularly in the humanities faculties of universities and the white „English‟ population 
grouping which these academic establishments served. The conservative English South 
African political scientist Dennis Worrell, who later became a member of the NP even 
suggested that those arrested had been misled by their university teachers:  
Although South African liberalism has always been firmly 
wedded to constitutional means of change, when its facile 
optimism began to wear thin in the early sixties, young English-
South African men and woman, whose expectations it had 
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 „English‟ universities allowed an academic depth and freedom that equated most western 
universities, unlike the more repressed atmosphere of Afrikaans universities such as 
Pretoria. However, English South African schools and the broader community were more 
conservative and respect for the military was reinforced to the advantage of both 
government and SADF.  It was these local high schools, which provided most of English-
language universities with their students.   
 
English „loyalty‟ to the „Afrikaner state‟ with reference to the SADF  
 
While broadly acquiescing to white privilege during the early 1960s, English-speaking 
whites were never seriously drawn into the Afrikaner volk structures, neither was there 
any particular interest for such from either grouping. „Republican white unity‟ was 
largely a racial solidarity compromise. There was some „temporary assimilation‟ for 
„English‟ SADF ballotees in the army, where in contrast to the navy and a lesser extent 
the air force, they entered a largely Afrikaans-dominated world. But the NP by 1960 were 
determined to draw more of the „English‟ vote, just as the entire white community was 
reminded through the press of the mass racial violence in the Congo and resultant panic 
stricken white exodus. The perception was also growing amongst English-speaking South 
Africans that Britain was betraying white Rhodesians, for whom as John Lambert puts it, 
“whiteness had become more important to them” then their “Britishness”. English South 
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Africans now increasingly “sought to preserve their position as part of a privileged white 
minority by accepting an implicitly racist consensus with Afrikaner nationalism,”
758
 
although their national loyalty was strong enough for the NP to count upon their support 
or at least acquiescence in defence. These subtle shifts amongst English-speakers political 
priorities was not unnoticed by Afrikaner political leaders, who continued to exult their 
nationalism, but concurrently stressed the importance of white unity. Hiemstra recalled 
how Verwoerd during a speech at the 1960 Republic Day celebrations in Bloemfontein 
had directly addressed “our English-speaking fellow citizens to assist Afrikaners in 
bringing about the Republic…Even the Cape Argus associated itself with him”.
759
   
 
However, besides it working towards attaining more „English‟ support for the republic 
besides canvassing them as potential future NP voters, the government never seriously 
adjusted civil service bureaucracy and ethos to make English South Africans feel the state 
sector was culturally more accepting of them.
760
 English South Africans seeking a 
military career in the 1960s also had the option of following scores of PF UDF members 
that during the previous decade pursued careers in the Rhodesian Federation forces.
761
 In 
August 1960, the Southern Rhodesian government sent recruiting teams to South Africa 
to entice volunteers to join new regular all white army units formed in the wake of the 
Congo events.
762
 The South African government gave permission for limited recruitment 
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of its white male citizens aged between 17 and 27 and the Rhodesian Army conducted its 
business in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban, securing its largest number of 
applicants in the latter city. The officer in charge of the recruitment reported that the pay 
had been an important incentive, being higher than offered by the SADF.
763
 One ex-
Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) member suggested that English South African 
considerations to join the unit were also Afrikaner dominance in the SA Army hence also 
the large numbers of recruits drawn from Natal.
764
 South Africans initially formed the 
largest number of troops in the RLI Regiment during the early 1960s; Moorcroft and 
McLaughlin reported how Rhodesian military intelligence had surmised that the (mainly) 
South African troops of the RLI were prepared to resist a post-UDI invasion by the 
British armed forces.
765
 While the SADF was not assumed by all English South Africans 
as the obvious place to seek a military career; a soldiering impulse had clearly not 
dimmed within young males within the community and some were quite content to 




Within the Broederbond, an organisation that by the 1960s was reputed to have held 
significant power over a range of political decision-making, there remained a wariness 
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that equal cooperation always held the possibility of Afrikaners being anglicised.
767
 
Broederbond hopes for English-Afrikaans relations were that over a long period of re-
socialisation, particularly at a formal educational level, English South Africans might 
eventually become „Afrikanerised‟ in their outlook and even embrace Afrikaner 




Afrikaner industrialist Anton Rupert saw „English settler culture‟ in South Africa as 
inherently weakened by its historical dependency on previous Imperial interests. Writing 
in the mid-1960s, Rupert asserted that decolonisation meant “settlers” were “mercilessly 
liquidated” because they had not developed an independent national identity bond with a 
land. Rupert acknowledged that external threats had contributed to consolidating white 
South Africans, “but in themselves had not united a population where deep historical and 
political fractures exist”. He pointed out that the worst civil wars can occur in times of 
siege. Rupert referred to the 1950s when the NP and UP had blamed one another for the 
rising external hostility to the country, with accusations and counter-accusations of “bad 
government” versus “anti-South African propaganda”. Rupert believed therefore that 
Afrikaners had the responsibility to set the pace and course of “nationhood”, by the 
“activation of the younger and significantly divergent elements of the population with an 
already active and integrated nation.”
769
 “Younger members” meant the new generation 
of „English‟ and Afrikaans males being drawn into the SADF through conscription. 
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Therefore beneath the apparent 1960s “white unity” whether in defence of another 
context, the over-riding Afrikaner nationalist assumption was that it had the right and 
duty to lead greater white South Africa, even more so, because Afrikaners he asserted, 
had a purported indigenous historical component which rooted them to the land. Such 
was the opinion of the leading Afrikaner businessman of the decade, whose opinions 
were taken seriously with government circles.
770
        
 
It was primarily within school sports, cadet competitions and compulsory military service 
where young English and Afrikaans males encountered one other to a significant extent. 
The communities had historically lived cheek by jowl within numerous urban and rural 
areas nationwide and many members of both had interacted at the deepest social levels, 
but undoubtedly, this situation occurred less so than the opposite, where the two language 
groupings maintained largely separate lives. Such were the realities of urban social 
geographical patterns where historically „English‟ towns had developed, while with later 
Afrikaner urbanisation, predominantly white Afrikaans areas had followed. Politically 
disempowered by the 1960s English-speaking whites might have arguably been more 
resentful than most Afrikaners of the obligations imposed by military service. Hyslop 
comments that as a cultural entity, the loyalty of English South Africans to the Afrikaner 
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However, „English‟ commitment to loyal citizenship still manifested itself, indicated by 
their compliance to military obligations and in some cases, a strong interest in local 
military affairs. For example, this was demonstrated in several ways; for example, there 
remained a considerable involvement by the „English‟ community regarding their part-
time soldiering in the „traditional‟ CF regiments. Indeed, it was within these culturally 
familiar army units that the broader „English‟ community during the 1960s maintained its 
pre-1948 military enthusiasm, despite the overwhelmingly Afrikaans-dominated PF 
army. Most of the „English‟ CF regiments were located within the appropriate white 
demographic enclaves around the coastal cities, Witwatersrand and the „English‟ rural 
communities within the Eastern Cape and Natal. However, their awareness of the military 
was also maintained through a range of commentators, including the prolific writing of 
English-language press defence correspondents. Defence concerns were also voiced 
through the opinions of the thousands of ex-servicemen from the World Wars, many of 
whom now held significant positions in public life, with some remaining active in the CF 
or ex-servicemen organisations.   
 
Changing/splintering political outlooks amongst „English‟ war veterans  
 
Although after 1948 when English South Africans lost political power and thereafter 
became increasingly marginalised in most state structures, most still voted against the NP 
during 1960 to 1968. However, by the latter date, clearly some „English‟ war veterans 













were supporting the NP in elections, as the government had picked up significant 
numbers of non-Afrikaner votes in the republican referendum and later still in the 1966 
general election.
772
 Neil Roos maintains that by the 1960s, considerable splits existed 
amongst war veterans‟ political views: Some remaining loyal members/supporters of the 
UP whose leader De Villiers Graaff was viewed by veterans as personifying honourable 
war service.
773
 Within the prosperous white English business community, there were 
scores of veterans of whom Harry Oppenheimer was one of the most prominent.
774
 
Others remained involved in the white political party arena, but like Oppenheimer 
became supporters of the Progressive Party, rejecting the UP as incapable of promoting 
appropriate political change. Roos argues that the MOTHS, as the biggest ex-serviceman 
organisation, served as an alternative means of camaraderie and mutual support for 
veterans disillusioned by both the UP and the government. Many veterans still had 
grievances that dated back to the war years and subsequently had shifted away from any 
formal political involvement, particularly after the mid-1950s Torch Commando break up 
created more disappointment when the NP won the 1953 election with an increased 
majority. Within the remnants of the socialist Springbok Legion, by 1960, political 
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fervour remained intense amongst a handful of white SACP ex-servicemen, who involved 




Therefore English-speaking World War Two veterans did not form any effective or 
cohesive anti-NP political pressure group in the 1960s, except briefly in Natal where 
there were some Torch Commando-style flashbacks during the Republican referendum 
campaign.
776
 Veteran divisions were obvious in late 1960, when Brig Eric Hartshorne, 
the war-time Transvaal Scottish Commanding Officer published Avenge Tobruk, which 
covered the course of South African troops 1939 mobilisation besides their involvement 
during North Africa and Italian campaigns. The book‟s final chapter lambasted the NP 
Afrikanerisation transformations in the Defence Force during the 1950s.
777
 Hartshorne 
explained his purpose in writing his account of the wartime UDF, as he hoped, helping to 
restore the honour of South African troops maligned for their surrender of the Tobruk 
desert garrison in June 1942. Hartshorne attacked alleged British duplicity that had forced 
Maj Gen H. B. Klopper and his Commonwealth command to continue with remaining in 
a hopeless situation, (rather than allowing them to break-out in time) besides failing to 
make public the findings of the official Court of Inquiry which cleared Klopper and his 
troops of responsibility.
778
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Hartshorne‟s book drew severe criticism from Major General George Brink, one of the 
most senior wartime UDF commanders and a former Torch Commando leader. Brink 
condemned the work as based upon hearsay and likely to be rejected by South African 
ex-servicemen. Brink further denied allegations of severe antagonisms between South 
African and British field commanders, remarking: “This sort of story may go down well 
with some people who delight in belittling everything British, but it will not go down 
well with South Africans of all ranks who know and respect men of the calibre 




Brink‟s response clearly suggests the following points: By 1960, there were English-
speaking veterans like Hartshorne who to a greater or lesser degree were antagonistic 
towards Britain, not least because of subsequent British foreign policy consequences for 
whites in Southern Africa. This trend was according to Lambert already discernable 
during the 1950s, when Britain‟s chang(ing) world status meant they (English South 
Africans) could no longer expect her leadership and support. In 1955, Natal 
Administrator Denis Shepstone had summed this attitude up by stating bitterly: “Britain 
had consistently and invariably sold the English-speaking South African down the 
river.”
780
 But veterans like Brink were determined to dismiss Hartshorne‟s account on 
account of it being allegedly Anglophobic, although it is well documented that some 
senior South African officers like Major General Dan Pienaar clashed severely with 
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British commanders during the war,
781
 although this was not necessarily the general 
experience of the UDF.   
 
But political cracks had long occurred amongst war veterans between the socialist 
Springbok Legion and MOTHS after the war, then in the wake of the Torch 
Commando/UP alliance failing to prevent a 1953 NP election victory. War veterans had 
splintering into various, sometimes over-lapping viewpoints: Those who retained some 
loyalty to the British/Commonwealth connection and heritage; others that were entirely 
disinterested in politics; and some who supported a kind of local „Rhodesian UDI mind-
set‟, projecting themselves increasingly as first and foremost South African, often with 
antipathy towards Britain perceived as „selling out the white man‟. As the NP called for 
increased white solidarity, it was far easier to market this appeal towards the latter 
grouping.  
 
The collapse of the Rhodesian Federation in 1963 and the wrangling between the 
Southern Rhodesian and British governments prompted the Afrikaans press to appeal to 
prosperous middle-class English-speakers to shift their voting support behind the NP, just 
as their “kinsmen” white Rhodesians of similar social class were regarding Ian Smith‟s 
conservative Rhodesian Front political party.
782
 Certainly, there was some shift amongst 
middle-aged veterans from their wartime hostility towards the NP because of the party‟s 
neutralist stance. Military historian and commentator Neil Orpen, who was also a war 
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veteran and CF member, openly concurred with the need to assist Afrikaners in defending 
the country against African nationalism and communism. Numerous regimental histories 
written during the 1960s, record the enthusiasm with which wartime UDF members in the 
„English‟ CF regiments performed their duties with competence and pride, as well as 
amongst „English‟ PF members.
783
   
 
English South African acquiescence to military training during the 1960s   
 
The NP government‟s determination after 1948 to ensure preferential treatment for 
Afrikaners in state employment created work environments, often culturally uncongenial 
to bloedsappe Afrikaners or „English‟ alike.
784
 By 1960, many English-speakers 
perceived the military to be likewise and particularly the army, outside of traditional 
„English‟ regiments. During the 1950s, there were still English-speaking new recruits 
seeking careers for the navy and some for the air force,
785
 but comparatively few entered 
the army, which received the bulk of the compulsory trainees after the ballot system 
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introduction in 1953. While amongst many English-speakers, there were undoubtedly 
strong political and cultural antipathies towards Afrikaners in general, there were various 
other strong social norms that ensured English-speaking young men conformed in 
complying with their military service duties. English South African youths called up for 
military training during the 1960s were often the sons of those who had served in the 
UDF during 1939-45 and the grandsons of those who had served in 1914-18.   
 
Hence, there existed a long-standing cultural construct within this community whereby 
military service was accepted as forming a masculine rite of passage. The white English 
South African community boasted a long-standing history of military service for Empire, 
King and the Union government, where for generations its members had served in 
colonial forces and the UDF. During the 1960s, this service remained well recognised 
and respected within community entities, whether within schools, sports clubs, 
universities, churches, businesses or families. The prospect of a young man undergoing 
that socially understood male milestone of being a soldier, would have been 
comprehended if not even explicitly supported by their senior male family members. 
Such an “initiation” would also be understood as capable of separation from a political 
component, because the male physical and leadership challenges of serving in the 
military, comprised the core of that “greater” concept of “serving one‟s country”. As is 
demonstrated later, there was even enthusiastic interest and support from English-
language newspapers for the rigors and „pure‟ masculinity of military service, despite this 












In short, the white English South African community endorsed military service and 
acknowledged its necessity according to the rationale given by government, 
parliamentary official opposition and the SADF. However, the English South African 
community‟s re-invigorated support for the military during the 1960s was also partly a 
consequence of government strategy. Despite regular parliamentary wrangles over 
defence between the NP and „English‟ dominated opposition, or the criticism of defence 
policy by the English-language press; in accordance with NP republican political 
strategy, the SADF formally endorsed and encouraged English support. With the 
exception of the navy, the SADF retained the strong Afrikaner cultural and demographic 
dominance achieved during the 1950s, but traditional “English” regiments received their 
share of ballottee intakes and budget. Through the CF, English South African military 
involvement received a new lease of life, while there was significant community support 
through voluntary participation in CF activities. Although as stated earlier, comparatively 
few English-speakers chose the SADF as a career during the 1960s and particularly 
regarding the army.   
 
But although white English-speakers were in general compliant and accepting regarding 
NP interpretations of defence issues, SADF military intelligence reports from the early 
1960s, expressed concern that non-Afrikaners drawn into the organisation through the 
ballot system could include subversive elements. A confidential report from April 1963 
noted that because all groups in the white community served in the Defence Force, it 











in the spreading of subversive propaganda.
786
 The clear implication is that this deduction 
referred specifically to English-speakers, or possibly Jewish South Africans, given their 
comparative prominence at the time amongst white members of the ANC and SACP.    
 
By the early 1960s, the population shift of white Afrikaners over the first half of the 
century meant they were now overwhelmingly urban, which would inevitably result in 
their beginning to lose aspects of the cultural isolation characteristic of their rural past. 
The NP had attempted to “quarantine” their volk from other cultural groups through 
separate schools, cultural and commercial organisations.
787
 However, compulsory 
military service not only presented special challenges for reinforcing government 
thinking at a political and cultural level, but it also allowed the possibility of introducing 
the nationalist outlook to „English‟ male youths. SADF conscription drew into its control 
a full spectrum of white South Africans with significant cultural and social class 
differences. Regarding the „English‟ community, this meant the reality of different 
schools, including private church schools, different church denominations and religions, 
(specifically Jewish servicemen)
788
 besides any number of different family socialising 
experiences. All these cultural variables were temporarily drawn into one state entity 
during military service. While extreme conformity is a central ethos of any armed forces, 
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the SADF also worked as an instrument of government vision and policy, reinforcing 
amongst young servicemen the enemy‟s identity as communist-inspired; a trend that 
become more apparent from 1968 during P.W. Botha‟s ministerial tenure.  
 
In the more closed, authoritarian and patriarchal Afrikaner social structures there was less 
of the openly conflict-filled generation gap amongst attitudes, discernable during the 
1960s within the western world. Afrikaner national servicemen, most particularly in the 
army, entered a military environment better tailored for them through a largely Afrikaner 
PF officer and non-commissioned officer corps. While English-speaking servicemen may 
have felt at times culturally alienated, their perceptions of threats were also moulded by 
what was disseminated during their upbringings and within the media. Most of the 
correspondents from both language groups who related their experiences of being 
balloted for military service recalling their having conventional understandings of the 
threats faced by the country as communist inspired. Most (bar one) of them also related 
that relations between English and Afrikaans trainees were good.
789
 It is unlikely that 
many of the English-speaking national servicemen felt as desperate as the acclaimed 
writer J.M. Coetzee recollected, when he referred to his anxiety of military service during 
1960 (which he avoided by emigrating to the United Kingdom directly after completing a 
degree at UCT).    
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When he left school they were conscripting only one white boy 
in three for military training. He was lucky not to be balloted. 
Now all that is changing there are new rules. Anytime he can 
find a call-up notice in his letter box: You are required to present 
yourself at the Castle at 9am on such-and –such date. Bring only 
toilet items. Voortrekkerhoogte, somewhere in the Transvaal, is 
the training camp he has heard the most noise about. It is where 
they send conscripts from the Cape, far from home, to break 
them. In a week he could find himself behind barbed wire in 
Voortrekkerhoogte, sharing a tent with thuggish Afrikaners, 
eating bully-beef out of cans, listening to Johnnie Ray on 
Springbok Radio. He would not be able to endure it; he would 
slash his wrists. There is only on course open: to flee.
790
               
 
Coetzee‟s recollections would certainly have been partly formed by contemporary 
perceptions of what the SADF was rumoured to hold in store for English-speakers, being 
drawn largely from conversations heard amongst those of his age group and social class: 
young white English-speaking males from Cape Town‟s southern suburbs schools now 
studying for degrees at UCT. However while the prejudices and anxieties he espoused 
may have been fairly common amongst his peers, Coetzee‟s complete revulsion and acute 




English South Africans also accepted the NPs explanation for compulsory military 
service because no spokespersons or alternate views considered credible emerged 
amongst this largely conservative community. The „English‟ constituted no obvious 
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future political threat to Afrikaner nationalist hegemony, nor did they demonstrate some 
kind of collective political consciousness likely in the near future to prompt mass 
opposition to military service. On the contrary judging from letters in the press, 
journalistic comment and the opinions of opposition members of parliament, it is clear 
that the white English community were committed like Afrikaners to understanding the 
Cold War as being explicitly Soviet expansionist driven; that South Africa was a central 
target of communist designs in Africa. They also shared the early 1960s white anxieties 
of violent internal revolution, further spurred by racial violence during decolonisation. 
Such uncertainties tended to also mute any loud objections that may have been felt 
against the government increasing its conscription demands in 1962 and again by 1968. 
English South Africans were still overall more prosperous than Afrikaners during the 
1960s
792
 but continued to involve themselves voluntarily in military or semi-military 
organisations like the CF units, MOTHS, Sappers Association, SA Legion
793
 and many 
others, besides participation in regular war commemorations. Part of „English‟ military 
service legacy from two World Wars and that of ancestors in the SA War and frontier 
wars were the constant reminders of cenotaphs and war memorials scattered throughout 
schools, universities, city or town public places and churches. Rather than any collective 
opposition by English-speaking whites against military service during the 1960s, there 
was rather acquiescence.  
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For example, the forced republican change of military titles and insignia did not dull 
enthusiasm in CF „English‟ units like the Cape Town Highlanders, one of the oldest CF 
regiments, where the constitutional alterations demanded new loyalties as opposed to 
those traditionally given to the British monarch. Orpen remarked upon the Cape Town 
Highlanders experience in 1961:  
The declaration of the Republic…brought with it the severance 
of some ties, which had been cherished for many years, but the 




The Highlanders discovered, contrary to rumours, that together with other „English‟ CF 
units, Fouché had no intention to interfere with their British originated traditions.
795
 And 
the regiment continued its vigorous participation within the SADF programmes of 
training manoeuvres and parades, while its ranks were swelled by recruits called up via 
the ballot system.
796
 This pattern was repeated throughout „traditional‟ „English‟ 
regiments as some of the historical antipathies slowly receded. In March 1966, the 
Highlanders received their new colours from Commandant General Hiemstra,
797
 whom 
two decades earlier, its wartime members would have openly despised. Lt Gen Ian 
Gleeson recalled of this period;  
 
during (the) time (when) the Union became a Republic and the 
royal titles and insignia of the former UDF were removed. This 
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upset a certain group of officers…but on the whole the main 
group of senior officers got on with the job at hand.”798  
 
This actually meant the continuance, indeed promotion of English South Africa‟s military 
traditions within a republican context, directly assisted by SADF call-ups and support for 
CF regiments. The Second World War generation still occupied the senior ranks in these 
„traditional „ regiments, which grew as the broader English community implicitly 
identified its prosperity and „whiteness‟ as being protected and included through 
government defence policies.  
 
Support for the SADF through the (white) English press and prominent military 
writer: Neil Orpen   
 
Interest in the English-language press during the 1960s towards local military affairs, 
reflects to an extent the broader interests of this community and journalists, but it also 
demonstrated a different tone to that which had been severely critical of the 1950s 
Defence Force‟s „Afrikanerisation‟. After initial English press hesitations about the 
republic, the growing national prosperity during the decade, which occurred alongside 
rumours of external threats, seemed to motivate journalistic support from Argus and 
South African Associated Press newspapers
799
 support of the SADF‟s aim for “white 
defence unity”. For example, at the beginning of 1962, the Cape Times reporting on the 
first of 10 000 men balloted as part of the extended training for nine months, covering the 
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local trainees‟ experiences with a gushingly enthusiastic article promoting the 
„unification‟ of the white language groups in this military context.   
There are boys from Bishopscourt and boys from Woodstock; 
English-speaking youths from the cities and Afrikaans-speaking 
from the platteland, working and living together in the rugged, 
healthy atmosphere of the army camp.
800
     
 
Regarding further extending military service to compulsory training for all white males of 
school-leaving age, the press projected the „English‟ community as not unsupportive of 
government intentions. In October 1966 when the debate on increasing conscription was 
a topical discussion point, the Cape Times reported:   
High-school youths of call-up age who were interviewed by the 
Cape Times yesterday endorsed the general agreement among 
industrialists, business men, school principals and defence 
experts that the proposed „100-per-cent call-up‟ was preferable to 




The newspaper quoted several prospective national servicemen, all of whom endorsed the 
new system with enthusiasm. Like most of the English papers, the Cape Times took a 
generally conservative view on defence matters, reflecting the political views of their 
middle-aged white readers and wary of differing with the government on defence 
issues.
802
 At the end of 1965, the Cape Times ran two lengthy articles by the military 
historian Neil Orpen, who was also an influential 1960s military analyst read in 
government and SADF circles.
803
 Orpen was a professional journalist, educated at St 
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John‟s College, Johannesburg and held an MA from Canterbury University. During more 
than forty years, Orpen published numerous books on South African military history, 
serving himself with the UDF in World War Two and being captured at Tobruk. After the 
war, Orpen pursued journalistic and CF careers, eventually commanding the Cape Field 
Artillery.
804
 He remained an active CF member till 1964, then turned his writing attention 
to republican military concerns. Orpen exemplified an English South African ex-
serviceman who put World War Two white divisions aside and embraced the “white 
nationalism” of the 1960s.  
 
The first of the long article referred to appeared under the heading: “If the Afro-Asians 
ever tried to invade South Africa”, where Orpen took a stridently anti-British tone in the 
wake of Rhodesian UDI two weeks earlier.
805
 Contemptuous of Britain‟s “molly-coddled 
young men in the increasingly effete atmosphere of so-called „affluent society‟” (where 
military national service had recently ended), Orpen warned that the UK would be 
powerless to prevent black African nationalism turning militant against white Rhodesia 
and speculated that a „African military invasion‟ of Rhodesia would inevitably draw in 
South African involvement, as it could be:  
the prelude to the adoption of similar means against South Africa 
on the pretext of placing a United Nations „presence‟ in South 
West Africa or, less hypocritically, for the cold-blooded 
smashing of White Government in the Republic.
806
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Orpen‟s article was a detailed continuation of a familiar contemporary theme: Perceived 
military threats against the republic. However, his article displayed a significant anti-
British sentiment, alongside identification and empathy with the Boer struggle against 
British Imperialism, being compared with white South Africa, Rhodesia and the 
Portuguese territories, facing current African and world hostility. Such embracement of 
the defensive “white nationalism” of the republic endorsed Afrikaner nationalist 
perceptions of contemporary common white defence interests. As a war veteran and 
highly regarded military writer, Orpen‟s views were published at length in a newspaper 
well known for historically expressing even jingoistic sentiments and hostility towards 
NP racial policies. Orpen‟s opinions may not have represented all „English‟ war veterans 
or CF members, but by 1965, he would most certainly have spoken on behalf of a good 
portion.     
 
The second article was entitled: “S.A.‟s Power to Resist,” with the sub-heading: “It is 
safe to say that 2 million men would be required to occupy South Africa effectively. Even 
then determined resistance would make their job impossible.”
807
 Orpen sketched his 
perceptions of the envisaged African invaders intentions. His emphasis was that (a 
common) white South African identity faced potential destruction.  
Any military threat to South Africa will go far beyond „one man, 
one vote‟. It will be the prelude to an attempt to exterminate the 
South Africans as a distinctive nation determined to maintain 
civilised standards that are higher than anywhere else in 
Africa.
808
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Orpen‟s views of defence, prominently placed within the Cape Time, reflected white 
uncertainties and reinforced the government‟s „backs to the wall‟ philosophy, 
demonstrating whites were aware of the military‟s growing prominence. As the SADF‟s 
role in „white survival‟ permeated gradually into the white South African consciousness, 
it was also assisting in acclimatising whites towards consenting with government and 
Defence Force thinking. Thus, there occurred alongside the general reorganisation and 
rearming of the SADF, a growing white community acceptance of the military adopting 
an enlarged role in their lives on Afrikaner nationalist terms. Referring to defence 
priorities, Orpen could easily have been speaking directly on behalf of Hiemstra and 
Verwoerd: 
South Africa‟s main danger lies in the possibility – that Britain 
has already lost control of events in Africa, with the initiative 
passing into the hands of irresponsible advocates of force, which 
itself will create the chaos (that can only be controlled by the 
application of an even greater force) sweeping southwards like a 
tidal wave to engulf the Republic. To prevent this, we need to 
prepare ourselves spiritually as much as physically. 
Determination is the key to our security.
809
    
 
In 1967, Orpen collated articles he had written concerning his envisaged role of the 
SADF commandos within a book called Total Defence.
810
 Here he described, rather 
implausibly, commando units forming a kind of irregular force fighting behind enemy 
lines. His historical inspiration was that of Boer guerrilla forces in 1900-02, supporting 





















White English South African schools and the military 
 
Some white English boys‟ schools had cadet detachments with origins dating back nearly 
a century and many of these, both private and public, existed in Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, Natal and the Eastern Cape; this was in contrast to there being relatively 
fewer Afrikaans-medium single sex schools. These older South African English 
educational institutions, still containing a lingering legacy of an original ethos, namely 
preparing young men to serve the British Empire. This educational cultural heritage 
component ensured that these schools were ideal training grounds for imbuing respect 
regarding strict military conformity and discipline, whether manifested in the classroom, 
sports field or cadets training sessions. John Lambert has written of white South African 
elite boys schools serving as “munitions factories” for providing young men for the 
forces during the First World War, being inculcated by their schools with patriotism for 
the British Empire. But it could certainly be argued that thirty to forty years later, despite 
the disappearance of the Empire, much of the same masculine educational dynamics 
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South African boys‟ schools placed a high emphasis upon physical prowess, prefect 
leadership and traditions that reinforced a hierarchical pecking order based upon 
seniority, sporting feats and physical dominance. 1960s type school discipline for 
relatively minor issues was even inflicted upon recruits who fell foul of the criminal 
justice system. During the 1960 State of Emergency call-up, three CF soldiers, Edgar 
Sven Christensen (21), David John Cheek (20), and Gerald Edmund Gouvaras (18) were 
sentenced to whippings by a Durban Magistrate for smoking dagga, who remarked that 
they had made themselves “incapable of carrying out their duties during a serious 
situation in the country.”
812
 Traditional male educational culture still co-existed with 
classroom teaching styles; that some private schools permitted broader thinking than 
what generally existed in state schools, particularly regarding subjects like History and 
English. Certainly there was significantly more chance of educational open-mindedness 
in English schools compared their Afrikaans equivalents. Such was the educational 
milieu from which numerous English-speaking boys emerged during the 1960s to begin 
their military training, where they also consciously or unconsciously anticipated formal 
military service from a long historical perspective. Their inevitable role of spending some 
time in the armed forces was part of a broader community‟s collective memory through 
fraternal association. War service had often constituted memorable milestones for fathers 
and grandfathers and more often than not occupied a respected place in family histories. 
While political controversies had raged within the Afrikaner community over service 
during both World Wars, many English South African families reflected back on 
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members war service as time and sacrifices honourably spent.
813
 It would have been 
common to see medals mounted on display in homes together with photographs of family 
members in uniform.  
 
Therefore, boys in a conformist and conservative society would have been socialised to 
view military service to one‟s country as at least obligatory and often approved of. As 
significant numbers of „English‟ during the 1960s were conscious of the military being 
part of family memory and folklore, they would have anticipated such a digression in 
their own lives, because military experiences had been significantly influential in the 
lives of their parents and grandparents. And it appeared to reinforce much of the 
traditional masculine norms that their schools reinforced. The 1960s white South African 
generation did not experience the same awareness of black organisations strongly 
opposing apartheid injustices. Young white soldiers in this period would therefore have 
been more likely to have accepted government explanations for military service: For 
example, understanding their call-ups during the 1960s because of „black riots‟ 
threatening the white community or being trained to repel other external or internal 
„threats‟ linked to „communism‟. The English-language press reinforced these views, for 
example, the Cape Argus in one post-Sharpeville article, implied that the men were 
favourably comprehending and accepting of their role. The newspaper quoted the Duke 
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 Commanding Officer stating that (within this „English‟ 
regiment, whose members were hastily summoned for duty): “The morale of the men is 
very high indeed”
815
         
 
The UP and the SADF: The Official Opposition begins to lose „English‟ political 
support 
 
During 1960 to 1968, the UP made every effort to assure the government and white 
public that the parliamentary opposition was supportive of government initiatives to 
secure the country‟s defence. The UP attempted to challenge the government where its 
members perceived political advantages in highlighting strategic errors regarding the 
country becoming more isolated, or the government‟s apparent lack of foresight in 
planning for new equipment acquisitions. The reality by 1960 was that Verwoerd‟s 
political vision for South Africa, in terms of separate black and white states, was 
acquiring increasingly more ideological conviction amongst whites. Therefore local 
defence matters, set in the white public minds against a turbulent continent and perceived 
as linked to the Cold War ideological struggle, made it more difficult for the UP to 
always convince the white electorate that NP‟s management of defence was wanting. 
Rather than successfully use defence issues to chip away at the government‟s support, the 
UP found the converse happening, in that political debate on national security and threats, 
reduced its space to be critical. With the Erasmus controversies still fresh, the UP 
attempted through its MP war veterans to demonstrate government defence 
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mismanagement. During one particularly heated debate in March 1960 there were UP 
accusations of favouritism in the SADF that resulted in the furious trading of insults, 
including accusations levelled of cowardice and fraud.
816
 But in the changing African and 
international circumstances the UP faced a dilemma of opposing the NP on defence, 
without wanting to appear unrealistic regarding security to conservative and nervous 
white voters.  
 
After the Sharpeville emergency and the SADF call-up, UP defence spokesman P. Moore 
mentioned during the debate on the Defence Vote that ballottee training was too short, 
while Progressive Party MP J. P. Cope displayed an extraordinary lack of grasp on South 
African defence realities in 1960, suggesting the government buy the navy an aircraft 
carrier.
817
 By the mid-1960s, the UP had moved their defence focus to challenging the 
government on the SADF‟s efficiency, criticising alleged bad treatment of conscripts and 
challenging the military‟s cost-effectiveness. Fouché‟s appointment was watched closely 
by the UP and English-language press, who were still generally supportive of the 
parliamentary Official Opposition and both entities responded mostly positively to 
Fouché‟s white “rapprochement”.  
 
Press reports also demonstrate that journalists were hardly ignorant of the NP‟s intentions 
of using defence issues as political campaign material. The UP tried to counter this, by 
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for example challenging the government over the country‟s lack of military alliances.
818
 
Opposition newspapers and the UP certainly agreed with government views that potential 
military threats must be counted with appropriate defence preparations. Verwoerd, 
Fouché and the Afrikaans press concurred with UP MP Sydney Waterson‟s views on 
“threats” to the Republic by March 1962, which included black states with „communist‟ 
assistance “threatening invasion”; potential global war involving South Africa and 
international military intervention to end apartheid.
819
 Die Burger remarked that 
Waterson‟s approach was in contrast to UP “progressive defeatism,” which the NP 
elaborated as being not resolutely accepting that South Africa‟s „enemies‟ wanted no less 
than black rule.
820
 Early 1962 was a period in which Afro-Asian or the UN „invasion 
scenarios‟ prompted a range of articles and editorials. A Cape Times editorial urged 
Fouché to use defence in a racially inclusive way, thereby destroying any propaganda 
case created outside the country.
821
 When the UN arms embargo was implemented from 
1963, the UP fully supported the government and its leader Graaff used the same 
arguments as the NP, accusing the international organisation of hypocrisy.
822
       
 
UP confusion between criticising the government, but also generally supporting them in 
defence issues was typified by their most senior member, Maj Piet Van der Byl, who had 
been an officer at the Defence Force‟s 1912 inception. In 1964, when the Huisgenoot ran 
an article by Van der Byl, an Afrikaner royalist and Smutsman, where he lamented how 
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he was now harbouring doubts about his anti-republican stance a few years earlier. Van 
der Byl expressed outrage for British „ingratitude‟ to the South African military 
contributions during 1939 to 1945 and in the Korean War, expressing confidence that the 
entire country would unite to defend itself against any future military attacks.
823
 Such 
would have perfectly suited NP propaganda goals aimed at rallying white unity across 
political party lines. Van der Byl‟s frustration essentially personified the dilemma facing 
traditionally UP-supporting English-speaking whites feeling abandoned by the Britain 
and the Commonwealth, whose links to South Africa they had tried to justify and defend 
only a few years earlier. The article‟s context was the British Labour Party anticipating 
not completing arms deliveries to South Africa:   
Let me put it plainly: I am a strong opponent of the current 
government. I am foremost a South African and then a politician. 
In the Referendum I voted against South Africa becoming a 
republic, concerned that we would lose our bonds with the 
Commonwealth and everything associated with these. But I am 
now beginning to wonder if I was not indeed wrong, particularly 
when viewing the possibility that the leader of the British Labour 
Party, Harold Wilson could quite possibly become Prime 
Minister of Britain this year, and has already stated that he will 
not deliver any weapons to South Africa- (that we require) to 
protect our woman and children.
824
   
 
Van der Byl concluded with a popularist tirade that reflected white South African beliefs 
that counter-belligerence was a justifiable response against the bellicose tones emanating 
from African leaders in the UN. Van der Byl rationale demonstrated how the UP‟s 
defence perspective, like the government‟s, would reinforce the white South African 
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sense of injustice being perpetrated against their country, whom they protested had been 
historically loyal to worthy international causes: 
South Africa was one of the few members of the UNO who kept 
to her commitments and despatched one of its best Air Force 
squadrons to Korea. And what of the Black states of Africa? 
They do not even pay their member contributions at the UNO, 
but are allowed and encouraged to single out and insult South 
Africa, a founder member (and who always promptly paid her 
membership contributions and gratuities.) Let us bring the 
political tin men of the world to their senses, if South Africa is 
attacked, every man and woman (except the few that sell 
themselves to the enemy), will stand together and fight- 




In the white political contest for votes, the UP had long shed the vast majority of its 
Afrikaans voters and when considering national defence issues, the NP had begun to 
draw conservative white support from both language groups. The UP sometimes differed 
in terms of strategies to bolster defences against perceived enemies, but Die Burger in 
March 1962, made the point that it was unlikely a post-1948 UP government would have 
made any difference regarding Afro-Asian hostility – a point that may well have reflected 
what UP supporters already knew.
826
 English South Africans interested in defence affairs 
maintained an outlook on international relations akin to the war against fascism, viewing 
the Cold War along similar lines as World War Two with „Western Civilisation‟ facing a 
global totalitarian threat. This kind of paradigm could be adjusted with ease to fit the 
official government interpretation of understanding Soviet and Chinese communism 
directing the main military threats to the Republic. Such is what Orpen and other 
commentators proceeded to do during the 1960s.     
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Several newspaper correspondents wrote lengthy opinion pieces along these lines, but 
some were also distinctly critical of the UP Defence correspondents. T. Scott of the Cape 
Argus remarked in August 1964 that “The (recent) Parliamentary debate on the Defence 
Vote was pathetic and no UP speaker showed a real grasp of South Africa‟s strategic and 
defence problems.”
827
 Such opinions, however subjective, also suggested that by the 
1960s, in terms of conservative South Africa opinion, the UP had started to struggle to 
retain credibility as the political party with the best outlook for defence. The party 
assumed it could contribute informed debate on defence issues, partly because of the high 
number of its MPs with war experience. Even with its numbers of MPs reduced from 49 
to 39 seats during the 1966 elections, the UP still boasted 26 parliamentarian ex-
servicemen.
828
 They included a group who were not only war veterans, but also victims 
of the Erasmus‟s political purging, including former SAAF Brigadiers Jimmy Durrant 
and Bronkhorst, Col de Vos and ex-army officers, Comdt Kingwell, Col J. D. Pretorius 
and Col Gideon Jacobs.
829
 This apparent wealth of military expertise was markedly 
lacking amongst government parliamentarians, resulting sometimes in both the UP and 
English-language press assuming the voters would respond favourably to the opposition 
barracking the government on defence issues.   
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But defence issues and controversies of the 1940s and 1950s were not necessarily 
foremost in the voters‟ minds during the 1960s. Despite some individual misgivings, the 
UP had supported government security legislation in the 1960s in the wake of Poqo 
attacks at Paarl and Bashee River (1962-63), besides the earlier MK and ARM sabotage 
attacks and the Johannesburg station bomb of mid-1964. Issues related to potential 
“external invasions” mentioned in the press, blended into the general perceptions of white 
insecurity, which was further enhanced by the grim accounts from Congo of inter-racial 
violence. UP spokespersons acknowledged the unsettled times and were supportive of the 
hard-line justice minister Vorster, who during April 1963 defended the new security bill 
in the Senate. It including legislation allowing for anybody suspected of sabotage or any 
offence under the Suppression of Communism or Unlawful Organisations Acts to be 
summarily detained by the state for up to ninety days at a time. MP Pilkington-Jordan, 
who was also a prominent UP defence spokesman, described how Vorster had remained 
courteous, patient and objective throughout the debate and despite wielding enormous 
powers had abused none of them. “This is a proud claim that I do not only concede 
unhesitatingly, but gladly”.
830
 However accurate this description may have been 
regarding Vorster‟s parliamentary demeanour, detainee accounts starkly refute the latter 
point in terms of physical violence meted out to those held by security police.
831
 
Pilkington-Jordan‟s urbane and complimentary assessment of Vorster demonstrated just 
how close the NP and UP had drawn on white security issues; within twenty years a 
former senior UDF member who had fought against Nazism, referred so complimentarily 
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to a former Ossewabrandwag general. The Cape Times while acknowledging that Fouché 
was apparently trying to move away from the (white) political polarisation over defence 
affairs that had characterised the Erasmus period, the newspaper still accused the 
government of ignoring the opposition‟s „expertise‟.
832
 In the spirit of drawing both 
language groups behind the Republic, Die Burger affirmed that the “Opposition men 
should be more closely involved in confidential discussions and planning (on 
defence)”.
833
 But NP suspicions and their distancing of the party from the UP remained 
and they continued often to be not forthcoming to their parliamentary opponents 
regarding defence matters. UP defence analyst, J.R. Bowring makes this clear in a 
document dated 27 July 1964:  
On the assumption that some information is better than none the 
White Paper reluctantly issued on Defence by the Defence 
Minister in consequence of United Party pressure may be 
regarded as a step forward.
834
        
       
As a shrewd „politician‟ Hiemstra perceived that the UP were gradually losing voter 
loyalties, in contrast to the 1950s when it still gained some limited mileage within its 
English supporters over NP wartime neutrality and Erasmus‟s SADF transformation. 
835
 
Afrikaner nationalist historian C.F.J. Muller explains that one of the hidden political 
purposes of establishing a Republic was the consolidation amongst white South Africans 
of pro-republicans and anti-republicans into pro-Apartheid and anti-apartheid groupings. 
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This ensured what Verwoerd assumed would be an enhancement of white security
836
 and 
by the 1966 general election, the NP started to draw part of the white English vote.
837
 
This not only marked the UP‟s failure to retain all it‟s most dependable voters, but it was 
also a clear rejection of the opposition‟s attempts during the 1960s to outbid the NP in 
defence issues. The 1966 election results demonstrated that the end was in sight for the 
UP by their winning only 39 out of 166 seats and barely forty percent of the votes, 
compared with the slender majority just achieved by the republicans in the referendum 
six years previously. Despite the impressive military background of many UP MPs, even 
the white English electorate with its scores of war veterans were no longer a guaranteed 
voter support bloc for the party, despite the UP taking defence issues exceptionally 
seriously and its attempted cooperation with Fouché. 
 
 White English-speaking Natal 1960-61: Last public manifestations of an English 
South African identity coupled to historic military experience   
 
During the early 1960s significant portions of the white Natal English community 
demonstrated something of a separate identify in terms of protest against both the 
republic and Afrikaner government, echoing something of the idealism and enthusiasm of 
the Torch Commando activities a few years previously. But an even more discernable 
feature was how quickly this final „white English protest‟ containing a military symbolic 
form dissipated after republic, never to re-emerge in the same form.    
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Afrikaner perceptions of English-speaking whites shortly after the republican referendum 
contribute to our insight into how previous military service and patriotism remained an 
integral part of English South African culture. During February and March 1961, the 
Afrikaans magazine Huisgenoot ran a three part article on a journalist‟s (P.C. Du Plessis) 
study entitled “Who or what is a Natalian”?
838
 There is no doubt that Huisgenoot’s large 
circulation would have been influential in contributing to moulding some Afrikaner 
opinions. This detailed and well-illustrated series opened with a large photograph of 
Natal ex-servicemen, including one holding a large Union Jack, attending an 11 
November 1960 Armistice Day commemoration, accompanied by other banner-wielding 
MOTH „Shellhole‟ members, recalling battle names and jargon that reflected World War 
experiences:  
Special cheering came in turn for this group with the Union Jack. 
The Union Jack has recently become, like many times in the past, 





This involvement by Natal MOTHS in political campaigns is a component that Neil 
Roos‟s study misses, with his contention that the organisation by the early 1960s was 
only acquiescent and apathetic regarding the political order. In fact amongst English 
South Africans in Natal, there were strident, albeit brief, mass objections to the Republic, 
directly involving the MOTHS and their ex-servicemen. Besides the tiny handful of war 
veterans who assisted the MK sabotage campaign
840
 there were also MOTHS that 
continued their wartime idealism, albeit in this final sectional secessionist manner, This 
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detail negates Roos‟s assertion: “the Order kept its distance from party politics and 
vigorously affirmed the „apolitical‟ service identity of white veterans”.
841
 The mass 
involvement of Natal ex-servicemen was also related to the remaining afterglow from the 





 Natal war veterans displayed even more extreme „jingoistic‟ fervour by turning out in 
their hundreds during the February 1960 Ladysmith Relief 50
th
 anniversary 
commemorations, specifically because Fouché denied the inclusion of SADF 
participation.
843
 At certain points of friction, English/ Afrikaner divisions became public, 
particularly when sectional passions were aroused within a military context. British 
Empire symbolism in 1960 retained some lingering meaning amongst some Natal white 
English ex-servicemen. Although the full implications of the Wind of Change Speech for 
Natal and English South Africa were not yet fully comprehended by nearly a thousand 
ex-servicemen and women, who in defiance of the Town Council decision not to either 
fly the Union Jack nor play the British National Anthem during the commemorations, 
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Huisgenoot acknowledged the powerful antipathy felt by English-speaking white 
Natalians for the coming republic, as this attitude was presented by Natal politicians, 
newspapers, public meetings, separatist organisations and military symbolism. Another 
photograph shows a crowd of Natal ex-servicemen and Natal Succession supporters 
around the Durban City Hall with a man carried shoulder-high holding a placard bearing 
a swastika, under which is boldly written „Natal Says No‟.
845
 Some of the other examples 
of paramilitary jingoism in Natal during this period suggest extraordinary eccentricity, 
but help us to comprehend the depth of community opinions. The Natal Mercury 
reported:  
A Durban ex-soldier, Mr Leslie Roberts, ….is looking for men 
with pluck and initiative who are interested in restoring British 
pageantry to the life of Natal and who are prepared to undertake 
ceremonial duties at the weekends and on special 
occasions…..the Legion of Frontiersmen….is a Commonwealth 
organization with between 50 000 and 60 000 members in 
Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand”. (uniformed with a 
dark blue tunic, khaki riding breeches, riding boots and scout-




English Natal emphatically rejected the republic at the ballot box and during the May 
1961 celebrations,
847
 but Huisgenoot debunked any conception that this community was 
still really „British‟ in loyalty and identity. The publication‟s study is not without some 
pertinent insights explaining English Natalians‟ attitudes opposing republic and their 
grappling with a multiple sense of identity as being South African, Natalian, „English‟ 
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and white. The second and third articles focused upon white Natalian fears of 
overwhelming Zulu demographics, their general hostility towards Indians and the long-
standing political conservatism of the province‟s British-descended inhabitants.
848
 
Huisgenoot specifically mentioned the January 1960 violence at Cato Manor, where nine 
white policemen had been murdered. This located the Natal „English‟ directly in the 
contemporary national political context of racial uncertainty and violence, a consequence 
according to the writer, of Cato Manor being the “breeding ground of mischief since the 
streaming in of natives to Durban during the war years”. Because white Natalians were 
“surrounded by Bantus and Indians” they were “perhaps more aware of the tensions 




By integrating the common white fears of racial conflict and domination, the article 
implicitly called for some understanding by Afrikaners of the Natal „English‟ 
„eccentricity‟ regarding their „war-orientated‟ political posturing. Afrikaner readers were 
introduced to the connection between English South Africans‟ strong consciousness of 
their war service, so earnestly annually commemorated as „honourably performed‟. The 
Huisgenoot analysis encouraged their readers to focus upon common white political 
concerns touching both Afrikaner and English.  
It was the big day of the year for them-„The day of the march‟ 
when they gather from all quarters of Durban to bring homage to 
their fallen comrades at the Cenotaph in front of the City Hall. A 
day when medals and decorations are brought out of storage and 
displayed proudly on the chest…in their hearts they are once 
again soldiers, and years of training in the war has left its impact 
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upon them. This is another aspect of Natal that people need to 
understand…this emotional sense of bond by virtually the entire 
province to the things that so many of its inhabitants fought for 
in two World Wars…nowhere have I been made more aware of 
the estrangement that the Second World War brought between 
the two white nationalisms (sic) as in Natal. In other provinces 
there are signs that the estrangement is being bridged. But in 
Natal, the most unilingual province in the country, fed by 
newspapers that all follow nearly the same political direction, the 
Englishman still thinks on Afrikaners as „Hitler-supporters‟, 
Quislings, Nazis. The idiom of a war twenty years ago has 
become the idiom whereby the Natalian- in a greater degree than 
his kindred spirits in the rest of the Union- continues today his 
political struggle.
850
             
 
The magazine was also trying to influence its readers in understanding their white 
English countrymen‟s motives and fears. Namely that like Afrikaners, the Natal English 
were also insecure, beleaguered and outnumbered South African whites facing the long-
term political realities of a black demographic majority. Within the province during 1960, 
there had on occasion been violent political exchanges between the two white 
communities. Republican feelings ran equally high amongst Afrikaners, as a reminiscing 
letter quoted below vividly shows and such violent hostility towards the „English‟ 
amongst nationalist crowds at public meetings needed tempering in order for the 
government to achieve long-term political objectives:  
When a meeting was held in Vryheid, the sparks really began to 
fly. Avid Afrikaner republicans refused to allow the meeting to 
start and, armed with bicycle chains and knuckle-dusters, laid 




One Durban grouping calling itself the “Horticultural Society” spoke of armed resistance 
after “Natal succession”; “holding the line of the Drakensberg against republican troops”, 
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while ex-servicemen were being publicly called upon to “march again”. The Natal UP 
leader Douglas Mitchell was swept along with the hysteria, much to party national leader 
De Villiers Graaff‟s embarrassment. Mitchell went as far as approaching Verwoerd, the 
British High Commissioner and Sir Roy Welensky to discuss possibilities of Natal 
joining the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
852
 But the post-republic period also 
saw a rapid waning of such emotions and the referendum issues, with some English 
South Africans shifted their political positions more quickly than they might have ever 
imagined. An illustration of this is provided by the actions of a schoolmaster at Kearsney 
College in Durban. After South Africa‟s departure from the British Commonwealth, he 
reacted by wearing his World War Two uniform during an emotional address to the 
school boys on their „English heritage‟ and the „betrayal‟ of the republican declaration. 
Several years later, the same individual went on to serve the government in various 




White English-Speaking South Africans and war veterans within the SA Army 
Permanent Force  
 
Since the beginning of his cabinet tenure, Fouché had tried to reassure the „English‟ that 
his explicit policy would be promoting English/Afrikaans cooperation in defence issues. 
Fouché was sometimes caught between two political constituencies, but an important test 
of his determination in achieving the above goal was whether there would be a 
discernible reversal of favouritism in PF promotions and appointments. The considerably 
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smaller navy and air force were different in their PF composition regarding the language 
groups, when compared to the army, with both the former services still containing 
significant numbers of English-speaking members. Yet despite overwhelming Afrikaner 
numerical dominance, there were English-speaking army members who also pursued 
successful senior careers during the 1960s. When recalling English-speaking colleagues 
from the era, Lt Gen Ian Gleeson, provided numerous names who had held significant 
ranks and important responsibilities;
854





No statistical documentation was located to precisely quantify English-speaking PF army 
members. It appears that within the PF, the navy were roughly fifty-fifty by the end of the 
1960s; the army overwhelming Afrikaans, but with scattered English-speaking members 
in some key positions, while one study has shown there was increased English-speaking 
air force recruitment during the second part of the 1960s.
856
 There is no doubt that during 
the 1960s a core of professional soldiers, sailors and airmen remained in the SADF 
despite the divisions from the Erasmus years, many of whom were World War Two 
veterans. Such a deduction is also reasonably well verified by promotion lists, when 
studied according to surnames and brief descriptions of individual service records. It is 
contended here, that these men also played a significant role in the SADF‟s 
reinvigoration. Gleeson who joined the army in 1953, was a captain by 1960 and 
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promoted to major in 1962, related that between the mid-1950s into the 1960s, “a strong 
group of World War Two veterans” in both the PF and CF, from both English and 
Afrikaans backgrounds, made up a high percentage of the command and training 
structure of the UDF/SADF. Despite the significant numbers of personnel who left 
because of the Erasmus‟s interferences, Gleeson believed the majority of those who 
remained should receive credit for “helping to lay the foundation for a professional 




Brig Gen McGill Alexander concurred that scores of World War Two veterans, including 
many English-speakers, were in the army during our period, although he described them 
as “scattered”.
858
 Gleeson recalled that North Africa and Italian campaign veterans were 
employed as officer instructors at the Artillery and Armour School, besides the other 
main training units at Potchefstroom and Bloemfontein and the higher training 
establishments such as the Military College. He remarked that: “Their knowledge and 
professional approach was of great value to us as young officers”
859
 An examination of 
articles in 1960s Commando editions also suggests that „English‟ members of the PF 
were a fairly significant SADF minority and that World War Two veterans were 
comparatively common. Commando regularly published accounts describing SADF 
members war service. A typical example being when a prominent veteran, Col P.S. De 
Lange MC, was introduced within the January 1961 edition as being on the SA Military 
College staff. His Military Cross had been awarded after participation in the Sidi Rezegh 
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 The same edition lists within the “Annual Promotions” article, significant 
numbers of officers with English-surnames besides those from both language 





Fouché had publicly insisted that he would only ratify promotions considered without 
political favouritism and just after the „invasion scare‟ stories of March 1962, the Cape 
Times reported the minister approving one hundred and thirty SADF promotions, citing 
these were: “warmly received in the Defence Force. Many English-speaking officers are 
involved”.
862
 In line with the declarations made by Fouché, the Cape Argus editorial 
remarked: “the reason given is the expansion of the Defence Force and the basis for 
selecting individuals for promotion is the new policy of merit and service”.
863
 This 
quotation endorses the point made that the English-language press responded to its white 
readers‟ interest in the involvement of their community in the SADF. There is also no 
doubt that Fouché was anxious to maintain the momentum of this change in perception. 
At a regimental dinner in Bloemfontein during September 1962, he implicitly criticised 
his predecessor for allowing political opinion to influence SADF appointments and 
reiterated that this practice had been discontinued.  
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I am a nationalist and I am a minister in the national government. 
But I will consider my officers in the Defence Force  only on 
merit. This is my firm policy. I have the greatest faith in the 
South African army. There will be difference of opinion amongst 
my officers, naturally on policies and the way they are carried 
out. But we have built mutual trust which has led to higher 




Concerning World War Two veterans and English-speakers being prominent in SADF 
training during the early 1960s, Gleeson further elaborated upon prominent appointments. 
At the SA Military College, two prominent soldiers Majors Doug Campbell and Bill 
Barends, who both held MCs from the Italian campaign,
865
 taught tactics to students on 
promotion courses. Gleeson also recalled Comdt Ronnie McWilliam who held an OBE 
and commanded 4 Field Training Regiment of the SA Artillery in Potchefstroom, while 
Comdt Robbertse held a DSO and was a senior staff instructor on the staff duties course, 
while Col Jannie Burger
866
 (OBE) was later commander of the College.
867
 Orpen refers 
specifically to Burger as “one of the most outstanding young professional artillery 
officers in the UDF, who had already received the MBE for his services in the desert 
fighting in 1942”. Many other names were deduced from a number of sources, referring 
to English-speaking army officers at ranks from major upwards. Magnus Malan who was 
identified in late the 1950s as a soldier of both promise and sound nationalist background, 
progressed meteorically through the 1960s, attaining positions clearly significant at the 
time, but alongside both war veterans and other aspiring officers who had joined the PF 
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in the post-war years. After a sort stint as second in command of the Military Academy, 
Malan during August 1960 attended the Army‟s Command and Staff Course in Pretoria 
along with Constand Viljoen who was a future SADF Chief and Bob Rogers a future 
SAAF Chief. By late 1961, Malan worked at the Directorate of Planning and Operations 
alongside Jannie Burger who impressed Malan immensely, 
868
 besides Combat Gen Piet 
Jacobs and later Combat Gen Nic Bierman. All of these officers barring Malan and 
Viljoen were war veterans. Brig Jannie Burger, whom Malan suggested would have been 
a future Army Chief, died suddenly, aged 47, from a heart attack during the SADF‟s 




      
 
The appointments at army training establishments of war veterans, many of whom were 
English-speaking, shows this grouping were valued and utilized in terms of their 
professionalism and experiences. Gleeson remarked that when he arrived at the College 
in 1960, he felt the senior officers‟ demonstrated professionalism:   
(Within) that important military institution (it was) very 
encouraging. They left me with the positive impression of getting 
on with the job rather than allowing a bad political period to 





Gleeson referred to how the appointment of a civil servant from another department in 
1960 as officer commanding the prestigious Military College, turned out to be a passing 
phase, where shortly afterwards a professional officer replaced him. Gleeson recalled this 
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clearly political appointment being a “civil servant” commander, who had been a part 
time soldier from the CF or Commandos but transferred from a civilian department. The 
new appointee apparently had neither the military background nor knowledge for such a 
prestigious post as Military College Head: “A futile attempt on the part of somebody 
higher up to make a political move which did not work”.
871
 By late 1963, another Italian 
campaign veteran, the English-speaking Brigadier W.R. Van der Riet MC was the 
commander of the College.
872
 Dawid Grobbelaar explained that his Commandant General 
father made a number of personnel changes where he brought in CF and English-
speakers, although he would have had to trade off using Afrikaner nationalists and 
Broederbond members in order to allow Fouché, the politician, to balance “merit” 




Gleeson‟s and others accounts indicate that neither the World War Two veterans nor 
English-speakers were pointedly marginalized within the SADF during the 1960s and 
that there was not quite as complete a purge in the Defence Force during the 1950s as 
Boulter and others have intimated. During the Fouché period, the SADF became a higher 
priority government department because of 1960s government security needs perceptions. 
The Defence Force remained another means by which NP aspirations of promoting white 
unity could be advanced, but there was no intention or likelihood of Afrikaner nationalist 
control over the armed forces being relinquished. Hiemstra‟s path  to the top remained 
assured, as were those of some of his “own men” like Lt Gen Willem Louw (See pp 133-
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134 of chapter two). However, a few other senior Afrikaner officers who had been 
appointed purely on political considerations were replaced, like for example Maj Gen 
Sybrand Engelbrecht who in 1963 was removed as Chief of the Army, to be replaced by 
Maj Gen Piet Jacobs.   
 
The Afrikaans language and culture still received regular affirmation in a military context 
through Commando. Although never mentioning the NP by name, the publication also 
ensured slavish adherence to party political opinions on defence issues, where readers 
were exposed to a purely republican viewpoint. English-speaking SADF members could 
not have commented publicly upon such issues without compromising their own careers. 
While in the British military tradition it was expected that politics were not discussed by 
officers in uniform, a kind of converse applied in the SADF, whereby it was implicitly 
understood that the NP government was „speaking‟ for both language groups. 
“Republicanism” represented a de facto supposedly inclusive South African patriotism, 
representing a form of „political correctness‟ which underpinned 1960s SADF culture and 
its official stance regarding its role. White English-speakers serving in the military and 
particularly those with career ambitions in the PF, would have ensured a wide distance 
from controversial political discussion.
874
 SADF members who were„English‟ and those 
with World War Two experience, did not challenge Afrikaner nationalism because of 
these issues in themselves. Rather their expertise was required and utilized, in contrast to 
some events during the 1950s, provided there was no shifting away from an official 
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„professional‟ stance whereby they did or said nothing that might be perceived as 
challenging government viewpoints.  
 
„English‟ mavericks within the PF were watched, for example, as a middle-ranking navy 
officer during the early 1960s, Rear Adm Max Kramer found himself the object of 
bizarre political observation. Sometime during 1965 Kramer was summoned by Hiemstra 
who stated that he wanted to be sure that he (Kramer) was “loyal”. Somebody, Kramer 
suspected one of the warrant-officers who also lived in the Da Gama Park naval suburb in 
the south Cape Peninsula had reported that Kramer as being an associate of a „Mrs 
Knight‟. She was apparently a known „liberal‟, where in fact Kramer only knew of her 
through their jointly serving on the Fish Hoek Primary School PTA. Another inference of 
state paranoia was evidenced by the presence of an American diplomat‟s vehicle outside 
Kramer‟s house. This resulted in some vaguely construed official concern that Kramer 





Afrikaner Broederbond recruitment continued steadily within the SADF during the 
1960s, mostly at middle ranking level.
876
 According to Col Jan Breytenbach, lower and 
middle ranking officer members of the Broederbond would be canvassed regarding 
SADF senior appointments, before such were ratified by the defence minister. This 
process would exclude the nomination of individuals for promotion, whose opinions, 
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according to Broederbond members, clashed with Afrikaner nationalist interests.
877
 Lt 
Gen Gleeson related that during 1967 when Willem Louw was making rapid career 
progress under Hiemstra towards Chief of the Army, the government were still looking 
for Broederbond members for senior appointments, which for “us at the lower levels this 
was something to be seen as a negative”.
878
 Under P.W. Botha the Fouché „equality 
policy‟ in officer appointments continued, although by the end of the 1960s to the mid-
1970s, the remaining war veterans retired or according to Brig Gen McGill Alexander, 





Lieutenant General C. A. (“Pops”) Fraser  
 
One of the most senior English-speaking SADF soldiers was Charles A. (Pops) Fraser 
who retired in the 1970s as a Lieutenant General and as mentioned earlier, from 1967 
held the senior position of Joint Combat Forces Chief (JCF) and before that Chief of the 
Army.
880
 Fraser served in the artillery during World War Two in both the North African 
and Italian campaigns. Along with that of Lt Gen W. R Van der Riet, Fraser‟s career 
reached the most senior level of any English-speaking army officers after 1948. Fraser‟s 
appointment JCF Chief (with English-speaker Brig Bill Barends as his second in 
command) in 1967 was significant for this was the SADF central organisational combat 
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component, drawn from different corps in the event of a conventional threat.
881
 Fraser 
was considered an expert on revolutionary warfare and became particularly influential 
within the SADF in this regard during 1967-68.
882
     
 
Maj Gen Phil Pretorius thought defence ministers Fouché and P.W. Botha had both 
viewed Fraser as „representative‟ of the „English fraternity‟ and they took his views 
carefully into consideration: For example, Fraser often passed books on topical defence 
issues across to them for study. Pretorius experienced Fraser as a skilled diplomat, 
although concurred with Lt Gen Jack Dutton that the JCF concept as a sort of task force 
to deal with a conventional threat, was too unwieldy from a command point of view.
883
 
Gen Magnus Malan recalled Fraser as highly competent and he believed that it was his 
writing that during the late 1960s that shifted SADF senior officers‟ mindsets away from 
conventional warfare towards revolutionary/counter-insurgency warfare.
884
 Maj Gen 
Dunbar Moodie also considered Fraser an outstanding diplomat, but thought him a rather 
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Brig Gen Alexander disagreed with such an assessment and suggested that Fraser as JCF 
Chief would have done meticulous planning for operations during the 1960s. He 
concurred that Fraser‟s theoretical contribution was decisive regarding to changes to 
SADF strategy towards counter-insurgency planning and training.
886
 Vice Adm Martin 
Trainor
887
 felt that Fraser was a highly competent officer whose writings had a significant 
impression upon Botha and other senior SADF officers. Col Jan Breytenbach had a high 
regard for Fraser, saying that he would have been the ideal Commandant General and 
may well have introduced black SADF combat troops earlier than Breytenbach did 
himself in 1976. But the Commandant General‟s position was one of significant political 
importance during the mid-1960s and Hiemstra was the long intended incumbent.
888
  
      
Lieutenant General Jack Dutton 
 
Dutton who retired as Chief of Army Staff in the early 1980s had been seconded to the 
British army during the Korean War, making him one of the very few SADF PF army 
officers gaining combat experience during the 1950s. Dutton was a determined 
professional who despite 1950s political controversies in the UDF/SADF had clearly 
decided to make a success of his military career. Dutton confirmed that the years post-
1955 were particularly difficult, in that he remained a captain for a long period. Fearing 
his chances of advancement were prejudiced, he had considered leaving the military 
during the 1950s but decided against it. However, Fouché‟s arrival as defence minister in 
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1960 resulted in what he in retrospect perceived as entirely fair treatment between 
English and Afrikaans officers in terms of their prospects and opportunities. During the 
1960s Dutton commanded various units. He acknowledged that he always adopted an 
explicitly apolitical stance and concentrated entirely upon his work, recalling Hiemstra 
and Grobbelaar as “straight up and down” men who were personally supportive of him. 
Dutton was clearly the ideal kind of soldier that the government and Hiemstra wanted of  
English-speakers – namely competent and entirely professional. Dutton recalled the 
AKVV activities but stated that he never had any interest in such things.
889
 Although a 
minority in the army, the presence and success of English-speaking officers bolstered 
government and Defence Force statements that members of the two language groups in 
the SADF worked well together. 
 
Aspects of English-speaking South African military heritage revived by the SADF   
 
Commando editions from 1960-66 demonstrated a revival of something akin to Herzog‟s 
pre-World War Two “Two-Stream Policy”
890
 approach regarding English-Afrikaans 
relations in the SADF. There were regular articles included in virtually every edition 
exulting 1899-1902 Afrikaner military exploits and heroes, but these were published 
alongside those addressing the history of the pro-South African Party/UP UDF during the 
two World Wars.
891
 World War Two has been described by John Lambert as “English 
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South Africa‟s Finest Hour”
892
, but it was also a period of intense white South African 
conflict. The war received something of an Afrikaner “rehabilitation” within a 1964 
edition of Huisgenoot, where the inter-Afrikaner conflict of the period was ignored, while 
the magazine published a lengthy illustrated article on South African Forces contribution 
during World War Two under the title: “The War of Extermination”. The article 
contained particular emphasis upon the involvement of South Africans in North Africa.
893
 
Such direct reference within a popular Afrikaans publication to such a controversial 
period suggested some softening of hardened wartime nationalist attitudes, which also 
fitted the 1960s context of white unity by de-emphasising both the wartime Afrikaans 
divisions and English/Afrikaans conflict during the period. Huisgenoot had adjusted its 
content to fit the republican precedent for white unity. However, the official writing of 
the South African involvement during the Second World War was a more complex issue, 
the details of which demonstrate there remained some tensions concerning „English‟ and 
Afrikaner perceptions of the war history. This is demonstrated by briefly examining the 
historical background behind the official South African World War Two histories 
completed during the 1960s. While popular publications made the “part-rehabilitation” 
for the war, it appears that official recording of South African involvement demonstrated 
there persisted frictions between government representatives and most English-speaking 
custodians of the old UDF‟s war heritage.      
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The 1960s South African Second World War histories 
 
According to the South African War Histories Advisory Committee Chairman, C.G. 
Kerr, Hiemstra as Commandant General had provided SADF “encouragement and 
support” to facilitate the collection of donations and complete the history of South 
African forces during the Second World War.
894
 After tepid support from the government 
during the 1950s, the closure of Union War Histories section had been announced from 
June 1960; however, various connected military associations facilitated by retired Lt Gen 
George Brink had succeeded in delaying this termination until July 1961. Even efforts 
that year by Commandant General Grobbelaar requesting the transfer of all war 
documentation to his authority and permission to complete the work were officially 
rebuffed.
895
 It was advised that relevant documentation would be transferred across to the 
National Archives for usage by researchers. Grey concludes that Afrikaner nationalist 
divisions and bitterness over the war ensured that NP politicians obstructed and hindered 
the completion of an official South African war history and he notes that the histories 
were significantly, never translated into Afrikaans.
896
 However, this dissertation contends 
that during the early 1960s the government and SADF also cautiously re-appraised World 
War Two as potentially positive regarding the promotion of white unity. South African 
war participation and the acknowledgement of UDF war heroes appeared in Commando, 
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while the same approach was also picked up by publications like Huisgenoot, as shown 
earlier.   
 
SA Military Academy historian Lt Col Ian Van der Waag suggests the closing of the 
Union War Histories section was the consequence of Erasmus‟s failed policy to try and 
control it. The historians that Erasmus appointed to his own military archives creation in 
1950 began two new series in the 1960s, namely a journal Militaria and the “Black 
Publication Series”; both of which, as Van der Waag puts it, were a “watershed in terms 
of military historiography in South Africa,” whereby the “practice of academic, 
scientifically responsible military history was now increasingly institutionalised within 
the SADF.”
897
 Van der Waag explains how only by the tenth issue of Militaria (in 1970) 
did the first article on World War Two appear. However, as stated above, in the far more 
widely distributed Commando there were scores of articles published lauding South 
African participation in World War Two. This demonstrates that the SADF had officially 
“part-rehabilitated” the 1939-45 conflict earlier than 1970 and for the same reasons that 
Van der Waag suggests were applicable for the 1970s,
898
 namely to help counter the 
Republic‟s increased political isolation. This thesis argues that “rehabilitating” South 
African war participation in an official SADF publication was also aimed at facilitating 
post-republic white rapprochement. But Van der Waag is correct in suggesting that it was 
the commencement of the South African Forces World War II series in the early 1960s 
                                                 
897
Van der Waag, I., Contested Histories: Official History and the South African Military in the Twentieth 
Century, The Last Word?: Essays on official history in the United States and British Commonwealth, (J. 
Grey Ed.), Contributions to the Study of World History, No. 106, Praeger Publishes, Westport, 2003, p. 41.   
898











and that is was the establishment of the South African National Museum of Military 
History, which really “buoyed” further official South African study of World War Two.       
 
The South African War Histories Advisory Committee eventually raised further funds 
while Verwoerd advised Brink to approach the Education Department‟s Arts and Culture 
section for a research grant. Kerr wrote that a “generous grant through the National 
Council for Social Research has made it possible to continue with the story of the North 
African Campaign”.
899
 Clearly as a political quid pro quo, Hiemstra ensured that SADF 
historians Commandant J. Ploeger and Captain E. Jonker sat on the Committee. Van der 
Waag describes Ploeger as an extreme Anglophobe, despite this Hiemstra nominee 
serving in World War Two.
900
 Besides these two official SADF Military Historical 
representatives (and Archival Services representatives, Brink and Professor D.W. 
Kruger), the Committee was comprised of English-speaking members, most of whom 
were war veterans. Ploeger‟s influence and conceivably that of others too on the 
Committee was undoubtedly a contributing factor in Orpen being instructed that he was 
to leave out that not applicable to the “ambit of military history”, including “all reference 
to conflict between English and Afrikaans South Africans” or “any incident that might 




In the 1968 publication of the history dealing with South African forces in the East 
African and Abyssinian campaigns, Kerr expressed his gratitude to both Hiemstra and 
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 both prominent Afrikaner nationalists who had objected vehemently to the 
country‟s participation in the war. Of course, it could be expected that in terms of 
protocol, official thanks would be obligatory regarding prominent government and SADF 
figures. But it still remains ironic that twenty years after the cessation of hostilities, 
leading English-speaking war veterans were recording how accommodating and helpful 
their political opponents of 1939-45 were in assisting the writing of the history of South 
Africa‟s war involvement. Van der Waag states that during the 1950s and 60s: “The 
writing of South Africa‟s Second World War history, in fact, burgeoned not because but 
in spite of the NP coming to power in 1948”.
903
 One could concur with this explicitly 
regarding serious academic research. However, this works contention is reiterated that  
the government and SADF during the 1960s, through both official and popular 
publications, made use of South African participation in World War Two to help 
facilitate the political ends of white unity.         
 
Some examples published in Commando where World War Two received this politically 
inspired new lease of life included a feature entitled “South Africa Fighter Aces of the 
Second World War”. This article contained photographs of Group Captain Sailor Malan, 
the vehemently anti-nationalist fighter pilot and an early 1950s Torch Commando 
leader.
904
 Commando later reported on Malan‟s old Royal Air Force squadron raising a 
subscription for a ceremonial sword, honouring him for the role he played during the 
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. This was a significant shift from the NP‟s previous attitude towards 
Malan, who as a Torch Commando leader had gone as far as contemplating the 
plausibility of an “armed struggle” against Malan‟s government.
906
 In the September 
1966 Commando edition, an article written in both English and Afrikaans reported upon a 
recent commemorative ceremony at Delville Wood which had included a senior SADF 
presence accompanying twenty-five South African veterans. Amongst the SADF officers 





Commando‟s „mission‟ towards the “inclusiveness” of aspects concerning both white 
language groups‟ respective military histories, even extended to coverage of the redcoats‟ 
heroism at Rorke‟s Drift in 1879. The April 1963 Commando included an article on 
Lieutenant John Chard during this Anglo-Zulu war battle and also commented upon a 
early 1950s SADF decoration created and named after him.
908
 A report dealt with 
coverage of the film “Zulu” being produced where SADF personnel had been utilised as 
extras. It concluded:  
But for the bestowal by the SADF in 1952 of the singular honour 
of naming one each of the new medals and decorations after the 
hero of Rorke‟s Drift, his very name, like others who won that 
most cherished decoration during the turbulent days of our 
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country‟s history, would be known to very few South Africans. 
The time is not long passed when practically every serviceman 
was asking: „What is the claim to fame?‟ There were only a few 
who could give but a hazy answer. This will be further remedies 




SADF assistance in the filming of „Zulu‟ is recorded via a “Memorandum Regarding 
Military Assistance in the Production of films, penned by Major Steyn Van Rooyan 
during November 1962 for the attention of Deputy Commandant General Hiemstra. 
Concerning the purported relevance of the film to English-speaking South Africans the 
report read: 
The Battle of Rorkes Drift during 22/23 January 1879 is of 
course one of the most illustrious of all the British conquering 
struggles in their colonial territories – and is viewed by the 
English-speaking component of the Republic, particularly in 
Natal, as a positive breakthrough for Western Civilisation in 
Africa and often linked to the Battle of Blood River supported by 
two elements, the Voortrekkers and British who were jointly 
responsible for white civilisation in South Africa. The Battle of 
Rorkes Drift is for the English-speaker in the Republic what the 
Blood River is for Afrikaners (Sentence underlined). Seen in this 
light it is my modest opinion that considerable internal and 
external propaganda value can be assisted, if indeed possible, 
through the production of the film Zulu.
910
     
 
These attempts to acknowledge something of the “English” white heritage within SADF 
culture and official publications was undoubtedly part of an official drive to draw white-
English speakers into part of a defensive common “white nationalism”. The link between 
the Blood River battle‟s centrality in Afrikaner nationalist historical mythology is well 
known. However, it was extraordinary that SADF Afrikaans officers were expressing 
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opinions that a similar nationalist history existed, or might even be contrived for English 
South Africans in Natal. Therefore the SADF assisting a British company in the 
commercial venture of filming „Zulu‟ was another means of endorsing white English 
South African “nationalism” for the government‟s political gain.
911
     
 
During the early 1960s, the government were anxious to demonstrate that ex-officers of 
the World War Two era who had been or felt marginalised during the Erasmus era, were 
included where appropriate at SADF functions. The SAAF had been a particularly 
marked target for Afrikanerisation during the 1950s,
912
 where Erasmus, Hiemstra and 
Melville had effectively fired some of the most prominent officers, including Brigadiers 
Durrant and Bronkhorst.
913
 Durrant had resigned after being offered an inappropriate 
diplomatic posting in 1953 and Bronkhorst, a UP MP from 1960 was the most senior 
victim of the notorious Erasmus/Hiemstra “Midnight Ride” of November 1953.
914
 
Bronkhorst and Durrant, both of whom had reason to be angry at their treatment from the 
government, appeared within a group photograph of serving and retired SAAF officers 
within the October 1963 edition of Commando standing alongside former Commandant 
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An even more interesting photograph arranged during the opening of a new SAAF base 
in Pietersberg during late 1964, appeared in the December 1964 Commando; it included 
several of the most prominent anti-nationalist officers from the old UDF, along with 
several previous and current SADF generals. The photograph makes an implicit point that 
any antipathies remaining from the 1950s purging of anti-nationalist officers would not 
prevent political opponents being present where the Republic‟s new air defences were on 
display. Between State President „Blackie‟ Swart and Hiemstra sat General Sir Pierre 
Van Ryneveld, the former UDF Chief of Staff under Smuts. In the front row between 
former SADF Chiefs Grobbelaar and Melville, sat Lt Gen George Brink one of the most 
senior UDF World War Two officers and Torch Commando leaders, who had severely 
criticised Erasmus and his 1950s Chief of Staff, General De Wet Du Toit. Smuts‟s 
wartime right-hand man, Maj Gen Frank Theron is at the back with current senior SADF 
officers, together with former Brig Durrant, another Torch Commando member who 
might well have been SAAF Chief by the early 1960s, had it not been for NP purges.
916
  




It appears that writers like Hartshorne and Boulter decades later might have overstated 
their cases regarding white English-speakers leaving the SADF in such droves during the 
1950s. English-speakers remained a contributing minority in the PF, while „English‟ 
regiments received financial support and recruits that re-invigorated their operation 
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during the 1960s. At every practical occasion Minister Fouché spoke about defence being 
an important component of white nation-building and this chapter has also demonstrated 
that white English speakers were integral to NP and SADF defence programs, often with 
marked enthusiasm from them as Defence Force members, writers and citizens.   
 
Boulter is to an extent correct that during the 1950s Erasmus and the NP had “eroded 
much of the sense of identity many English-speaking officers had with the Defence 
Force. ”
917
 However, there still remained a powerful military legacy that stretched deep 
into the memory and consciousness of white English South Africans that continued 
during the 1960s and beyond. Fouché worked to restore some sense of even-handedness 
between treatment of the two language groups and the CF, in particular, no longer felt 
threatened by previous ministerial hostility to their regimental traditions. However, 
Fouché also maintained Afrikaner nationalist control over SADF culture, personnel and 
policy, while „English South African military consciousness‟ was a useful historical 
phenomena which the NP could to its advantage draw upon, both for defence needs and 
drawing the whites closer together during the 1960s. Afrikaner nationalist symbolism 
remained prominent in the SADF, but some limited attempts were made to persuade 
English-speakers their heritage was not being ignored. In reality, the latter had to accept a 
subordinate position, but also as any English South African sense of identity was likewise 
becoming more fluid. Fouché and Hiemstra both clearly understood the potential political 
and military gain of ditching the tactless and alienating Erasmus approach to 
English/Afrikaans relations in the SADF. 
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The support of the English-language press, schools and business for SADF programs was 
generally reflective of community feelings. There remained a large grouping of English 
South Africans who were explicitly hostile to the „Afrikaner republic‟ of 1961, 
particularly in Natal where opposition was expressed at military commemorative 
occasions. But this final „jingoism‟ surge petered out comparatively quickly amidst 
perceived military threats to the republic and the prosperity enjoyed by the white 
community during the 1960s. At the same time there was an SADF and government 
attempt to re-endorse South Africa‟s involvement in the World Wars. By 1967-68, the 
English South African community were very largely acquiescent regarding Afrikaner 
nationalist security planning. There was a discernable 1960s shift in English-community 
identity from „British‟ South African during the late 1940s and 50s, to one tentatively 
supportive of broader white South African interests of maintaining political control. The 
strong „English‟ involvement in the SADF at a range of levels, not least in the CF 
regiments endorses this contention.   
 
As the CF English units prospered, the participation of English-speakers at PF level in the 
army slowly diminished as the World War Two generation retired. Fewer English-
speakers joined the SADF during the 1960s compared to previous decades and 
particularly regarding the army, which became more identified with an Afrikaner cultural 
environment than the SAAF and SA Navy. Consumerism and prosperity also weakened 
any significant white career commitment to the PF and certainly more with the English-















From the French Revolution‟s imperative for citizens being obligated to perform military 
service, armies during modern historical processes of nationalism have been assumed as 
ideal mediums whereby a population can be infused with common patriotism and 
national identity. Afrikaner nationalists during the 1960s likened their historical struggle 
for self-determination as compatible with that of Jewish Zionist aspirations to protect 
Israeli independence during the twentieth century. The Israeli Defence Force is viewed 
by its government and citizens as a melting pot whereby new immigrants from the 
Diaspora would develop a common Israeli identity, a heightened sense of citizenship and 
a willingness to defend the national homeland. Barber remarks that the government, 
particularly after the 1967 Six Day War, began to regularly draw comparisons between 
South Africa and Israel, in the sense that small determined states with a “dedicated 
citizen army” and “economic and technical strength” can survive against “overwhelming 
odds”. Articles on the Israeli armed forces also became more prominent in Commando 
after 1967. Die Burger had already made comparative references to Israel as early as 




During much of the 1960s, the SADF operated against an economic backdrop where the 
republic experienced considerable prosperity from a growth rate of six percent and an 
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inflation rate of only two percent, while disposable income amongst whites had risen 
significantly.
919
 Job opportunities and the material benefits of a consumer society also 
meant the SADF had competition getting whites to view the military as a career. During a 
period when the NP racial policies were at their most stridently domineering, Verwoerd 
was determined to make apartheid and the homelands policy in particular a „competitive 
alternative‟ to a multi-racial democracy.
920
 The SADF‟s primary focus in planning was 
towards threats from any potential enemies of the white state. This chapter broaches the 
issue of to what extent were commonalities of white South African identity and state 
loyalty engendered by the SADF projecting itself as an important and highly visual part 
of the white community during the 1960s. It also touches upon the manner in which white 
South African society was initially mobilised through the beginnings of a kind of social 
militarization against the perceived armed threats to it. Increased conscription also started 
to ensure the SADF as being a more specific focus of “white nationalism”, besides also 
becoming an increased intrusion into white citizens‟ lives.         
 
Hyslop suggests that military conscription constituted one component whereby the state 
exerted some control over Afrikaner political and cultural uniformity.
921
 This thesis 
contends that both resentment and enthusiasm for military service from elements within 
both white language-groups, illustrate that a uniformity of reaction from either cannot be 
simplistically generalised. But the dominant reaction was conformity to the law and more 
particularly amongst Afrikaners where military service also received clear church 
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endorsement. „English‟ churches fully maintained their chaplaincies within military 
structures through the 1960s; only much later did they start becoming highly critical of 
the implications of national service being connected to allegedly defending government 
racial policies. The divergence of different denominations within the 1960s SADF had 
obvious implications for any project attempting to mould a common “white-nation” 
mindset.
922
   
 
The SADF was not properly prepared for conscription in terms of infrastructure or 
training programs, partly because of the assumed urgency to fulfil the counter-strategy 
needs endorsed by its own threat appraisals. After 1966 particularly, a majority of white 
South Africans voted for the NP and  thereby also directly consented to its racial policies 
while indirectly acknowledging the government view of the „vital‟ role of the SADF in 
„ensuring white survival‟. The media and official publications presented the image of a 
confident SADF, but this masked deeper insecurities within Afrikaner political concerns 
for preserving their unity and control. The latter according to Hyslop was partly achieved, 
particularly within the Afrikaans community, through informal and formal surveillance 
plus censorship, creating what he refers to as a kind of “cultural autarky”.
923
 But 
Giliomee and others show the political divisions existent between Verwoerd and his 
                                                 
922
 In the 1960s, the SADF did appear to try and cover all Christian denominations and the Jewish faith in 
terms of worship facilities and time. For example, Lt Gen Jack Dutton who commanded 1 Special Service 
Battalion (Armour) training regiment from 1964-66 and dealt with thousands of balloted trainees, recalled : 
“I had 3 PF Chaplains, NG Kerk, Anglican and Free Churches so the men were spiritually well cared for!  
On a Friday afternoon a group from the local Jewish community would arrive and take those men to their 
homes for supper etc.  I also had a special room with the necessary facilities and equipment in the Men‟s 
Mess for the more orthodox members to ensure their meals were kosher.” Email from Lt Gen J. Dutton, 1 
June 2006. Only towards the late 1970s were there louder objections from some „English‟ denominations – 
Anglican and Catholic and others towards the political controversies surrounding national service.  
923











supporters and other NP members, including prominent leadership figures within 
Afrikaner politics, press, church and business.
924
 This gap between what came to be 
referred in political parlance as being between verligtes and verkramptes appeared to play 
itself to an extent within military opinions too, when some official statements from the 
decade, both classified and public, are placed under analysis.     
 
Official SADF perceptions of the white community: Early 1960s  
 
Military Intelligence (DMI) attempted to assess the capacity of the white population to 
respond effectively to military threats whether conventional or guerrilla. Some appraisals 
reported that it was not entirely certain if whites were ready to face potential enemy 
subversion of the country. A senior intelligence officer commented in 1963: “There are 
indications that the volk’s (whites) will to succeed and willingness to accept necessary 
suffering is not as strong as is generally presumed. This aspect should be further 
investigated.”
925
 Implied was that because all attempts to combat subversion were 
essentially defensive and only occurred when such subversive acts actually ensued, this 
could result in a sense of frustration amongst whites and even a defeatist attitude.
926
 The 
report also speculated that a conservative component of the volk might not see possible 
assistance from neighbouring states (Portuguese or Rhodesia) as necessary and such 
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might have far-reaching political consequences.
927
 This was suggestive that some 
Afrikaners lacked insight, despite regular press coverage of local military threats possibly 
requiring cooperation with the republic‟s “buffer states”. The SADF‟s threat perceptions, 
by the organisation‟s own evaluations received mixed responses from the white 
community by 1963. DMI postulated that measures taken against subversive elements 
could often only be reactive rather than proactive, risking frustrations predominating and 
ultimately creating an outlook (amongst whites) that “at some or other stage they (the 




 How the intelligence reporter came to such conclusions is not explained within the 
document; however, its underlying fears are clear: Volkseenheid
929
and nationalism were 
perceived as waning. Within Afrikaner society during the 1960s, the socio-economic 
diversity of the volk had changed from 1948 with the further urbanisation and continued 
growth of a prosperous Afrikaner middle-class. Afrikaners were still behind the white 
English community in terms of education levels, university graduates and incomes,
930
 
however as Giliomee points out, NP politicians by the 1960s were less inclined to try to 
gain political capital from highlighting Afrikaner political power against the considerable 
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As Afrikaners increased consolidated around an urban identity, new „dangers‟ „lurking‟ 
in this environment and foreseen by the NP, were no longer issues of “exploitation by 
English capitalists” as during earlier in the century. Rather it was varied phenomena 
perceived as disseminated readily from within the city environment: “atheism, 
internationalism, liberalism, materialism”.
932
 Issues such as „communism‟ and 
„liberalism‟ were also connected directly to forces understood by the NP as behind 
potential military threats. With more Afrikaner conscipts coming into the SADF from the 
same cities as their English-speaking counterparts, the military wanted to reinforce the 
message by highlighting the corrupting influences of the urban environment. „Defeatism‟, 
understood as a shrinking of both „national pride‟ and „patriotism,‟ was identified by 
military intelligence as amongst symptoms negatively affecting white youth. 
„Materialism‟ had for some years not escaped the concerns of military chiefs: In May 
1961 the SA Navy Chief-of-Staff, Rear Adm Hugo Biermann referred to his own 
perceptions of young white South Africans‟ priorities: 
In my opinion concentrated training in the armed forces could 
only be of benefit to the people of South Africa. Modern youth in 
South Africa has too many bioscopes, too many Elvis Presleys 





Hiemstra also reflected upon a marked distance between the experiences of his own 
generation of Afrikaners, many whom had struggled out of poverty, compared to 
elements amongst the increasingly materialistic volk of the 1960s. At a 1959 Day of the 
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Covenant commemorative speech Hiemstra had lashed out at parents who assumed 
military service was the panacea for difficult sons in an era of new fashions and antisocial 
trends such as the „ducktail‟ cult amongst white youths: 
The lost young people of today are the responsibility of their 
parents and it is misdirected to think that the Defence Force or 
some other establishment can correct what these parents spoilt 
(verbrou) for seventeen years.
934
                    
 
Military call-ups during the 1960 State of Emergency did not occur to Fouché‟s 
satisfaction, while balloted conscription for continuous training had in response to 
perceived defence needs been extended during 1962. This duration of continuous service 
was increased from three to nine months, with training occurring often under the 
direction of war veteran officers who used young PF instructors. One popular assumption 
was that military life straightened out anti-social behaviour. When interviewing an 
instructor staff sergeant, the Cape Times reporter wrote the following of the expectations 
of the military regarding Oudtshoorn trainees in 1962:   
I (the reporter) was assured that „ducktails‟ and „milkbar 
cowboys‟  presented no problems in camp. „They arrive here 
sure enough but they soon have the nonsense knocked out of 
them – usually by the trainees themselves,‟ ….For the whole 
nine months they may not have liquor. For them it is a period of 
abstinence and rigid discipline. What   mother and the coloured 
servant did for them before, they now have to do themselves.
935
  :     
 
However, the SADF had its own problems with objectionable conduct amongst its own 
junior instructor ranks and the organisation did not always officially appreciate taking on 
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a „rehabilitative‟ role. For example, J. von Moltke, a NP SWA MP went to considerable 
trouble to intervene on behalf of Josef Davids, a nineteen year old, rejected during 1963 
for PF service on the grounds of his civilian court convictions for petty theft. SADF 
correspondence pointedly informed von Moltke that it did not want impressionable young 
conscripts mixed alongside PF members with dubious reputations.
936
 A correspondent 
balloted for service in Walvis Bay during 1962, remarked on his being disillusioned by 
some non-commissioned officers boasting about their smoking dagga to trainees.
937
 Some 
further examples of complaints to MPs by parents over junior instructors are detailed 
below, to emphasise how the conscription was also questioned and criticised by white 
citizens, not on grounds of political objections, but on grievances regarding poor 
treatment during training besides objections to its inconvenience to studies and the erratic 
application of exemption.    
 
The SADF and white citizens during the early 1960s  
 
The Exemption Board to whom those called up for military training could apply for 
exemption or deferment, did not grant such a status readily. The Board‟s policy of 
insisting that those who wished to study at university had to first complete military 
obligations caused consternation amongst some parents ambitious for sons not to break 
the continuity of study after matric. Officially, the Exemption Board was the only body 
that could either postpone or exempt a citizen from military service. Even a ministerial 
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recommendation had to be supported by “relevant facts”.
938
 Future teachers balloted for 
service however, received special exemption if willing to undergo a course for cadet 
officers.
939
 Cadets was a long established activity in both white English and Afrikaans 
schools and its facilitation required large numbers of instructors, who were drawn from 
school staffs.  
 
Yet despite the SADF drawing in thousands of young men to experience the organisation 
through compulsory call-ups, the military was not a popular career choice. Even 
Commando, the SADF‟s official mouthpiece allowed correspondents to question the 
perceived apathy manifest in the Defence Force failing to market itself effectively. In 
mid-1964 at the height of the press reported military threats, a young officer severely 
criticised a planned military tattoo in Pretoria being based around an unimaginative 
theme of “Physical Education through the Ages”. He remarked: “With recruiting for the 
PF at the extraordinary low ebb that it is at the moment” such a display was “scarcely 
likely to arouse much enthusiasm for a career!”
940
 The navy in particular struggled with 
technical manpower shortages during the 1960s, but recruitment was also low in the army 
and by the middle of the decade, this fact was severely criticised in parliament. UP 
defence spokesman Gay attributed poor recruitment to low salaries and alleged poor 
management, pointing out that provision existed for 20 000 officers, yet as Fouché had 
acknowledged a few days earlier, the air force were short by 1755 officers; the navy of 
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1537 and the army of 2492 officers; in total constituting 25 percent of the strength 
approved by parliament.
941
 It is not difficult to see that the state‟s eventual decision for 
full white male conscription at eighteen was also motivated simply by acute manpower 
needs, just as Hiemstra had always claimed. 
 
By the end of the 1960s a kind of white community „militarization‟ was achieved, in the 
sense that the white public were aware of “threats” and the SADF had entered citizens 
lives by both choice and compulsion. Although in terms of „compulsion‟ when aggrieved 
by the organisation, both English and Afrikaans white citizens demonstrated a confidence 
in the influence of parliamentary representatives regarding military authority, this being 
verified by numerous lengthy and diligent attempts at intercessions under-taken by MPs 
on behalf of their constituents. The usual correspondence channels for raising objections 
about the SADF were directed to the Commandant General, the Minister of Defence, or 
even the Prime Minister and inevitably, the letters reached the offices of Grobbelaar or 
Hiemstra, although hardly necessarily for their personal viewing. The Commandant 
General Group at the Pretoria Military Archives contains large numbers of boxes dealing 
with the scores of applications for exemption and details concerning various complaints. 
MPs attempted to facilitate a wide range of requests, including on behalf of PF members. 
For examples, NP Senator Tom Naude of Pietersberg wrote directly to Commandant 
General Grobbelaar in October 1963, appealing on behalf of Sergeant Major J.C. de 
Klerk, request to be considered for light administrative work for reasons of poor health 
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and a transfer from Pretoria to Pietersberg where his wife resided. Naude assured 




Public and parliamentary representation against and for the SADF 
 
Conscious of growing complaints regarding military training, during 1965 Fouché 
instituted the Groenewoud Committee to ascertain SADF needs regarding personnel.
943
 
Fouché requested members of parliament to submit complaints to the Secretary of a 
Commission of Inquiry into Defence Force matters. The Committee reported two years 
later, with important recommendations supporting Hiemstra‟s long established call for 
extending national service. As more young whites were drawn into military service via 
the ballot system, so MPs fielded complaints from both trainees and parents about poor 
treatment, inadequate facilities, boredom and the “waste” of their time in terms of future 
career development. A score of incidents in military camps involving assaults and brutal 
treatment of ballotees were reported in the press. The Secretary for Defence invited 
written public submissions on military training, for the government could not 
contemplate a national negative attitude towards the SADF amongst whites.  
 
Perhaps the most substantiating letter encountered and which was also not made public 
came from J.A. Fourie, Headmaster of the prestigious Pretoria Afrikaanse Seuns 
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 Writing to the Secretary for Defence in mid-June 1965 Fourie‟s stature as 
Principal of a top school could barely have been overlooked by SADF authority, 
particularly as his letter included an urgent affirmation of a national need for military 
service. He based his comments upon encounters and communications with numerous ex-
students who had recently completed military service, deducing two issues that as an 
educationist deeply concerned him.  
Almost without exception the boys explain that their time is not 
properly utilised; and that they waste a great deal of time; that 
the training could be shorter; that they are often involved for 
weeks in paltry things like washing dishes for several weeks; 
standing guard for 6-8 weeks; etc. I get the impression that there 
is not a proper plan for instruction over the entire period of 
training, and therefore far too many useless tasks are performed, 
so as only to utilise the young men‟s time.  
 
I feel that the training the boys receive is necessary and also that 
they must get an intensive and full program overseen by work 
and relaxation. We need to build citizens, not just to carry a rifle, 
but also to give a sense of belonging, and in addition, to ensure 
good national citizens and workers; strong characters and 
purpose-driven, meaning that there must be building, not 
breaking down.  
 
A second issue that is perhaps more difficult to broach is the 
complaint over the non-commissioned officers who have to give 
instruction, and where it is done in such a manner that an 
undermining of respect and authority occurs as well as wide-
spread disparagement (of the military by the trainees).   
 
I must reiterate that I am not against the training, if some suggest 
this be my objection. This (letter) is only here because the above 
allegations are so regularly forthcoming that truth could well be 
hidden therein, and I feel our Defence Force  is developing a 
reputation that is unworthy, and it cannot.
945
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The Afrikaanse Seuns Hoërskool in 1965 would have drawn its boys from amongst 
families that included those of senior Afrikaner politicians, professionals and civil 
servants. Then Minister of Justice and future Prime Minister John Vorster‟s sons attended 
the school the eldest becoming head boy in 1967.
946
 Fourie specifically outlined problems 
regarding poor usage of the trainees time, besides abusive and incompetent instructor 
conduct. Fourie could have conceivably been hearing the objections from the sons of 
prosperous urban Afrikaners, who objected at being mistreated by instructors barely the 
same age, that would often have come from more modest backgrounds. Fourie‟s letter 
confirms there were perceptions of some serious problems of organisation and discipline 
within military training, which he feared threatened to implant a poor view of military 
training and the SADF‟s reputation amongst the Afrikaans and white communities. In the 
long-term such could have assured a serious national problem for the government who 
were committed to ensuring its voters would contribute willingly to the country‟s largely 
citizen-based defence.  
 
UP MPs also immediately responded to the Groenewoud Committee‟s requests, but were 
emphatic that they would not assist those perceived as attempting to evade military 
service. Their MPs also diligently performed their constituency representative roles, 
drafting letters to the authorities. The implications of these official steps to investigate the 
SADF were also indicative of concerns reflecting a political intensity and anxiety 
regarding the long-term prospects of white rule. Such were clearly felt within the NP 
government, hence their urgency to get the inquiry underway. The Principal of another 
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top school, Mr Clarke of Rondebosch Boys High (Cape Town) had already a year earlier 
conveyed his own feelings about military service to the parliamentary opposition leader, 
Sir De Villiers Graaff (quoted below) which confirmed Fouché acknowledgement that 
the later stages of training were being marked by poorly utilised time. This and other 
evidence suggests the SADF were simply not sufficiently organised to accommodate the 
trainees: 
The general slackness in the latter part of the training period has 
been raised from many quarters and all we can get from the 
Minister (off the record) is that while he has not yet adequate 
facilities for intensive training during the whole period of 
service, he feels compelled to hold trainees for the full period so 
as to have a large force under arms for security reasons. This, of 
course, is not public property and we cannot get him to say it 
publicly at the moment. The other matter which is worrying us a 
lot is the calling up of boys going into industries which will be 
regarded as key industries during wartime, from which they will 
not be released for service. As a result of which the time, energy 
and money spent on their training will have been wasted. There 
again we seem to have struck a blank wall.
947
        
 
Fouché had implicitly acknowledged to Graaff in confidence that the threat perceptions 
of the period were the justification for retaining large numbers of troops after training. 
The minister confirmed as such in parliament a year after the above letter was penned, 
stating that in 1960 training was in place principally to deal with internal security, but this 
had changed with perceptions that South Africa was also facing a possible external 
threat.
948
 UP defence spokesmen continued to severely criticise the SADF for poor 
management. MP Vause Raw accused Fouché of over-conscripting men for instruction 
by PF personnel who simply could not cope with the numbers and this in consequence 
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resulted in unsatisfactory training - three months “square-bashing, three months training”, 
but the last three months according to Raw: “are wasted because of excessive conscript 
numbers. 16 000 men were drawn out the economy but without proper utilization; 
companies commanded by lieutenants, during the winter over 1964, men in Bloemfontein 
were not issued with their winter clothing”.
949
 So the complaints continued.  
 
In response, the military authorities tried to convince the public that training was 
conducive to producing a citizen of value and that the SADF was a healthy and maturing 
environment for white youth. As mentioned, a strong perception existed amongst older 
white South Africans that young (white) men displaying bad behaviour might be 
rehabilitated through a military experience. In June 1964, J.F. Schoonbee, the NP MP for 
Pretoria District was quoted as saying that idle youths and gangs should be conscripted 
into the army, where “scum was eliminated and ducktails were turned into decent 
people”.
950
 Justice Minister Vorster mooted an old idea of a CF special youth battalion 
rehabilitating young white male offenders. He emphasised the need for military discipline 
being enforced upon young white men between ages 18-30 and expressing his concern 
that in contrast to just 47 white woman prisoners nationally, there were about 60 000 
white male prisoners, who could also “sweat out their penalties on the parade ground”.
951
 
Schoonbee went so far as to draw a non-racial commonality amongst idle young people 
being susceptible to the inevitable hoodoo ideology: 
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Whether black, brown or White, youths should not be allowed to 
run wild and grow ripe for communism. Even if they were given 





The SADF published selected letters in Commando which endorsed the nationalist 
imperative of drawing the English-speakers closer to accepting the Afrikaner cultural 
outlook. There was inevitably emphasis upon how English servicemen were integrating 
successfully and developing a better understanding of the Afrikaans community. As true 
as this may have been, there were seldom, if ever, suggestion of the reverse occurring and 
this being likewise publicised. Mrs I. Freese of Durban remarked on her son‟s 1962 
service in the Air Force Gymnasium in Pretoria: 
I need to mention here the beneficial results of discipline, 
physical training, etc., with which you are well acquainted, but I 
would like to mention that I was particularly happy to find any 
trace of prejudice against the Afrikaans Section (sic) gone 
completely. His Afrikaans has improved considerably. He has 
been hospitably received in the homes of Afrikaans fellow 
„rofies‟  and has altogether a very high opinion of his hosts. This 
represents a broadening in outlook which could possibly have 
been denied him if he had not been able to widen his field.
953
       
 
Within components of the English South African academic world, there were also 
affirmations of the „benefits‟ of military service. The Secretary of Defence reported to the 
Commandant General in November 1963 that at the “Cape Town Medical School” 
(assumedly UCT), a professor had stated that those who had undergone military service 
turned out to be better students and ultimately better doctors and citizens. The Secretary 
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also remarked that the professor relayed to him that during a meeting of “his Medical 
Association” a proposal was defeated whereby the “Association” were called to approach 
the government to relieve medical students of military obligations.
954
 But the large 
numbers of applications attempting to side-step military service for academic study 
suggests that many of the professionally ambitious were more concerned about their own 
personal interests.  
 
As introduced above the SADF were increasingly alerted to dysfunctional conduct within 
their own instructor ranks, this being reinforced by submissions from angry parents and 
concerned community leaders. UP MP Gay had in June 1965 reported in parliament that 
parents were “ringing up Defence headquarters…say(ing) they are not prepared to let 
their sons go … under conditions such as those exposed in the Press.
955
 MP Van der Byl, 
displayed his party‟s conservative ambivalence, where like his UP colleagues, he also 
needed to demonstrate his party‟s commitment to defence besides field and pass on 
complaints from trainees. Van der Byl received a range of correspondence and some 
examples are worth referring. The Johnsons of Elsies River requested assistance with 
obtaining exemption for their son Claude, whose brother Colin was tragically shot at 
some earlier date while doing training in Walvis Bay and claimed no official inquest had 
been held nor any form of compensation granted to the family. Claude had some 
unexplained foot complaint, but despite being declared unfit by medical doctors had still 
been informed to report for duty with the Cape Town Highlanders on 29 September 1965, 
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despite his parents sending a medical certificate three months earlier to Pretoria.
956
 In 
responding to this particular case, Van der Byl had written to the Secretary for the 
Committee of Inquiry that this was “typical of the slackness by the Defence Force in 
replying to correspondence”. He endorsed this by pointing out that although Claude 
eventually received exemption, he had been kept waiting for three months “unable to 




The ballot system‟s administrative clumsiness was evident concerning older students. 
Three future chartered accountants, M. Friedman of Vredehoek, D. Kretzner of 
Claremont and B. Glass of Parow complained in September 1965 that they had never 
been balloted while at school, yet now at university had received call-ups, making it 
difficult for them to complete their accountant internships because the nine months gap 
would interrupt their required study.
958
 An anonymous complainant, who spent six 
months at the Technical Service Corps in Pretoria, detailed his spending this entire period 
living in a tent, unable to study properly with candlelight, enduring poor food, unhygienic 
toilets, uncurbed stealing, inadequate leave and abusive officers who got drunk on 
manoeuvres. He also mentioned the training period being too long.
959
 A parent voiced his 
concern about camp facilities near or at Tempe, Bloemfontein where inadequate water 
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was available for washing and laundry.
960
 In terms of treatment meted out to trainees, a 
trainee‟s father resident in the Northern Cape wrote a particularly strong letter about his 
son‟s 1963 experiences at the Air Force Gymnasium where he had been injured during 
training. 
The idea of training is sound but unfortunately it has landed in 
the wrong hands. The officers may be ok but the instructors i.e. 
corporals and sergeants are a bunch of sadists. I personally don‟t 
think they would have been anything in civilian life but now the 
army gave them some authority over men perhaps even better 
educated than what they are…We all know as old soldiers that 
army language is rough but they are going too far. I say the 
lowest scum of the earth will use better language. I cannot even 
quote examples…a Sergeant Major of the military Gym said the 
easiest way to get out the army is to swear. Well if that is so they 
just do not know what is going on. I think they would have the 
shock of their lives if they concealed tape recorders on the boys. 
As for the training they are sadists. Boys have collapsed and 
vomited from fatigue. All they do is rub their faces in it. With 
their exaggerated stamping of feet at the halt etc. they also 
accounted for several boys having cartilage trouble. My son‟s 
legs gave in. I think about 18 of his pals as well. They were all 





The father went onto explain that his son‟s knee had still not recovered two and a half 
years later and that he could not even play golf. Even taking into account the bitter fury 
of this parent possibly making him overstate his case, the brutality suggested by ill-suited 
personalities given instruction duties is corroborated by many other accounts. In a 
“Memorial Album” for the Air Force Gymnasium published in 1977, some of the 1960s 
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photos give a glimpse of the institution‟s culture. One shows a recruit having to drink a 




Another anonymous parent wrote undated complaints about her son‟s experiences in the 
navy. They included lack of supervision when his ship had travelled to Lourenco 
Marques; trainees visited a brothel and on returning to their ship were informed to visit 
the dispensary on board for „VD injections‟. The mother remarked: “It seems that for 
boys of this age – certain places could be Red Light areas – and the boys punished if 
found there. This is surely not unreasonable as they are not yet permanent force – nor are 
they adult.”
963
 Other complaints were lack of supervision by officers and non-
commissioned officers while on watch duty and cruelty towards the ship‟s dog (the soles 
of its feet burnt with matches) in front of an officer. Other parents‟ complaints again 
followed the familiar pattern of idleness created through lack of planning for activity: 
Every trainee I have spoken to from Army, Navy or Air Force 
training has been upset by the waste of time that these nine 
months seem to be, and of the time they spend doing nothing at 
all. A lot of free time is given- some instruction is found 
interesting, and the boys get keen – and then they get frustrated 
as they never get a chance to use their new knowledge in any 
satisfactory way- and they wonder why they ever had to do their 
training – they lose all pride in their progress and achievements. 
Many complaints come from those who go to the yearly three 
weekly camps – as the feeling of learning nothing new is 
uppermost. On certain Wednesdays and Saturdays throughout the 
years following – Trainees meet for parades. They line up, are 
inspected and fall out. They would like an exercise of some sort, 
as they are bored by giving up these afternoons (which many 
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students can ill-afford) to doing nothing definite or 
constructive.
964
                                    
 
It is not too difficult to discern a pattern in this and other correspondence whereby 
trainees who were enthusiastic to learn, sometimes found this zest stunted by poor 
management and abusive instructors. This particular young man on board the ship had 
been trained as a navy diver. Van der Byl added that his mother had also said regarding 
those charged with training:  
His complaint is the general attitude of the instructors, their 
hopeless handling which can only destroy discipline and the 
variety of ignorant people making a mess of keen, ready-to-
work-and-learn material. He realises that many trainees are 
uncouth, but feels that a different calibre of man in charge would 
do away with much of the worst weaknesses.
965
         
 
Interesting enough, these kinds of views are in stark contrast to what Lt Gen Dutton, who 
in the early 1960s commanded a training regiment in Bloemfontein, expressed when 
remarking upon his unit programmes at 1 Special Service Battalion which encompassed 
both infantry and armour training:  
In July 1964 I was promoted and appointed OC 2 Armd Car 
Regt, a Full Time Force unit in Tempe where ballotees spent the 
last 6 months of their 9 on squadron and regiment training and 
operations…There were quarterly intakes of new recruits.  I 
spent the rest of 1964 commanding both Regts simultaneously 
which was not easy but gave me a fair insight of all aspects of 
what these young men were expected to do in their 9 months. At 
1SSB the men had their formative training period which was 
interesting…From the point of view of discipline I was at all 
times most satisfied with our standard.  I had a large staff of 
officers, WOs and NCOs all of whom were well trained, 
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experienced and reliable. Of course there was always the feeling 
amongst ballotees of “Why me when Johnny next door was not 
called up?”  My Regt had a large infantry company and a smaller 
armour squadron and there was a healthy rivalry between the 
two. Up until I think 1966 we still worked on Saturday mornings 





The distance between the commander and his men can be considerable in terms of 
training experiences, but many serious complaints against the SADF by trainees and 
parents are archived, although they may have been far less of an issue in Dutton‟s camp. 
NP MPs brought their own constituents grievances to Parliament. G.P. van den Berg, the 
NP MP for Wolmaranstad, commented in mid-1964 that his colleagues received 
numerous complaints from ballotees about poor treatment, although the only examples he 
gave were swearing. He emphasised that ballotees should not fear their superiors and 
demanded that bad language be eradicated in the Defence Force.
967
 This naïve perception 
of what is plausible within a military establishment also may have suggested a gulf 
between the ideal of traditional Afrikaner values, facing a rude reality within impersonal 
state entities such as the military, an institution whose rough dynamics the NP MPs of the 
1960s had virtually no experience. Afrikaners whose expectations of a government entity 
such as the SADF being all that was “decent” and Christian” were clearly disturbed. But 
the extent of continual complaints was real and suggested that at least some white South 
African young men during this period were surprised and outraged at aspects of their 
management by the state.  
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Another lengthy set of serious grievances were from the father of a 1964 ballotee, also 
demonstrates that the trainees were bewildered by attitudes and actions emanating from 
their instructors. This complainant held a “very senior position in a well-known 
scholastic institution”
968
 and related through his son a series of events occurring while he 
was training with his company at Diepkloof.
969
 Allegations included the physical assault 
by a PF corporal on a trainee, who was also compelled to run along cattle kraal walls with 
full pack throughout the morning. At the end of the exercise, this man was punished 
further by being formally “placed under close arrest” and forced to run with sandbags 
after refusing to get into a hole the corporal had threatened to bury him in. Later when 
troops were driving through a “coloured reserve,” a corporal ordered them to “arrest” a 
“coloured bystander” and several children from nearby houses. Divisions had occurred 
amongst the troops, with some participating in this intimidation and others refusing. 
Eventually back at the camp, all of the captives were released while being shot at with 
blank ammunition as they ran away. Later during a night attack exercise, instructors 
allegedly assaulted one recruit and threw stones at others. The ballotee company did not 
receive breakfast on three occasions during the exercise as punitive measures for 
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It is of interest that some trainees were determined to respond to abuse through their MPs 
in attempts to confront the military and express a sense of injustice. Bearing in mind that 
white society at this time was largely conformist and conservative, there is outrage 
expressed in these letters just how the SADF could be an unhealthy place for some young 
men doing their training, but there was also a willingness to perform military service with 
expectations of just and appropriate instruction and supervision. While at a political level 
white society was being informed there were potentially grave future threats to the 
country‟s security, the army was under public accusation of failing to curb instructor 
misbehaviour and disorganisation, thereby hindering government and SADF intentions to 
bring whites to a more complete sense of acceptance and appreciation of military service.  
 
Official reaction to such complaints is not always easy to determine. The culture in the 
military of intimidation against anybody officially lodging complaints was undoubtedly 
high, as is borne out by the majority of Van der Byl‟s complainants strongly asserting 
they remain anonymous. Fouché received correspondence in the same year signed by 
Commandant General Grobbelaar, reporting upon “alleged unauthorised occurrences” at 
Oudtshoorn involving assaults by instructors on ballotees, besides also complaints from 
the Private Secretaries to the Ministers of Forestry, Bantu Education and Indian Affairs, 
that their instructors course candidates had received similar treatment. A board had 
investigated the allegations and its findings had included that there had indeed been six 
incidents where ballotees complaints were verified. There was evidence accepted of four 
incidents concerning swearing and bad language being used against ballotees and eight 











were being taken against an officer, a warrant officer and six non-commissioned officers. 
Allegations repeated referring to poorly organised training programmes, where 
demeaning jobs filled in for time were effectively dismissed. Grobbelaar did however, 
report to the Minister that because of previous complaints he had appointed a senior 
board of officers to investigate certain aspects of CF training and particularly the issue of 




One of the clear problems during the early 1960s was that although the SADF also 
utilised CF instructors, much of this work was under the control of junior PF members. 
There was not only a shortage of these men, but a lack of quality too, particularly 
amongst non-commissioned officers. Former senior SADF officer Vice Adm Martin 
Trainor recalled Magnus Malan remarking during the early 1970s that: „If he could not 
have an army of good permanent force sergeants, then it would be better to have an army 
of good national service corporals.‟
972
 The inference is clear that there were problems, 
which dated back to the 1960s which were meant to be remedied by national servicemen 
from the early 1970s taking over much of the junior instructor work.  
 
By mid-1966, new defence minister P.W. Botha was capitalising on the extent to which 
the SADF had become pervasive within white South Africans lives. Addressing the 
Rapportryers Club in Porterville, Botha made specific references to employers, in that he 
encouraged them to support their workers obligatory service in the SADF. But more 
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specifically Botha laid emphasis upon the white youth viewing military service as a 
patriotic duty that promoted the “physical and spiritual well-being” of the nation. The 
view of compulsory military service had subtly shifted since 1960. It was now given a 
loud nationalistic purpose, as opposed to what had arguably been understood as a legal 
obligation performed by those balloted to contribute to the country‟s defence. Within six 
years, Botha was making grandiose sweeping statements such as: “South Africa has a 
right to expect enthusiasm for her Defence Force from every patriotic citizen.”
973
 This 
was a considerable change from a previous situation in 1960 where Die Burger had 
advocated that the government approach with great caution the issue of extending the 
military ballot system to all white male school-leavers. (See chapter 4, p. 297)    
 
The SADF in public during the 1960s 
 
Most police security operations remained largely clandestine, however, the SADF‟s 
activities were more open to public view, as was its growing arsenal purchased or ordered 
during the 1960s. Some the more high profile acquisitions included French Alouette and 
Super Frelon helicopters, Mirage III interceptors, British Buccaneer and Canberra 
bombers, French Panhard armoured cars, American C130 and C160 transport aircraft, 
new air-defence systems of radar and anti-aircraft artillery from Britain and Switzerland 
and new anti-submarine frigates from Britain. Ordered in the 1960s and delivered in the 
early 1970 included the navy‟s French supplied submarine fleet, Mirage F1 interceptors 
and Cactus surface to air missiles. Most of this equipment, obtained both before and after 
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the 1963 UN mandatory arms embargo had a primarily conventional war deterrent 
purpose, particularly the air defences and submarines. All purchases were well publicised 
in the press and the new equipment also had a marked impact upon how effectively the 
SADF could project itself as a force to be reckoned with.  
 
While some white citizens had their complaints about conditions during compulsory 
military service, most responded in large numbers, with a mixture of national pride and 
curiosity, by their attendance at SADF „shows‟. Such bolstering of patriotism through a 
public interest in the military occurred simultaneously with the press reporting 
enthusiastically upon the arrival of a new SAN ship or SAAF aircraft purchase, or often 
front page-type treatment of SADF participation during national or other events. For 
example when the third and last of the navy‟s new frigates arrived in Cape Town from 
the UK on 26 September 1964, crowds lined Signal Hill and the surrounding heights. The 
SAS President Pretorius was met by four other frigates and destroyers, besides 
formations of Mirages, Sabres and Vampire jet fighters. The Transvaal-based Afrikaans 
newspaper Die Vaderland produced a vivid photographic display of the frigate being 
welcomed under a banner headline: “Another fist for the SA Navy” and reported that “the 
air display by the Mirages was the highlight of the biggest demonstration of South 




The military and public welcome given for the frigate‟s arrival can also be understood in 
the context of white insecurities to the arms embargo enforced by traditional allies Britain 
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and the USA. Also dominating both English and Afrikaans press at the time was the 
aftermath of the Rivonia trial, besides the arrest and trials of African Resistance 
Movement (ARM) members and leading South African Communist Party fugitive Braam 
Fischer. The press had devoted considerable attention to the ARM trials and that of 
station bomber John Harris. The SADF displayed its maritime strike potential for the 
white public, for not only did it make interesting public viewing, but the press had long 
reported upon the perceived conventional military threats to the republic.           
 
In this and other ways, new arms acquisitions were open to inspection by white 
taxpayers, while the growing pool of future national service recruits also received 
exposure. The highly publicised weapon additions helped to give the SADF a rejuvenated 
status it had not enjoyed amongst the white community during the 1950s. There were 
several naval acquisitions during the 1950s as well as aircraft (Sabres and Vampires) and 
Centurion tanks. As explained in chapter one these were intended largely to equip a 
South Africa expeditionary force to assist Britain in the event of war in the Middle East. 
However, this idea eventually fell away as British strategic policy changed, with much of 
the equipment either mothballed or sold. As the SADF‟s public status was low at the 
time, there was not the same interest as during the 1960s when new equipment arrived, 
material which was also modern,  unlike the aircraft and some of the 1950s ships whose 
obsolescence was one of the reasons necessitating frantic SADF rearmament during the 
emerging „threat perceptions‟ of the new decade. The 1960s witnessed the SADF 
receiving significant coverage in the press, while the extensive involvement by the 











of republican nationhood. SADF public displays of weaponry and „live ammunition‟ 





There had been a large military display held on 30 May 1955 near Swartkop, Pretoria for 
Union Day. On this occasion, the UDF Inspector General H. B. Klopper explained how 
the Defence Force had maintained a boeregewoonte – literally “farmer‟s habit” of 
“weapon‟s shows”. Klopper announced that the government had decided to conduct such 
military extravagances every five years, possibly then hence the massive live ammunition 
public demonstration held outside Bloemfontein on 31 May 1960.
976
 (See chapter one, pp 
51-52) These displays had continued regularly during World War Two and particularly 
for recruiting purposes amongst Afrikaners as Grundlingh has shown.
977
 This dissertation 
contends that the SADF also provided such public military displays as a tacit reassurance 
to the white community, besides displaying the force‟s efficiency and integrating it with 
the white public‟s collective consciousness. Such displays were far more easily 
assimilated when ostensibly presented as entertainment just as the World War Two 
recruiting campaigns had been. But they also played the roles of demonstrating state 
military power and promoting national pride amongst the white community via the 
SADF. 
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The military‟s capacity to stage such spectacular “shows” assisted it‟s “popularization” 
amongst the white community and this became part a process whereby the white 
community would be cautiously introduced to viewing military service as an important 
part of their own duty, protection and lives. Both Afrikaner and „English‟ support and 
interest in the military was demonstrated through various civic organisations calling on 
the SADF to perform various displays at a range of commemorative and other occasions. 
This also reinforces the contention that as the SADF became a more visible entity it was 
also being viewed as „theirs” by the white public. Regular applications for SADF 
participation in public events continued throughout the early 1960s, to the point where 
many requests from organisations and town councils had to be turned down. The most 
innocuous of occasions sometimes resulted in the SADF receiving a call, like a request 
from the Harrismith Municipality in June 1964, asking for a display of jet fighters to 
mark the occasion of the opening of a new tar road from the town to the Rand. The 
Commandant General‟s Office rejected it, not only because the occasion failed the 
criteria laid down for air-displays, but also because the SAAF were already overloaded 
with such appeals that it was becoming impossible to comply with them all.
978
 Hiemstra 
personally vetoed a similar request from the Belfast Municipality, celebrating their 75
th
 
Anniversary in March 1965, for an air and paratrooper display, citing that the defence 
minister in August 1963 had already made it clear that only 100 and 150-year 




                                                 
978
 Box 459, KG Gp5, 37, SAW deelname: aerial display: official opening of tarred road from Harrismith 
to the Rand, Department of Defence Documentation Centre, Pretoria.    
979
 Box 459, KG Gp 5,KG/SER/10 Militêre Deelname: 75 jarige bestaan: Belfast, Department of Defence 











Afrikaner nationalist occasions that drew large crowds ensured that both Hiemstra and 
SADF were never far from the newspaper front pages. Hiemstra also found himself 
invited to address the exclusive Durban “Wings” club in June 1965, which held an air 
show that included a huge aerial display by SAAF aircraft watched by 180 000 people.
980
 
Such occasions also collectively contributed to the “popularisation” of the SADF 
amongst the white community. The SADF was regularly the prominent, indeed usually 
dominant, official presence at commemorative and national occasions, while the white 
“reconciliation” theme was often included within proceedings. The 11 July 1964 
unveiling of the Spioenkop Monument to the burgers who had fallen in the Boer War 
battle, epitomised the popularised direction of the Afrikaner-run Republic regarding the 
broader white community. English and Afrikaner were projected as one, but emphatically 
under Afrikaner nationalist leadership and its policies. State President C.R. Swart referred 
to the perceived urgency of a common white nationhood, a point of his speech directly 
emphasised in the Commando report: 
We are no longer Boer and Brit – we are South Africans…we 





The SADF role in the 1966 Republic Day Festivities   
 
During the fifth anniversary republican celebrations in May 1966, thousands of white 
citizens in Pretoria watched a military march-past of nearly 20 000 troops, together with 
columns involving several hundred tanks, armoured cars, trucks and artillery with 
Hiemstra travelling in the lead vehicle. Overhead the parade hundreds of aircraft 
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thundered across the sky, including the air force‟s most modern acquisitions.
982
 It was an 
impressive military display for white public consumption, pride and their enhanced sense 
of security, again documenting the remarkably successful 1960s “popularisation” of the 
SADF. Thousands of white South Africans travelled to view this Republic Day spectacle, 
which served as the finale of the celebrations centred around the Voortrekker Monument 
amphitheatre; many camping overnight or travelling through the night to the site by train 
or vehicle. The Cape Times reported that: 
Before sunrise, already thousands of people were huddled around 
camp fires…the air was thick with smoke and the aroma of 
coffee. Flags fluttered in the breeze, a carnival atmosphere 





There were scores of celebratory items concerning the Republic Day program, but the 
military proceedings easily towered over those others held in Pretoria, while the parade 
was the main reporting focus within the national press. Under an editorial headline of 
“On parade for peace”, the Cape Times attempted a cautiously optimistic assessment of 
the parade not being intended as a demonstration of military prowess and aggression. 
This was at odds with the front-page headline: “S.A. Shows World her Might”. The 
editorial intimated that peace was Verwoerd‟s intention and shared by “all South 
Africans, “although there are many outside who believe or profess to believe the 
contrary”.
984
 Even taking into account its flourishing propagandistic style, Commando 
described scenes that demonstrated the power of mass military parades in creating mass 
nationalist fervour through the spectacular visual impact which military equipment can 
                                                 
982
 Commando, July 1966, pp 6-11.  
983
 Cape Times, 1 June 1966, p.1.  
984











create. And no more so than during this entirely white South African celebration, 
occurring as it did against white prosperity and illusions of political and military security. 
At 10h42, the mechanised column…began rolling past the 
saluting base. In the lead vehicle was the Commandant-General 
SADF,…R.C. Hiemstra…Few, if any, of the crowd estimated at 
750 000, failed to thrill at the thunder of the tanks of the 
Armoured Regiment…Marching with measured treads in ranks 
of nine abreast they came, battalion after battalion and the 
mighty crowd thrilled and applauded as they glimpsed the 
shoulder insignia…of famous regiments…At 11h28, on 
schedule, the fly-past of aircraft of the SAAF began…Special 
cheers went up…as the new jet trainer, „Impala‟ made her public 
debut, rolling, climbing and twisting in the Transvaal sky…as 
South African as the veld itself…The Sabre aerobatic team 
brought gasps of praise as flying in perfect precision they traced 
a smoke pattern of Orange, White and Blue. A massed fly-past of 
201 aircraft was brought to a thrilling climax by a spectacular 
„bomb-burst‟ by the acrobatic team. At noon, a 21-gun salute 





 Verwoerd was reported elsewhere as making it entirely clear that white „unity‟, separate 
development and political conformity were phenomena to be defended, if necessary by 
force of arms: 
Tonight I am not dealing with the wreckers. I am speaking to the 
builders. Five eventful years have passed and many people who 
were not prepared for the constitutional development that had 
taken place were now happy that it had come to pass…What is 
there to look back for? Let us align ourselves into one nation and 
let us defend that nation with all that we have…To those who 
cannot accept South Africa as it is and as it grows, but seek to 
change it into something wholly new with the resultant chaos, as 
elsewhere in Africa, I have nothing to say…The Republic was 
part of the domain of the white man in the world.
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The Star was more forthright in celebrating the military grandeur of the parade by 
headlining it as “South Africa Shows Might in Vast Parade” – with a “massive and 
spectacular display” of our armed might.
987
 Hiemstra had wanted a parade which he felt 
would compare to that of the French Armed Forces on Bastille Day, sending a clear 
message to the “black nations of Africa who had thought possibly they could take us over 
with their bare hands. Certainly not after that day (of the parade)”.
988
 The SADF was also 
prominent at other Republic Day Shows – Commando published an article entitled “SA 
Bastion of the South” referring to the Defence Force display at the Republic Festival 
Show at Milner Park in Johannesburg.
989
 The term “Bastion of the South” or ”Vesting in 
die Suide” was the title of a propaganda film released two years earlier, promoting the 
SADF as guarding the country‟s “multi-national” community and western interests, as the 
“world endeavours to counter an alien ideology” (communism).
990
 The Cape Times 
reported on hundreds of people crowding to board the new navy frigates visiting the city 
docks for a week as part of the Republic Festival.
991
 The paper also gave the SADF 
prominence in its „Festival Supplement‟, remarking favourably on the organisations 
marked growth since 1960-1961. This paper demonstrated continued interest in the 
SADF that in itself must have reflected increased white public interest. 
 
The five years since the founding of the Republic have seen the 
most phenomenal growth in its Defence Force‟s, potential and 
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expenditure. The Defence Budget has been increased immensely 
from R45.8m spent in 1960-61, to more than R232m in 1964-65. 
Army, Air Force and navy strengths were increased – the 
Permanent Force grew by 65.5% - new units formed, Citizen 
Force and Commando strengths boosted and air commandos 
established. The Republic‟s forces have been equipped for their 
role in guarding the country‟s 3100 miles of frontier and 2500 
miles of coastline, while internal security is in the hands of a 
modern expanded police force. 
992
    
   
The 1966 Republic Day SADF parade and other events reflected an emerging white 
South African and particularly Afrikaner solidarity within a military context. But it also 
was a hugely successful public relations exercise that Hiemstra had initiated, just as 
compulsory military conscription for all white male school-leavers loomed closer. 
Businesses also associated themselves with the growing SADF public presence. For 
example, the South African Mutual Life Assurance Company produced a full page 
advertisement portraying three of the SAAF‟s new Buccaneers jets, accompanied by a 
caption:  
CONFIDENCE: Five years have passed since the birth of our 
Republic. They have witnessed an enrichment of our South 
African way of life, and a firm determination to defend our 
heritage. The Republic looks confidently towards the future.
993
   
 
A Commando advertisement in June 1967 from the oil company BP presented a display 
feature “BP Salutes our Fleet” with a large photo of SA Navy ensign on the stern of one 
of the new frigates, followed by another warship in the background;
994
 this on occasion of 
the navy‟s 21
st
 anniversary of its official inception. (See illustrations)  
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Merging white community „militarization‟ and SADF „popularisation‟  
 
After the successful security police operations against the ANC and the ARM, along with 
Bram Fischer‟s arrest and conviction, Afrikaner right-wing and government obsessions 
with communism and internal subversives intensified further. Vorster‟s appointment as 
Prime Minister meant that the most conservative elements with the NP had a securocrat 
in the premier‟s office and security legislation became even harsher by 1967, where the 
police could detain anyone considered a „terrorist‟ until they were satisfied otherwise.
995
 
This is relevant in the SADF context because coupled to the Rule of Law being eroded; 
white South African males were compelled through legislation to give more of their time 
to military training.  
 
Callistair has made some interesting deductions in suggesting that by 1967 national 
service was one under sufferance by some, citing comments from a parliamentary speech 
the same year, referring to the retiring Chief of the Army, Lt Gen Jacobs complaining 
that substantial numbers of trainees were entering the military “in a spirit of 
resistance”.
996
 Callistair‟s point that the military by the mid-1960s was perceived as an 
intrusion amongst at least part of the white community is valid. But there was not only no 
significant resistance to the imposition of compulsory national service, but to an extent, 
SADF „militarization‟ and „popularization‟ of the white community were merging, even 
if it was hardly a venerated national institution by all. This is evident by the mass public 
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enthusiasm for military shows, as described above and the SADF‟s centrality in being 
able to invoke demonstrative white patriotism over security issues. By the end of our 
period, the SADF had certainly announced its presence in ways that were hardly as 
apparent in 1960. By the conclusion of the decade, the SADF was starting to be given a 
louder nationalistic purpose by the NP government, who were blending national service 
obligations with a definition of patriotism that was being defined strictly within their 
political party terms and objectives.   
 
It is also pertinent to note that by 1967-68, the SADF‟s perceptions of external 
intervention or internal black uprising had a less dramatic impact in the white public 
mind than earlier in the decade, with the waning of the first and the government‟s 
crushing of internal black nationalist militant organisations. The SADF was shifting its 
attention to the first low-key guerrilla infiltration in SWA and clandestine involvement in 
anti-black nationalist military operations in neighbouring states. The government‟s stress 
upon white unity during the post-republic period had also to an extent abated by the late 
1960s. The general white view was that a strong Defence Force remained a necessity to 
deal with potentially communist inspired threats from without or within. However, 
despite some public objections towards how military service was sometimes conducted, 
there is no doubt the SADF towards the end of the 1960s had undergone a marked 
popularisation shift in six years. It had become a more vivid entity in the white public 
mind, as the Cape Times optimistically asserted by mid-1966:   
Another important change…has come into the attitude of the 











he was inclined to look down upon them. This was all changed 




                            
Conclusion 
 
It has been the main purpose of this chapter to show how amidst triumphant Afrikaner 
republicanism and growing white prosperity there was increased white community  
interest and participation in the SADF. There has also been an attempt to demonstrate 
how the SADF projected an assurance to white South Africans that their republic had 
both an effective guardian and an impressive symbol of state. Military displays were 
watched and admired by whites and by Afrikaners in particular, many of whom were 
once estranged from the military, now whose fathers, sons and uncles made up the larger 
proportion of SADF personnel. The imperative behind republicanism to unite the two 
white language groups behind Verwoerd‟s government was endorsed through the 
operation of the SADF and regularly bulwarked via its official publication Commando. 
Despite the parliamentary acknowledgement of abuses within the SADF, particularly that 
by junior instructors, Fouché tried to keep ahead of opposition criticism through the 
Groenewoud Commission, although this was really intended to investigate a more 
efficient expansion of compulsory white military service. 
 
The SADF‟s increasingly high profile amongst the white community would continue to 
rise during the decades to come. Whether whites during the 1960s would have fought en 
mass against an invader to maintain political control, as implied by Alexander, is not 
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 But considering the conformism of the time and the interest besides involvement 
in the military by sections of the community, such a mass resistance was certainly 
plausible. The mobilization of South African whites during the first part of the 1960s for 
the SADF was a complex process, prompted by deliberate policy decisions taken at 
cabinet level and then enacted through SADF command structures. But there is also no 
doubt that whites were in general receptive and certainly not obstructive to this process 
and by 1966 there had been considerable additions in military equipment, manpower and 
strategic thinking, which complemented increased white withdrawal into a defensive 
mode. 
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As with the Afrikaner republics during 1895-1899 when the South African Republic 
(SAR) was increasingly at odds with Britain, the Afrikaner-run republic of the 1960s also 
felt the winds of change and isolation. Like the late nineteenth century Orange Free State 
and SAR, their 1960s successor responded amidst rumours of war with increased 
attention to its defence. At the end of World War Two the war-weary white South 
African community hardly represented a likely grouping conducive to any form of state 
coercion towards any state directed program involving militarization, yet the start of such 
a process occurred two decades later. The 1960s SADF military threat perceptions forms 
the historical context against which this dissertation has attempted to examine aspects of 
white South Africa and defence. Varied sources have been utilised in combinations not 
previously encountered in writings on this topic, including formally classified 
documentation, recollections of SADF members from the period and a wide assortment 
of secondary sources. The latter include extensive use of the press, biographical writings, 
official and popular publications, besides film material.  
 
This thesis has contended that despite some operational problems and a significant degree 
of public objections to both the personal inconveniences or management of conscription, 
the SADF still transformed during 1960-1968 into becoming a higher priority state 
institution, a process that accentuated further during the 1970s and 1980s. Understanding 
how the chosen decade‟s military threat perceptions impacted upon both the Defence 











into this community‟s political behaviour. Security concerns became crucial components 
in promoting a discernable white South African cohesion of conservative political 
opinion, which also fuelled increased military and national defensiveness. White South 
African alarm, regarding both external and internal enemies, was endorsed further by the 
visible SADF counter strategies taken, including both rearming and conscription. These 
latter two changes were regularly portrayed within the local media for the white 
community to ingest and speculate over, along with the various SADF threat appraisals. 
Selected information on military plans, infrastructure and equipment purchased to deter 
and if necessary repel potential aggressors, was made public knowledge by government 
to alert (if not alarm) the white public how national security perspectives were changing.  
 
Threat appraisals details placed in public within summarised forms, included the highly 
implausible “African threat”. There seems little doubt that the government used its 
politicians to deliberately whip the white community together, thereby hoping to increase 
NP support at the polls. Many examples of government statements illustrate as such, 
which resulted in the official UP opposition which was conservative on defence issues, 
often with difficulty having to illustrate it was in no way „soft‟ when commenting upon 
white South African security. Curiously, the government claiming priority for white 
citizens‟ loyalty on national defence, reduced the degree to which the opposition could 
criticise both the NP‟s appeals for white republican solidarity behind the SADF and even 
UP criticism of government racial policies. This dissertation has used the terms “tentative 
white unity” and “white nationalism”; describing phenomena that it contends manifested 











mobilization of the white community during the first decade of republic. It suggests 
further that this creeping militarization was a marked change in the relationship between 
the SADF and white community, compared with the 1950s, when the SADF was the 
focus of intra-white political conflict and occupied a lower national profile.  
 
Groundwork was undoubtedly laid by the government during the 1960s that prepared 
white South Africans to accept, if not also respect and amongst the vast majority, fully 
collaborate with the SADF. Through politicians, the SADF and the media, the white 
community were drawn into a defensive but existent solidarity in their reacting to 
supposedly potential war situations. Both the English and Afrikaans press endorsed 
security concerns by earnestly and enthusiastically reporting upon defence issues during 
the 1960s; this point being asserted as one of several verifications of the heightened 
public interest in the SADF. Considerable referencing within this thesis to formally 
classified documentation also provides evidence of the extent to which the military 
interpreted 1960s external threats to the republic and SWA; creating in response various 
counter strategies.  
 
One of the most important counter strategies and a feature of the incipient militarization 
of white South Africa during the 1960s, was the advent of white male conscription for all 
school-leavers by their eighteenth year; a development that is inextricably connected to 
Commandant General Rudolph Hiemstra‟s career. From the 1950s, Hiemstra had openly 
shifted from the serving military officer‟s traditional (British-originated) public stance of 











nationalist credentials and his unique position as a leading military figure within his 
Afrikaner nationalists, Hiemstra‟s politicking received tacit support from the government. 
Hiemstra played an important role in championing an SADF that embodied the 
characteristics of a “volksweermag” or a Republican Defence Force, inclusive of both 
white language groups, but unlike the pre-1948 UDF, under explicit Afrikaner nationalist 
leadership. The army in particular transformed into being a predominantly Afrikaans 
organisation in terms of its members and identity. No publication or writings have to this 
author‟s knowledge, analysed the role of Hiemstra in the development of a “republican 
military culture” amongst the South African white community during the 1960s and early 
70s. Neither has the SADF and its relationship with the white community during this 
period been closely examined against the context of the “popularisation” and 
militarization issues discussed within this thesis. These features during the 1960s, 
elevated local military affairs amongst white South Africans current affairs perceptions 
and it is hoped this examination of them constitutes some original contribution towards 
our understanding of aspects of white South African social history during the first decade 
of the Republic. 
 
The Second World War and its broader impact upon South Africa was a mere twenty 
years or less distance from the 1960s. This thesis has also tried to demonstrate that this 
formed a significant context regarding our understanding the dynamics amongst white 
South Africans and the SADF during the 1960s. Both English and Afrikaans ex-
servicemen and their communities had either participated in, or lived through World War 











afterwards. Therefore, the two white communities inevitably used the war, which had 
such profound political consequences for South Africa, as one important reference point 
for comprehending the changing circumstances that the SADF found itself in during the 
1960s. Echoes of wartime squabbles and white political divisions of twenty years earlier 
remained and the government tried to temper these to its advantage. Where plausible, 
some old differences were diverted by endorsing white commonalities of purpose in their 
supposedly protecting the republic against a range of perceived threats.   
 
English-speaking ex-servicemen, although somewhat fissured in terms of their political 
opinions, were in the main supportive of the military‟s outlook of bolstering national 
defences against “threats”. This thesis suggests that the fathers of the first generation of 
English-speaking conscripts, despite some having perhaps reservations about the 
Afrikaner-dominated army, still accepted if not even fully supported their sons‟ 
conscription into the SADF. There were certainly never any significant public objections 
to such training. This was partly a consequence of a socialisation „rite of passage‟ 
regarding the „appropriateness‟ of young men serving their country as soldiers. It was 
also plausible that many white South Africans understood the “military threats” to the 
republic or SWA, as synonymous with those associated with the 1930s and 1940s 
European dictators. When African and Asian spokespersons uttered threats against the 
republic through the international media, white South Africans largely perceived them as 
dictatorial, irrational, aggressive and potentially dangerous to (white) „civilisation‟. Such 
views were also held in common by most South African whites; therefore, the SADF 












For Afrikaners, the 1960s also marked a curious return to aspects of the World War Two 
issues, as they had effected this community. During the two world wars, where South 
Africans had fought alongside the British Empire/Commonwealth, the attendant 
memories and sacrifices were not remembered or commemorated amongst Afrikaners as 
a community, as occurred so vividly and regularly within the English-speaking grouping. 
World War Two remained a sensitive issue amongst white South Africans, but in terms 
of raising the SADF‟s profile amongst them to promote the purported white republican 
unity, there also had to be some government approved view of the South African 
military‟s history. Therefore, in the 1960s the NP and its attendant supporting 
publications like Commando and Huisgenoot played down the historic Afrikaner 
divisions over participation or non-participation in 1939-1945. As this thesis suggests, the 
Second World War even underwent a kind of “part-rehabilitation” in the government-
supporting media. For the sake of white unity, the government supported attempts to 
show that the conflict also contained components of which white South Africans could 
collectively be proud of, in terms of their involvement.  
 
The government had virtually no defence expertise and experience of its own. Prominent 
Second World War neutralists like Verwoerd, Vorster, Fouché and Botha, leant heavily 
upon the knowledge of war veterans like Commandant General Piet Grobbelaar, Vice 
Adm Hugo Biermann, Maj Gen Nic Bierman, Lt Gen Charles Fraser and others, in 
formulating any military responses to those threats the new republic was assumed to be 











supporters by the 1960s, or certainly endorsed its views on defence, which on matters of 
potential threats, seldom differed substantially from those held by the UP parliamentary 
opposition. At a more overt political level, some Afrikaner nationalists still stridently 
demanded priority in the SADF. This thesis argues that the grooming of Hiemstra from 
1948 and his appointment as Deputy SADF Chief in 1960, and as SADF Commandant 
General by late 1965, actually partly completed Erasmus‟s controversial 1950s 
republicanisation of the Defence Force. Simultaneously, the new Defence Minister Jim 
Fouché, while assuring English-speakers particularly, that only merit would count in 
promotions and appointments, also had to balance these against political realities where 
Broederbond and NP considerations still pressed for special preferences in the SADF for 
Afrikaner nationalists.      
 
During the first half of the decade, Hiemstra effectively played the role of a kind of 
SADF senior political commissar, while Commandant General Grobbelaar and the rest of 
the General Staff advised Fouché on defence preparedness. Had South Africa been 
involved in a war, the government would have depended upon the SADF‟s war veterans 
as the most experienced potential combat formation commanders. The 1960s defence 
uncertainties therefore brought the Republican government politicians, once so hostile to 
South African involvement in World War Two, ironically now heavily reliant upon the 
very men whose war service the NP had once spurned. The government was comprised 
of members who had objected so vehemently to South Africa‟s war participation that 
were now themselves dependent upon that very experience attained by men whom 











acclaimed role in World War Two was shifted by the 1960s into the SADF being 
perceived in some international political circles as backing a regime akin to that which it 
had fought in North Africa and Italy. But whatever their politics, most SADF officers 
responded with detached professionalism to South Africa‟s national and international 
political circumstances that had altered so much between 1945 to the 1960s. In general, 
SADF officers with war experience endorsed the government‟s strategies to promote a 
kind of white unity and „nationalism‟, whereby political differences amongst South 
African whites were certainly at a military level, largely subsumed in the official 
reactions to perceived urgencies in issues concerning national defence. If anything, 
“white South African nationalism” was probably more evident in the SADF than any 
other state entity at the time.     
 
Despite those within both white communities, who for differing reasons were still uneasy 
about the military, after 1960 white South Africans generally started accepting the SADF, 
even if in some cases tepidly, as a „necessary‟ reality in their lives. This occurred 
regardless of the over-bearing presence of triumphalist Afrikaner nationalism, including 
its curbing of civil liberties and violation of the rule of law to crush extra-parliamentary 
political opposition. New defence priorities, like for example the SADF military threat 
perceptions following strident Afro-Asian objections to republican racial policy, meant 
the government had to at least partially reverse Erasmus‟s SADF Afrikanerisation 
policies, particularly regarding alleged low morale and perceptions of political 
favouritism. In terms of its fears for white survival and the SADF potential protective 











Fouché‟s direction, based clearly upon Verwoerd‟s broader republican strategy of 
drawing whites closer, the SADF attempted to appear more inclusive of English-
speakers, including incorporating aspects of the military traditions from both white 
communities. However, Afrikaner nationalist leadership and dominance did not markedly 
reduce within the organisation. Although Fouché was to appoint several senior English-
speaking officers into some significant responsibility positions, there was never intended 
to occur any sharing of responsibility, to an extent that might dilute Afrikaner nationalist 
political goals or cohesion. At a party political level, although the „white English‟ did not 
shift in mass across to the NP, they also did not embrace another popular strategy for 
white survival and neither was any offered in what would have appeared to them as a 
plausible form by the UP and Progressive Party parliamentary opposition. Neither of the 
two white communities were historically overwhelmingly military-orientated, but both 
still retained past military-cultural components; from the English historic associations to 
CF regiments to the Afrikaner cultural attachment regarding their historic commando 
heritage. These were factors which the SADF tried to amplify and utilise in reforming its 
own white republican identity.    
 
Therefore the NP had to work towards some kind of rapprochement with those former 
SADF members alienated during the 1950s and the thousands of whites who had voted 
„No‟ during the October 1960 republican referendum and still remained suspicious of 
Afrikaner nationalist intentions. Therefore, the government compromised and through 
Fouché worked at rebuilding the SADF‟s combat capability and its public image to 











attempted some pragmatism in affirming English-speaking members where this advanced 
the organisation‟s effectiveness and the government‟s political aims.  
 
International and internal circumstances during the 1960s ensured that the government 
was galvanised into viewing the military as pivotal in defending both South Africa and 
NP policies. The SADF was used by the government as an instrument whereby it was 
hoped, confidence and morale for the republic‟s future could be built amongst the white 
populace across historically conflicting political lines and also where a „white 
nationalism‟ and national pride might be bolstered through making the SADF more 
„public‟ and „popularised‟. The 1960s also marked the beginnings of a slow ebbing 
regarding Afrikaner nationalist community fervour as urbanisation, prosperity and 
consumerism, ubiquitously competed with NP imperatives of patriotism and volk unity. 
Although not immediately discernable, Afrikaner nationalist political energy had peaked, 
just as economic prosperity became an attractive diversion to continual political 
enthusiasm. This also impacted upon the SADF where both amongst Afrikaans and 
„English‟ balloted conscripts, large numbers applied to postpone or avoid military service 
for career or professional reasons. Neither was the military a particularly popular choice 
of career for young white males, attributed to it providing salaries and careers that could 
not compete with those offered in civilian employment.  .    
 
Conscription also played a role of asserting a conservative Afrikaner political 
socialisation, particularly during the latter part of the 1960s, emphasising amongst 











internal enemies, particularly those purportedly „communist-inspired‟. In this way, the 
SADF undoubtedly reinforced defensiveness throughout white society and such was also 
transmitted with varying success to the white English-community. Although there were 
scores of institutional differences between the Afrikaans and English white South African 
communities in terms of schools, universities, businesses, newspapers and churches, to 
list just a few, the „English‟ remained politically largely conservative. Without any mass 
enthusiasm, they accepted their role in defence; with the CF regiments in particular and 
individuals amongst the most senior ranks making significant contributions. After their 
diminished post-1948 role within the SADF, the „English‟ in the 1960s received new 
official „approval‟ within the SADF, while the government also drew additional political 
support from this grouping. Fouché worked at soothing past historic frictions and avoided 
where possible, public dwelling upon previous white political conflict in the military. His 
approach to defence was often loudly acclaimed by the English press and UP, who 
commended the minister‟s „merit only‟ policy regarding promotions. This enthusiastic 
media reaction, also demonstrated how some „English‟ whites were also drawn to varying 
degrees into something like a sense of “republican belonging” and an acquiescence 
regarding the NP‟s republican strategy of drawing whites together under Afrikaner 
nationalist leadership.   
 
Afrikaner nationalist attempts to „claim‟ the SADF as „theirs‟ still continued during the 
1960s, ironically in parallel to Fouché‟s efforts at white unity. The AKVV activities often 
embraced the most defensive of verkrampte
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 impulses regarding perceived potential 
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enemies of Afrikaners and most particularly those from „within.‟ Hiemstra and the AKVV 
remained closely associated during the first half of the decade while the organisation 
often served as a medium to reinforce his untiring efforts to synthesise Afrikaner 
nationalist history, theology and militarism as an integral component of broader 
Afrikaner culture. This entirely sectional activity within SADF structures continued 
despite it not being in sync with government efforts at „white nation building‟ for the 
Republic; perhaps giving an indication of just how significant Hiemstra‟s Broederbond 
influence was within the SADF.  
 
Also significant in understanding aspects of the SADF during the 1960s is Afrikaner 
nationalist historian and political analyst G. D. Scholtz, considering his indirect 
involvement in SADF Intelligence rationales. Scholtz also encouraged Afrikaners to view 
the military as “theirs”; a reversal of a previous historical situation where Afrikaner 
nationalists claimed feeling alienation from the Defence Force.
1000
 Scholtz‟s writings and  
how they were studied and distributed within the SADF, endorses this dissertation‟s 
contention that a close study of the period in relation to the Defence Force is significant 
in terms of our deeper understanding regarding South African civil-military relations. 
Scholtz who was a confidant of both Verwoerd and Hiemstra was able to write 
triumphantly in 1962: 
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The spirit of the Defence Force today is such that the Afrikaner 
can in all respects feel at home. The most intimate bonds can 




Scholtz‟s work also encouraged Afrikaners to view their own volk history within a wider 
global context. He urged Afrikaners to resist that which he perceived diluted the „purity‟ 
of their nationalism, or that what insidiously „threatened‟ Afrikanerdom in the longer 
term, including his understandings of „communism‟ and „liberalism‟. Such were amongst 
the „forces‟ against which the most conservative individuals within Afrikaner institutions 
rallied during the mid-1960s to „resist‟. Similar elements within the SADF also tried to 
align the organisation with this verkrampte faction and the AKVV became one such 
vehicle for extreme opinions. But more particularly, this thesis has tried to show that 
Scholtz‟s writings clearly influenced SADF threat appraisals rationales, particularly 
concerning the UN General Assembly hostility to South Africa and his contention that 
UN military intervention in South Africa was inevitable, given the process he described 
as “equalisation” being resisted by the South African government. The extent to which 
the SADF annually appraised a potential UN military threat is evidence of how seriously 
such was assumed, even though it is clear this “threat” diminished amongst military 
intelligence priorities by the mid-1960s. As isolation, international marginalisation and 
hostility still dominated the media throughout the decade the SADF continued to secretly 
consider the implication of armed international intervention.     
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The narrow voting majority in republican favour by South African whites during the 
October 1960 republican referendum was undoubtedly facilitated to a significant extent 
by their shock at concurrent events in the Congo, where white communities were abused 
and even massacred by African nationalists. This white South African survival nightmare 
scenario, of their at some future date being treated likewise, also occurred against white 
alarm as black South Africans expressed their own grievances most vividly during high-
profile early 1960s outbreaks of anti-state protests, sabotage campaigns and the violent 
incidents attributed to Poqo. The state‟s mobilisation of the white community towards 
some form of militarization was also facilitated by this white fear in reaction to the 
extremes of violence perpetrated against settlers in other parts of Africa. The Angolan 
uprisings during 1961 were even more violent than the Congo events in terms of the 
ghoulish details spread throughout the South African press. These accounts fed further 
into horrific white South African visions of what the future held for them if they were not 
properly prepared to defend themselves.      
 
Verwoerd took a particular interest in the December 1960 appointment of Grobbelaar as 
Commandant General, who in turn ordered defence threat appraisals. Through NP 
politicians, the press disseminated superficial details thereof, of which for most of white 
society, lent apparent legitimacy to increased defence budgets and conscription. It was 
assumed by whites that rearming would ensure a credible military deterrent, regardless of 
how vaguely construed the conventional warfare threats were. In addition, there were a 
myriad of other supposedly inter-linked “enemies” and claimed internal subversion 











government described as further constituting adequate justification for increased defence 
spending and white South African support for the SADF. The extent of vivid media 
coverage ensured the SADF taking an increasingly high public profile at a wide-range of 
public events - the huge 1966 Republic Day parade was a spectacular culmination of 
such. Other regular displays during various occasions of military prowess, where the 
SADF participation often dominated the proceedings, also meant that the white 
community, who were enthusiastic spectators of such events, were drawn into closer 
proximity with military explanations of the SADF importance in protecting them from 
danger.   
 
As the 1960s were filled with constant images of the Cold War, with government 
spokespersons reminding of communist and terrorist „successes‟ throughout Africa, such 
also contributed to white South African observations of such international developments 
impacting upon their security. There was also the emerging influence of the Third World 
within international relations, with the much publicised vehement criticism of apartheid, 
accompanied sometimes by veiled and not so veiled, threatening posturing by African 
and Asian representatives. Consequently, the SADF received widespread encouragement 
for improving its effectiveness from a range of white community groupings. Neil Orpen 
is cited as a particularly strident “republican military spokesman” from within the white 
„English‟ community. This interest and involvement in the military by Afrikaners and 
English whites alike, along with media speculation of all the „threats,‟ to some extent 
deflected popular thinking away from political disunities within the white community, as 











grand apartheid. SADF public demonstrations of its supposed prowess helped reinforce 
white confidence during the first uncertain years of political isolation. 
 
However, the SADF‟s supposedly confident public face during our period also concealed 
the intense insecurity prevalent within Afrikaner nationalist politics, where the emphasis 
remained upon preserving Afrikaner unity and control. The period 1960 to 1968 marked 
the high point of achievements regarding the Afrikaner nationalist goal of Republic, with 
the vast majority of Afrikaners, along with a sizable minority of English-speakers voting 
for the NP. Although an extreme right-wing political party challenge had occurred to the 
NP from 1966, in the form of the Herstigte Nationale Party, this splinter party was 
bulldozed by NP supporters during public election meetings that year and it failed to win 
a seat in parliament. Nevertheless, after the assassination of Verwoerd, verkramptes and 
verligtes factions were coming into clear existence within the Afrikaner nationalist 
political establishment and this also started to impact upon the SADF.  
 
The 1960s also witnessed the implementation of Verwoerdian grand apartheid as the 
„pinnacle‟ of separate development. All cabinet ministers, including Fouché, integrated 
grand apartheid into their public explanations of their portfolio decisions. Although the 
homeland policy brought with it particular security concerns; one of the SADF‟s 
reorganisation strategies was to concentrate new bases adjoining Bantustans and national 
borders, evidence of the government‟s attempts in spreading out resources to pre-empt 
internal security problems as well as external threats. The efforts to launch grand 











also subordinated to this political goal. In short, the SADF made its presence felt amongst 
white South Africans, providing some reassurance for white insecurities in respect to 
their isolated and beleaguered global status. This is the sense that their military deterrent 
against threats was projected as superior to any thing which African or domestic 
opponents may possess. From a white South African perspective this was significant, 
considering that they were faced with the black majority, that by 1968 were 
comparatively politically docile, but where every historical guide, let alone common 
sense suggested that this passivity would never be indefinitely sustained.  
 
Through the existence of a supposedly well-trained and efficient military capable of 
protecting „its own‟, the „improved‟ SADF during 1960-68 vividly portrayed itself 
through politicians and the media as the ultimate guardian of the country. Publicly SADF 
leaders projected their institution as guarding the country as one united entity. Whites 
were being tacitly guided to understand that this concerned their interests foremost, 
whether this was the „English‟ community‟s largely comfortable lifestyle and its 
institutions; the Afrikaner nationalist (temporary) achievement of volkseenheid; Afrikaner 
political monopoly or the private property and prosperity of both communities. The 
SADF provided some panacea allowing whites to deny long-term political realities, while 
also ensuring a deterrent against most potential aggressors or internal black rebellion. 
This must have raised the confidence of many white South Africans in the government 
and contributed to increased electoral support for the NP during the 1966 General 
Election. For those whites who thought little or nothing about politics, the SADF 











their futures were protected, without their necessarily needing to take any further interest 
in either the military or NP policy objectives.   
 
The 1960s defence expansion set the momentum for later military growth. The SADF 
was re-equipped, reorganised and remarketed for the white public‟s protection, 
participation and politically facilitated militarization during 1960 to 1968, which 
introduced a relationship between military and civilians that accentuated during the 
following two decades despite organisational problems during the decade that included 
various public complaints against conscription. However, during the 1960s, the SADF 
did not necessarily become an entirely effective organisation in terms of its own 
operational aims. The army in particular could not be properly prepared for any war as 
was loosely implied within the official classified appraisals. Besides the Walvis Bay 
garrison‟s establishment and fortification along with coastal artillery, other significant 
army organisational responses largely involved boosting troop numbers and the base 
additions already referred to. Training during the first part of the decade continued 
largely along conventional World War Two doctrinal lines, integrating equipment of that 
era with the new, although some anti-guerrilla concepts were introduced. It was clear that 
with the increased numbers of men balloted after 1962 the army during the next few 
years struggled to create adequate training programs to cover the full nine months of their 
service. This probably would help to at least part account for the boredom and 
frustrations, which transformed into some of the highly publicised cases of trainee abuse 












Therefore, the 1960s SADF only partly achieved its claimed public profile of ensuring 
protection for the “Bastion of the South”. Rearming, the re-structuring of the top 
command and later, re-orientation towards counter-insurgency as opposed to a dominant 
emphasis upon conventional war also occurred before the „Republican Defence Force‟ 
was finally tested in battle during the mid-1970s. The 1960s witnessed the SADF 
obtaining substantial new conventional warfare and other equipment and there was a 
particular emphasis upon improving its strategically vital aerial combat capacity. From 
1967 came the first clandestine SADF involvement in counter-insurgency operations 
within SWA, Angola and Rhodesia; but SADF battle capability came under much 
scrutiny during the Angolan Civil War in 1975. Limitations in artillery were revealed for 
the arms embargo had precluded any efforts that might have been made to replace the 
army‟s World War Two vintage guns.         
 
The air force and navy appeared clearer with the limits of their respective capacities and 
roles. The marked expansion of the SAAF from 1960 ensured that by 1968, it over-
shadowed all other sub-Saharan air forces combined in terms of numbers and aircraft 
sophistication. The enlarged SAAF provided not only the Republic‟s most convincing 
military deterrent, but also its most impressive visual public display of capability. The 
SAAF‟s actual air defence deficiencies were largely hidden from public view, but they 
still created anxieties amongst SADF commanders, as it remained very uncertain whether 
the air force actually could have prevented any highly concentrated aerial bombing on 
South African cities. The navy‟s shortages of trained specialists became a reality during 











Simon‟s Town Agreement and national defence obligations. Potential UN military 
intervention on behalf of African nationalist forces was perceived by SADF planners to 
have a precedent in the Congo during the attempted Katanga succession. The military 
intervention by UN forces intended to forestall this attempt at independence by the 
Katanganese, included a sizable Indian Armed Forces component. This thesis has shown 
that the SADF were particularly watchful of India as a potentially aggressive military 
power, as it had already used armed force against a colonial power, namely Portugal 
regarding Goa. Shortly thereafter, India was sanctioned by the UN to use her military 
under the international organisation‟s auspices, to terminate Katanga‟s attempted break 
away from independent Congo. This had resulted in clashes between Belgian whites and 
Indian troops and in some white South Africans minds, these events seemed to presage 
the same occurring regarding themselves and Afro-Asians hostile to apartheid and the 
SWA “occupation”.   
 
By the late 1960s, pronounced official emphasis upon white unity within the SADF 
became less of a priority as the republic apparently prospered and internal black 
opposition was temporarily crushed. There was also a waning of the earlier external 
military threat paranoia. However, a pattern emerged up to 1968, whereby white South 
African society exhibited the beginnings of a militarization not evident in 1960. There 
had been several important changes, including full white male conscription at age 
eighteen and a new „threat‟ identified namely “revolutionary warfare”. The latter 
postulated particularly through (then) Lt Gen Charles Fraser‟s writings, whose impact 











SADF priorities shifted towards more all-embracing defensive strategies involving 
counter-insurgency warfare, which also started to draw white South Africans closer 
towards the government and state objectives being increasingly indivisible. The influence 
of French strategist Beaufre upon Fraser‟s work was mentioned; within this framework, 
state interests were closely related to current military strategy, manifesting a new 
approach towards the SADF, directly informing trainees of government perceptions 
around „communism‟, besides various other issues that conservatives throughout the 
western world identified as supposedly undermining society. Against a tumultuous 
background of student unrest within Europe and North America in the 1960s, culminating 
during 1968, the SADF with full white male conscription in force from that year lurched 
towards an enhanced alternative direction, trying to enforce more conservative 
conformity amongst white youth via military training and political socialisation.   
 
There is no doubt that by the end of 1968, both the SADF and its relationship with the 
white community had changed from what it had been at the beginning of the decade. 
Fraser‟s concept of revolutionary warfare contributed not just to strengthening the 
foundations of a semi-militarised white South Africa, but also accentuated public beliefs 
concerning the significance of „communist threats‟. Fraser‟s writings were the genesis of 
Botha‟s later concept of “Total Onslaught”. A 1969 survey showed that by this date, the 
vast majority of whites from both language groups viewed the country‟s greatest threats 











movements and Communism in black Africa”.
1002
 Unlike his two predecessors, P.W. 
Botha made it his business to study defence and significantly further elevate the defence 
ministerial portfolio amongst government priorities. With Hiemstra as SADF Chief from 
October 1965, an important Afrikaner nationalist leader and Broederbond member now 
occupied this top appointment until the early 1970s. Hiemstra was assisted by a 
combination of World War Two veterans, besides officers trained in the post-war years, 
all of whom bore the institutional cultural stamp of the largely Afrikaner-dominated 
SADF of the 1960s. The government‟s original republican goal of a white South African 
unity around defence issues was less visible by the end of the decade. A new generation 
of SADF leadership also emerged in the 1960s, most particularly Magnus Malan, whose 
career moved significantly during this decade, along with those of several other 
promising younger middle-ranking officers who had joined shortly after World War Two. 
Being a soldier of ambition and ability, but also with his impeccable Afrikaner nationalist 
credentials, Malan was earmarked for top SADF leadership. He accelerated through 
several important intermediate appointments, particularly during the latter part of the 
1960s under Botha‟s ministerial tenure, being the government and Hiemstra‟s “nominee” 
as a future SADF Chief.   
 
Trying to adjudicate the professional competence of SADF commanders in the 1960s or 
the organisation‟s efficiency is difficult. Arguably the 1960s defence upgrades also 
enabled the SADF to ascertain its operational capacity, or lack of it, although it took 
already mentioned deficiencies exposed by the 1975 Angolan Civil War to force further 
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important modernisation upon the SADF. However, from a military perspective one 
could also refer favourably to the initial spectacular tactical advances made by SADF 
troops in Angola during the 1975 conflict, as evidence that 1960s training programs had 
facilitated confidence and resourcefulness amongst its troops, despite limitations in some 
of their equipment. Maj Gen Phil Pretorius believed that the SADF was not of the highest 
quality during the early 1960s, but that money was available and its capacity had 
improved markedly by the end of the decade.
1003
 While addressing the white South 
African public, the SADF may have exaggerated its fighting capacity in the 1960s, but 
there is no doubt the government made important use of it to manoeuvre increased 
commonality in white opinion to support NP perceptions of various military threats, 
thereby also drawing enlarged political support.     
 
The SADF would demand increasingly more of white citizens during the 1970s, as Botha 
would take closer political control of the organisation, placing into command some of the 
men he identified earlier. By 1973, Malan was made Chief of the Army and he has 
recorded his opinion that much military preparation was still wanting by this stage, for 
example, that no priority list existed for the acquisition of armaments. Malan believed 
that equipment had been purchased haphazardly and in consequence, this issue had 
required further planning.
1004
 After Hiemstra‟s 1972 retirement, Admiral Hugo Biermann 
was made SADF Chief, serving effectively as a stand-in prior to Malan‟s 1976 
appointment. Biermann‟s term was however to coincide with several important political 
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developments, all of which impacted significantly upon the SADF. Most of these 
occurrences were much more serious than what was experienced during the 1960s; 
including the Portuguese military withdrawal from their African colonies during 1974 
and the emergence of these newly independent states; the SADF‟s intervention in the 
Angolan conflict of 1975 and the Soweto Uprising of 1976 which irrevocably changed 
the South African political landscape.  
 
By the end of the 1960s, with enforced compulsory conscription, the government and 
SADF had completed significant propagandising groundwork that would be built upon 
further as hostility and threats increased to the white South African state and its racial 
policies. By the mid-1970s, militarization in the form of further increased conscription 
durations and the CF operational three month “camps” were well-established features of 
white South African society. Because the SADF had encountered in Angola clear 
limitations to its conventional war capacity,
1005
 it thereafter entered a new phase of 
command restructuring and equipment acquisition, utilising more of the local arms 
industry that had its origins in the 1960s.  
 
This work has attempted to show how the 1960s SADF substantially shifted its counter-
threat preparedness, compared to its doldrums and internal conflict during the 1950s, 
halting the military‟s apparent directionless and apathetic operational purpose, readiness 
and capacity. It has contended that the period 1960-1968 was little researched; this 
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despite it being when the SADF connection with the white community changed so 
significantly. This thesis has also attempted to investigate broader political and social 
backgrounds amongst the South African white community and provide more historical 
substance to the chosen components; particularly those detailing SADF appraisals of 
1960s military threats and their impact upon the mobilization of white South Africa 
towards militarization. Having worked through just some of the extensive documentation 
on the period available in the South African National Defence Force Archives, this author 
would suggest that more exhaustive archival-based studies into the SADF and its 
operations during the 1970s still needs to be undertaken; particularly regarding the 
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The White Tribe of Africa (Footage on 1966 5
th
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English-speaking South African war veterans demonstrating against the Republic in 
Durban in 1960. From Die Huisgenoot, 17 February 1961, p. 7.    
 
Defence Minister Jim Fouché and Commandant General S.A. Melville in 1960. 














Commando May 1960 edition cover page: Three SAAF Dakota aircraft with 





The SA Army in 1960 – 1
st
 Mobile Watch in Cape Town during the March 1960 
State of Emergency; note World War Two battledress and helmets. (From 













The saluting podium for the SADF march past during the official Republic 
ceremony in May 1961. H.F. Verwoerd flanked by his military and police officers. 
SADF officers from left: Deputy Commandant General Rudolf Hiemstra, Combat 
General Nic Bierman (Inspector General), Combat General Sybrand Engelbrecht 
(Army Chief of Staff), Combat General Ben Viljoen (Air Force Chief of Staff), 
Commandant General Piet Grobbelaar, Rear Admiral Hugo Biermann (Navy Chief 
of Staff) is obscured in picture. (Combat General was equivalent to Major General; 














The Indian navy aircraft carrier Vikrant. Photo taken from Jane‟s Fighting Ships 
1962-63; the SADF threat appraisers during the early 1960s were concerned this 
vessel might spear-head a United Nations or Afro-Asian amphibious military assault 






The concrete emplacements upon which the six-inch coastal defence artillery 
(Namib battery) was mounted in 1962 by the SA Navy, as clandestine efforts to 
fortify Walvis Bay against perceived UN military threats. The signs upon the 
emplacements indicate that a hotel was soon to be built upon the site. Photograph 













Africa – As seen by Die Huisgenoot 11 October 1963, p.5; map showing “black 
Africa”facing white South Africa and her “buffer states”. 
 
 





Grobbelaar – first 
caption of the topics 
on the cover reads: 
“Our Defence Force 













An article from Die Vaderland 22 October 1964, illustrating the Cold War articles 
and style so prevalent during the period in the South African press. This headline 
reads: “Africa today is Red China and Russia‟s Chessboard.” 
 
 
Die Vaderland (4 October 1964 edition) as it recorded the arrival of the navy‟s third 
new President-class (Type-12) frigate in Cape Town. The caption reads “Another 
fist for the SA Navy”. Note also photos of SAAF fly pasts and white South African 












White South African senior military officialdom and politicians at opening of the 
new Pietersberg air force base in 1964. In the front row: Deputy Comdt Gen.  
Hiemstra; former UDF Chief of Staff Gen Sir Pierre Van Ryneveld; Minister Jim 
Fouché; State President Swart; Comdt Gen Grobbelaar, Lt Gen George Brink, 
former Comdt Gen S. A. Melville. The backrow is an assortment of current and 
former SADF commanders, some of the latter were bluntly marginalised in the 
1950s. On extreme right, Combat Gen P. Jacobs (Army); 3
rd
 from right, Combat 
Gen N. Bierman (DPO Chief); 5th from right, Combat Gen B. Viljoen (SAAF). 2
nd
 
from left is Sir Francis de Guingand, on his right, former Cmdt Gen H. Klopper, 
then Brig J. Durrant. (From Commando, May, 1964,  p.15.)    
 
 
The Devon radar scanner – part of the air defence network established in the early 
1960s that took much of the decade to be made operational for the SAAF new 
Mirage interceptors. From Cockbain, T., Sweeping Circles in the Sky- Tom 
Ccckbain His personal story and experiences in the development of South Africa‟s 
post-war Radar System, Africa Aviation Series, No. 14, Freeworld Publication, 













 From Die Huisgenoot 20 May 1966: A carefully setup photo at Waterkloof 
Air Force Base outside Pretoria displaying part of the SA Air Force arsenal: 
Mirage 111s, Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft (dark blue); Canberra light 













From Commando, April 1965, p.21. Commandant General Piet Grobbelaar a few 
months before his retirement; on his left, Deputy Commandant General Rudolf 
Hiemstra and right, Major General Ben Viljoen Air Force Chief of Staff.   
 
 













Commando magazine cover, July 1966 edition, showing part of the huge SADF 
parade during festivities on 31 May 1966 celebrating the 5
th
 Republic anniversary; 
during the early 1960s years of international isolation and economic prosperity for 













From Commando, June 1967, p. 46, Defence Minister P.W. Botha with some of his 
most senior SADF commanders: Botha in dark suit, from his left, Brig Bill Barends, 
SAAF Chief, Lt Gen H.J. Martin, Maj Gen Nic Bierman, Joint Combat Forces 
Commander, Maj Gen C.A. “Pops” Fraser. On Botha‟s right is Commandant 
General R.C. Hiemstra.  
 
Acknowledgement from the BP oil company of the SA Navy‟s 21
st
 anniversary: “BP 













Lt Gen Charles Fraser after receiving the Star of South Africa decoration in late 
1969 for his work on revolutionary warfare and counter-insurgency.  From left: 
State President Jim Fouchê, Defence Minister, P.W. Botha, Lt Gen C.A. Fraser, 
Commandant General R. C. Hiemstra. From Commando, December 1969, p.39.  
 
   
 
From Commando, July 1968. Commandant General R. C. Hiemstra after a flip in a 
Mirage with SAAF Maj Ken Smith. Hiemstra‟s accession to the Commandant 
General position was a foregone conclusion throughout the 1960s.   
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